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DATE: April 4, 2025

REPLY TO: Deputy Chief Integrity Officer
ATTN OF:

SUBJECT: Proposed Suspension

TO: Senior Special Agent [REDACTED] Lead Agent
Pittsburg Field Office

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
memorandum

U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

This is to inform you that I propose that you be suspended from duty without pay for twenty-one (21) calendar days. This suspension, if effected, will take place no sooner than thirty (30) calendar days from the date you receive this notice. The reasons for this proposed action are outlined below.

1. Background

On July 13, 2024, Thomas Crooks attempted to assassinate then Former President of the United States (FPOTUS) Donald J. Trump at a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. During the attack, one person was killed, and three were injured, including FPOTUS Trump. In response to the incident, an investigation was conducted by the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, as well as by the House Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump.

From July 3–13, 2024, you were the Lead Advance Agent assigned to the Butler Farm Show site from the Pittsburgh Field Office. Other members of the Advance Team included, Senior Special Agent [REDACTED] Site Counterpart as the Site Counterpart Agent assigned from the Pittsburgh Field Office, and SA [REDACTED] Site Agent as the Site Agent assigned from the Donald Trump Protection Detail. In your role as a Lead Advance Agent, you were expected to, among other things, implement security arrangements, serve as a conduit between the field office and the detail, coordinate the advance team, and maintain communication with the protectee's staff and our local law enforcement partners.

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2. Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8

Specification 1 – Failure to Mitigate Line-of-Sight Issues

On July 13, 2024, Crooks utilized the roof of the AGR building in his attempted assassination of FPOTUS Trump. Crooks was able to position himself on the roof of the building and to take several shots before a Secret Service counter sniper stopped him. You were aware of the line-of sight concerns that the AGR building presented. However, you did not engage in the coordination necessary to ensure that the concerns were mitigated.

On October 18, 2024, you were interviewed by the House Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump. In your interview with the House Task Force, you stated that, as the Lead Advance Agent, you were responsible for coordinating and putting the plans in place for the visit. You explained that you were, “supposed to know everything that’s going on so that I can help make a coordinated effort and a coordinated decision in order to make it a successful trip.”

However, you also implied to the House Task Force that you did not have awareness of the security plans for the AGR building:

- When asked if you communicated with the Secret Service Counter Sniper (CS) Advance about where the local snipers would be located, you told the Task Force that you “didn’t question as to exactly what his placement [of the local sniper team] was. There [were] a lot of vulnerabilities, a lot of buildings, a lot of people . . .” Instead, all you asked the CS Advance was if he “had a plan,” and if he was “comfortable with his plan.”
- You also informed the Task Force that you did not speak to any local law enforcement regarding the plans for the AGR building, stating that you “did not talk to anyone about the building specifically.”

Likewise, in your interview with the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs on August 26, 2024, you repeatedly eschewed responsibility for any security vulnerabilities, citing your lack of knowledge of the details of the security plans or issues with the security build.

- When asked if you were aware that the three local snipers were inside the AGR building without a visual of the AGR building’s roof, you

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responded that you “did not know any of that. All [you] knew was that we were supposed to have police assets in the area of the AGR building.”

- When asked if all equipment to mitigate line-of-sight was properly in place, or if there were security concerns leading up to the event, you stated that, on July 12, 2024, and July 13, 2024, “the site agents were at the site, walking around . . . to make sure that . . . whatever holes needed to be filled, were filled,” and that you “did not receive information . . . that [the site] wasn’t built properly and things were not filled and mitigated.” You maintained that “because those issues weren’t raised to [you], [your] understanding was that whatever mitigation needed to happen, had happened.”

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-03, Protective Advance – Overview, states the following:

The mission of the Secret Service advance team . . . is to plan and execute security arrangements for the protectee. A successful advance requires effective coordination and cooperation with the protectee’s staff, as well as with other federal, state, and local agencies. The goal of the Secret Service advance is to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities and to reduce the risk of harm to protectees.

OPO-03 also states that the Lead Advance Agent’s responsibilities include:

- [P]lan[ing] and implement[ing] the security arrangements;
- Serve[ing] as a conduit between the protective division/detail and the field office; [and]
- Coordinate[ing] the activities of advance team members[.]

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-04, Protective Advance – Guidelines, states that the Lead Advance Agent must:

- Discuss the itinerary and walk through the site(s) with the protectee’s staff advance . . . [and] attend all walk-throughs and countdown meetings.
- Conduct police meeting(s) and ensure assignments of counterparts.

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- Coordinate all physical security needs such as:
 - Ropes and stanchions;
 - Barricades, sawhorses, barrels;
 - Pipe and drapes;
 - Tents/awnings; and
 - Lighting.
- Determine police and Secret Service staffing needs for the site(s)
- Brief all post-standers and support entities on responsibilities, scheduled site movements, site identification, press movements, intelligence information, homicide bomber policy, and emergency evacuation procedures (medical, fire, tactical); be cognizant that post-standers and support entities have different experience levels.
- Ensure all protective equipment is properly positioned, complete, and in proper working condition.

The Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) Offense Code 1.8, "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," states it is a disciplinable offense to:

[n]egligently perform[] your official duties. . . . Examples of negligent performance include, but are not limited to, . . . inattention to duty

Under Agency policy, you had the responsibility to take part in planning *and implementing* security arrangements. You were also to coordinate the activities of advance team members, to include the site agents and the CS Advance. However, you admitted to a lack of knowledge regarding the security plans around the AGR building. You implied that, if an issue was not brought to your attention, it was not your responsibility. However, to plan and implement security arrangements, you needed to have knowledge of the security plans, including those of local law enforcement and the CS Advance. Thus, you failed to effectively implement security arrangements and coordinate the activities of advance team members.

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Specification 2 – Failure to Mitigate Communication Issues

On July 13, 2024, local law enforcement discovered that Crooks was on the roof of the AGR building before the Secret Service became aware. The lack of direct communication between local law enforcement and Secret Service—due to the lack of local presence in the security room and the lack of Secret Service presence in the local command post—led to a time lag between the discovery of Crooks position and the Secret Service response.

During your August 26, 2024, interview with the Senate, you stated that, on July 8, 2024, during the first meeting with all of the entities supporting the visit, you invited a member from each law enforcement agency to be in the Secret Service security room. However, this is where your involvement in ensuring the appropriate staffing of the security room ended. You did not do anything further to ensure that local law enforcement entities staffed the security room. Additionally, on July 13, 2024, you did not enter the security room to determine if there were representatives from our local law enforcement partners in the security room, and, as you told the House Task Force, you were “not aware of who was in there besides Secret Service personnel.”

Likewise, you did not ensure that any Secret Service personnel were in the mobile command post staffed by local law enforcement.

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-08, Communications, states the following:

The Lead Advance Agent, Site Agent, and responsible field office SAIC will collaborate to determine requisite security room staffing by state and local partners. Staffing determinations will be designed to facilitate communications between all partner agencies/entities to the greatest extent possible. Staff representatives from partner agencies/entities should be at the supervisory or otherwise most senior level available.

...

For any protective visit or site where state and/or local law enforcement partners have established a complementary command post or coordination center, the Secret Service will staff that complementary command post/coordination center

The Secret Service TOP Offense Code 1.8, “Negligence in Performance of Official

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Duties,” states it is a disciplinable offense to:

[n]egligently perform[] your official duties. . . . Examples of negligent performance include, but are not limited to, . . . inattention to duty

You held at least partial responsibility for ensuring that representatives from our local law enforcement partners were in the Secret Service security room and that Secret Service personnel were present at the local command post. You failed to fulfill this responsibility.

3. I find that there is a nexus between your conduct described in paragraph two (2) of this notice and the efficiency of the service. There is a clear and direct relationship between the grounds for the charge and your ability to accomplish your duties in a satisfactory manner. Your actions adversely affected the agency’s trust and confidence in your job performance and the Secret Service’s mission.
4. In proposing this action, I have considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) as guidance.

The TOP states that the Proposing Official should also consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factor(s) exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factor(s) exist will yield a lesser penalty.

With regard to the TOP, the offense of “Negligence in Performance of Official Duties,” Offense Code 1.8, provides for a standard penalty of a five-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a three-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a seven-day to a twenty-one-day suspension. The aggravating factor for Offense Code 1.8 of “disruption to the mission” appears to apply in this situation. It does not appear that any of the mitigating factors listed under the TOP Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 1.8 apply.

With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offenses and their relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities and the clarity with which you were on notice of the rules you violated in committing this offense. As a law enforcement officer, you are held to a higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees. With regard to the line of sight, you were well aware of the concerns of the AGR building, and yet you failed to ensure that the concern was mitigated. You claimed that you were not aware that the three local snipers were inside the AGR building. Additionally, you admitted that there were a lot of line-of-

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sight vulnerabilities and yet you were not aware of the specifics of the CS Advance's plan. You had an affirmative duty to ensure that security plans were planned and implemented effectively. Instead, you acted in a passive manner, assuming that any issues would be brought to your attention. In regard to the failure to mitigate communication issues, I find that you did not ensure that our local law enforcement partners were physically inside the security room with the Secret Service agents. You did admit that you were aware of the local law enforcements mobile command post, however, you did not ensure that the Secret Service had a representative in the local command post. This resulted in a serious lack of communication on the day of the rally. If this were not the case, it is possible that the Secret Service would have been alerted when our local partners radioed that there was a man with a weapon on the AGR building's roof prior to the shots being fired, which may have resulted in a different outcome that day. I have taken into consideration the fact that a protectee was shot, that a civilian was killed, and that two civilians were critically wounded. I have also considered the notoriety of the offense, and its impact on the mission of the Secret Service and the negative impact to public trust in the agency.

In mitigation, I have considered your twenty-one (21) years of service and that you have no prior discipline record. I have also considered your performance record wherein your performance was rated as Outstanding for 2023, 2022, and 2021. I have also taken into account that it was not the negligence of any one employee that led to the failure to mitigate security vulnerabilities. I believe that you have the potential for rehabilitation and that a suspension will serve as an adequate sanction.

In light of the above and consistent with the Secret Service's TOP, I propose that you be suspended for twenty-one (21) calendar days. This action, if effected, will promote the efficiency of the service.

5. The documentation on which this proposal is based is attached. The documentation consists of:
 - a. Your Official Transcript from the August 26, 2024, interview with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs;
 - b. Your Official Transcript from October 18, 2024, interview with the House Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs;
 - c. The Office of Protective Operations Manual, section OPO-03;
 - d. The Office of Protective Operations Manual, section OPO-04;

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- e. The Office of Protective Operations Manual, section OPO-08; and
 - f. The Office of the Director Manual, section ITG-04, United States Secret Service Table of Penalties.
6. The deciding official in this matter is Deputy Assistant Director (DAD)/Chief Integrity Officer [PII] Office of Integrity. You have the right to reply to this notice orally and/or in writing and to submit affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of your reply. You may also be represented by an attorney or other representative at your own expense.
 7. You have fifteen (15) calendar days from the day you receive this notice to reply to DAD [PII]. Your written reply should be sent to Communications Center (ITG), Attn.: [PII], 245 Murray Drive, SW, Bldg. T-5, Washington, D.C. 20223. If you elect to reply orally, you should contact [Integrity Office] of the Office of Integrity at [Integrity Office] prior to the expiration of the fifteen-day response period. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD [PII] after expiration of the fifteen-day response period. Your oral reply will be held virtually via Microsoft Office Teams. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD [PII] after the expiration of the fifteen-day response period.
 8. If you feel that you have an emotional, personal, and/or family problem which may have contributed to, or caused, your conduct as described above, I encourage you to contact the Secret Service Employee Assistance Program. Program counselors may be reached at [LES].
 9. If the decision regarding this proposal is that you be removed, reduced in grade or pay, or suspended for more than fourteen (14) days, you will have the right to appeal that decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Specific details for filing, including filing addresses and time limitations, will be included in the final decision. For more information, you may visit www.mspb.gov. Alternatively, once you receive the decision in this matter, you may elect to waive your MSPB appeal rights and request administrative review of the decision by filing a grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB).
 10. If you believe that this proposal or any subsequent action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a

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complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov. A complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the MSPB. In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel action and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or other protected activity. Please note that if you seek corrective action from OSC prior to filing an appeal to MSPB, you will have elected corrective action and any appeal to the MSPB would be an IRA appeal and limited as such, regardless of the nature of the decision.

11. Allegations that this proposal is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be raised as an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. Please note that while EEO complaints regarding proposals will be counseled during the informal EEO process, formal EEO complaints generally must be dismissed except under certain circumstances where reprisal for prior protected EEO related activity is being alleged or the proposal itself is alleged to be part of a pattern of harassment or a hostile work environment.

However, allegations that the decision on this proposal, if the decision is that you be removed, reduced in grade or pay, or suspended for more than fourteen (14) days, is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be brought either in an appeal to the MSPB or an EEO complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System, but not in both forums. Otherwise, the allegation regarding the decision can be brought as an EEO complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System.

12. If you wish the deciding official to consider any medical condition(s), which you believe may have contributed to your conduct as described above, please submit to DAD [PII] medical documentation (i.e., a copy of a dated, written, and signed statement, and/or a dated copy of actual medical office or hospital records, from a licensed physician or other health practitioner) which provides, in detail, the following information:
 - a. Diagnosis, including the current clinical status;
 - b. The history of the medical condition(s), including references to findings from previous examinations, treatment, and responses to treatment;

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- c. Prognosis, including an estimate of the expected date of full or partial recovery; and
- d. An explanation of the impact of the medical condition(s) on overall health and activities, including the basis for any conclusion as to whether restrictions or accommodations are necessary.

The medical documentation must be provided to DAD PII within the fifteen-calendar day reply time limited described above whenever possible. The documentation, if timely submitted, will be considered in reaching a decision on the proposed action along with any written and/or oral reply to the notice of proposal which you may make.

- 13. No decision to effect this proposed action has been made or will be made until the time allowed for your reply. If you submit a reply, it will be given full and impartial consideration before a final decision is made.
- 14. If you have questions concerning this proposed action, please contact Integrity Office Office of Integrity, at Integrity Office .

PII

Digitally signed by
PII
Date: 2025.04.04
12:58:58 -04'00'

PII

Lead Agent

Receipt Acknowledgment

Date

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USSS - Standard Sensitive Info
DATE: July 1, 2025

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
memorandum

U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

REPLY TO:
ATTN OF: Deputy Assistant Director/Chief Integrity Officer

SUBJECT: Suspension Decision

TO: Senior Special Agent **Lead Agent**
Pittsburg Field Office

1. This is in reference to Deputy Chief Integrity Officer **PII** notice to you dated April 4, 2025, which informed you that he proposed that you be suspended from duty for twenty-one (21) calendar days under the charge of Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8.
2. I find that the charge of Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8, is fully supported by the evidence. I have considered the written reply submitted by your representative, **PII** dated May 12, 2025. I also considered your May 19, 2025, oral reply, at which you were represented by **Counsel** and **Counsel**. A copy of the transcript from the oral reply was sent to **Counsel** and **Counsel** on June 2, 2025. I further considered the Douglas Factors analysis submitted by Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge (ATSAIC) **PII**, a copy was provided to you on April 29, 2025.

In your replies, you explained that you were the Lead Advance Agent and part of the advance team that was responsible for planning the security and logistics for the Butler rally. You explained that each team member served a unique role with a focus on their particular expertise. You stated as the Lead Advance Agent you coordinated the functions of the advance team members and ensured that the team had the resources needed to complete their responsibilities. You stated that you led the initial police meeting, introduced the Service advance team members to the local law enforcement counterparts, completed site walkthroughs, submitted the documentation for manpower and documented the security plan, and coordinated travel logistics.

You explained that you were also the Transportation Advance Agent for the visit, which

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required you to plan for then former President of the United States (POTUS) Donald J. Trump's arrival and departure from the airport. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and manage vehicle logistics. You added that you also coordinated with the now former First Lady's detail on security planning as the First Lady was also scheduled to visit Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, that same day.

You explained that you should not have been expected to micromanage every decision made by members of the advance team that were responsible for performing their duties in their areas of expertise. You stated that in your role you were to assist the advance team members to resolve problems that arose. You added that you secured a local counter sniper team after you received a request from the second supervisor on the Donald Trump Detail (DTD).

You stated that you were aware of line-of-sight concerns and that you participated in discussions all week to mitigate the concerns. You explained that, by July 12th, that the Site Agents, DTD campaign staff, and local law enforcement, had a plan to mitigate line-of-sight concerns. You explained that the plan included bleachers, large screens, and farm equipment that would all be in place to obstruct the line-of-sight from the AGR building to the stage. You further said that the AGR building would be closed, local law enforcement would have posts around the AGR, and Secret Service counter snipers (CS) would cover the AGR's roofline.

You explained that no one informed you that the bleachers were not angled properly or that the screens were smaller than you were originally told. Nor had anyone told you that local law enforcement did not secure the AGR building as you had previously been informed. You also said that you were not aware that the local snipers and Secret Service CS, did not have a clear view of the AGR roof. You explained that the Site Agents, who were to oversee the buildout of the line-of-sight mitigations, did not ensure that the mitigation plans were fully implemented as you had been informed they would be.

You explained that you did fulfill your responsibilities as the Lead Advance Agent as you were informed that the AGR building would be closed, secured, and posted with law enforcement officers. You added that it was the Site Agent's responsibility to coordinate with local law enforcement as to the exact position of the post standers. You stated that you were not informed by local law enforcement partners or the Site Agents of any concerns regarding securing the AGR building. You stated that you could not "solve problems" that you were not made aware of.

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In regard to you being charged with failing to mitigate communication issues, you stated that the cited policy, OPO-08, did not go into effect until September 11, 2024. You pointed out that the CNOS-03 policy, which was in effect, stated that the Site Agent was responsible for the setup and staffing of the Security Room. You added that based on the policies in place on July 13th, you fulfilled your responsibilities. You also said that at the July 8th meeting, you invited all law enforcement entities into the Security Room, although it was not required as stated in the manual section at that time. Additionally, you stated that in both your roles, as Lead Advance Agent and Transportation Advance Agent, you would not have been physically able to enter the Security Room to determine if all law enforcement partners were represented, as you were required to remain with the protectee, and that this was in fact the role of the Site Agents.

You stated that you are wrongfully being held to a standard of duty that was not in effect on July 13th and that was later incorporated into Secret Service policy. You requested that the proposed discipline be reconsidered.

The evidence shows that Thomas Matthew Crooks circumnavigated site security at then former President of the United States (POTUS) Donald J. Trump's campaign rally in Butler, PA, on July 13, 2024, and attempted to assassinate POTUS Trump. The attempted assassination resulted in the death of Corey Comperatore, and David Dutch, James Copenhagen, and POTUS Trump were injured. You were the Lead Advance Agent on the advance for the rally and ultimately responsible for, among other things, planning and implementing security arrangements and coordinating the activities of the advance team members. Despite your argument to the contrary, this meant that you had a responsibility to ensure that the advance team actually implemented the mitigation measures that they had planned to place, including those developed to mitigate the threat posed by the AGR building. You failed to ensure this was the case. Thus, I find that the evidence sufficiently shows that you negligently performed your duties as the Lead Advance Agent.

I further find that there was a nexus between your actions referenced in the proposed suspension and the efficiency of the service. There is a clear and direct relationship between the grounds for the charge and your ability to accomplish your law enforcement duties in a satisfactory manner. These circumstances were egregious, and the misconduct interfered with and adversely affected the mission of the Secret Service.

3. In reaching my decision, I have considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) as guidance.

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The TOP provides that the Deciding Official will consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factors exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factors exist will yield a lower penalty.

The offense of "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," Offense Code 1.8, provides for a standard penalty of a five-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a three-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a seven-day to a twenty-one-day suspension. The aggravating factor for Offense Code 1.8 of "disruption to the mission" is applicable in this situation. The mitigating factors listed under the TOP Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 1.8 do not apply in this situation.

With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities, and the clarity with which you were on notice of any rules that were violated in committing the offense. The attempted assassination of POTUS Trump by Thomas Crooks at the Rally in Butler, PA, resulted in the death of Corey Comperatore and in injuries to David Dutch, James Copenhagen, and POTUS Trump. This incident received world-wide media attention which negatively affected this agency's reputation and eroded confidence in our ability to execute our core mission.

I have further considered that, as a law enforcement officer, you are held to a higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees. I have also considered your twenty-one (21) years of service with this agency, including the approximately six (6) years that you were assigned to the Vice Presidential Protective Division (VPD). While on VPD you conducted multiple site advances, you were assigned to the Second Lady's Detail, and you were assigned to the Operations Section. I have further considered that you attended Lead School and conducted multiple lead advances and you were eventually selected to be a "whip" on an operational shift. In other words, I have factored in that, at the time of this incident, you were arguably the most senior and experienced special agent on the advance team.

In the Secret Service, the GS-13, special agents, who are given the title and responsibility of "lead" and/or "whips" hold great authority, respect, and influence amongst their peers. These positions are bestowed upon deserving individuals because of their experience and leadership potential. In the absence of a formal supervisor or manager, leads and whips are expected to fill that void. With regards to the events of July 13th, your responsibility was defined in the very title of the position which you held; an individual in a leadership role responsible for guiding their advance team to mission success.

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I will also add that you are expected to mentor, set priorities and standards, as well as oversee the quality of work of your advance team. However, you appeared to have downplayed your role during your testimony to the Senate, the House, in your written reply, and during your oral reply. For instance, during your testimony with the Senate, you claimed that the Lead Advance Agent is more a coordinating role, stating, "I coordinate and submit." You further stated "I don't approve anything. I clearly just take the information that they have recommended and put together with the other information from the other advance entities, and those are all submitted to the field office and then submitted to the Trump detail, the candidate nominations operations, and then they go further to headquarters." I find that this statement is misleading and an abdication of your role and responsibilities.

Throughout your testimony given to the various institutions you clearly state that the line of sight remained a major concern throughout the advance. For instance, during your interview with the Senate you listed multiple line-of-sight concerns, to include the AGR building complex, buildings within the perimeter, residential areas that "butted up" to the Farm Show Site, and airplane hangars on the attached airport. Yet, when asked about the police posts around the AGR building you repeatedly stated you did not know any of the those details, or "I was not a part of that conversation."

You appear to have expressed concerns with the positioning of the local snipers located inside of the AGR Building, looking out of a window. However, never did you raise your concerns with the subject matter experts. When asked about the CS advance you stated, "I deferred to the counter-sniper as to his expertise and where he wanted those assets placed." I agree that during an advance the opinion and advise of subject matter experts must be given serious consideration. However, as the Lead Advance Agent, you must have a basic understanding of their plan and methods of operation to adequately incorporate said plan into your Emergency Action (EA) blueprint and provide clear explanations to supervisors.

Furthermore, I see no evidence that these issues were adequately addressed, nor where the line-of-sight concerns raised to PIT supervisors after the initial manpower walk-through or prior to the second supervisor walk-through. I see no efforts made by you to have mechanisms in place, such as countdown meetings, to ensure that the concerns of the advance team were addressed, or to make you aware of everyone's individual progress.

Protective advances are a team sport, rather than an individual effort. We often brief post standers, "if you see a hole, then fill it," or to bring their concerns immediately to the site agent. There were ongoing concerns, and it is my opinion that you failed to address them appropriately. You were responsible for devising a robust security plan to ensure the

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safety of our protectee. It is my opinion that your actions failed to meet this basic mandate.

In making my decision, and in mitigation, I have considered your dual role, as the Lead Advance Agent, as well as the Transportation Advance Agent. Both assignments are demanding and time consuming. As the Transportation Advance Agent you were required to not only LES

LES I recognize there is a general practice to allow advance team members to handle multiple assignments for certain protectees. It is my opinion that this practice may be suitable and practical for low-level protectees with little to no adverse intelligence; however, I believe your leadership should have taken into account POTUS Trump's popularity, political standing, and the knowledge that the Republican National Convention was to begin only two days after the July 13th rally before assigning you the roles of Lead and Transportation Advance Agent.

I have also taken into consideration that the Office of Protective Operations Manual, section OPO-08, dated September 11, 2024, was used as part of the documents relied upon in the proposal.

In further mitigation, I have considered your twenty-one years of service with this agency, with no prior disciplinary actions. I have also considered your performance ratings of Outstanding for the 2023, 2022, and 2021, rating cycles. I have also considered the Douglas Factors analysis provided by ATSAIC PII ATSAIC PII said that you have held many positions within the Secret Service that require trust and confidence and that your performance is exemplary. ATSAIC PII also stated that leadership has confidence in your ability to continue to perform at a high level.

Finally, I have taken into consideration that it was not the negligence of just one employee that led to this unwanted outcome. I have also taken into consideration that your chain of command, in my opinion, abdicated their responsibility and authorities during the advance. I have strongly considered your quick reaction responding to the dais after hearing the first shots fired, with no consideration to your own peril, and the exemplary manner in which you performed your duties thereafter.

In balancing the above factors against the nature and seriousness of the offense, I find it appropriate to mitigate the proposed twenty-one (21) calendar day suspension to a fourteen (14) day suspension. Therefore, you will be suspended from duty without pay for fourteen (14) calendar days on dates to be determined by your supervisor. You are also reminded that employees are not eligible to work overtime in the pay period in which they

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are suspended in accordance with the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(04). This action promotes the efficiency of the Federal service.

3. If you feel this action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov. A complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel actions and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or other protected activity.
4. You may request administrative review of this decision by filing an administrative grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB) as specified in the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(04). You should present your grievance in writing on the attached Secret Service Administrative Grievance Form, SSF 3112. You may e-mail this grievance to the Office of Integrity at **Integrity Office**. The Office of Integrity will refer your grievance to the DRB. If you wish to file a grievance, it must be submitted to the Office of Integrity no later than fifteen (15) calendar days after the date of your receipt of this decision.
5. If you feel this action is being taken based on discrimination due to race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, genetic information, age (40 or older), parental status, or reprisal for prior protected Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) related activity, you may file a complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. To initiate an EEO complaint, you must contact EEO Case Management within forty-five (45) calendar days of the effective date of this action. EEO Case Management may be contacted by calling **PII** or emailing **PII**@uss.s.dhs.gov.

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6. If you have any questions about the contents of this notice, you may contact [redacted] Integrity Office [redacted] Office of Integrity, at [redacted] Integrity Office [redacted].

PII [redacted]

Digitally signed by PII [redacted]
Date: 2025.07.01 13:31:18 -04'00'

PII [redacted]

cc: [redacted] Counsel [redacted]

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