

COMMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF POLICY CHANGES IMPLEMENTED BY U.S. SECRET SERVICE

SOD-03 & SOD-03(1)

The Special Operations Division-03 (SOD-03) policy has been updated twice since the July 13, 2024, campaign rally. The policy was first updated on August 16, 2024, and again on February 5, 2025.ⁱ The first update adds specific teams and units not previously included in SOD-03 and removes others which are no longer applicable under the SOD.ⁱⁱ Specifically, the policy provides guidance on advance procedures for the Hazardous Agent Mitigation and Medical Emergency Response (HAMMER), Airspace Security Branch (ASB), Emergency Response Team (ERT), Specialized Rifle Unit (SRU) and Tactical Operations Branch (TOB). These SOD advance elements provide security assessments, safeguard communications, develop countermeasures, and implement a tactically oriented security plan.ⁱⁱⁱ

Further, the August 16, 2024, policy states that the SOD advance, composed of CAT, counter sniper (CS), ERT, SRU, ASB, and TOB personnel will advise the lead agent from the protective detail on the number of HAMMER, CAT, CS, ERT, SRU, ASB, and TOB personnel needed to conduct to tactical security plan.^{iv} The policy also explicitly stated that advance work conducted by SOD EDT [Explosive Detection Team] is done in conjunction with TSD [Technical Security Division].^v

The August 2024 update removed mention of CSU as they were placed under the Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information and removed references to magnetometers which were moved under the Uniformed Division (UD).^{vi} The most recent update of SOD-03 from February 5, 2025, removed the Airspace Security Branch (ASB) from the SOD Advance Procedures all together. Pursuant to the updated policy, ASB no longer provides security assessments, secures communications, or develops a security plan with other SOD elements during the advance.^{vii}

On December 6, 2024, the Secret Service implemented Special Operations Division policy SOD-03(01) regarding advance procedure for the USSS CS team.^{viii} SOD-03(01) supplements SOD-03, updated on February 5, 2025, by further delineating the responsibilities of the CS team lead during the advance planning of a protective event.^{ix x}

SOD-03(01) states the CS team lead assigned to an advance team is responsible for creating a plan of protection for a protectee or venue.^{xi} Specifically, the CS team lead will conduct a sniper threat assessment to identify long range threats and line-of sight-concerns.^{xii} In the assessment, the CS team lead will give a detailed explanation for how CS will cover the site including the number and placement of CS teams and their counterparts (if applicable), areas of concern, and recommendations for mitigation.^{xiii}

SOD-03 requires the SOD Advance Team, including the CS team lead, to attend and brief Secret Service personnel at the visit manpower briefing.^{xiv} SOD-03(1) provides further detail, stating the CS team lead is required to attend relevant meetings and *all* manpower briefings.^{xv} Furthermore, SOD-03(01) outlines the CS Survey, which the CS team lead is required to conduct as part of the advance procedure.^{xvi} The policy underscores that the survey should be done in a way that any CS personnel or

non-Secret Service unit supplementing the CS team can understand and implement.^{xvii} The survey will include, among other items, maps and photographs of areas of concern.^{xviii}

SOD-03(01) also creates a section on events management requirements, stipulating the CS team lead will request necessary resources in consultation with the lead advance agent and CS Operations, complete all information under the “Personnel, Equipment, and Actions” tab and all statistical data slots, including why a particular site was recommended “no CS coverage”, when applicable.^{xix}

SOD-03(01) further outlines the CS Advance Checklist in Appendix A as a master document for all CS protective advances.^{xx} The policy gives the CS team lead discretion, stating the CS team lead may use their judgement to address items not on the list or decide if certain items on the list are not applicable for a specific event.^{xxi} Furthermore, the CS team lead may prioritize items on the checklist during a shortened advance timeline or late notification of a protective location.^{xxii}

SOD-08

The Special Operations Division Policy 08 (SOD-08) in place on July 13, 2024, provided an overview, responsibilities, and qualification for the USSS counter sniper team. On December 9, 2024, the USSS released an updated version of this policy. While many of the updated policies were inconsequential to the events of July 13, there were specific substantial changes in response to the issues identified in the Committee’s interim findings report. The most notable change is the addition to a section called “CS Communications.”^{xxiii} This section expands upon the previously updated SOD-08 to list specific acceptable forms of communication to facilitate the quick and smooth transmission of information between USSS counter snipers and state and local counter sniper teams.^{xxiv}

In an effort to ensure intra-agency communications and increase accountability, the revised policy updated on December 9, 2024, states that USSS counter sniper personnel are responsible for directing counter sniper response teams to areas identified by counter sniper personnel requiring further investigation. Moreover, any additional taskings to CS response teams shall be coordinated through counter sniper personnel.^{xxv} This policy change will help to alleviate confusion from counter sniper response agents and keep USSS counter snipers informed of the activities of their dedicated response agents. On July 13, members of the USSS counter sniper team were unaware that the counter sniper response agent was deployed by the C-UAS agent embedded in the USSS Command Post.^{xxvi}

Another issue identified by the Committee was the denial of USSS counter sniper personnel to campaign events due to lack of staffing. To address staffing and logistical challenges with the USSS counter sniper teams, the updated policy authorizes at least eight more slots for USSS counter snipers within the Special Operations Division (SOD). However, the policy clarifies the number of authorized personnel is subject to change.^{xxvii}

OPO-08

Office of Protective Operations Policy-08 (OPO-08) issues regulations related to communications within the USSS. In addition to general communications the policy also includes guidance on administration of the Command Post and Security Room. Following the July 13, campaign rally, communications were at the forefront of failures by the USSS. On September 11, 2024, USSS

issued an updated policy of OPO-8, which provides in greater detail the roles and responsibilities of USSS agents in regard to communications.

The most notable update from the policy in place on July 13, is the updated policy requiring a “supervisory-level special agent to be assigned as the command post supervisor for specific classes of protectees.”^{xxviii} Moreover, the policy stipulates that no less than a GS-13 level special agent will be assigned as the command post supervisor for all other sites and events.^{xxix} Under previous guidance, there was no specificity as to what events or sites a special agent could be assigned as the command post supervisor and ambiguously stated that an “experienced” agent should serve in this role. In addition to grade-level requirements, the policy promulgates the Lead Advance agent of the site or event is now responsible for providing the command post with paper copies of documents and forms including “all security and/or tactical plans from partner law enforcement and public safety agencies providing support to the protective visit.”^{xxx}

The policy also places further responsibility on the Lead Advance Agent and field office SAIC to determine command post staffing by state and local partners.^{xxxi} The purpose of the updated policy is to facilitate communications between all partner agencies to the greatest extent possible.^{xxxii} As the Committee previously discussed, as there was no dedicated command post at the Butler, PA rally, the command post supervisor served as both the command post supervisor and the security room agent simultaneously.^{xxxiii}

In regard to the security room, the updated policy makes a technical and conforming change from “... and should be provided with communications equipment and the same pertinent Secret Service forms and surveys that are also provided to the command post” to “... and *will* be provided with the same pertinent Secret Service forms and surveys that are also provided to the command post.”^{xxxiv} Further contained in the updated policy, the field office SAIC or their designee will make the decision as to who shall staff the security room.^{xxxv} According to the new policy this decision should be made taking into account numerous factors such as the level of the protectee, the assessment of the site, and the number of expected attendees.^{xxxvi} Similar to the command post, staffing by state and local partners should be determined by both the field office SAIC as well as the Lead Advance Agent, and Site Agent.^{xxxvii}

On July 13, 2024, numerous agents of USSS, communicated using their cell phones rather than their USSS-issued radios. The updated policy also stipulates that USSS personnel assigned to work at protected sites or events are expected to communicate with each other over their Secret Service-issued radios.^{xxxviii}

OPO-24

Prior to the Butler rally on July 13, 2024, requests from USSS protective divisions to the Office of Protective Operations (OPO) Staffing and Logistics, were often denied without explanation.^{xxxix} OPO-24, implemented on November 7, 2024, provides guidance to OPO Staffing and Logistics on coordinating with protective divisions, the Office of Investigations (INV), the Office of Technical Development and Mission Support (TEC), the Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information (SII), and other directorates as needed to provide the appropriate number of personnel and assets for each protective event.^{xl}

OPO Staffing and Logistics is managed by the Deputy Assistant Director of OPO with the Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) and Assistant SAIC providing day-to-day oversight of the office's mission.^{xli} The purpose of OPO Staffing and Logistics is to help coordinate the temporary assignment of personnel and other resources used to supplement the protective divisions of USSS for protective operations.^{xlii} The office is staffed by a combination of special agents and a Uniformed Division (UD) official.^{xliii}

It is the responsibility of OPO Staffing and Logistics to evaluate personnel and asset requests submitted by protective divisions. OPO-24 states decisions regarding the use of assets for protective operations, "are informed by previous protective events."^{xliv} The lead advance agent for a visit or event will work with a field office supervisor to determine the number of post standers needed for a protective visit.^{xlv} The lead advance agent will then submit a Manpower Request Form to describe post stander needs. The lead advance agent will also submit a more thorough Manpower Justification Form detailing post stander needs and may provide the site post log to justify the staffing request.^{xlvi} However, OPO-24 permits flexibility in the resource request process.^{xlvii} If an event occurs on short notice, OPO may work directly with the operations section of the protective detail to process staffing requests permitting an omission of the Manpower Justification Form.^{xlviii}

OPO-24 stipulates the Manpower Justification Form, created by the lead advance agent, shall include: "adverse intelligence specific to the protectee, event, or site that can be mitigated through the requested asset; a description or map of how assets will be deployed; a list of local assets which were requested; if applicable, a description of local assets which are unavailable and why; and alternative solutions providing mitigation of a concern if the requested personnel or assets are not available."^{xlix} Once completed, the Manpower Request Form is sent to the operations team of the protective detail for review. The operations team will then send the Manpower Justification Form to OPO Staffing and Logistics.¹ OPO Staffing and Logistics and the respective protective division operations team will work together if OPO believes efficiencies can be found in the request. The protective division's operations team will then communicate with both the lead advance agent and OPO Staffing and Logistics if changes to staffing levels are made.^{li} Concurrently, the local field office operations team or supervisor will submit the number of post standers needed to Office of Investigations (INV) Staffing and Logistics.^{lii} OPO Staffing and Logistics and INV Staffing and Logistics will coordinate to ensure the number of local post standers requested by the protective division are available in the district.^{liii} If the number of local post standers falls below the agreed upon request, INV Staffing and Logistics will provide additional post standers from out of district.^{liv}

Magnetometer support consists of various forms for search and detection of prohibited items. Decisions regarding the number of magnetometers provided are based solely on the amount of time it takes to screen and not on the level of screening attendees will receive.^{lv} The policy states the Magnetometer Operations Unit will then decide the number of personnel needed to operate the requested magnetometers, taking into consideration whether USSS is requesting additional magnetometer support from other DHS components such as the Transportation Security Agency (TSA).^{lvi} The lead advance agent then submits the request for magnetometer support where the detail's operation team will review it prior to sending the request to OPO Staffing and Logistics.^{lvii}

For protective events without a magnetometer advance coordinator, these responsibilities are handled by the lead advance agent.^{lviii} The policy further states that OPO Staffing and Logistics and Magnetometer Operations Unit will work through any discrepancies with what the protective division is requesting and what the Magnetometer Operations Divisions deems is available and appropriate for the protective event.^{lix}

If Counter Surveillance Division (CSD) or PID assets are requested by the protective division, OPO Staffing and Logistics will pass the request to SII.^{lx} The OPO Office of Staffing and Logistics will also send an email to the requesting protective division confirming receipt, copying the respective operations team of the respective division to notify them of the request.^{lxi} The specific operations team will then respond to the message, including the protective division, with a response including the amount of support that will be provided and an explanation for any requests the respective Ops cannot meet.^{lxii} Moreover, If CSD or PID are unable to provide the resources requested by the protective division, it is the responsibility of the lead advance agent, who originally made the request, to find alternatives to mitigate the concerns the requested assets would have addressed.^{lxiii}

OPO-25

In order to increase accountability specifically among USSS protective operations leadership, on April 4, 2025, the USSS published OPO-25. OPO-25, Protective Operations Accountability, ensures a clear hierarchy of specific protective operations personnel as it relates to their overall responsibilities when planning an event. The policy states that “the lines of accountability established in this policy supersede any lines of accountability defined elsewhere in the Protective Operations Manual or other sections of the Secret Service Manual.”^{lxiv} The lines of accountability contained within this policy concern the Assistant Director (AD) of the Office of Protective Operations (OPO), the protective division SAIC, the field office SAIC, lead advance agent, and site agent.^{lxv}

OPO-25 prescribes the AD of OPO will have final decision authority over all USSS personnel supporting protective operations.^{lxvi} The protective division SAIC will have authority over all USSS personnel of a specific visit, regardless of the office to which they are normally assigned.^{lxvii} Prior to the protective division SAIC arriving at the event, the field office SAIC will have responsibility for the protective advance.^{lxviii} Once the protective division SAIC arrives at the event, the field office SAIC will then report to the protective division SAIC and continue their duties in a supporting role.^{lxix} OPO-25 also states that the lead advance agent is responsible for the protective advance and works in coordination with the field office SAIC, but under the supervision of the protective division SAIC.^{lxx} Furthermore, the lead advance agent is also responsible for the coordination of advance team members and maintains a line of communication with all protective operations staff, including partner agencies.^{lxxi}

Working under the supervision of the lead advance agent is the site agent.^{lxxii} The site agent is responsible for designating the site perimeters, identifying line-of-sight concerns and communicating those designations to the USSS advance team, including the lead advance agent.^{lxxiii} In regard to advance paperwork, the lead advance agent is responsible for the accuracy of advance paperwork associated with a protective visit. Once the advance paperwork is submitted, the final review and approval of the advance paperwork rests with the field office SAIC.^{lxxiv}

OPO-03(01)-03(04)

OPO-03, the policy document prescribing guidance for USSS advance planning was most recently updated on April 10, 2025. In the most recent update, the policy was further broken down into four separate OPO policy documents: OPO-03(1) Protective Advance Overview; OPO-03(2), Advance Team Components; OPO-03(3), Protective Advance Meetings and Briefings; and OPO-03(4), situation reports. The majority of OPO-03, prior to the update was under the subheading “Advance Team Components.” This section was expanded upon and reissued as a separate policy.^{lxxv} The most significant change in the updated OPO-03(01) policy are additions related to coordination with “Partner Law Enforcement Agencies.”^{lxxvi} Specifically, OPO-03(01) now ensures that members of the USSS advance team working with other federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies will request and review the partners’ operations plans.^{lxxvii} Prior to July 13, there was no requirement for USSS agents to request partner law enforcement agency’s operational plans, much less review them.

OPO-03(02) was released on April 10, 2025, as a more separate version of the OPO-03 updated in March of 2024, which lists the duties and responsibilities of certain advance jobs related to protective visits. Previously, the duties listed in the policy updated in March 2024, the responsibilities were superficial and ill-defined. In the April 2025 update, changes were made to extensively cover all responsibilities of an agent’s job and further solidify a chain of command to ensure accountability for specific duties. Most notably, changes were made to the duties of the field office SAIC, the lead advance agent, the site agent, and the protective intelligence agent.

In the April release of OPO-03(02), the responsibility of coordinating a meeting with federal, state, and local law enforcement entities were removed from the field office SAIC and replaced with the responsibility to review and approve advance paperwork, including the preliminary survey.^{lxxviii} Furthermore, pursuant to the updated policy, the Lead Advance Agent is now specifically responsible for: ensuring other members of the USSS advance team have established plans for communications between USSS and all other law enforcement entities involved in the protective operation, reviewing the plans to ensure they are sufficient, the overall security plan for the visit, and ensuring the command post staffing is consistent with the policy prescribed in OPO-08.^{lxxix}

In addition to the previously prescribed duties listed in the March 2024 policy, the Site Agent is now responsible for designating perimeters and communicating those perimeters to the USSS advance team, requesting copies of other law enforcement agency’s operations plans, conducting site walk-throughs with partner agencies to review responsibilities, and providing the applicable paperwork to the security room and command post.^{lxxx} Regarding the PI agent the only further duty assigned is that the PI agent will now work with the detail SAIC, field office SAIC, and lead advance agent to ensure all agents assigned to the visit are informed of relevant intelligence and threats against the visit and protectees.^{lxxxi}

OPO-03(03) was released as a supplemental extension of certain policies in the previously updated OPO-03 policy documents. OPO-03(03) concentrates on protective advance meetings and briefings.^{lxxxii} The purpose of these updates is chiefly to maintain open lines of communication between the USSS and partner entities, whether they be federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies.^{lxxxiii} Notable changes include additional guidance on administering police meetings and manpower briefings as well as creating a requirement that each member of the advance team to conduct daily check-ins with their partner agency counterparts leading up to protective events.^{lxxxiv}

In regard to police meetings, changes were made to require the USSS to include all partners involved in the police meeting to also be invited to the final briefing.^{lxxxv} This change is in response to reports from PSP officers who were asked to leave the final manpower briefing on July 13.^{lxxxvi} Furthermore, in a change from previous policy, police meetings are now mandatory for all events involving specific classes of protectees.^{lxxxvii} Formally known as the manpower briefing, final briefings take place in order to provide all pertinent information related to a visit or event to increase awareness of threats or address certain issues which arose during the advance process.^{lxxxviii}

Similar to police meetings, changes were made to the organization of “final briefings.” Per the April 10, 2025, dissemination of OPO-03(03), members of partner agencies are now required to be invited to the final briefing, and the meeting is now mandatory for all USSS agents to attend.^{lxxxix} Exceptions can be made for a pre-approved absence from the final briefing under extenuating circumstances and only with approval from the field office SAIC.^{xc} This change in policy echoes the importance of communication between the USSS and other federal, state, and local entities.

OPO-03(04) was also released on April 10, 2024, and provides instructions on providing situation reports.^{xc} Unlike other policy documents related to OPO-03, while this guidance is an extension of OPO-03, the issuance of this document was as a result of specific USSS failures on July 13. The most relevant portion of this document is titled *Situation Reports – Examples of Critical Information to be Passed*. In this section of OPO-03(04), many examples given are of specific instances which occurred on July 13. For example, the USSS includes: “Changes to protective countermeasures – e.g., availability of counter-unmanned aircraft systems... due to inoperability.”^{xcii} As the Committee unveiled in the September 2024 report, the USSS C-UAS system was inoperable until over 30 minutes after Crooks flew a drone over the event.^{xciii} This information was never passed to the USSS Site Counterpart.^{xciv}

Other examples of critical information to be passed included in OPO-03(04) include “any suspicious person observed in proximity to the site, to include identification and photographs of the suspicious person(s), if available”; “results of efforts to locate/interview suspicious persons” and “security sweeps which reveal explosives or other hazardous materials.”^{xcv} The Committee is aware of instances where the PI Response Agent did not alert the security room when she split up from her PSP counterpart and returned to crowd control duties. Furthermore, the PI Response Agent did not send the photo of Crooks to the security room agent until after the event had concluded.^{xcvi}

ⁱ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Secret Service Monthly Summary of Secret Service Policy Changes for August 2024, at USSS_006351 (Sept. 4, 2024), (on file with Committee); U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special Operations Division Advance Procedures – General, SOD-03, at USSS_006391 (on file with Committee).

ⁱⁱ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Secret Service Monthly Summary of Secret Service Policy Changes for August 2024, at USSS_006351 (Sept. 4, 2024), (on file with Committee).

ⁱⁱⁱ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special Operations Division Advance Procedures – General, SOD-03, at USSS_006391 pg. 5 (on file with Committee).

^{iv} Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Secret Service Monthly Summary of Secret Service Policy Changes for August 2024, at USSS_006351 (Sept. 4, 2024), (on file with Committee).

^v Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Secret Service Monthly Summary of Secret Service Policy Changes for August 2024, at USSS_006351 (Sept. 4, 2024), (on file with Committee).

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- vi Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Secret Service Monthly Summary of Secret Service Policy Changes for August 2024, at USSS_006351 (Sept. 4, 2024), (on file with Committee).
- vii *See generally* U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special Operations Division Advance Procedures – General, SOD-03, at USSS_023648-023649 (Feb. 5, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- viii *See generally* U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS_023669-023673 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).
- ix *See generally* U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS_023669-023673 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).
- x *See generally* U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special Operations Division Advance Procedures – General, SOD-03, at USSS_023648-023649 (Feb. 5, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- xi U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS_023669-023673 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).
- xii U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS_023669-023673 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).
- xiii U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS_023669-023673 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).
- xiv U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special Operations Division Advance Procedures – General, SOD-03, at USSS_023649 (Feb. 5, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- xv U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special Operations Division Advance Procedures – General, SOD-03, at USSS_023649 (Feb. 5, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- xvi U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS_023670 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).
- xvii U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS_023670 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).
- xviii U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS_023670-023671 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).
- xix U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS_023671 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).
- xx U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS_023669 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).
- xxi U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS_023669 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee); U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS_023672-023673 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).
- xxii U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO-03(02), at USSS_0023699 (on file with Committee); U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO-03(02), at USSS_02372-023673 (on file with Committee).
- xxiii U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special Operations Division Advance Procedures – General, SOD-03, at USSS_023652 (Feb. 5, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- xxiv U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special Operations Division Advance Procedures – General, SOD-03, at USSS_023652 (Feb. 5, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- xxv U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Overview, Responsibilities, and Qualifications, SOD-08, at USSS_023651 (Dec. 9, 2024), (on file with Committee).
- xxvi Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Officer Technician, at 207 (Aug. 28, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 42 (Dec. 5, 2024).
- xxvii U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Overview, Responsibilities, and Qualifications, SOD-08, at USSS_023656 (Dec. 9, 2024), (on file with Committee).
- xxviii U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Communications, OPO-08, at USSS_023659 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on file with Committee).
- xxix U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Communications, OPO-08, at USSS_023659 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on file with Committee).
- xxx U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Communications, OPO-08, at USSS_023659 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on file with Committee).
- xxxi U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Communications, OPO-08, at USSS_023659 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on file with Committee).
- xxxii U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Communications, OPO-08, at USSS_023659 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on file with Committee).

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- lxi U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS_023668 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
- lxii U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS_023668 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
- lxiii U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS_023666 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
- lxiv U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO-25, at USSS_023674 (Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- lxv U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO-25, at USSS_023674 (Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- lxvi U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO-25, at USSS_023674 (Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- lxvii U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO-25, at USSS_023674 (Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- lxviii U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO-25, at USSS_023675 (Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- lxix U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO-25, at USSS_023675 (Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- lxx U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO-25, at USSS_023676 (Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- lxxi U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO-25, at USSS_023676 (Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- lxxii U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO-25, at USSS_023676 (Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- lxxiii U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO-25, at USSS_023676 (Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- lxxiv U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO-25, at USSS_023677 (Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- lxxv U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO-03(02), at USSS_023692 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- lxxvi U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Overview, OPO-03(01), at USSS_023682 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- lxxvii U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Overview, OPO-03(01), at USSS_023682 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- lxxviii U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO-03(02), at USSS_023692 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- lxxix U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO-03(02), at USSS_023693 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- lxxx U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO-03(02), at USSS_023695 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- lxxxi U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO-03(02), at USSS_023695 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee); U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO-03(02), at USSS_023696 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- lxxxii U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO-03(03), at USSS_023703 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- lxxxiii U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO-03(03), at USSS_023704 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- lxxxiv U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO-03(03), at USSS_023704 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee); U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO-03(03), at USSS_023705 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- lxxxv U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO-03(03), at USSS_023704 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- lxxxvi Pennsylvania State Police, Interview with PSP Official, re PA_2024-924893 (July 23, 2024) at 2-3 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

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- ^{lxxxvii} U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO-03(03), at USSS_023704 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- ^{lxxxviii} U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO-03(03), at USSS_023705 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- ^{lxxxix} U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO-03(03), at USSS_023705 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- ^{xc} U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO-03(03), at USSS_023705 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- ^{xc i} *See generally* U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Situation Reports, OPO-03(04), at USSS_023711 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- ^{xc ii} U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Situation Reports, OPO-03(04), at USSS_023711 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- ^{xc iii} Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 19 (Aug. 20, 2024).
- ^{xc iv} Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Senior Special Agent, at 109 (Aug. 21, 2024).
- ^{xc v} U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Situation Reports, OPO-03(04), at USSS_023712 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
- ^{xc vi} Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 43 (Nov. 14, 2024).