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DATE: April 4, 2025

REPLY TO: Deputy Chief Integrity Officer
ATTN OF:

SUBJECT: Proposed Suspension

TO: Senior Special Agent [REDACTED] Site Counterpart
Pittsburg Field Office

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
memorandum

U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

This is to inform you that I propose that you be suspended from duty without pay for fourteen (14) calendar days. This suspension, if effected, will take place no sooner than thirty (30) calendar days from the date you receive this notice. The reason(s) for this proposed action are outlined below.

1. Background

On July 13, 2024, Thomas Crooks attempted to assassinate then former President (FPOTUS) Donald J. Trump at a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. During the attack, FPOTUS Trump was injured, a civilian was killed, and several others at the event were injured. In response to the July 13th incident, the Secret Service's Office of Professional Responsibility, Inspection Division, conduct a Mission Assurance Inquiry into the factors that contributed to the assassination attempt.

From July 6 – 13, 2024, Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] Site Agent from the Donald Trump Detail (DTD), was the assigned Site Agent for the Butler Rally advance. You were the assigned local Site Counterpart from the Pittsburgh Field Office (PIT).

2. Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8

On August 6, 2024, and August 13, 2024, you were interviewed by Inspectors [REDACTED] Inspections Office and [REDACTED] Inspections Office about the incident on July 13, 2024. In your interviews with Inspectors, you explained that you volunteered for the Site Counterpart role because you felt that your level of experience and your time on the presidential detail would be valuable in filling the role. Regarding SA [REDACTED] Site Agent, you stated that, while you were not sure how many times that she had been a Site Agent in the past, you "could tell that she wasn't kind of sure of – she didn't have a lot of experience." You further stated that SA [REDACTED] Site Agent did not have

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knowledge of certain “basic things,” you would expect her to know. You noted that, during the days leading up to the event, SA [Site Agent] did not have the correct “mentality,” and that “she didn’t seem like she was worried at all.” You also said that you had no idea of what she expected of you as the Site Counterpart. Despite this, you said that you did not have discussions with SA [Site Agent] about your roles and responsibilities. Finally, you did not elevate your concerns about SA [Site Agent] lack of experience or understanding of her assignment to your chain of command.

Despite acknowledging that you knew SA [Site Agent] lacked the experience and knowledge necessary to ensure site security, you admitted to Inspectors during your interviews that:

- you were not present when the site build occurred, despite your insistence to SA [Site Agent] that the Site Agent needed to attend the build and despite your assertion that SA [Site Agent] did not seem to have the appropriate understanding of the importance of her role/ presence at the site build;
- local law enforcement emailed you and SA [Site Agent] an operational plan showing where their resources would be placed, but you neither read it nor knew if it had been provided to the Counter Sniper (CS) Advance Team or Counter Assault Team (CAT); and
- you did not ensure that Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) radios could communicate with the Butler County Police Department or Butler Township or that Secret Service radios could communicate with PSP or Butler County.

You also articulated to Inspectors that you knew that line of site concerns existed but stated that mitigating the line of site was not your responsibility and that “. . . not once did I think that my job as a Site Counterpart [was] to mitigate line of sight concerns.” Nor did you escalate your line-of-sight concerns to DTD staff or your chain of command.

On October 17, 2024, you were interviewed by the House of Representatives Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump. During that interview, you again eschewed any responsibility for the security of the site, stating that your job was limited to acting as liaison with local law enforcement and that, when you acted as Site Agent in the past, you never “rel[ie]d on my site counterpart to do anything for me.” You further noted that the “site agent is in charge of the site, period.” However, you did tell the Task Force that on the day of the event, the Site Counterpart would “deal[] with any issues that are going to arise,” as the Site Agent was responsible for the protectee once he arrived at the site.

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-03, Protective Advance – Overview,

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states the following:

The mission of the Secret Service advance team . . . is to plan and execute security arrangements for the protectee. A successful advance requires effective coordination and cooperation with the protectee's staff, as well as with other federal, state, and local agencies. The goal of the Secret Service advance is to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities and to reduce the risk of harm to protectees.

The Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) Offense Code 1.8, "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," states it is a disciplinable offense to:

[n]egligently perform[] your official duties. . . . Examples of negligent performance include, but are not limited to, . . . inattention to duty . . .

3. I find that there is a nexus between your conduct described in paragraph 2 of this notice and the efficiency of the service. There is a clear and direct relationship between the grounds for the charges and your ability to accomplish your duties in a satisfactory manner.
4. In proposing this action, I have considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) as guidance.

The TOP states that the Proposing Official should also consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factor(s) exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factor(s) exist will yield a lesser penalty.

With regard to the TOP, the offense of "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," Offense Code 1.8, provides for a standard penalty of a five-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a three-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a seven-day to a twenty-one-day suspension. The aggravating factor for Offense Code 1.8 of "disruption to the mission" is applicable in this situation. It does not appear that any of the mitigating factors listed under the TOP Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 1.8 apply in this situation.

With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offenses and their relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities and the clarity with which you were on notice of the rules you violated in committing this

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offense. As a law enforcement officer, you are held to a higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees. I find that despite your experience and knowledge, you did not perform your duties in assisting SA [Site Agent]. You stated that you were aware that SA [Site Agent] had trouble in performing her advance duties and lacked the experience to be fully effective. You abdicated responsibility when you failed to proactively assist and ensure that the site was secure. The manual section, OPO-03, notes that the goal of the protective advance is to mitigate vulnerabilities, which I find you failed to do when you did not rely on your experience to help SA [Site Agent] more assertively or to elevate your concerns up your chain of command. Furthermore, you admitted that you were responsible for liaising with local law enforcement yet failed to read the PSP operational plan. You also admitted that you did not ensure that our local law enforcement partners had direct communication each other and with the Secret Service, and the lack of communication that day led to a delay in the response to Crook's presence. You admitted to Inspectors that you were responsible for overseeing "issues that arose" on the day of the event, and therefore, you had a responsibility to be aware of the site security plans and vulnerabilities.

I have also considered the notoriety of the offense and its impact on the reputation of the Secret Service. The notoriety of this incident negatively impacts the reputation of the Secret Service and has resulted in negative public attention.

In mitigation, I have considered your twenty (20) years of service and that you have no prior discipline record. I have also considered your performance record wherein your performance was rated as Outstanding for 2023 and 2022 and Exceeds Expectations for 2021. I have considered as a mitigating factor that you were assigned as the Site Counterpart and not the Site Agent. I have also taken into account that it was not the negligence of any one employee that led the failure to mitigate security vulnerabilities. I believe that you have the potential for rehabilitation and that a suspension will serve as an adequate sanction.

In light of the above and consistent with the Secret Service's TOP, I propose that you be suspended for fourteen (14) calendar days. This action, if effected, will promote the efficiency of the service.

5. The documentation on which this proposal is based is attached. The documentation consists of:
 - a. Your Official Transcript from your Inspection Division Interview on August 6, 2024;

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- b. Audio recording of your interview on August 6, 2024. (To listen to the recording contact **Integrity Office** ITG);
 - c. Your Official Transcript from your Inspection Division Interview on August 13, 2024;
 - d. Audio recording of your interview on August 13, 2024. (To listen to the recording contact **Integrity Office**, ITG);
 - e. Your Official Transcript from the October 17, 2024, interview with the U.S. House of Representatives;
 - f. Your Official Transcript from the August 21, 2024, interview with the U.S. Senate;
 - g. The Office of Protection Operations Manual, section OPO-03; and
 - h. The Office of the Director Manual, section ITG-04, United States Secret Service Table of Penalties.
6. The deciding official in this matter is Deputy Assistant Director (DAD)/Chief Integrity Officer **PII** Office of Integrity. You have the right to reply to this notice orally and/or in writing and to submit affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of your reply. You may also be represented by an attorney or other representative at your own expense.
7. You have fifteen (15) calendar days from the day you receive this notice to reply to DAD Wym. Your written reply should be sent to Communications Center (ITG), Attn: **PII**. If you elect to reply orally, you should contact **Integrity Office** of the Office of Integrity at **Integrity Office** prior to the expiration of the fifteen-day response period. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD **PII** after expiration of the fifteen-day response period. Your oral reply will be held virtually via Microsoft Office Teams. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD **PII** after the expiration of the fifteen-day response period.
8. If the decision regarding this proposal is that you be suspended for fourteen (14) days or less, or issued a letter of reprimand, you will have the right to request administrative review of the action by filing a grievance with the Secret Service's

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Discipline Review Board (DRB). Specific details for filing a grievance will be included in the final decision.

9. If you believe that this proposal or any subsequent action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov. A complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel action and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or other protected activity.
10. Allegations that this proposal is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be raised as an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. Please note that while EEO complaints regarding proposals will be counseled during the informal EEO process, formal EEO complaints generally must be dismissed except under certain circumstances where reprisal for prior protected EEO related activity is being alleged or the proposal itself is alleged to be part of a pattern of harassment or a hostile work environment.

Allegations that the decision on this proposal is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be brought in an EEO complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System.
11. If you feel that you have an emotional, personal, and/or family problem which may have contributed to, or caused, your conduct as described above, I encourage you to contact the Secret Service Employee Assistance Program. Program counselors may be reached at LES [REDACTED].
12. If you wish the deciding official to consider any medical condition(s), which you believe may have contributed to your conduct as described above, please submit to DAD/PII [REDACTED] medical documentation (i.e., a copy of a dated, written, and signed statement, and/or a dated copy of actual medical office or hospital records, from a licensed physician or other health practitioner) which provides, in detail, the following information:

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- a. Diagnosis, including the current clinical status;
- b. The history of the medical condition(s), including references to findings from previous examinations, treatment, and responses to treatment;
- c. Prognosis, including an estimate of the expected date of full or partial recovery; and
- d. An explanation of the impact of the medical condition(s) on overall health and activities, including the basis for any conclusion as to whether restrictions or accommodations are necessary.

The medical documentation must be provided to DAD [PII] within the fifteen (15) calendar day reply time limited described above whenever possible. The documentation, if timely submitted, will be considered in reaching a decision on the proposed action along with any written and/or oral reply to the notice of proposal which you may make.

13. No decision to effect this proposed action has been made or will be made until the time allowed for your reply. If you submit a reply, it will be given full and impartial consideration before a final decision is made.
14. If you have questions concerning this proposed action, please contact Angel Rizzuto, Office of Integrity, at [LES]

[PII] Digitally signed by
[PII]
Date: 2025.04.04
13:09:56 -04'00'
[PII]

Site Counterpart

Receipt Acknowledgment

Date

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
memorandum

USSS - Standard Sensitive Info

DATE: June 30, 2025

REPLY TO: Deputy Assistant Director/Chief Integrity Officer
ATTN OF:

U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

SUBJECT: Suspension Decision

TO: Senior Special Agent [REDACTED] Site Counterpart
Pittsburg Field Office

1. This is in reference to Deputy Chief Integrity Officer [REDACTED] notice to you dated April 4, 2025, proposing that you be suspended from duty for fourteen (14) calendar days under the charge of Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8. I have decided to uphold this charge and the proposed penalty.
2. I find that the charge of Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8, is fully supported by the evidence. I have carefully reviewed the proposal and the documentation upon which the proposal was based. I considered your written reply submitted by your representative, [REDACTED] Counsel dated May 12, 2025. I also considered your May 15, 2025, oral reply, at which you were represented by [REDACTED] Counsel. A copy of the transcript from the oral reply was sent to [REDACTED] Counsel on May 30, 2025. I also considered the Douglas Factors analysis submitted by Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge (ATSAIC) [REDACTED] PII.

In your replies, you argued that the proposed discipline should be rescinded or mitigated because you were being blamed for negligently carrying out duties that were assigned to the Site Agent, Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] Site Agent. You admitted that you had more experience than SA [REDACTED] PII because, among other things, you had been the Site Agent on site advances while assigned to the Presidential Protective Division (PPD) and you had done over two years on the agency's Counter Surveillance Unit (CSU). You also admitted that you felt SA [REDACTED] Site Agent was not as engaged as she should have been when it came to asking questions and providing feedback and that her lack of engagement left you "having to address issues that should have been addressed by the Site Agent, not the Site Counterpart."

You claimed that you brought this concern to Site Lead Agent, Senior Special Agent

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Lead Agent who you claimed had similar concerns. You also suggested that Assistant Special Agent in Charge **DTD 2nd Sup.** was concerned too. Yet they decided to keep SA **Site Agent** as the Site Agent, so every indicator was that "SA **Site Agent** was meeting the expectations of her own supervisors from the DTD who were present during the advance and on the day of the Rally."

You then went on to address individual concerns raised in the proposal. First, you argued that, regardless of whether you ensured SA **Site Agent** stayed to ensure the site build was completed properly the night before the rally, you showed up at 8 a.m. the day of the Rally and made sure that the site build had been properly completed. Second, although you admitted that you did not review the local law enforcement operational plan that had been emailed to you prior to the Rally, you claimed that missing it had "absolutely no impact on anything as all strategy and planning operational activities . . . were in place." Third, you said that you were not responsible for ensuring communication between local law enforcement and the Secret Service, which was a long-standing agency issue unrelated to SA **Site Agent** experience as a Site Agent. Fourth, you argued that the proposal inaccurately claimed that you failed to address or escalate line of sight concerns, but you said that you testified that line of sight issues were frequently discussed and communicated to ASAIC **DTD 2nd Sup.** and Inspector **DTD Campaign Sup.** during the final walkthrough of the site. Finally, you claim that the cited policy in the proposal fails to detail any specific responsibilities that you failed to perform or even reference "Site Counterpart Agent" at all.

The evidence shows that Thomas Matthew Crooks circumnavigated site security at then former President of the United States (POTUS) Donald J. Trump's campaign rally in Butler, PA, on July 13, 2024, and attempted to assassinate POTUS Trump. The attempted assassination left Corey Comperatore dead and David Dutch, James Copenhaver, and POTUS Trump injured. You were the assigned Site Counterpart Agent on the advance for the campaign rally in Butler, PA. As the Site Counterpart, you were part of the team responsible for planning and executing security arrangements for POTUS Trump at the rally. Despite your suggestions otherwise, this meant that you were responsible for coordinating and cooperating with POTUS Trump's staff along with state and local agencies. You were also responsible for identifying and mitigating any vulnerabilities to reduce the risk of harm to POTUS Trump. What is more, you were a Senior Special Agent with experience on PPD and CSU, which gave you a unique insight into the weaknesses of the security plan. You recognized this and took responsibility for executing many of the Site Agent's responsibilities. Thus, I find that the evidence sufficiently shows that you negligently performed your duties as Site Counterpart and uphold the charge.

I further find that there was a nexus between your actions referenced in the proposed

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suspension and the efficiency of the service. There is a clear and direct relationship between the grounds for the charge and your ability to accomplish your law enforcement duties in a satisfactory manner. These circumstances were egregious, and the misconduct interfered with and adversely affected the mission of the Secret Service.

3. I have decided to uphold the fourteen (14) calendar day suspension. In reaching my decision, I have considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) as guidance.

The TOP provides that the Deciding Official will consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factors exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factors exist will yield a lower penalty.

The offense of "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," Offense Code 1.8, provides for a standard penalty of a five-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a three-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a seven-day to a twenty-one-day suspension. The aggravating factor for Offense Code 1.8 of "disruption to the mission" is applicable in this situation. The mitigating factors listed under the TOP Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 1.8 do not apply in this situation.

With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities, and the clarity with which you were on notice of any rules that were violated in committing the offense. The attempted assassination of POTUS Trump by Thomas Crooks at the Rally in Butler, PA, resulted in the death of Corey Comperatore and in injuries to David Dutch, James Copenhaver, and POTUS Trump. This incident received world-wide media attention which negatively affected this agency's reputation and eroded confidence in our ability to execute our core mission.

I have further considered that, as a law enforcement officer, you are held to a higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees. Likewise, I have taken into account your years of service with this agency, including the experience you gained from being assigned to PPD and CSU. Similarly, I have factored in that you were a Senior Special Agent in the Pittsburgh Field Office and, arguably, one of the most experienced agents on the advance team.

Although I recognize that the protective detail site advance agent is sometimes more experienced than the field office site counterpart, that was not the case here. Yet, instead

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of mentoring SA [Site Agent] through this process, you told inspectors during your second interview with the Inspection Division (ISP) that it was not your responsibility to "coach her." Moreover, throughout your testimony you repeatedly abdicated your responsibility by making it clear that you were "only" the site counterpart, while SA [Site Agent] was the site agent. You stated, "Had I been a site agent, I would've handled things differently. I would've ensured I knew what my responsibilities were and assigned those around me to facilitate those to completion."

During your interview with ISP, and throughout testimony given to other bodies, when asked if you had an immediate concern with the site, you stated that line of sight was a major concern. You stated, "Okay, well the main thing was the line of sight. Obviously, that was the main thing, it was discussed almost every day." You further stated that you had multiple conversations with the staff lead about possible objects being strategically placed to mitigate line of sight issues, but he refused claiming it would mess up the press sight. Though line of sight and the refusal of staff to cooperate in addressing these concerns seemed to remain a common theme throughout the advance, I see no evidence that you attempted to raise your concerns with either Special Agent in Charge [SAIC Pittsburgh] or more appropriately Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge [PII], who was assigned as the Site Supervisor for the Pittsburgh Field Office. When inspectors asked if you escalated your concerns to your supervisors you stated, "I don't know if the site agent talked to her supervisors, but no, I didn't escalate any of the staff problems to anybody." I do recognize that you made a passive attempt to address the issue during the second supervisor walk-through by having the staff lead present, but it is my opinion that you should have taken a more aggressive posture in raising your concerns.

You also expressed concerns with the positioning of local Counter Snipers inside of the American Glass Research (AGR) building, looking out a window and facing the stage, as well as the positioning of local tactical assets positioned between buildings and not being used as a visible deterrent. However, never did you raise your concerns up your chain of command. When you were asked about the Counter Sniper advance you stated, "I didn't go into his plan, I didn't -- he's the expertise, it's his expertise, and I let him take care of it. When he said that he was good, I didn't question it further." I agree that during the course of an advance the opinion and advice of the subject matter experts must be given serious consideration. However, as the site agent you must have a basic understanding of their plan and methods of operation in order to adequately incorporate said plan into your Emergency Action blueprint.

When asked about the communications plan you advised that all law enforcement entities were invited, but only the Pennsylvania State Police and the Butler Emergency Medical

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Service (EMS) showed up to the security room. You further stated that all other entities reported to the mobile command bus. During your interview with ISP, you advised that you were aware that Butler EMS was going to use their mobile command bus, stating you knew, "... right at the beginning." When asked about its use, you stated, "... it's, like a dispatch. It's, like their communication center. And I'm guessing that their -- some of their, you know, command is going to be in there." It is my opinion that your communication plan was based on assumptions and that expectations were not adequately explained to our local counterparts. Nor were the necessary adjustment made, such as having the site supervisor relocate to the mobile command bus.

I also find that you were on notice of your responsibility to raise your security concerns up the chain. While I have considered that the Site Agent Counterpart responsibilities could have been better defined in agency policy, you know, or should know, that protective advances are a team sport, rather than an individual effort. Post standers are often briefed that, "if you see a hole, then fill it," or to bring their concerns immediately to the site agent. You had concerns and failed to address them appropriately. You were responsible for devising a robust security plan to ensure not only the safety of the protectee, but also the safety of the general public attending the event. It is my opinion that your actions failed to meet this basic mandate. Furthermore, in making my decision, I must consider that as an agency, we failed to meet our primary objective.

In mitigation, I have considered your eighteen (18) years of service and that you have no prior discipline record. I have also considered your performance record wherein your performance was rated as Outstanding for 2023 and 2022 and Exceeds Expectations for 2021. I have also considered the Douglas Factors analysis provided by ATSAIC PII [REDACTED]. ATSAIC PII [REDACTED] said that you have held many positions within the Secret Service that require trust and confidence and that your performance is exemplary. ATSAIC PII [REDACTED] also stated that leadership has confidence in your ability to continue to perform at a high level.

In balancing the above factors against the nature and seriousness of the offense, I find it appropriate to uphold the proposed fourteen (14) calendar day suspension. Therefore, you will be suspended from duty without pay for fourteen (14) calendar days on dates to be determined by your supervisor. You are also reminded that employees are not eligible to work overtime in the pay period in which they are suspended in accordance with the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(04). This action promotes the efficiency of the Federal service.

4. If you feel this action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected

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activities, you have the right to seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov. A complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel actions and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or other protected activity.

5. You may request administrative review of this decision by filing an administrative grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB) as specified in the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(04). You should present your grievance in writing on the attached Secret Service Administrative Grievance Form, SSF 3112. You may e-mail this grievance to the Office of Integrity at [REDACTED] Integrity Office [REDACTED]. The Office of Integrity will refer your grievance to the DRB. If you wish to file a grievance, it must be submitted to the Office of Integrity no later than fifteen (15) calendar days after the date of your receipt of this decision.
6. If you feel this action is being taken based on discrimination due to race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, genetic information, age (40 or older), parental status, or reprisal for prior protected Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) related activity, you may file a complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. To initiate an EEO complaint, you must contact EEO Case Management within forty-five (45) calendar days of the effective date of this action. EEO Case Management may be contacted by calling LES [REDACTED] or emailing ContactEEO@uss.s.dhs.gov.

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7. If you have any questions about the contents of this notice, you may contact

Integrity
Office

Office of Integrity, at Integrity Office

PII

Digitally signed by PII
Date: 2025.06.30 11:44:27 -04'00'

PII

cc:

Counsel

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