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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
**memorandum**

U.S. SECRET SERVICE  
203.110

DATE: January 18, 2025

REPLY TO: Deputy Chief Integrity Officer  
ATTN OF:

SUBJECT: Proposed Suspension

TO: Special Agent in Charge SAIC Pittsburgh  
Pittsburg Field Office

This is to inform you that I propose that you be suspended from duty without pay for fourteen (14) calendar days. This suspension, if effected, will take place no sooner than thirty (30) calendar days from the date you receive this notice. The reason(s) for this proposed action are outlined below.

1. Background

On July 13, 2024, Thomas Crooks attempted to assassinate Former President of the United States (FPOTUS) Donald J. Trump at a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. During the attack, one person was killed, and three were injured, including FPOTUS Trump. In response to the incident, the Secret Service's Office of Professional Responsibility, Inspection Division, conducted a Mission Assurance Inquiry into the factors that contributed to the assassination attempt. In addition, an investigation was conducted by the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, as well as by the House Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump.

On July 13, 2024, and at all times during the planning of the Butler Farm Show visit, you were the Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) of the Pittsburgh Field Office (PIT). You assigned PIT Senior Special Agent (SSA) [Redacted] as the Lead Advance Agent and PIT SSA [Redacted] as the Site Counterpart Agent. The Donald Trump Protective Division (DTD) assigned Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] as the Site Agent. For a protective advance involving a former president, the applicable field office maintains the overall responsibility for the site.

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As the SAIC of the responsible field office, you had, among other duties, the following responsibilities: 1) oversight of the planning and execution of security arrangements; 2) coordinating decisions relating to the operational security environment with the Lead Advance Agent; and 3) oversight/collaboration with the Lead Advance Agent to determine requisite security room staffing by state and local partners.

2. Dereliction of Supervisory Responsibility, Offense Code 5.6

On July 30, 2024, you were interviewed by Inspector [Inspections Office] and Assistant Inspector [Inspections Office]. In that interview, you stated that, prior to the July 8, 2024 police meeting, you received information that local partners and the Advance Team had a number of protective concerns with the Butler Farm Show site. One concern was the amount of active construction in the area. Another was that the roads came up right onto the property, which was unsecured, despite being closed to the public. Because these issues made the site difficult to secure, the Advance Team tried to get DTD staff to change the venue, without success.

You also stated that, at the July 8, 2024 police meeting, you overheard Butler law enforcement officers discussing staffing issues and saying that they were concerned over whether they would have enough officers to cover the rally. You told inspectors that when no one brought this issue to you directly, you assumed it was not going to be a problem going forward.

You informed inspectors that, on July 10, 2024, you conducted a manpower walkthrough for the rally. You stated that this was the first time you had visited the Butler Farm Show site. You further said that you immediately recognized the dangers posed by the exposed site. However, you told inspectors that the Advance Team members informed you that large farm equipment and bleachers would be placed between the AGR building and the stage that was set up for FPOTUS Trump, to mitigate the line-of-sight concerns. They also told you that local police would be roving the area and that the AGR building complex would be locked down, so no one would be allowed in or around the building on the day of the rally.

Additionally, you told inspectors that, towards the end of your July 10, 2024 walkthrough, the Counter Sniper Advance arrived in Butler. You informed inspectors that, although it is extremely rare to have counter snipers assist with a former president's event, you did not ask SSA [Site Counter] why the asset was deployed to Butler. You assumed that the Counter Sniper Advance would contact their local counterparts to coordinate the deployment of their assets.

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You further informed inspectors that, on July 11, 2024, the Advance Team conducted a walkthrough of the site with local law enforcement partners. Although you did not attend, you told inspectors that, typically, the local and state partners would agree among themselves how to divide their protective responsibilities. You stated that it was likely that the local and state partners told the Advance Team that they had everything covered.

You also explained to inspectors that, on July 12, 2024, you received a call from SSA Lead Advance early in the morning, saying that she was in the emergency room suffering from heat exhaustion and would not be able to conduct the final walkthrough with DTD supervisors that day. Because of a conflict, you also did not attend the final walkthrough. You told inspectors that it was typically a job for the “second sups,” but that your team was aware you were available if they needed you.

On August 30, 2024, you were interviewed by the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs about the events of July 13, 2024. During that interview, you admitted that you could not recall reviewing the site plans for the Butler Farm Show visit. You did, however, admit to receiving and reviewing a Preliminary Survey on July 12, 2024. The Survey had conflicting information about where a local counter sniper team would be located. One picture showed the local team inside a building, and another showed them on a roof. You admitted that you were aware of this and that you did not notify anyone about this inconsistency.

You told the Senate Committee that you were not responsible for approving any documents associated with the visit. You admitted that you did not review any of the local partners’ operational plans and deferred any questions about the plans to the Site Agent. You stated that the DTD and Office of Protective Operations had the final say over any issue that arose during the visit, and you eschewed responsibility for these decisions. You acknowledged that it was uncommon to have a separate local security room, like the mobile Command Center, but you did not take responsibility for the communications strategy.

The Secret Service Office of the Director Manual, ITG-03(01), “Standards of Conduct – General,” says that “Secret Service employees are responsible for conducting themselves in a manner that reflects the highest standards of the United States Government and must maintain an appropriate state of awareness and mission preparedness.” This policy requires supervisors to “[u]nderstand and adhere to the standards of conduct applicable to themselves and to the employees under their supervision.”

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The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-03, "Protective Advance – Overview," states the following:

The mission of the Secret Service advance team, with oversight from the appropriate field office [SAICs] and protective division SAICs, is to plan and execute security arrangements for the protectee. A successful advance requires effective coordination and cooperation with the protectee's staff, as well as with other federal, state, and local agencies. The goal of the Secret Service advance is to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities and to reduce the risk of harm to protectees.

OPO-03 further states that the appropriate field office SAIC must:

- work with the Lead Advance Agent in "coordinating decisions relating to the operational security environment." The Lead Advance Agent should "routinely" be contacting the SAIC over "schedule changes, police meetings, intelligence concerns, support requests, and any other pertinent information regarding the visit or event . . . ;"
- ". . . review any verbal and written agreements made with local partners prior to conducting the advance to determine their relevance as security planning continues for the protective visit or event;" and
- ". . . determine if it is necessary to conduct a final police meeting . . . to summarize and confirm all security procedures agreed to during the advance process."

In addition, the Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-04, "Protective Advance – Guidelines," states that the Lead Advance Agent must schedule a "security briefing and supervisory final walk through" with the SAIC or his or her designee before a visit or event.

Finally, the Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-08, "Communications," states:

The Lead Advance Agent, Site Agent, and responsible field office SAIC will collaborate to determine requisite security room staffing by state and local partners. Staffing determinations will be designed to facilitate communications between all partner agencies/entities to the greatest extent possible. Staff representatives from partner agencies/entities should be at

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the supervisory or otherwise most senior level available.

The Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP), Offense Code 5.6, Dereliction of Supervisory Responsibility, states that a supervisor can be disciplined for the following:

failing to exercise reasonable care in the execution of his/her duties or responsibilities [or] disregarding his/her duties or responsibilities; [or] significantly deviating from appropriate methods of supervision . . .

I find that you failed to appropriately exercise oversight of the security arrangements for the protectee, to appropriately supervise security room staffing by state and local partners as required to ensure that communication was optimally facilitated, and to effectively coordinate with the Lead Advance Agent regarding decisions about the operational security environment. You also admitted to taking a passive stance during the planning of the July 13, 2024 visit, assuming that issues would be brought to your attention, instead of exercising the active oversight and supervision required by Agency policy. Further, you admitted to recognizing a discrepancy with where the location of the local counter sniper team would be located, but you did not alert your team to the discrepancy.

2. There is a nexus between your conduct described in paragraph 1 of this notice and the efficiency of the service. There is a clear and direct relationship between the grounds for the charge and your ability to carry out your duties in a satisfactory manner. Your actions adversely affected the Agency's trust and confidence in your job performance and the mission of the Secret Service. As a SAIC in the Secret Service, you were, or should have been aware of your duty to oversee and, if necessary, take charge of any situation that needed your expertise and oversight. You also knew, or should have known, that you were a vital and required part of the team responsible for the protectee's safety on July 13, 2024. Even so, you continually failed to take any ownership of the decisions relating to the operational and security decisions for the visit.
3. In proposing this action, I have considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) as guidance.

The TOP states that the Proposing Official should also consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factor(s) exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factor(s) exist will yield a lesser penalty.

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The offense of “Dereliction of Supervisory Responsibility,” Offense Code 5.6, provides for a standard penalty of a five-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a three-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a seven-day to a fourteen-day suspension. It does not appear that any of the mitigating factors under the Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 5.6 apply to this situation. The applicable aggravating factors of “[j]eopardizes safety of others,” “injury/harm to persons/property” and “impact on agency/mission” all appear to apply in this situation.

With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities. I have further considered the clarity with which you were on notice of the rules you violated in committing this offense. I have also considered that, as a supervisory law enforcement officer, you are held to a higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees.

I find that you did not carry out your supervisory duties and responsibilities with reasonable care when it came to preparing for FPOTUS Trump’s visit to Butler on July 13, 2024. You failed to confirm that the Lead Advance Agent had established a plan to ensure Secret Service personnel could effectively communicate with their local counterparts, despite your awareness of the possibility of local law enforcement being understaffed. You were aware of the dangers posed by the Butler Farm Show site, yet this information seemed to have no effect on how you approached the site’s security. For example, you failed to follow up with the Advance Team to ensure the line-of-sight danger had been mitigated, and you did not review any agreements between the Advance Team and local partners about securing the site. Finally, after you received a Preliminary Survey with obvious errors and omissions, you did nothing about it. In sum, it was your responsibility to be more proactive and involved in overseeing the planning for this visit.

While I have considered your claim that ensuring effective communications, mitigating line-of-sight concerns, and reviewing local partners’ operational plans, was not your responsibility, I find this assertion to be incorrect and a failure to take responsibility for your actions.

In mitigation, I have considered your twenty-four (24) years of service and that you have no prior discipline record. I have also considered your performance record wherein your performance was rated as Outstanding for the 2023 and 2022 rating periods and an Exceeds Expectations for the 2024 rating period. I believe that you have the potential for rehabilitation and that a suspension will serve as an adequate sanction.

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In light of the above and consistent with the Secret Service's TOP, I propose that you be suspended for fourteen (14) calendar days. This action, if effected, will promote the efficiency of the service.

4. The documentation on which this proposal is based is attached. The documentation consists of:
  - a. Your Official Transcripts from the July 30, 2024, and August 16, 2024, Inspection Division Interviews;
  - b. Your Official Transcript from the August 30, 2024, interview with the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs;
  - c. Cited portions of the Protective Operations Manual, OPO-03, "Protective Advance – Overview;"
  - d. Cited portions of the Protective Operations Manual, OPO-04, "Protective Advance – Guidelines;"
  - e. The Office of the Director Manual, ITG-03(01) "Standards of Conduct – General;"
  - f. The Office of the Director Manual, section ITG-04, "United States Secret Service Table of Penalties;" and
  - g. Cited portions of the Protective Operations Manual, OPO-08, "Communications."
5. The deciding official in this matter is Deputy Assistant Director (DAD)/Chief Integrity Officer **LES** [REDACTED] Office of Integrity. You have the right to reply to this notice orally and/or in writing and to submit affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of your reply. You may also be represented by an attorney or other representative at your own expense.
6. You have fifteen-calendar days from the day you receive this notice to reply to DAD **PII** [REDACTED]. Your written reply should be sent to Communications Center (ITG), Attn.: **PII** [REDACTED] 245 Murray Drive, SW, Bldg. T-5, Washington, D.C. 20223. If you elect to reply orally, you should contact **Integrity Office** of the Office of Integrity at **Integrity Office** [REDACTED] prior to the expiration of the fifteen-day response period. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD **LES** [REDACTED] after expiration of the fifteen-day response period. Unless otherwise specified, your oral reply will be held virtually via

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Microsoft Office Teams. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD **LES** after the expiration of the fifteen-day response period.

7. If the decision regarding this proposal is that you be suspended for fourteen (14) days or less, or issued a letter of reprimand, you will have the right to request administrative review of the action by filing a grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB). Specific details for filing a grievance will be included in the final decision.
8. If you believe that this proposal or any subsequent action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at [www.osc.gov](http://www.osc.gov). A complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel action and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or other protected activity.
9. Allegations that this proposal is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be raised as an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. Please note that while EEO complaints regarding proposals will be counseled during the informal EEO process, formal EEO complaints generally must be dismissed except under certain circumstances where reprisal for prior protected EEO related activity is being alleged or the proposal itself is alleged to be part of a pattern of harassment or a hostile work environment.

Allegations that the decision on this proposal is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be brought in an EEO complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System.

10. If you feel that you have an emotional, personal, and/or family problem which may have contributed to, or caused, your conduct as described above, I encourage you to contact the Secret Service Employee Assistance Program. Program counselors may be reached at **LES** [REDACTED]
11. If you wish the deciding official to consider any medical condition(s), which you believe may have contributed to your conduct as described above, please submit to DAD **LES** medical documentation (i.e., a copy of a dated, written, and signed statement, and/or a dated copy of

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actual medical office or hospital records, from a licenses physician or other health practitioner) which provides, in detail, the following information:

- a. Diagnosis, including the current clinical status;
- b. The history of the medical condition(s), including references to findings from previous examinations, treatment and responses to treatment;
- c. Prognosis, including an estimate of the expected date of full or partial recovery; and
- d. An explanation of the impact of the medical condition(s) on overall health and activities, including the basis for any conclusion as to whether restrictions or accommodations are necessary.

The medical documentation must be provided to DAD [LES] within the fifteen-calendar day reply time limited described above whenever possible. The documentation, if timely submitted, will be considered in reaching a decision on the proposed action along with any written and/or oral reply to the notice of proposal which you may make.

12. No decision to effect this proposed action has been made or will be made until the time allowed for your reply. If you submit a reply it will be given full and impartial consideration before a final decision is made.
13. If you have questions concerning this proposed action, please contact [Integrity Office], Office of Integrity, at [Integrity Office].

LES

LES

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LES  
Date: 2025.01.18  
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SAIC Pittsburgh

Receipt Acknowledgment

Date

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
**memorandum**

DATE: April 24, 2025

REPLY TO:  
ATTN OF: Deputy Assistant Director/Chief Integrity Officer

U.S. SECRET SERVICE  
203.110

SUBJECT: Suspension Decision

TO: Director - SAIC Pittsburgh  
National Cyber and Forensics Training Alliance

1. This is in reference to notice to you dated January 18, 2025, which informed you that he proposed that you be suspended from duty for fourteen (14) calendar days based on the information cited in that notice.
2. I have carefully reviewed the proposal and the documentation upon which the proposal was based. I have considered your written reply submitted by your representative, , dated February 19, 2025. I have also considered your March 4, 2025, oral reply, at which you were represented by Counsel and Counsel . A copy of the transcript from the oral reply was sent to Counsel and Counsel on March 18, 2025. Additionally, I have considered your addendum that was submitted by your representative Counsel , on March 18, 2025. I have also considered the Douglas Factors analysis submitted by then

In your replies, you stated that you have fully cooperated with all of the inquiries into the events and planning of the assassination attempt on July 13, 2024. You asserted that you have been punished already as you were asked to refrain from in-person work at the Pittsburgh Field Office and were eventually reassigned to the position of Director of the National Cyber and Forensics Training Alliance (NCFTA). Given this, you argued that a fourteen (14) day suspension was not warranted.

You explained that you lacked critical intelligence that suggested that there was a known threat against now President of the United States (POTUS) Donald J. Trump prior to the visit. You said that, had you been aware of this adverse intelligence, you would have recommended either that the event be held indoors, or that additional resources be deployed at the Butler Farm site (e.g., a counter assault team, a HAMMER team, or a

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counter-surveillance team). You also claimed that members of the Donald Trump Protective Detail (DTD), the Office of Protective Operations (OPO), and the Protective Intelligence Division (PID) had received this intelligence. This, in your view, was proof that they, not you, were responsible for overall security at the event.

You also noted that both the former First Lady of the United States (FLOTUS) Jill Biden and POTUS Trump visited the Pittsburgh district on July 13, 2024. You said having the two visits happening at the same time required you to divide your attention between the two sites. You further mentioned that the visits were taking place during a critical staffing period (i.e., between the NATO Summit in Washington, DC, and the RNC in Milwaukee, WI). When ISP asked you about the supervisor walk-through on July 12, 2024, you stated you did not require

do a "walk-through" because "... both of the second supervisors (from DTD) were going to be on the ground for their final walkthrough on Friday when everything was built out." You also advised that you attended a monthly meeting, called the LEAD meeting, with the heads of federal and local LE agencies.

You argued that neither Secret Service policy nor current practices support the proposal suspension's statement that "the applicable field office maintains the overall responsibility for the site." Instead, you claimed that, over the last several years, the protective detail supervisors for Presidential Protective Division (PPD), Vice Presidential Protective Division (VPD), and DTD, had been responsible for overall security, not the field offices.

You then listed ten reasons why you were not responsible for security at Butler: (1) you were never made aware of the intelligence of a known threat against POTUS Trump, but members of DTD were; (2) you were not required to complete an Unusual Event Preliminary Information Form, which is only filled out by the person with overall responsibility of the site; (3) DTD and CNOS supervisors completed the second supervisor walkthrough, not you; (4) on two previous visits by then former POTUS Trump, DTD supervisors were responsible for overall security planning; (5) the Counter-Sniper (CS) Advance Team never communicated with you; (6) you were not invited to the Emergency Action Briefing; (7) DTD Operations emailed the Lead Advance, telling her that it would review the Preliminary Survey; (8) the Lead Advance submitted all paperwork to DTD supervisors for approval; (9) the Lead Advance had been trained to submit all paperwork to DTD Operations; and (10) you were not invited to the final DTD supervisor Briefing held the night before the rally.

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You further explained that, after the walkthrough you participated in on July 10, 2024, you were briefed that state and local law enforcement would secure the AGR building, and that all line-of-sight issues would be mitigated by large farm equipment, banners, jumbotrons,

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bleachers, or the CS Team. You stated that you had no reason to believe that after the July 10, 2024 walkthrough that these items would not be in place on the day of the rally.

You argued that you did not take a “passive stance” during the visit as asserted in the proposal. You stated that on July 10, 2024, that you pointed out that the AGR building was a vulnerability. You said that you requested additional assets from the then-named Office of Investigations (INV), and that you placed an experienced SAIC in the security room. You also stated that you had been in contact with leadership from the state and local law enforcement entities supporting the visit and that you were not informed of any staffing issues.

You claimed that state and local law enforcement failed to secure the AGR Building as expected. You also stated that the protectee’s staff overruled the Secret Service’s request to block the line of sight from the AGR building with farm equipment.

You admitted that you never reviewed the Pennsylvania State Police’s operational plan but claimed that they were not required to give you copy of it. You admitted that you were informed by the Emergency Medical Services Director that a local Mobile Command Post would be on site but said that you thought it would be used for medical issues, not as a second command post. You claimed that all law enforcement agencies were briefed on the Secret Service’s security room and its functions.

In the addendum that you submitted on March 18, 2025, you stated that then Acting Director Ronald Rowe said in a press conference that the CS Advance failed to pass any security issues to supervisors. You said that in the USSS Mission Assurance Investigation it was stated, “Agency supervisors reported that the line-of-sight mitigation they had expected to be in place for the event to eliminate the line-of-sight issues were not present at the time the former President arrived.” You explained that the investigation also concluded that the Advance Team did not make supervisors aware that the line-of-sight issues were not mitigated. You stated that, when you arrived at the site on the day of the visit, you were not made aware of any security concerns by the state and local law enforcement officials. Specifically, you asserted you were not informed that they were searching for a suspicious individual. You added that you were not informed of any security issues or concerns when you entered the security room. Finally, you reiterated that you were not responsible for overall security of the site and should not be held responsible for what was not within your scope of responsibility.

I find that the charge of Dereliction of Supervisory Responsibility, Offense Code 5.6, is fully supported by the evidence.

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I further find that there was a nexus between your actions referenced in the proposed suspension and the efficiency of the service. There is a clear and direct relationship between the grounds for the charge and your ability to accomplish your law enforcement duties in a satisfactory manner. These circumstances were egregious, your misconduct adversely affects the agency's trust and confidence in your job performance, and the misconduct interfered with and adversely affected the mission of the Secret Service.

In reaching my decision, I have considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) as guidance.

The TOP provides that the Deciding Official will consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factors exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factors exist will yield a lower penalty.

The offense of "Dereliction of Supervisory Responsibility," Offense Code 5.6, provides for a standard penalty of a five-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a three-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a seven day to a fourteen-day suspension. The mitigating factors under the Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 5.6 do not apply to this situation. The aggravating factors of "[j]eopardizes safety of others," "injury/harm to persons property," and "impact on agency/mission" apply in this situation.

With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities, and the clarity with which you were on notice of any rules that were violated in committing the offense. As a law enforcement officer and supervisor, you are held to a higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees. I find your actions, or lack thereof, to be a disregard of Secret Service policy.

On July 13, 2024 Thomas Crooks attempted to assassinate POTUS Trump at a campaign rally in Butler, PA, which fell under the Pittsburgh Field Office's jurisdiction. The assassination attempt resulted with the death of Corey Comperatore, and injuries to David Dutch, James Copenhaver, and POTUS Trump. This incident received world-wide media attention which negatively affected this agency's reputation and eroded confidence in our ability to execute our core mission.

This is not a case where critical information was withheld or obscured from you. On the contrary, you were well aware of a number of security concerns that had been raised in the days leading up to the Butler rally, yet you failed to take any affirmative action to correct them. As the SAIC of the Pittsburgh District, you were responsible for overseeing the

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Advance Teams, coordinating decisions with the Lead Advance Agent, and mitigating security vulnerabilities. However, even though you were well aware of a number of security concerns leading up to the day of the rally, you failed to take any affirmative action to correct them

First, our local partners reached out to you, pushing for a change of venue because of ongoing construction around Butler, yet you did nothing with this information. During your oral reply, you explained that Butler County [Butler Co. Sherriff] and Congressman Mike Kelly called you a week before the Butler visit, saying that they “were very worried” about using the Butler site because “of all the construction [around the site] and getting people in and out.” Despite them raising these concerns, you made no effort to correct the issue with the advance team, nor did you notify anyone in either OPO or DTD about the matter.

Second, you were aware that our local partners were concerned about having enough assets to secure the Butler site, but you sat on this information. During your interview with Inspector [Inspections Office] and Assistant Inspector [Inspections Office], you explained that securing the Butler site was a “nightmare” because it was a heavily trafficked, wide open space with multiple entrances. You also told them that you “overheard . . . Sheriff [Butler Co. Sherriff] just talking about staffing issues and just being able to supply enough manpower for [the visit] and that being a concern.” You did not, however, vigorously follow up on this issue because no one had “directly” raised a concern with you

Third, despite recognizing that the “entire [Butler] site was a line-of-sight disaster,” you took little to no interest in whether any line-of-sight threats were properly mitigated before the event. For example, you told inspectors that you were briefed that the line-of-sight concerns would be mitigated with farm equipment, bleachers, and roving police posts. However, because you never followed up on the matter, all you could tell inspectors about whether these mitigation measures were deployed was that you didn’t “think [they] came to fruition.” Likewise, during your interview with the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, when asked whether “farm equipment [was] used to block the line-of-sight [threat]” from the AGR building, you said that you did not “know if it was positioned where it was requested to be [because] that wasn’t determined through [you].” Similarly, during your oral reply, you blamed your lack of awareness about the CS Advance’s plan for the site on his failure to communicate with you, instead of your failure to take the initiative and contact him.

Fourth, even though you claimed to be the liaison between our local partners and DTD, you told inspectors that you had no idea how our local partners’ assets would be posted. Nor did you know if anyone on the Advance Team would be privy to that information.

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Instead, you thought the local postings “probably would’ve been for [our local and state partners] to hash out themselves.”

Fifth, you did not ensure that the Advance Team was properly supervised. When it came to second supervisor walkthroughs, you told inspectors “sometimes [you] go . . . [s]ometimes [you] don’t . . . . It just depend[ed] on [the] schedule.” You also might send one of your “other supervisors along if they’re free.” However, because “the detail [supervisors were] the ones . . . basically signing off on the final plan,” you felt that you did not need to be there. Nor did your opinion change after you learned that the Lead Advance Agent was hospitalized and would miss the walk through. At the same time, you must have known that you, or another supervisor, should have attended that walkthrough because you explicitly told inspectors that you did not want to say that you failed to attend simply because you thought DTD was responsible for the overall security of the site. Finally, as a highly experienced, supervisory special agent, you knew how critical communications are during protective operations, yet you could not say which of our local partners were represented in the security room, nor could you confidently say whether any of them could communicate with each other.

In your replies, you generally argued that you were not responsible for the overall security of the site. However, as the SAIC of the local field office, you knew, or should have known, that you needed to be more engaged during this visit given the high profile of the protectee and the operational concerns that you were aware of prior to the visit. At a minimum, you should have communicated directly with DTD supervisors and/or OPO leadership about these matters. Instead, if you were not told there was an issue or invited to a meeting, you felt no need to follow up on a matter. Moreover, I find your statements asserting that you did not attend meetings due to a lack of invitation or that you did not address concerns because they were not raised to you, to be troubling. No SAIC must wait for an invite to attend a meeting or a walkthrough about a protective visit to his or her district. What is more, I find that your lack of knowledge of the security plan, postings, and police functions, left you ineffective. Additionally, I find your argument that things would have been different if you had been told about the credible threat intelligence to be wanting. Whether you knew about the threat or not, your actions should have been the same—to mitigate all line-of-sight threats and ensure the safety of our protectee.

I find that you abdicated your responsibilities as the SAIC of the district. As the SAIC, you are responsible for providing oversight to the advance team, the coordination of decisions relating to the security environment with the lead advance special agent, planning and executing security arrangements with the goal of identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities and to reduce the risk of harm to the protectee. I find that you failed to meet your supervisory responsibilities. In my decision, I must consider that as an agency, we

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failed to meet our primary objective, the zero fail mission, which ultimately resulted in injuries and the loss of life.

In mitigation, I have considered your twenty-four (24) years of service with this agency, and your lack of prior disciplinary actions. I have also considered your performance ratings of Outstanding for the 2023, 2022, and 2021 ratings cycles. I have also considered the Douglas Factors analysis provided by then PII [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said that you have held many positions within the Secret Service that require trust and confidence and that your performance is exemplary. He also stated that you are well respected within the law enforcement community at the Federal, State, and local levels. He mentioned too that the Office of Field Operations management team is confident in your abilities to continue to perform your duties.

In balancing the above factors against the nature and seriousness of the offense, I find it appropriate to uphold the proposed fourteen (14) calendar day suspension. Therefore, you will be suspended from duty without pay for fourteen (14) calendar days on dates to be determined by your supervisor. You are also reminded that employees are not eligible to work overtime in the pay period in which they are suspended in accordance with the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(04). This action promotes the efficiency of the Federal service.

3. If you feel this action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at [www.osc.gov](http://www.osc.gov). A complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel actions and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or other protected activity.
4. You may request administrative review of this decision by filing an administrative grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB) as specified in the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(04). You should present your grievance in writing on the attached Secret Service Administrative Grievance Form, SSF 3112. You may e-mail this grievance to the Office of Integrity at [REDACTED] Integrity Office [REDACTED]. The Office of Integrity will refer your grievance to the DRB. If you wish to file a grievance, it must be submitted to the Office of Integrity no later than fifteen (15) calendar days after the date of your receipt of this decision.

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5. If you feel this action is being taken based on discrimination due to race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, genetic information, age (40 or older), parental status, or reprisal for prior protected Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) related activity, you may file a complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. To initiate an EEO complaint, you must contact EEO Case Management within forty-five (45) calendar days of the effective date of this action. EEO Case Management may be contacted by calling or emailing .
6. If you have any questions about the contents of this notice, you may contact [redacted], Office of Integrity, at [redacted] Integrity Office .

Integrity  
Office

Digitally signed by [redacted]  
Date: 2025.04.24 15:04:48 -04'00'

cc:

Counsel

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
memorandum

DATE: June 2, 2025

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: Discipline Review BoardU.S. SECRET SERVICE  
203.110

SUBJECT: Grievance Decision

TO: SAIC Pittsburgh  
Director, National Cyber and Forensics Training Alliance

1. This is in reference to your grievance dated May 6, 2025. Through your grievance, you requested a review of Deputy Assistant Director (DAD)/Chief Integrity Officer PII decision of a fourteen (14) calendar day suspension for Dereliction of Supervisory Responsibility.
2. The Discipline Review Board (DRB) met on June 2, 2025, and reviewed your written grievance and the case file. The DRB also considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties as guidance.

After reviewing this matter, the DRB finds that the evidence in this case supports DAD PII decision. The DRB determined that the charges were sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. The DRB also determined that DAD PII appropriately balanced the Douglas Factors in determining an appropriate penalty for the charges. Therefore, the DRB has decided to uphold DAD PII decision in this matter, and you will be suspended for fourteen (14) calendar days. This action promotes the efficiency of the Federal service.

PII

Digitally signed by PII

Date: 2025.06.04

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Deputy Assistant Director PII  
Office of Field Operations

SAIC Pittsburgh

Receipt Acknowledgment

Date