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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
memorandum

U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

DATE: April 23, 2025

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: Deputy Chief Integrity Officer

SUBJECT: Proposed Suspension

TO: Officer-Technician **CS Team Lead**
Uniformed Division – Special Operations Branch

This is to inform you that I propose that you be suspended from duty without pay for fifty-two (52) calendar days. This suspension, if effected, will take place no sooner than thirty (30) calendar days from the date you receive this notice. The reason(s) for this proposed action are outlined below.

1. Background

On July 13, 2024, Thomas Crooks attempted to assassinate Former President of the United States (FPOTUS) Donald J. Trump at a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. During the attack, one person was killed, and three were injured, including FPOTUS Trump. In response to the incident, the Secret Service's Office of Professional Responsibility, Inspection Division, conducted a Mission Assurance Inquiry into the factors that contributed to the assassination attempt. In addition, an investigation was conducted by the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, as well as by the House Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump.

From July 10-13, 2024, you were the Uniformed Division Counter Sniper (CS) Advance for the Butler Farm Show site. In your role as the CS Advance, you were expected to evaluate areas of vulnerability; work with the Lead Advance Agent to determine the location and number of CS teams required for the visit; conduct building surveys; participate in briefings and provide site familiarization to the CS teams; and inform and confirm arrangements with the Pittsburgh Field Office Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) **SAIC Pittsburgh** and the Lead Advance Agent, Senior Special Agent (SSA) **Lead Agent**.

2. Charge and Specifications

a. Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8

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Specification 1 – Failure to Mitigate Line-of-Sight Threats

On July 13, 2024, Crooks utilized the roof of the AGR building in his attempted assassination. Crooks was able to position himself on the roof of the building and to take several shots before he was stopped by a Secret Service counter sniper. You were aware of the security vulnerabilities posed by the AGR building roof, but you failed to mitigate line-of-sight vulnerabilities.

You told the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs on August 28, 2024, that you considered the AGR building “a threat.” Specifically, you flagged that the AGR building’s roof had a direct line of sight to where FPOTUS Trump would be giving his speech. Despite this, you never took the time to either enter the building or get on its roof. However, when asked by the House Task Force if it would have been prudent to walk over and inspect the AGR building, given that it was an elevated position only 150 yards from where FPOTUS Trump would be standing, you candidly admitted that, in retrospect, “absolutely” it made “total sense” to do so.

During your interview with the House Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump on October 22, 2024, you admitted that you conducted only a cursory walkthrough of the site after you arrived on July 10th. You explained that, once the Site Agent told you where the stage would be set up on the day of the rally, you took 360-degree photographs of the site and determined that the best place to position the Secret Service CS teams, Hercules 1 & 2, would be on the roofs of two barns located behind the stage. You then admitted that “you did not walk any of the other parts of the site at that point.” Instead, you relied on “modern technology, like Google and stuff, [to] look at the overhead” of the site. Because of this, you “did not feel that [you] had to further walk the site[.]”

You also told the Senate during your August 28, 2024, interview that you were relying on the local sniper team to assist in covering the AGR building’s roof, yet you failed to develop an effective operational plan and coordinate tactical assets with the local team to ensure this threat was properly mitigated. For example, you admitted that you did not “know what [the local sniper team] could see or could not see” because you were “never in the [AGR] building and [you] never looked out the window” where the local sniper team was posted. Likewise, you never communicated nor met with the team to discuss these matters. In other words, you were relying on the local sniper team to cover line-of-sight threats, like the AGR building’s roof, but you admittedly knew nothing about how the team intended to work or what threats it could cover from its position.

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You further told the Senate that, when you saw the AGR building, you thought that the best place for the local sniper team was on its roof and that you were surprised when you learned that the local team would be located inside the building. Still, you said nothing about moving them to the roof because their position in the AGR building was set before you arrived at the site, and you did not want to risk engendering any bad feelings by moving them to the roof.

You further admitted that Hercules 2's view of the AGR building's roof was partially "covered by trees or foliage." You explained that you knew that Hercules 2 could only see one side of the roof because of this obstruction. Even so, you did not tell Hercules 2 about its limited view of the roof. During your interview with the House Task Force, however, you admitted that you "should have [told Hercules 2 about the tree], absolutely."

Finally, you suggested that, between Hercules 1 & 2 the AGR building's roof was covered, so it did not matter that Hercules 2's view was obstructed because Hercules 1 could cover that part of the roof. However, you admitted to the Senate that a person in the prone position behind the AGR building's roof was hidden from the view of both Hercules 1 & 2. This is why you did not see Crooks run up to the slope of the roof or take a prone position behind it. Rather, as you acknowledged, the first time you saw Crooks was after he was shot.

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, SOD-03, Special Operations Division Advance Procedures, states further that:

- SOD advance personnel will make contact with local law enforcement counterparts, develop an operational plan, and coordinate tactical assets.
- The SOD advance team will conduct vulnerability assessments of the protected sites and ... identify and establish appropriate countermeasures. ... The SOD advance team will make recommendations to the site agents regarding tactical enhancements to the site security plan.

The Protective Operations Manual, OPO-03, states that the CS Team Advance:

- Evaluates area of vulnerability from a long-range single threat (e.g., lone sniper) and/or coordinated assault;
- Conducts building surveys with the local field office;

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- Participates in police/agent briefings and provides site familiarization to the CS team(s)[.]

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, SOD-08, CS Team Overview, Responsibilities, and Qualifications, states the following:

...

At least one hour prior to the arrival of the protectee, . . . the CS team leader will provide the CS response team(s) with the appropriate portions of the tactical survey and an extensive briefing suggesting pre-positioning locations and areas of concern. . . .

Specification 2 – Failure to Establish Effective Communications with Local Snipers

You knew that communications between Hercules 1 & 2 and the local sniper teams was critical, yet you did not pick up the radios that the local sniper teams offered you. During your Senate interview, you stated that the Secret Service CS teams typically co-locate with the local law enforcement sniper teams during a President of the United States (POTUS) visit. However, you stated that the local snipers declined to co-locate with your teams. You said that since this was not a POTUS event, it did not raise an immediate “red flag” for you that the teams were not co-located. You did not raise concerns regarding that decision, even though co-locating with the local sniper teams would have provided quicker and more efficient communication between the teams. You noted too, however, that the communication issue could have been mitigated if you had picked up the extra set of radios that the local sniper team had offered you. You admitted that the local sniper teams not only offered you the use of these radios but also told you where to find them. You thought using the local radios was a great idea, but you did not pick them up because you became busy with other matters. You acknowledged, however, that you could have, and should have, delegated picking up the radios to another member of the Secret Service CS team.

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, SOD-03, Special Operations Division Advance Procedures, states the following:

- SOD advance personnel will make contact with local law enforcement counterparts, develop an operational plan, and coordinate tactical assets.

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, SOD-08, CS Team Overview, Responsibilities, and Qualifications, states the following:

- CS will also maintain communications with any local and federal tactical units that are participating in the visitor event.

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Specification 3 – Failure to Disseminate Critical Information

You acknowledged that you received a text message containing information and photos of a suspicious person and that you only disseminated that information via e-mail to Hercules 1 & 2. You failed to immediately notify the security room, Lead Advance Agent, or the Site Agent. Furthermore, you acknowledged that you did not notify the CS Response Special Agent because you were unsure of the location of the individual.

The Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) Offense Code 1.8, "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," states it is a disciplinable offense to:

[n]egligently perform[] your official duties. . . . Examples of negligent performance include, but are not limited to, . . . inattention to duty

During your CS Advance planning, you failed to adequately address obvious line-of-sight issues, which ultimately provided the shooter with ample coverage from your CS teams. You knew that these concerns existed, yet you did not take action to remedy those concerns. You further failed to ensure that communication between local law enforcement and USSS was effective by utilizing the shared radio communications offered to you. That decision left the Secret Service at a disadvantage during a security event.

3. I find that there is a nexus between your conduct described in paragraph 1 of this notice and the efficiency of the service. There is a clear and direct relationship between the grounds for the charge and your ability to accomplish your duties in a satisfactory manner. Your actions adversely affected the agency's trust and confidence in your job performance and the Secret Service's mission.
4. In proposing this action, I have considered as guidance the TOP and the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors).

The TOP provides that the Proposing Official will consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factor(s) exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factor(s) exist will yield a lower penalty. The TOP further provides that, where an employee has committed "more than one offense," the Proposing Official may add the penalties together.

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With regard to the TOP, the offense of "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," Offense Code 1.8, provides for a standard penalty of a five-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a three-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a seven-day to a twenty-one-day suspension. It does not appear that any of the mitigating listed under the TOP Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 1.8 apply in this situation. It appears that the aggravating factor of "disruption of the mission" applies in this situation.

With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities and the clarity with which you were on notice of any rules that were violated in committing this offense. As a law enforcement officer, you are held to a higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees. Furthermore, as the CS Advance, it was your responsibility in ensuring that both the Secret Service and local sniper teams were positioned for maximum and unobstructed coverage. I have considered that you allowed the local CS teams to select and post their CS teams where they determined necessary, to include posting a team inside of the AGR building where their visibility was limited. Furthermore, I have considered that you declined to co-locate the CS teams as well as utilize their offer of radios, which would have served as an additional means of communication that day. As an aggravating factor, I have also considered the conflicting testimony you provided during your interviews with the Senate and House committees as well as your interview with the Inspection Division, which suggests to me that your security and communication plans for the day of the event were unclear. Your actions reflected negatively on the Secret Service and call into question your honesty, integrity, and judgment.

As a significant aggravating factor, I have taken into consideration the fact that a protectee was shot, that a civilian was killed, and that two civilians were critically wounded. Furthermore, I have also considered the notoriety of the offense, and its impact on the mission of the Secret Service and negatively impacted public trust in the Agency.

In mitigation, I have considered your ten (10) years of service and that you have no prior discipline. I have also considered your performance record wherein your performance was rated as Exceeds Expectations for the last three rating periods. Additionally, I have considered that it was the negligence of several individuals that led to the security failure on July 13, 2024. I have also considered that you were given a shorter time to conduct your advance than was otherwise usual. Based upon these mitigating factors, I believe that you have the potential for rehabilitation and that a suspension will serve as an adequate sanction.

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In light of the above and consistent with the Secret Service's TOP, I propose that you be suspended for fifty-two (52) calendar days. This action, if effected, will promote the efficiency of the service.

5. The documentation on which this proposal is based is attached. The documentation consists of:
 - a. Your Official Transcript from the August 28, 2024, interview with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs;
 - b. Your Official Transcript from the October 22, 2024, interview with the House Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump;
 - c. The Protective Operations Manual, section OPO-03, Protective Advance – Overview;
 - d. The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, SOD-03, Special Operations Division Advance Procedures;
 - e. The Protective Operations Manual, SOD-08, Counter Sniper (CS) Team Overview, Responsibilities, and Qualifications; and
 - f. The Secret Service Office of the Director Manual, section ITG-04, United States Secret Service Table of Penalties.
6. The deciding official in this matter is Deputy Assistant Director (DAD)/Chief Integrity Officer [PII] Office of Integrity. You have the right to reply to this notice orally and/or in writing and to submit affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of your reply. You may also be represented by an attorney or other representative at your own expense.
7. You have fifteen calendar days from the day you receive this notice to reply to DAD Wynn. Your written reply should be sent to Communications Center (ITG), Attn.: [PII], [PII]. If you elect to reply orally, you should contact [Integrity Office] of the Office of Integrity at [PII] prior to the expiration of the fifteen-day response period. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD [PII] after expiration of the fifteen-day response period. Unless other specified, your oral reply will be held virtually via Microsoft Office Teams. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD [PII] after the expiration of the fifteen-day response period.

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8. If you feel that you have an emotional, personal, and/or family problem which may have contributed to, or caused, your conduct as described above, I encourage you to contact the Secret Service Employee Assistance Program. Program counselors may be reached at

PII [REDACTED]

9. If the decision regarding this proposal is that you be removed, reduced in grade or pay, or suspended for more than fourteen (14) days, you will have the right to appeal that decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Specific details for filing, including filing addresses and time limitations, will be included in the final decision. For more information, you may visit www.mspb.gov. Alternatively, once you receive the decision in this matter, you may elect to waive your MSPB appeal rights and request administrative review of the decision by filing a grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB).

If the decision regarding this proposal is that you be suspended for fourteen (14) days or less, or issued a letter of reprimand, you will have the right to file a grievance with the DRB. Specific details for filing a grievance will be included in the final decision.

10. If you believe that this proposal or any subsequent action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov. A complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the MSPB. In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel action and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or other protected activity. Please note that if you seek corrective action from OSC prior to filing an appeal to MSPB, you will have elected corrective action and any appeal to the MSPB would be an IRA appeal and limited as such, regardless of the nature of the decision.
11. Allegations that this proposal is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be raised as an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. Please note that while EEO complaints regarding proposals will be counseled during the informal EEO process, formal EEO complaints generally must be dismissed except under certain circumstances where reprisal for prior protected EEO related activity is being alleged or the proposal itself is alleged to be part of a pattern of harassment or a hostile work environment.

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12. However, allegations that the decision on this proposal, if the decision is that you be removed, reduced in grade or pay, or suspended for more than fourteen (14) days, is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be brought either in an appeal to the MSPB or an EEO complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System, but not in both forums. Otherwise, the allegation regarding the decision can be brought as an EEO complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System.
13. If you wish the deciding official to consider any medical condition(s), which you believe may have contributed to your conduct as described above, please submit to DAD PII medical documentation (i.e., a copy of a dated, written, and signed statement, and/or a dated copy of actual medical office or hospital records, from a licensed physician or other health practitioner) which provides, in detail, the following information:
 - a. Diagnosis, including the current clinical status;
 - b. The history of the medical condition(s), including references to findings from previous examinations, treatment, and responses to treatment;
 - c. Prognosis, including an estimate of the expected date of full or partial recovery; and
 - d. An explanation of the impact of the medical condition(s) on overall health and activities, including the basis for any conclusion as to whether restrictions or accommodations are necessary.

The medical documentation must be provided to DAD PII within the fifteen-calendar day reply time limited described above whenever possible. The documentation, if timely submitted, will be considered in reaching a decision on the proposed action along with any written and/or oral reply to the notice of proposal which you may make.

13. No decision to effect this proposed action has been made or will be made until the time allowed for your reply. If you submit a reply, it will be given full and impartial consideration before a final decision is made.

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14. If you have questions concerning this proposed action, please contact **Integrity Office**, Office of Integrity, at **PII**.

PII
PII
Digitally signed by
PII
Date: 2025.04.23
09:20:27 -04'00'
Jeffrey J. Lowe

CS Team Lead

04/25/25
Date

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USSS - Standard Sensitive Info

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
memorandum

DATE: July 3, 2025

U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

REPLY TO: Deputy Assistant Director/Chief Integrity Officer

SUBJECT: Suspension Decision

TO: Officer-Technician **CS Team Lead**
Uniformed Division – Special Operations Branch

1. This is in reference to Deputy Chief Integrity Officer **PII** notice to you dated April 23, 2025, which informed you that he proposed that you be suspended from duty for fifty-two (52) calendar days based on the information cited in the notice.
2. I find that the charge and specifications of Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8, are fully supported by the evidence. I have carefully reviewed the proposal and the documentation upon which the proposal was based. I have considered your written reply submitted by your representative, **Counsel**, dated June 6, 2025. I have also considered your June 23, 2025, oral reply, at which you were represented by Mr. **Counsel**. A copy of the transcript from the oral reply was sent to Mr. **Counsel** on July 2, 2025.

In your replies you argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the charge of Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8. You explained your duties as the Counter Sniper (CS) Advance for the Butler rally, noting that you were a late addition to the advance team and arrived on site on July 10, 2024.

As to the specification of Failure to Mitigate Line-of-Sight Threats, you claimed that you selected the placement of the Secret Service's CS Team's (i.e., Hercules 1 and 2) post locations to ensure the team could adequately view all threat areas. However, you admitted that Hercules 2's view of the AGR building's roof was partially obscured by a crop of trees. Additionally, while Hercules 1 had a full view of the AGR building's roof, you conceded that a person could remain obscured behind the roof's arch.

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You further noted that the local police sniper team declined your offer to “co-locate” with either Hercules 1 or 2, and you informed your supervisor of its decision. You explained that standard protocol required local sniper and counter sniper teams to co-locate with Secret Service CS Teams on Presidential Protective Division (PPD) advances to facilitate communication between the teams. However, you stated that you did not press the issue because this was not a typical PPD advance, and you were concerned about upsetting our local law enforcement partners.

Although you expressed confidence in the local sniper team’s capability and its contribution to the overall protective mission and thought that it could cover the portion of the AGR building’s roof behind the arch, you admitted that your primary concern was having Hercules 1 or 2 identify the local snipers as a threat and accidentally firing on them. So, while you thought that they could, or would, cover the portion of the AGR building’s roof that sat behind the roof’s arch, you never verified that this was the case.

Regarding the specification of Failure to Establish Effective Communications with Local Snipers, you acknowledged that the local snipers offered you radios for the Hercules Teams, and you agreed to retrieve them. However, as you were heading to do so, you received a radio transmission indicating that then former President of the United States (POTUS) Donald J. Trump was already en route to the site. Although you admitted that you could have assigned getting the radios to another Secret Service employee, you did not do so. Rather, you chose to take up your position with Hercules 1. Thus, you noted that the radios were never collected, and you used your cell phone to communicate with the local snipers.

You stated that the shortened advance notice and your inability to attend the initial police briefings impacted your ability to convince the local police to co-locate with your teams. You argued that you are not at fault for the lack of response from the local police partners posted in or around the AGR building. You further alleged that it was reasonable for you to believe that those officers would appropriately address any issues that arose during the event.

Based on the above, you claimed that you were not negligent in performing your duties. However, you also admitted that you could have performed your role in a more effective manner. Specifically, you admitted that, in hindsight, it would have been simple for you to have another employee pick up the radios from the local counter sniper team, that you

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should have raised the co-location discussion up your chain of command, and that you should have communicated to others when you learned of a suspicious individual. You took responsibility for your actions and apologized for your role in the events of July 13, 2024.

The evidence shows that Thomas Matthew Crooks circumnavigated site security at POTUS Trump's campaign rally in Butler, PA, on July 13, 2024, and attempted to assassinate POTUS Trump. The attempted assassination resulted in the death of Corey Comperatore, and David Dutch, James Copenhaver, and POTUS Trump were injured. You were the CS Advance for the rally and ultimately responsible for, among other things, evaluating areas of vulnerability and working with the local snipers to ensure all long-distance threats were addressed and quick, efficient communications were established between the teams. You failed to do this. Thus, I find that the evidence sufficiently shows that you negligently performed your duties as the CS Advance.

3. I find that there was a nexus between your actions referenced in the proposed suspension and the efficiency of the service. There is a clear and direct relationship between the grounds for the charge and your ability to accomplish your law enforcement duties in a satisfactory manner. Your negligence adversely affects the agency's trust and confidence in your job performance and adversely affected the mission of the Secret Service.
4. In reaching my decision, I have considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) as guidance.

The TOP provides that the Deciding Official will consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factors exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factors exist will yield a lower penalty.

The offense of "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," Offense Code 1.8, provides for a standard penalty of a five-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a three-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a seven-day to a twenty-one-day suspension. The aggravating factor for Offense Code 1.8 of "disruption to the mission" is applicable in this situation. The mitigating factors listed under the TOP Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 1.8 do not apply in this situation.

With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities, and the clarity with which you were on notice of any rules that were violated in committing the offense. I have

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considered that you did not fully address line-of-sight threats, which the shooter ultimately took advantage of in carrying out this heinous act. I have further considered that you could have easily assigned the duty of picking up radios that would have facilitated communications with the local snipers to another Secret Service employee, but that you did not. I have considered too that you did not pass relevant information to the security room, CS Response, Lead Advance, and Site Advance because you assumed someone else would do so. I have considered as well that this incident, which resulted in death and injury, received world-wide media coverage that negatively affected this agency's reputation and eroded confidence in our ability to execute our core mission.

I have also considered that, as a law enforcement officer, you are held to a higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees; your ten (10) years of service with this agency, including the approximately two (2) years you served in the Uniformed Division's White House Branch; and the eight (8) years you have been assigned to the Counter Sniper Program, during which you have completed approximately ten (10) to fifteen (15) CS advances. This level of experience indicates to me that you knew, or should have known, how to successfully carry out your duties as the CS advance.

In mitigation I have considered your ten (10) years of service with this agency, with no prior disciplinary actions. I have also considered your performance ratings of Exceeds Expectations for the previous three rating cycles. I have further taken into consideration it was not the negligence of just one employee that led to this unwanted outcome. In addition, I have strongly considered that it was your CS position that ultimately neutralized the threat, ending all hostile actions. I have also strongly considered that you have taken responsibility for your actions and identified key steps that you could have taken that may have prevented this unwanted outcome.

In balancing the above factors against the nature and seriousness of the offense, I find it appropriate to mitigate the proposed fifty-two (52) calendar day suspension to a thirty-five (35) calendar day suspension. Therefore, you will be suspended from duty without pay for thirty-five (35) calendar days on dates to be determined by your office. You are also reminded that employees are not eligible to work overtime in the pay period in which they are suspended in accordance with the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(05). This action promotes the efficiency of the Federal service.

5. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) under 5 U.S.C. § 7701. You may file an appeal by sending it to the MSPB, Washington DC Regional Office, 1901 S. Bell Street, Suite 950, Arlington, VA 22202, or by electronic filing by using "e-Appeal," an interactive application available on the MSPB website at

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<https://e-appeal.mspb.gov/>. If you wish to appeal this decision, you may file such an appeal no later than thirty (30) calendar days after the effective date of this action, or no later than thirty (30) calendar days after the date of your receipt of this decision, whichever is later. If you do not submit an appeal within this time period, your appeal will be dismissed as untimely filed unless a good reason for the delay is shown; the judge will provide you an opportunity to show why your appeal should not be dismissed as untimely. Appeals submitted by traditional means must be in writing and contain all the information specified in the MSPB regulations (the MSPB's Appeal Form and regulations are available on the MSPB website at <https://www.mspb.gov/appeals/appeals.htm>). You must follow the instructions on e-Appeal for electronic appeals.

6. Under Secret Service policy, you may elect to waive your rights to file a MSPB appeal under 5 U.S.C. § 7701 and request administrative review of this decision by filing an administrative grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB) as specified in the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(05). In your grievance, you must specifically state that you are waiving your MSPB appeal rights. You should present your grievance in writing on the attached Secret Service Administrative Grievance Form, SSF 3112. You may email your grievance to the Office of Integrity at [REDACTED] Integrity Office. The Office of Integrity will refer your grievance to the DRB. If you wish to file a grievance, it must be submitted to the Office of Integrity no later than fifteen (15) calendar days after the date of your receipt of this decision.
7. If you feel this action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to either: 1) to file an appeal of this decision to the MSPB under 5 U.S.C. § 7701 as referenced above and include such a claim in your appeal, or 2) seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov, but not both. However, a complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the MSPB. In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel action and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or protected activity. If you file a complaint with OSC prior to filing an appeal to the MSPB, you have elected corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12, and as such, any appeal to the MSPB would be limited to an IRA appeal, resolving only claims of reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities.

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8. If you feel this action is being taken based on discrimination due to race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, genetic information, age (40 or older), parental status, or reprisal for prior protected Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) related activity, you may file a complaint you may file a complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. To initiate an EEO complaint, you must contact EEO Case Management within forty five (45) calendar days of the effective date of this action. EEO Case Management may be contacted by calling (202) 406-5540 or emailing ContactEEO@uss.s.dhs.gov.
9. The Secret Service will generally be notified of any appeal filed with the MSPB via e-Appeal. However, to the extent required, the MSPB should forward a copy of the appeal and Acknowledgement Order to the Communications Center (LEG), Attn: Associate Chief Counsel [redacted] Agency Counsel [redacted] PII [redacted]; email: PII [redacted], phone: PII [redacted], fax: PII [redacted].
10. If you have any questions about the contents of this notice, you may contact Integrity Office [redacted], Office of Integrity, at PII [redacted].

PII [redacted]

Digitally signed by PII [redacted]
Date: 2025.07.03 09:51:28 -04'00'

PII [redacted]

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