

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
memorandum

U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

DATE: November 5, 2024

REPLY TO: Deputy Chief Integrity Officer
ATTN OF:

SUBJECT: Proposed Suspension

TO: Special Agent [REDACTED] Site Agent [REDACTED]
Donald Trump Protective Division

This is to inform you that I propose that you be suspended from duty without pay for three (3) calendar days. This suspension, if effected, will take place no sooner than thirty (30) calendar days from the date you receive this notice. The reason(s) for this proposed action are outlined below.

a. Failure to Follow Secret Service Policy, Offense Code 5.12

On August 28, 2024, [REDACTED] Reporter [REDACTED], a reporter from [REDACTED] Publication [REDACTED], contacted you via your personal cell phone regarding the July 13, 2024, attempted assassination of former President Donald Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania. During your conversation, Ms. [REDACTED] Reporter explained to you that she was gathering information regarding the events that occurred that day. Ms. [REDACTED] Reporter asked you for details regarding that incident and you notified Ms. [REDACTED] Reporter that you were not permitted to speak to her, and you provided Ms. [REDACTED] Reporter with the contact information for the Office of Communication and Media Relations (CMR). Ms. [REDACTED] Reporter stated that you had been identified as the individual responsible for the events that occurred that day and proceeded to ask you additional questions. In response, you stated to Ms. [REDACTED] Reporter that some of the information being reported in the media was inaccurate. Furthermore, when Ms. [REDACTED] Reporter continued to ask questions, specifically about the site advance procedures, you again responded to her inquiry by discussing elements of the planning and coordination process. You did not have authorization from CMR to speak to the reporter regarding this matter.

In your Official Memorandum dated September 3, 2024, you stated:

On 08/28/2024, at approximately 10:50 hours, I . . . received a phone call on my personal electronic device . . . [s]he identified herself as [REDACTED] Reporter [REDACTED] an investigative reporter who works for [REDACTED] Publication [REDACTED] . . . stat[ing] that she was attempting to gather information regarding the events on July 13, 2024 in Butler, Pennsylvania. . . . Mrs. [REDACTED] Reporter started asking questions about the events on July 13. I stated that I was not allowed to speak on the matter and that she will have to contact the USSS Communication[] and Media Relations (CMR) if needed. Mrs. [REDACTED] Reporter continued asking more questions and stated that she had been told by an unidentified individual that I was the

agent to blame for the events that unfolded that day. At that time, I stated that some of the information that has been circulating on the news and that has been reported to other media outlets lacks accuracy and actual facts. . . . Mrs. **Reporter** continued to ask more questions as to the procedures during the site advance work, to include interaction with local law enforcement counterparts, to which I responded that an essential part of the process is to plan and coordinate with local entities for site security. . . .

The Official United States Secret Service E-Mail from DSAIC **PII** labeled "Inquiries," dated July 21, 2024, states:

If any personnel receive external (outside USSS) unsolicited requests for information or interviews, please advise and consult with your Supervisor.

. . .

If any media outlets contact individuals privately, all personnel are reminded of USSS policies and communications with external entities. All media inquiries should be referred to the USSS Office of Communication[] and Media Relations. . . .

Furthermore, the Secret Service Office of Government and Public Affairs Manual, section CMR-03(01), states:

. . . Under no circumstances should any non-designated employee comment to the media on behalf of the Secret Service and/or regarding Secret Service activities without the prior approval of CMR, their AD/EC, DAD, SAIC, or Division Chief. . . .

The Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) Offense Code 5.12 states that it is a disciplinable offense to:

Fail[] to follow a...policy, procedure, practice, protocol or rule.

2. In proposing this action, I have considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) as guidance.

The TOP states that the Proposing Official should also consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factor(s) exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factors exist will yield a lesser penalty.

The offense of "Failure to Follow Instructions," Offense Code 5.12, provides for a standard penalty of a three-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a one-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a five-day to a seven-day suspension. It does not appear that any of the mitigating factors under the Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 5.12 apply to this situation. The applicable aggravating factor of "willful" appears to apply in this situation.

With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offenses and their relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities and the clarity with which you were on notice of the rules you violated in committing this offense. As a law enforcement officer, you are held to a higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees. You participated in an unauthorized conversation with Ms. **Reporter** regarding the July 13, 2024, attempted assassination of a protectee. You should be well aware that speaking to a member of the national media without authorization is in violation of Secret Service policy. Additionally, this conversation involved a matter that was still under active investigation. Furthermore, you admitted that you spoke to Ms. **Reporter** even after she informed you that she was inquiring about the events that occurred on July 13, 2024. Your actions violated Secret Service policy and cannot be condoned.

In mitigation, I have considered your five (5) years of service and that you have no prior discipline record. I have also considered your performance record wherein your performance was rated as Outstanding for the 2023 rating period. I believe that you have the potential for rehabilitation and that a suspension will serve as an adequate sanction.

In light of the above and consistent with the Secret Service's TOP, I propose that you be suspended for three (3) calendar days. This action, if effected, will promote the efficiency of the service.

3. The documentation on which this proposal is based is attached. The documentation consists of:
 - a. Your Official Memorandum to SAIC **PII**, dated September 3, 2024;
 - b. E-Mail from DSAIC **PII**, Subject: Inquiries, dated July 21, 2024;
 - c. Cited portions of the Office of Government and Public Affairs Manual, section CMR03(01); and
 - d. The Office of the Director Manual, section ITG-04, United States Secret Service Table of Penalties.

4. The deciding official in this matter is Deputy Assistant Director (DAD)/Chief Integrity Officer [PII] Office of Integrity. You have the right to reply to this notice orally and/or in writing and to submit affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of your reply. You may also be represented by an attorney or other representative at your own expense.
5. You have fifteen calendar days from the day you receive this notice to reply to DAD [PII]. Your written reply should be sent to Communications Center (ITG), Attn.: [PII]. If you elect to reply orally, you should contact [PII] Integrity Office of the Office of Integrity at [PII] prior to the expiration of the fifteen-day response period. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD [PII] after expiration of the fifteen-day response period. Unless otherwise specified, your oral reply will be held virtually via Microsoft Office Teams. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD [PII] after the expiration of the fifteen-day response period.
6. If the decision regarding this proposal is that you be suspended for fourteen (14) days or less, or issued a letter of reprimand, you will have the right to request administrative review of the action by filing a grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB). Specific details for filing a grievance will be included in the final decision.
7. If you believe that this proposal or any subsequent action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov. A complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel action and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or other protected activity.
8. Allegations that this proposal is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be raised as an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. Please note that while EEO complaints regarding proposals will be counseled during the informal EEO process, formal EEO complaints generally must be dismissed except under certain circumstances where reprisal for prior protected EEO related activity is being alleged or the proposal itself is alleged to be part of a pattern of harassment or a hostile work environment.

Allegations that the decision on this proposal is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be brought in an EEO complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System.

9. If you feel that you have an emotional, personal, and/or family problem which may have contributed to, or caused, your conduct as described above, I encourage you to contact the Secret Service Employee Assistance Program. Program counselors may be reached at

PII

10. If you wish the deciding official to consider any medical condition(s), which you believe may have contributed to your conduct as described above, please submit to DAD PII medical documentation (i.e., a copy of a dated, written, and signed statement, and/or a dated copy of actual medical office or hospital records, from a licensed physician or other health practitioner) which provides, in detail, the following information:

- a. Diagnosis, including the current clinical status;
- b. The history of the medical condition(s), including references to findings from previous examinations, treatment and responses to treatment;
- c. Prognosis, including an estimate of the expected date of full or partial recovery; and
- d. An explanation of the impact of the medical condition(s) on overall health and activities, including the basis for any conclusion as to whether restrictions or accommodations are necessary.

The medical documentation must be provided to DAD PII within the fifteen calendar day reply time limited described above whenever possible. The documentation, if timely submitted, will be considered in reaching a decision on the proposed action along with any written and/or oral reply to the notice of proposal which you may make.

11. No decision to effect this proposed action has been made or will be made until the time allowed for your reply. If you submit a reply, it will be given full and impartial consideration before a final decision is made.

12. If you have questions concerning this proposed action, please contact Integrity Office, Office of Integrity, at PII

PII

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
memorandum
U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

DATE: April 3, 2025

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: Deputy Assistant Director/Chief Integrity Officer

SUBJECT: Suspension Decision

TO: Special Agent [REDACTED] Site Agent
Miami Field Office

1. This is in reference to Deputy Chief Integrity Officer [REDACTED] PII notice to you dated November 5, 2024, which informed you that he proposed that you be suspended from duty for three (3) calendar days based on the information cited in section one of that notice.
2. I have carefully reviewed the proposal and the documentation upon which the proposal was based. I have considered your written reply, submitted via e-mail by your representative, Counsel [REDACTED] on December 20, 2024. I have also considered your oral reply held on January 30, 2025, where you were also represented by Mr. Counsel [REDACTED]. A copy of the transcript was provided via e-mail to Mr. Counsel [REDACTED] on February 18, 2025. I find that the charge of "Failure to Follow Secret Service Policy," Offense Code 5.12, is fully supported by the evidence.

In your replies, you described your current and former work history with the Secret Service, the United States Army, and your position with the Transportation Security Administration. You stated that shortly after the July 13, 2024, incident, you began to receive numerous calls and e-mails to your personal electronic devices and to your work cell phone. You explained that you answered the call from the Publication [REDACTED] reporter, Reporter [REDACTED] because it was from a 202-area code, and you had assumed that it was a co-worker trying to reach you. You stated that you were not expecting the call, but that when Ms. Reporter [REDACTED] began to make a provocative accusation that you were to blame for the events that unfolded during the July 13th incident, you began to defend yourself.

You stated that your response was an effort to defend yourself from what you perceived as a defamatory and inaccurate attack on your character, work ethic, and performance. You also asserted that merely stating that the accusations against you were inaccurate does not contradict current Secret Service policy nor is it equivalent to commenting on behalf of the Secret Service. You stated that it was not your intent to circumvent Secret Service policy and asserted that your actions showed that you intended on adhering to established policy as you only mentioned facts that were readily available through open sources. You further stated that you immediately reported your conversation to your supervisor who instructed you to notify the Office of Communication and Media Relations (CMR).

You denied revealing any information that would be considered and disclosed on a “need to know” basis only. Given that, you stated that a suspension is not justified, and the charge should not be sustained.

You stated that you have fully cooperated in all the investigative efforts conducted by multiple entities. You apologized and took full responsibility for your actions and noted that you have learned from this incident. You stated that you have not been the subject of prior discipline and that you are proud to serve. You made assurances that in the future you will refer any reporter or media representative directly to CMR without further comment from you.

In reaching my decision, I have considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) as guidance.

The TOP provides that the Deciding Official will consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factors exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factors exist will yield a lower penalty.

The offense of “Failure to Follow Instructions,” Offense Code 5.12, provides for a standard penalty of a three-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a one-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a five-day to a seven-day suspension. It does not appear that any of the mitigating or aggravating factors under the Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 5.12 apply to this situation.

With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to your duties, position, responsibilities, and the clarity with which you were on notice of any rules that were violated in committing the offense. As a law enforcement officer, you are held to a higher standard than other Federal employees. On August 28, 2024, you were contacted directly by a member of the press inquiring about your involvement in the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt of Former President Donald J. Trump. It is my opinion that the reporter used dishonorable tactics and goaded you into providing information by making statements blaming you for the events of July 13, 2024. I recognize the information you provided was minimal. However, in your efforts to defend yourself you did provide elements of the planning and coordination process. Your actions demonstrated a disregard not only for Secret Service policy, but also for a directive given to you by your chain of command.

However, in mitigation, I have considered that you have no prior disciplinary action. I have considered the Outstanding performance rating you received for the 2023 rating cycle. I have strongly considered that you immediately reported your contact with the media to your chain of command and CMR.

In balancing the above factors against the nature and seriousness of the offense, I find it appropriate to mitigate the proposed three (3) day suspension to a one (1) calendar day suspension. Therefore, you will be suspended from duty without pay for one (1) calendar day on a date to be determined by your office. You are also reminded that employees are

not eligible to work overtime in the pay period in which they are suspended in accordance with the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(04). This action promotes the efficiency of the Federal service.

3. If you feel this action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov. A complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel actions and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or other protected activity.
4. You may request administrative review of this decision by filing an administrative grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB) as specified in the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(04). You should present your grievance in writing on the attached Secret Service Administrative Grievance Form, SSF 3112. You may e-mail this grievance to the Office of Integrity at PII. The Office of Integrity will refer your grievance to the DRB. If you wish to file a grievance, it must be submitted to the Office of Integrity no later than fifteen (15) calendar days after the date of your receipt of this decision.
5. If you feel this action is being taken based on discrimination due to race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, genetic information, age (40 or older), parental status, or reprisal for prior protected Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) related activity, you may file a complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. To initiate an EEO complaint, you must contact EEO Case Management within forty-five (45) calendar days of the effective date of this action. EEO Case Management may be contacted by calling PII or emailing ContactEEO@usss.dhs.gov.
6. If you have any questions about the contents of this notice, you may contact Integrity Office PII Office of Integrity, at PII.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
memorandum

U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

DATE: April 4, 2025

REPLY TO: Deputy Chief Integrity Officer
ATTN OF:

SUBJECT: Proposed Suspension

TO: Special Agent [REDACTED] Site Agent
Miami Field Office

This is to inform you that I propose that you be suspended from duty without pay for forty-two (42) calendar days. This suspension, if effected, will take place no sooner than thirty (30) calendar days from the date you receive this notice. The reason(s) for this proposed action are outlined below.

1. Background

On July 13, 2024, Thomas Crooks attempted to assassinate then Former President of the United States (FPOTUS) Donald J. Trump at a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. During the attack, one person was killed, and three were injured, including FPOTUS Trump. In response to the incident, the Secret Service's Office of Professional Responsibility, Inspection Division, conducted a Mission Assurance Inquiry into the factors that contributed to the assassination attempt. In addition, an investigation was conducted by the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, as well as by the House Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump.

From July 7-13, 2024, you were the Donald Trump Detail (DTD) assigned Site Agent for the Butler Farm Show site. Other members of the Advance Team included, Pittsburgh Field Office (PIT) Senior Special Agent (SSA) [REDACTED] Lead Agent as the assigned Lead Advance Agent and PIT SSA [REDACTED] Site Counterpart as the Site Counterpart Agent. In your role as a Site Agent, you were expected to create a site security plan for the event that optimized the resources at your disposal and mitigated any site vulnerabilities to ensure a secure environment for FPOTUS Trump.

2. Charge and Specifications

a. Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8

Specification 1 – Failure to Properly Secure AGR Building

On July 13, 2024, Crooks utilized the roof of the AGR building in his attempted assassination. Crooks was able to position himself on the roof of the building and to take several shots before he was stopped by a Secret Service counter sniper.

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You were aware of the security vulnerabilities posed by the AGR building, but failed to mitigate those vulnerabilities, as detailed below.

On August 13, 2024, you were interviewed by Secret Service Inspector [Inspections Office] and Assistant Inspector [Inspections Office]. During this interview you acknowledged that line-of-sight issues, specifically the AGR building, were vulnerabilities you were aware of before the Butler Rally. You stated that the line-of-sight threats for outdoor events were always a "number one concern." You further stated that you recognized the difficulty in mitigating the danger from the AGR building's roof because of its elevated position and "direct line of sight to where the former president was standing." You described a line-of-sight threat as "any point of view that could be approached by the enemy or [that] someone [could] utilize as a target to conduct an attack [at] the event." When asked who was responsible for mitigating line-of-sight threats, you admitted that "[w]e are, the Secret Service."

During your interview with the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs on August 23, 2024, you told the Committee that there was a "designated inner perimeter and an outer perimeter," and that any issue that arose concerning the outer perimeter was delegated to local law enforcement, unless local law enforcement raised a concern to the site or lead agent.

On July 11, 2024, local law enforcement did voice concerns to you regarding the AGR building. Specifically, you were told that local law enforcement did not have the resources to secure the AGR building. At that time, you were also aware that local counter snipers would not be on the roof of the AGR building and would only be inside the building. During your August 23, 2024 interview with the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, you told the Committee that you were aware, before July 13, 2024, "that local Pennsylvania State Police [would not] have the manpower to secure the building." When the Committee asked you what steps you took to secure the AGR once you were told that local law enforcement would be unable to secure it, you stated, "it was on the outer perimeter. We did not discuss or plan for having . . . any other asset other than the local counter sniper once they decided to have a local counter sniper inside the building for that day." Instead—as you admitted to the U.S. House of Representatives Task Force on The Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump during your October 30, 2024 interview—you told our local partners that there "should be enough . . . police presence . . . outside of the fence line and covering from the water tower," and that presence "should be good."

You also failed to elevate the concerns regarding the AGR building to your supervisor. On November 12, 2024, Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) [DTD 2nd Sup.] was interviewed by the House Task Force. ASAC [DTD 2nd Sup.] told the

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Task Force that, during the July 12, 2024 Butler Farm Show site walkthrough he attended with you, the AGR building was specifically discussed. ASAIC ^{DTD 2nd Sup.} was briefed that there would be a local counter sniper presence as well as a local uniformed presence to cover the AGR. In other words, you informed him that there was a plan for a uniformed presence to secure the AGR building. You stated this despite the fact that, as you admitted to the Senate Committee, you did not know how the AGR building would be covered prior the July 13, 2024 event. You also did not inform ASAIC ^{DTD 2nd Sup.} that local law enforcement had voiced specific concerns about the ability to secure the AGR building.

The Secret Service 2024 Campaign Operational Guide, CNOS-02, states the following:

CNOS Site Agents are responsible for establishing a secure environment for CNOS protectees as detailed in OPO-06, Site Security.

The Secret Service 2024 Campaign Operational Guide, CNOS-03, states the following:

The Site Agent is responsible for an in-depth physical survey/study of the site, in order to address all security concerns

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-03, Protective Advance – Overview, states the following:

The mission of the Secret Service advance team . . . is to plan and execute security arrangements for the protectee. A successful advance requires effective coordination and cooperation with the protectee's staff, as well as with other federal, state, and local agencies. The goal of the Secret Service advance is to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities and to reduce the risk of harm to protectees.

OPO-03 further states that the Site Agent:

- Plans and implements the procedures necessary to create a secure environment at their assigned site;
- Is thoroughly familiar with the physical layout of their site;
- Plans for any contingency that could arise during the visit;

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- Coordinates site security concerns with local law enforcement and support agencies, press advance personnel, members of the protectee's and host committee's staff, and venue security staff; and
- Coordinates placement of post standers and the requisite paperwork for the post stander assignments.

You failed to mitigate the security vulnerabilities posed by the AGR building. Also, despite your awareness of the line-of-sight issues posed by the building and the concerns of local law enforcement that they would be unable to secure it, you did not raise concerns up your chain of command.

Specification 2 – Communication Failures

On July 13, 2024, local law enforcement discovered that Crooks was on the roof of the AGR building before the Secret Service became aware. The lack of direct communication between local law enforcement and Secret Service—due to the lack of local presence in the Security room and the lack of Secret Service presence at the local command post—led to a time lag between the discovery of Crooks position and the Secret Service response.

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-08, Communications, states the following:

The Lead Advance Agent, Site Agent, and responsible field office SAIC will collaborate to determine requisite security room staffing by state and local partners. Staffing determinations will be designed to facilitate communications between all partner agencies/entities to the greatest extent possible. Staff representatives from partner agencies/entities should be at the supervisory or otherwise most senior level available.

...

For any protective visit or site where state and/or local law enforcement partners have established a complementary command post or coordination center, the Secret Service will staff that complementary command post/coordination center

The Secret Service 2024 Campaign Operational Guide, CNOS-03, states the following:

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When a security room has been designated, the Site Agent is responsible for coordinating its physical setup and staffing, as well as for ensuring that administrative requirements are met.

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-06, Site Security, states the following:

The Site Agent is responsible for conducting and/or ensuring that all personnel associated with the security of the site have been properly briefed.

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-08, Communications, states that security rooms must be staffed to:

facilitate communications between all partner agencies/entities to the greatest extent possible.

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-04, Protective Advance Guidelines, states the following:

Ensure survey reports, hospital routes/surveys, Site Post Assignment Logs, site diagrams, access lists, and phone numbers are available in the command post and/or security rooms.

In your July 30, 2024 interview with Inspectors [redacted] Inspections Office and [redacted] Inspections Office you discussed the role that the Secret Service Security Room and Butler County's mobile Command Post played at the Butler Farm Show site on July 13, 2024. You acknowledged that you were aware of the local Command Post at the Butler Farm Show site. You also knew that our local partners planned on using it as a communication center for the various local agencies involved in securing the site. However, you admitted to Inspectors that, instead of placing a post stander at the command post, you determined that you would communicate with the Command Post by phone.

During your interview with the House Task Force on October 30, 2024, you admitted that, even though you knew it was your responsibility, you did not set up the Security Room. Instead, and in contradiction to your admission that you were responsible for setting up the Security Room, you stated that you expected that the field office would be coordinating the Security Room set up. You further admitted that you did not draft the Security Room Book, which would have included local points of contact and other information. Finally, although you told the House Task Force that "it is always

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common sense” to have a representative from each local law enforcement agency in the Security Room, you did nothing to confirm that any of the ten people you saw in the Security Room on the day of the rally were representatives from each local law enforcement agency participating in site security that day.

The Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) Offense Code 1.8, “Negligence in Performance of Official Duties,” states it is a disciplinable offense to:

[n]egligently perform[] your official duties. . . . Examples of negligent performance include, but are not limited to, . . . inattention to duty

You failed to appropriately mitigate security concerns regarding the line-of-sight threat created by the AGR building. You knew that these concerns existed, yet you did not take action to ensure a secure environment when you were told that local law enforcement did not have the personnel to lock down the building. You further failed to ensure that communication between local law enforcement and USSS was effective, leaving Secret Service unaware and unprepared for security contingencies.

3. I find that there is a nexus between your conduct described in paragraph 2 of this notice and the efficiency of the service. There is a clear and direct relationship between the grounds for the charge and your ability to accomplish your duties in a satisfactory manner. Your actions adversely affected the Agency’s trust and confidence in your job performance and the Secret Service’s mission.
4. In proposing this action, I have considered as guidance the TOP and the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors).

The TOP provides that the Proposing Official will consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factor(s) exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factor(s) exist will yield a lower penalty. The TOP further provides that, where an employee has committed “more than one offense,” the Proposing Official may add the penalties together.

With regard to the TOP, the offense of “Negligence in Performance of Official Duties,” Offense Code 1.8, provides for a standard penalty of a five-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a three-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a seven-day to a twenty-one-day suspension. It does not appear that any of the mitigating listed under the TOP Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 1.8 apply in this situation. It appears that the aggravating factor of “disruption of the mission” applies in this situation.

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With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities and the clarity with which you were on notice of any rules that were violated in committing this offense. As a law enforcement officer, you are held to a higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees. I have also considered that you were, or should have been, on notice that it was your responsibility to mitigate security concerns at the site and to collaborate with other advance staff to ensure to facilitate communications between all partner agencies/entities to the greatest extent possible.

I have considered that, after a local law enforcement counterpart told you that he lacked sufficient personnel to secure the AGR building on July 11, 2024, you did not communicate this concern to your advance team counterparts or otherwise mitigate the security concern. Instead, when you were given a specific opportunity to discuss the AGR building line-of-sight threat with a supervisor during the July 12, 2024, walkthrough, you glossed over the security threat, instead informing him that there was a plan for that area with a police uniform presence. Furthermore, your failure to post a Secret Service representative in the local Command Post and ensure local representatives were posted in the Security Room hampered communications the day of the rally. If this were not the case, it is possible that the Secret Service would have been alerted when our local partners radioed that there was a man with a weapon on the AGR building's roof thirty (30) seconds prior to the shots being fired, which may have resulted in a different outcome that day. I have taken into consideration the fact that a protectee was shot, that a civilian was killed, and that two civilians were critically wounded. I have also considered the notoriety of the offense, and its impact on the mission of the Secret Service and negatively impacted public trust in the Agency.

In mitigation, I have considered your five (5) years of service and that you have no prior discipline. I have also considered your performance record wherein your performance was rated as Outstanding for the 2023 rating period. Additionally, I have considered that it was the negligence of several individuals that led to the security failure on July 13, 2024. Based upon these mitigating factors, I believe that you have the potential for rehabilitation and that a suspension will serve as an adequate sanction.

In light of the above and consistent with the Secret Service's TOP, I propose that you be suspended for forty-two (42) calendar days. This action, if effected, will promote the efficiency of the service.

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5. The documentation on which this proposal is based is attached. The documentation consists of:
- a. Your Official Transcripts from the July 30, 2024, and August 13, 2024, interviews with the Inspection Division;
 - b. Your Official Transcript from the October 30, 2024, interview with the House Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump;
 - c. Your Official Transcript from the August 23, 2024, interview with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs;
 - d. Cited Portions of the Official Transcripts from ASAIC [REDACTED] DTD 2nd Sup. [REDACTED] s August 22, 2024, interview with the Inspection Division, and the November 12, 2024, interview with the House Task Force;
 - e. Department of Homeland Security Independent Review Panel Report on the July 13, 2024, Assassination Attempt in Butler, Pennsylvania, dated October 15, 2024;
 - f. The Protective Operations Manual, section OPO-03, Protective Advance – Overview;
 - g. The Protective Operations Manual, section OPO-04, Protective Advance Guidelines;
 - h. The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-06, Site Security;
 - i. The Secret Service 2024 Campaign Operational Guide, CNOS-03;
 - j. The Protective Operations Manual, section OPO-08, Communications; and
 - k. The Secret Service Office of the Director Manual, section ITG-04, United States Secret Service Table of Penalties.
6. The deciding official in this matter is Deputy Assistant Director (DAD)/Chief Integrity Officer [REDACTED] PII [REDACTED], Office of Integrity. You have the right to reply to this notice orally and/or in writing and to submit affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of your reply. You may also be represented by an attorney or other representative at your own expense.

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7. You have fifteen calendar days from the day you receive this notice to reply to DAD Wynn. Your written reply should be sent to Communications Center (ITG), Attn.: PII [REDACTED], PII [REDACTED] or e-mailed to PII [REDACTED]. If you elect to reply orally, you should contact Integrity Office of the Office of Integrity at PII [REDACTED] prior to the expiration of the fifteen-day response period. Unless other specified, your oral reply will be held virtually via Microsoft Office Teams. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD PII [REDACTED] after the expiration of the fifteen-day response period.
8. If you feel that you have an emotional, personal, and/or family problem which may have contributed to, or caused, your conduct as described above, I encourage you to contact the Secret Service Employee Assistance Program. Program counselors may be reached at PII [REDACTED].
9. If the decision regarding this proposal is that you be removed, reduced in grade or pay, or suspended for more than fourteen (14) days, you will have the right to appeal that decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Specific details for filing, including filing addresses and time limitations, will be included in the final decision. For more information, you may visit www.mspb.gov. Alternatively, once you receive the decision in this matter, you may elect to waive your MSPB appeal rights and request administrative review of the decision by filing a grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB).
- If the decision regarding this proposal is that you be suspended for fourteen (14) days or less, or issued a letter of reprimand, you will have the right to file a grievance with the DRB. Specific details for filing a grievance will be included in the final decision.
10. If you believe that this proposal or any subsequent action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov. A complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the MSPB. In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel action and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or other protected activity. Please note that if you seek corrective action from OSC prior to filing an appeal to MSPB, you will have elected corrective action and any appeal to the MSPB would be an IRA appeal and limited as such, regardless of the nature of the decision.

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11. Allegations that this proposal is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be raised as an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. Please note that while EEO complaints regarding proposals will be counseled during the informal EEO process, formal EEO complaints generally must be dismissed except under certain circumstances where reprisal for prior protected EEO related activity is being alleged or the proposal itself is alleged to be part of a pattern of harassment or a hostile work environment.

However, allegations that the decision on this proposal, if the decision is that you be removed, reduced in grade or pay, or suspended for more than fourteen (14) days, is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be brought either in an appeal to the MSPB or an EEO complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System, but not in both forums. Otherwise, the allegation regarding the decision can be brought as an EEO complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System.

12. If you wish the deciding official to consider any medical condition(s), which you believe may have contributed to your conduct as described above, please submit to DAD [PII] medical documentation (i.e., a copy of a dated, written, and signed statement, and/or a dated copy of actual medical office or hospital records, from a licensed physician or other health practitioner) which provides, in detail, the following information:
- a. Diagnosis, including the current clinical status;
 - b. The history of the medical condition(s), including references to findings from previous examinations, treatment, and responses to treatment;
 - c. Prognosis, including an estimate of the expected date of full or partial recovery; and
 - d. An explanation of the impact of the medical condition(s) on overall health and activities, including the basis for any conclusion as to whether restrictions or accommodations are necessary.

The medical documentation must be provided to DAD [PII] within the fifteen-calendar day reply time limited described above whenever possible. The documentation, if timely submitted, will be considered in reaching a decision on the proposed action along with any written and/or oral reply to the notice of proposal which you may make.

13. No decision to effect this proposed action has been made or will be made until the time allowed for your reply. If you submit a reply, it will be given full and impartial consideration before a final decision is made.

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14. If you have questions concerning this proposed action, please contact Integrity Office
Office of Integrity, at PII

PII

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PII

Date: 2025.04.04

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Site Agent

4/8/2025
Date

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USSS - Standard Sensitive Info

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
memorandum

DATE: July 3, 2025

U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

REPLY TO: Deputy Assistant Director/Chief Integrity Officer

SUBJECT: Suspension Decision

TO: Special Agent [REDACTED] Site Agent
Miami Field Office

1. This is in reference to Deputy Chief Integrity Officer [REDACTED] PII notice to you dated April 4, 2025, which informed you that he proposed that you be suspended from duty for forty-two (42) calendar days based on the information cited in that notice.
2. I find that the charge of Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8, is fully supported by the evidence. I have carefully reviewed the proposal and the documentation upon which the proposal was based. I have considered your written reply submitted by your representative, [REDACTED] Counsel dated May 9, 2025. I have also considered your May 29, 2025 oral reply, at which you were represented by Mr. [REDACTED] Counsel. A copy of the transcript from the oral reply was sent to Mr. [REDACTED] Counsel on June 27, 2025.

In your replies, you contended that there was insufficient evidence to support the charge of Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8. You affirmed your familiarity with Secret Service policies OPO-06, Site Security, and OPO-03, Protective Advance Overview, and argued that your actions complied with these policies.

Regarding the specification for failing to mitigate line-of-sight issues, you argued the proposal did not recognize the actions you took to mitigate these concerns. You said that you identified vulnerabilities and relied on the expertise of local sniper and Secret Service counter sniper teams. You argued it was reasonable to assume local law enforcement would understand their responsibilities, and any failure was not your fault.

You stated that you recognized the threat posed by the AGR building from the first day you arrived on site. You also said that, although you were informed that the AGR building would be closed on the day of the rally, you were not aware of the specific plans, if any,

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2

for securing it by local law enforcement. You clarified that the primary role of local law enforcement was to prevent bystanders from approaching the secure area near the stage, not to control access to the AGR building itself. Despite this, you stated that you believed that bystanders were not supposed to be in the vicinity of the AGR building. Furthermore, you admitted that you were not briefed on the snipers' role in the AGR building but understood that their responsibilities did not include access control.

You emphasized your reliance on personnel tasked with protecting then former President of the United States (POTUS) Donald J. Trump during the event, arguing that you reasonably relied on them to highlight line-of-sight issues and should not be blamed for their deficiencies. You stated that you briefed the detail leader and other personnel on site diagrams, post standers, and local law enforcement placement, and that no concerns were raised afterward.

Regarding the specification for failing to mitigate communication issues, you stated that you informed local counterparts about the Security Room location and the need for one individual to be assigned there. You also said that the only communication that you had with our local law enforcement counterparts about their mobile Command Center was that it was supposed to be used to mitigate line-of-sight concerns from the 9 o' clock position and as a down room for local law enforcement personnel. You claimed that you never discussed it being used as a secondary communication center with anyone.

You also asserted that it was Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart]'s responsibility to set up the Security Room. Although you stated that you did not spend much time in the Security Room due to other concerns, you noted that you periodically entered and observed local law enforcement and Secret Service personnel present. You further claimed that no one raised any communication issues with you on the day of the rally.

In conclusion, you argued your actions were reasonable and that you exercised appropriate care. You requested a rescission of the proposed suspension or mitigation of the proposed penalty.

The evidence shows that Thomas Matthew Crooks circumnavigated site security at POTUS Trump's campaign rally in Butler, PA, on July 13, 2024, and attempted to assassinate POTUS Trump. The attempted assassination resulted in the death of Corey Comperatore, and David Dutch, James Copenhaver, and POTUS Trump were injured. You were the Site Agent on the advance for the rally and ultimately responsible for site security. Despite your arguments to the contrary, this meant that you were responsible for establishing a secure environment for POTUS Trump in accordance with the Secret

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3

Service policies referenced in the proposal. You failed to ensure this was the case. Thus, I find that the evidence sufficiently shows that you negligently performed your duties as the Site Agent and uphold both specifications of Negligence in the Performance of Official Duties, as described in the proposed suspension.

3. I find that there was a nexus between your actions referenced in the proposed suspension and the efficiency of the service. There is a clear and direct relationship between the grounds for the charge and your ability to accomplish your law enforcement duties in a satisfactory manner. Your negligence adversely affected the agency's trust and confidence in your job performance and negatively impacted the mission of the Secret Service.
4. In reaching my decision, I have considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) as guidance.

The TOP provides that the Deciding Official will consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factors exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factors exist will yield a lower penalty.

The offense of "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," Offense Code 1.8, provides for a standard penalty of a five-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a three-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a seven-day to a twenty-one-day suspension. The aggravating factor for Offense Code 1.8 of "disruption to the mission" is applicable in this situation. The mitigating factors listed under the TOP Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 1.8 do not apply in this situation.

With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities, and the clarity with which you were on notice of any rules that were violated in committing the offense. The attempted assassination of POTUS Trump by Thomas Crooks at the Rally in Butler, PA, resulted in the death of Corey Comperatore and in injuries to David Dutch, James Copenhaver, and POTUS Trump. This incident received world-wide media attention that negatively affected this agency's reputation and eroded confidence in our ability to execute our core mission.

I have also considered your five (5) years of service with this agency, including the approximate four (4) years assigned to the Miami Field Office working investigations and various protection assignments. I have also taken into account that, at the time of this incident, you had been assigned to the Donald Trump Protective Division (DTD) for one

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4

(1) year and completed several protective advances. This level of experience indicates to me that you knew, or should have known, how to successfully carry out your duties as Site Agent and the appropriate level of attention to give those duties.

While I have considered your argument that you believe you fulfilled your responsibility to mitigate line-of-site concerns, I do not find it convincing. During your replies and interviews with the Inspection Division, the House, and the Senate, you have made several contradictions regarding the plan for the AGR building. For example, during your oral reply, you said that no one told you that the AGR building would be "locked and secured by local law enforcement," or that the area around the AGR building would be secured. However, only moments later, you said that the general public was not allowed to be in the area around the AGR building. While I am not accusing you of lacking candor, this lack of clarity on the issue shows how little you understood the steps taken to ensure the site was secure, a failure that is extremely concerning considering that you were the Site Agent, and the security of the site was your responsibility.

Similarly, you stated in your replies that no one told you that the local Mobile Command Center would be used as a secondary communication center for our local counterparts. However, you testified previously that local law enforcement specifically told you that it would be used as such, which again shows that you lacked clarity on the significance of this issue. You knew, or should have known, that unified communications were an absolute necessity for site security.

Moreover, your interview with ISP, made it clear that you were not familiar with which local law enforcement agency would have representation in the security room. It also made clear that you were aware, as just mentioned, that the Mobile Command Center would be used as a command post for our local counterparts. You, unfortunately, had no strategy to properly implement this asset into your security plan. You should have known that allowing two communication hubs or platforms to operate simultaneously at the same protective site without proper forethought would result with confusion and communication failures. The evidence, therefore, shows, that your communication plan was based on assumptions and a misunderstanding of standard protocol.

Additionally, you took little, if any, responsibility for failures in site security leading up to, and on the day of, the rally. For example, you put the full responsibility of establishing a Security Room on SSA [Site Counterpart], your Site Agent Counterpart. Likewise, during your interview with ISP, you often described your role as a "liaison," suggesting at times that you were not fully responsible for site security. In other words, you frequently blamed

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5

others for security failures that led to what occurred on July 13th, even though you were ultimately responsible for site security, which causes me to question whether you have learned from the circumstances.

In mitigation I have considered your six (6) years of service with this agency, with no prior disciplinary actions. I have also considered your performance rating of Outstanding for the 2023 rating cycle. I have further taken into consideration it was not the negligence of just one employee that led to this unwanted outcome.

In balancing the above factors against the nature and seriousness of the offense, I find it appropriate to uphold the proposed forty-two (42) calendar day suspension. Therefore, you will be suspended from duty without pay for forty-two (42) calendar days on dates to be determined by your supervisor. You are also reminded that employees are not eligible to work overtime in the pay period in which they are suspended in accordance with the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(05). This action promotes the efficiency of the Federal service.

5. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) under 5 U.S.C. § 7701. You may file an appeal by sending it to the MSPB, Atlanta Regional Office, 401 W. Peachtree Street, NW, 10th Floor, Atlanta, GA 30308-3519, or by electronic filing by using "e-Appeal," an interactive application available on the MSPB website at <https://e-appeal.mspb.gov/>. If you wish to appeal this decision, you may file such an appeal no later than thirty (30) calendar days after the effective date of this action, or no later than thirty (30) calendar days after the date of your receipt of this decision, whichever is later. If you do not submit an appeal within this time period, your appeal will be dismissed as untimely filed unless a good reason for the delay is shown; the judge will provide you an opportunity to show why your appeal should not be dismissed as untimely. Appeals submitted by traditional means must be in writing and contain all the information specified in the MSPB regulations (the MSPB's Appeal Form and regulations are available on the MSPB website at <https://www.mspb.gov/appeals/appeals.htm>). You must follow the instructions on e-Appeal for electronic appeals.
6. Under Secret Service policy, you may elect to waive your rights to file a MSPB appeal under 5 U.S.C. § 7701 and request administrative review of this decision by filing an administrative grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB) as specified in the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(05). In your grievance, you must specifically state that you are waiving your MSPB appeal rights. You should present your

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6

grievance in writing on the attached Secret Service Administrative Grievance Form, SSF 3112. You may email your grievance to the Office of Integrity at

PII [REDACTED] The Office of Integrity will refer your grievance to the DRB. If you wish to file a grievance, it must be submitted to the Office of Integrity no later than fifteen (15) calendar days after the date of your receipt of this decision.

7. If you feel this action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to either: 1) to file an appeal of this decision to the MSPB under 5 U.S.C. § 7701 as referenced above and include such a claim in your appeal, or 2) seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov, but not both. However, a complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the MSPB. In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel action and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or protected activity. If you file a complaint with OSC prior to filing an appeal to the MSPB, you have elected corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12, and as such, any appeal to the MSPB would be limited to an IRA appeal, resolving only claims of reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities.
8. If you feel this action is being taken based on discrimination due to race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, genetic information, age (40 or older), parental status, or reprisal for prior protected Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) related activity, you may file a complaint you may file a complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. To initiate an EEO complaint, you must contact EEO Case Management within forty-five (45) calendar days of the effective date of this action. EEO Case Management may be contacted by calling PII [REDACTED] or emailing ContactEEO@uss.s.dhs.gov.
9. The Secret Service will generally be notified of any appeal filed with the MSPB via e-Appeal. However, to the extent required, the MSPB should forward a copy of the appeal and Acknowledgement Order to the Communications Center (LEG), Attn: Associate Chief Counsel, Agency Counsel, PII [REDACTED]; email: PII [REDACTED], phone: PII [REDACTED], fax: PII [REDACTED].

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7

10. If you have any questions about the contents of this notice, you may contact **Integrity** **Office** Office of Integrity, at **PII**.

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