Chairman Rand Paul Releases Final Report Detailing Secret Service Failures in Attempted Assassination of President Donald J. Trump 

Report Reveals Inexcusable Negligence, Communication Breakdowns, Systemic Weaknesses, and Limited Accountability

Today, U.S. Senator Rand Paul (R-KY), Chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, released his final report detailing failures by the United States Secret Service (USSS) that allowed the July 13, 2024, attempted assassination of then-former President Donald J. Trump during a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, to nearly succeed. The report exposes a disturbing pattern of denials, mismanagement, and missed warning signs—some occurring just minutes before shots were fired.

On July 13, 2024, a gunman climbed onto the roof of the American Glass Research building near the Butler Farm Show rally and opened fire, striking four individuals, including President Trump, and killing firefighter Corey Comperatore. The shooter had been reported to Secret Service as suspicious and with a rangefinder at least 25 minutes earlier. Following the attack, the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (the Committee) and the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) launched a joint-bipartisan investigation. Over the past year, the Committee has conducted 17 transcribed interviews with USSS personnel and reviewed over 75,000 pages of documents produced from federal, state, and local law enforcement entities. A preliminary report was issued in September 2024. This final report issued by the Chairman builds on those findings and includes new evidence.

“What happened in Butler, Pennsylvania, was not just a tragedy—it was a scandal. The United States Secret Service failed to act on credible intelligence, failed to coordinate with local law enforcement, and failed to prevent an attack that nearly took the life of a then-former president,” said Chairman Paul. “Despite those failures, no one has been fired. And we only know what little discipline was handed out because I issued a subpoena. That’s unacceptable. This was not a single lapse in judgment. It was a complete breakdown of security at every level—fueled by bureaucratic indifference, a lack of clear protocols, and a shocking refusal to act on direct threats. We must hold individuals accountable and ensure reforms are fully implemented so this never happens again.”

 Based on the evidence gathered, the Committee found the following:

1. USSS denied multiple requests for additional staff, assets, and resources to protect President Trump during the campaign.
2. USSS did not fire a single person involved in the planning and execution of the Butler rally. USSS formally disciplined only six personnel, some of whom received their disciplinary decision as recently as July 2025. In two instances, the final disciplinary decision was a reduced punishment from what was originally recommended.
3. Former Director Kimberly Cheatle falsely testified to Congress that no USSS asset requests were denied for the Butler rally.
4. Despite USSS leadership receiving an intelligence briefing regarding the protectee and authorizing counter snipers at all of President Trump’s outdoor rallies a day prior, counter snipers were not present at the July 9, Doral campaign rally.
5. There were ill-defined responsibilities for USSS agents serving in advance roles.
6. USSS agents failed to communicate crucial information regarding the suspicious individual to President Trump’s shift detail, which had the ability to prevent him from taking the stage.
7. Pertinent threat intelligence related to the protectee was not shared with USSS agents in charge of security at the Butler, Pennsylvania, rally.
8. There was a severe lack of coordination and communication between USSS and state and local law enforcement from the advance process through the event.

In the interest of transparency, the Committee is releasing a number of subpoenaed records and additional transcripts in the addendum. The addendum also includes a summary of changes USSS made to its policies and procedures as a result of the events of July 13 and the Committee’s interim report.

FINAL REPORT: [HERE]

COMMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF USSS POLICY CHANGES: [HERE]

USSS RECORDS: 

1. USSS DISCIPLINARY CHART: [HERE]
2. USSS SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS : [HERE]
3. PITTSBURGH FIELD OFFICE SAIC DISCIPLINARY DOCUMENTS: [HERE]
4. PITTSBURGH FIELD OFFICE ATSAIC DISCIPLINARY DOCUMENTS: [HERE]
5. COUNTER-SNIPER TEAM LEAD DISCIPLINARY DOCUMENTS: [HERE]
6. LEAD ADVANCE AGENT DISCIPLINARY DOCUMENTS: [HERE]
7. SITE COUNTERPART DISCIPLINARY DOCUMENTS: [HERE]
8. SITE AGENT DISCIPLINARY DOCUMENTS: [HERE]

INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS: These transcribed interviews were conducted during the 118^th Congress. References to offices reflect the leadership structure of the Committee in the 118^th Congress, and not the current leadership structure of the Committee. References to HSGAC Minority refer to now Chairman Paul’s staff. References to HSGAC majority refer to now Ranking Member Peters’ staff. References to PSI Minority refer to now Chairman Johnson’s staff. References to PSI Majority refer to now Ranking Member Blumenthal’s staff. 

1. DTD 2^ND SUPERVISOR: [HERE]
2. PI RESPONSE AGENT: [HERE]
3. HERCULES 1 CS: [HERE]
4. CS RESPONSE AGENT:[HERE]
5. USSS SECURITY ROOM AGENT: [HERE]

###