

UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY
& **GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS**
CHAIRMAN RAND PAUL, M.D.

ONE YEAR LATER:
THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE'S
FAILURES SURROUNDING
THE JULY 13, 2024
ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT
Final Report

I. Executive Summary

Today, U.S. Senator Rand Paul, Chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) released the Committee's final report regarding what can only be described as stunning failures by the United States Secret Service (USSS) that allowed then-former President Donald J. Trump to be shot on July 13, 2024, in an attempted assassination in Butler, Pennsylvania. One year later, the facts remain as chilling as ever: a former President of the United States and major party candidate was shot in the head at a public rally by an individual who was reported as suspicious and carrying a rangefinder to the Secret Service at least 25 minutes prior. It is a miracle that President Trump survived. This attempt on the life of President Trump cost one innocent life and could have resulted in far more bloodshed. The truth is, President Trump, and the nation, was fortunate. The once-again President survived despite being shot in the head. Since that day, there has been another attempt on his life and further threats to do him harm, including most recently a renewed threat from Iran. This report reveals a disturbing pattern of communication failures and negligence that culminated in a preventable tragedy. What happened was inexcusable and the consequences imposed for the failures so far do not reflect the severity of the situation.

The Attempted Assassination

On July 13, 2024, at approximately 6:11 p.m., Thomas Crooks, a 20-year-old man from Bethel Park, Pennsylvania, managed to climb on to the roof of the American Glass Research (AGR) building, unimpeded, during a campaign rally at the Butler Farm Show. From that rooftop, Crooks fired eight shots from a rifle at President Trump. Crooks struck four individuals, killing Corey Comperatore and injuring three others, including President Trump.

The Investigation

Following the attack, the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (the Committee) and the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) launched a joint-bipartisan investigation. Over the past year, the Committee has conducted 17 transcribed interviews with USSS personnel and reviewed over 75,000 pages of documents produced from federal, state, and local law enforcement entities. A preliminary report was issued in September 2024. This final report issued by the Chairman builds on those findings and includes new evidence.

The Failures by the Secret Service

There were multiple, unacceptable failures in the planning and execution of the July 13 Butler rally. A 20-year-old gunman was able to evade detection by the country's top protective agency for nearly 45 minutes. Agents and officers chose not to retrieve radios from local and state law enforcement, limiting coordination at a critical time. Known line-of-sight vulnerabilities were identified in advance but not addressed. An inexperienced operator was tasked with managing counter-unmanned aerial systems. Personnel who were vital to mission success were not requested. In addition to the consequential failures on the ground in Butler,

Pennsylvania, there were also numerous failures in Washington, D.C., at USSS Headquarters. USSS executives told the Committee that prior to July 13, 2024, there was no formal process to request or deny assets. USSS advance agents told the Committee that when their requests went unanswered, they had no way of knowing whether they would receive the support needed to protect the former President. Some did not even bother submitting requests at all, convinced they would be denied by headquarters.

Insufficient Accountability

Not a single person has been fired. USSS has conducted internal reviews, but only six individuals have faced disciplinary action. Two of those individuals received lighter punishments than initially recommended. The Committee believes more than six individuals should have received disciplinary action as a result of their action (or inaction) on July 13, 2024. Those who were disciplined received penalties far too weak to match the severity the failures. Details on these disciplinary actions were withheld from the Committee until Chairman Paul issued a subpoena for them on July 1, 2025. The American people deserve better.

Findings

Based on the evidence gathered, the Committee found the following:

1. USSS denied multiple requests for additional staff, assets, and resources to protect President Trump during the campaign.
2. USSS did not fire a single person involved in the planning and execution of the Butler rally. USSS formally disciplined only six personnel, some of whom received their disciplinary decision as recently as July 2025. In two instances, the final disciplinary decision was a reduced punishment from what was originally recommended.
3. Former Director Kimberly Cheatle falsely testified to Congress that no USSS asset requests were denied for the Butler rally.
4. Despite USSS leadership receiving an intelligence briefing regarding the protectee and authorizing counter snipers at all of President Trump's outdoor rallies a day prior, counter snipers were not present at the July 9, Doral campaign rally.
5. There were ill-defined responsibilities for USSS agents serving in advance roles.
6. USSS agents failed to communicate crucial information regarding the suspicious individual to President Trump's shift detail, which had the ability to prevent him from taking the stage.
7. Pertinent threat intelligence related to the protectee was not shared with USSS agents in charge of security at the Butler, Pennsylvania, rally.
8. There was a severe lack of coordination and communication between USSS and state and local law enforcement from the advance process through the event.

This was not a single error. It was a cascade of preventable failures that nearly cost President Trump his life. In the interest of transparency, the Committee is releasing a number of subpoenaed records and additional transcripts in the addendum. The addendum also includes a summary of changes USSS made to its policies and procedures as a result of the events of July 13 and the Committee's interim report.

II. HISTORY OF DENIED STAFFING, ASSETS, AND RESOURCE REQUESTS FROM SECRET SERVICE HEADQUARTERS

According to USSS documents provided to the Committee, USSS Headquarters denied or left unfulfilled at least 10 requests by the Donald Trump Division (DTD) for additional resources during the 2024 campaign including enhanced counter-unmanned aerial system (C-UAS) assets, counter assault team (CAT) personnel, and counter sniper personnel.ⁱ The documents revealed a pattern of certain categories of requests being either blatantly denied, unfulfilled, or required to be supplemented by local law enforcement or other federal agencies, such as the Transportation Safety Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), or Homeland Security Investigations (HSI).ⁱⁱ These documents further contradict statements made by former Director of USSS, Kimberly Cheatle's testimony to the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.ⁱⁱⁱ

Counter Snipers

On July 1, 2023, President Trump visited Pickens, South Carolina, for a campaign rally.^{iv} Prior to the visit, on June 28, 2023, DTD requested the Office of Protective Operations (OPO) provide counter sniper assets in support of this event due to "line-of-sight vulnerabilities."^v This request for USSS counter snipers included a full justification from DTD, noting the expectancy of over 20,000 attendees, a statement that TSD relayed to DTD that the use of ballistic glass would not be an option for this visit, and a notification that then-Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) of DTD would be speaking to the OPO Deputy Assistant Director about the request.^{vi} The OPO responded to DTD, only three hours later, stating that following a review of the justification and manpower availability, USSS counter snipers were not available.^{vii} Furthermore, despite the justification sent to OPO and a conversation between the DTD SAIC and OPO Deputy Assistant Director, the Committee was provided with internal DTD communications stating that Uniformed Division (UD) counter snipers in full or LNO (liaison) role would not be authorized for the visit, primarily due to manpower constraints.^{viii}

Notwithstanding the history of denials from USSS Headquarters, the current Chief Counsel of USSS, appointed by President Trump, told the Committee that there was no discernable evidence of political animus related to the reason for these denials.^{ix}

In a briefing with the Committee, USSS explained the lack of Uniformed Division counter sniper personnel is a limiting factor when determining approval for specific events.^x Similar to using HSI Special Agents to supplement post standers, USSS explained that following July 13, 2024, USSS entered into a request for assistance agreement with CBP to use their Tactical Unit Snipers known as BORTAC from the Eagle Pass, Texas, post to supplement USSS counter snipers.^{xi}

Counter Assault Team (CAT)

From January 5, 2024, to February 29, 2024, DTD was denied CAT assets for various roles six times.^{xii} When asked about the denial of CAT assets, the ATSAIC of DTD told the Committee in a transcribed interview that sometimes they did get [CAT assets] and sometimes they did not. One notable example was for a January 6, 2024, visit to Iowa. DTD requested CAT advance support over email, CAT responded that they were unable to fulfill the request due to lack of available assets. Documents reviewed by the Committee indicated that the request was fulfilled by local tactical assets. However, the itinerary for the event stated that there would be “No traditional police meeting scheduled.”^{xiii} A police meeting is a planning meeting between USSS and local law enforcement to go over operational plans for securing the event. The Technical Security Division (TSD) advance agent for the Butler rally stated that a police meeting is “where all the assets that I need to talk to, from the fire chief, the respective bomb squad sergeant or captain – or commander... and so on and so forth, they are at this meeting.”^{xiv}

A similar instance occurred for a visit to Las Vegas, Nevada from January 26, 2024, to January 28, 2024, President Trump’s detail requested CAT advance support one week prior to the event, on January 19, 2024. Internal communications between CAT Operations Center and DTD provided to the Committee revealed that the denial of the request took CAT Operations Center fewer than twenty minutes to relay the denial to DTD. However, unlike other denials, CAT Operations Center stated the reason for denial was due to the lack of available personnel in this district.^{xv} In a letter from USSS to the Committee, USSS explained that because of the unavailability of CAT advance support, local law enforcement who usually supplement USSS CAT personnel were not provided because there was no liaison from the USSS available.^{xvi}

The ATSAIC of DTD stated CAT denials were not uncommon. In a transcribed interview with the Committee, the ATSAIC of DTD stated there were probably more than five times where CAT assets were denied following a request from DTD.^{xvii} While the Committee could not verify the exact number of denials for CAT assets and personnel, USSS told the Committee that on April 7, 2024, a CAT team was assigned to travel with DTD on an ongoing basis.^{xviii}

Enhanced Counter-Unmanned Aerial System Assets

Between November 15, 2022, the date President Trump announced his candidacy for a second term, and July 13, 2024, the date of the Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign rally, USSS denied or left unfulfilled enhanced C-UAS asset requests on four separate occasions.^{xix} All of the requests were unfulfilled due to lack of manpower.^{xx} In a briefing to the Committee, USSS senior agency officials told the Committee that all requests submitted by the DTD for enhanced C-UAS assets were denied prior to the July 13, 2024, Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign rally.^{xxi}

For President Trump’s June 9, 2024, visit to Las Vegas, Nevada, DTD requested enhanced C-UAS assets. Internal communications from DTD to the Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge (ATSAIC) of the Technical Security Division (TSD) stated that President Trump would be speaking outdoors, fully exposed, and vulnerable to UAS threats. TSD replied that they would be unable to support the request but would assist with setting up a ground response plan.^{xxii} TSD did not indicate a reason for the denial.

While TSD did not provide justification for the denial of enhanced C-UAS assets in Las Vegas, two weeks later DTD once again requested these capabilities for President Trump's visit to Chesapeake, Virginia, on June 28, 2024.^{xxiii} Similar to the Las Vegas rally, DTD told TSD in the request that President Trump would be speaking outdoors, exposed, and vulnerable to UAS threats.^{xxiv} The next denial of enhanced C-UAS assets by TSD occurred ahead of the July 9, 2024, campaign event in Doral, Florida, which was expected to have an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 attendees.^{xxv} In preparation for this event, on July 1, 2024, DTD operations staff emailed the ATSAIC of TSD requesting "enhanced C-UAS coverage to include, detection and enhanced mitigation capabilities... as well as an operator for the day of the visit."^{xxvi} TSD responded to DTD the following day, stating: "Due to POTUS travel and the NATO NSSE during this timeframe, C-UAS is unable to accommodate this request."^{xxvii} This specific denial of assets is notable, as the campaign event took place on July 9, the same day which threat information was shared with DTD and USSS agents preparing for the upcoming Butler rally on July 13.^{xxviii}

The final denial for C-UAS assets by USSS Headquarters came days prior to the July 13, 2024, Butler, Pennsylvania rally. In a transcribed interview with the Committee, the C-UAS advance agent stated that he requested enhanced C-UAS assets on July 10, 2024, which were denied.^{xxix} In a document production to the Committee, USSS provided internal communications related to the denial of enhanced C-UAS assets to the DTD.^{xxx} In the Committee's review of this production, Committee staff did not locate an explicit denial of enhanced C-UAS to DTD for the July 13 campaign rally. However, in a transcribed interview, the C-UAS Advance Agent told the Committee the request was denied telephonically from the TSD Advance Agent, which was corroborated by documentation from USSS.^{xxxi} When the Committee asked whether it was common for asset denials to be issued without providing a reason, USSS told the Committee that prior to July 13, 2024, there was no formal procedure to submit a request and justification to the Office of Staffing and Logistics and therefore, there was no standard response concerning approvals or denials of such requests from USSS Headquarters.^{xxxii}

III. ACCOUNTABILITY WITHIN THE SECRET SERVICE

In the seventeen transcribed interviews the Committee has conducted, the USSS personnel interviewed have continued to shift blame and point fingers, not only within the agency, but also with PSP and Butler ESU. Following months of requests for records relating to the disciplinary actions taken against USSS personnel involved in the planning and execution of the Butler rally, the Chairman issued a subpoena on behalf of the Committee to USSS for such records on July 1, 2025.

On July 3, 2025, USSS produced to the Committee a table of administrative and disciplinary actions taken against officers related to their performance at the July 13, 2024, campaign rally.^{xxxiii} According to the document, six individuals received disciplinary action from the USSS Office of Integrity following the attempted assassination of President Trump.^{xxxiv} Four of these individuals were assigned to the USSS Pittsburgh Field Office, one individual was assigned to DTD, and one individual is assigned to UD. The disciplinary actions taken by the USSS Office of Integrity span from a ten-day to forty-two-day suspension without pay.^{xxxv}

Additionally, two individuals were placed on management directed reassignments.^{xxxvi} No USSS personnel were fired for their role in the planning or execution of the Butler rally.^{xxxvii}

While these six individuals played a role in the failures that occurred on July 13, 2024, the Committee would like to note the lack of disciplinary action for other individuals involved, most notably the USSS Security Room Agent, who, according to testimony and documents received by the committee, failed to relay critical information he obtained from the PSP Security Room Officer regarding a suspicious individual with a range finder to the DTD agents who could have removed or prevented President Trump from taking the stage.^{xxxviii} In a document provided to the Committee detailing administrative actions taken against agents or officers of USSS by the agency, the USSS states “After the Mission Assurance Inquiry review was completed, as part of the determination of which employees might face discipline, [the USSS Security Room Agent] was found not to be in violation of Secret Service policy. [The USSS Security Room Agent] retired on June 28, 2025.”^{xxxix} Further discussions of the USSS Security Room Agent’s actions on July 13 are included below.

It is also concerning to the Committee that nearly one year has passed since an assassination attempt of the current President of the United States and the USSS has only days ago issued final disposition of disciplinary action to individuals who were determined to be complicit in the failures of USSS on July 13. Furthermore, USSS completed the disciplinary process for two personnel only after the Chairman issued the subpoena.

Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC

On August 14, 2024, the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC, was informed that pending the ongoing investigation into the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt, he was placed on telework status by his direct supervisor, the Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) in the Office of Investigations. The DAD in the Office of Investigations informed the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC that this decision came directly from Acting Director Rowe and the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC was instructed to place the USSS Site Counterpart, USSS Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC, the Protective Intelligence Advance Lead, and the USSS Advance Lead on the same telework status.^{xl} According to the USSS Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC’s written response to his Notice of Proposed Suspension, no reason, justification, or instructions for this action by Acting Director Rowe were given to the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC or any of the individuals the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC was instructed to place on telework status.^{xli} However, in the USSS Site Counterpart’s written response to her Notice of Proposed Suspension, she states “[USSS Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC] specifically informed me that I would not receive any documentation because there were concerns the information would leak.”^{xlii}

On November 26, 2024, the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC was informed by the DAD in the Office of Investigations that the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC would be permanently reassigned as the Director of USSS Personnel National Cyber and Forensics Training Alliance (NCFTA) and the DSAIC in the Criminal Investigative Division (CID).^{xliii} Despite this reassignment, the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC remained on restricted duty until December 29, 2024.^{xliv} This same day, the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC received a total of \$9,000 in performance-based awards for his exceptional hard work. . . during a manpower intensive

Presidential Campaign.^{xlv} In a written response to the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC's Notice of Proposed Suspension, the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC's attorney stated these awards are contingent on not receiving disciplinary action from the agency.^{xlvi} While the Committee is aware the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC did receive disciplinary action, it is unclear if he ever received the \$9,000 in performance-based awards.

On January 18, 2025, the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC received a Notice of Proposed Suspension stating the USSS Office of Integrity recommending he be suspended for fourteen days without pay.^{xlvii} On April 24, 2025, the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC received a final suspension decision from the USSS Office of Integrity which stated that the USSS' decision is that the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC will receive a fourteen-day suspension.^{xlviii}

As per Secret Service policy, if an individual disagrees with a final decision of the USSS Office of Integrity, they have the ability to request an administrative review of the decision by filing an administrative grievance with the USSS Discipline Review Board (DRB).^{xlix} The DRB will then meet to determine if the disciplinary action taken by the USSS Office of Integrity is adequate and will issue a response to the complainant. On May 6, 2025, the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC requested DRB review. On June 2, 2025, the DRB met and upheld the USSS Office of Integrity's decision regarding the proposed suspension for the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC.^l The Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC was issued a 14-day suspension without pay.^{li}

Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC

On August 14, 2024, the Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC was placed on telework status on the orders of former Acting Director Rowe by the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC. On January 17, 2025, the USSS Deputy Chief Integrity Officer issued a Notice recommending the Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC be suspended for ten days without pay.^{lii} On April 24, the Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC was issued a final suspension decision which confirmed the USSS's decision to suspend him for 10 days without pay.^{liii} On May 1, 2025, the Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC resumed full operational duty in his leadership position in the Pittsburgh Field Office.^{liv} On May 9, 2025, the Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC requested DRB review. On June 2, 2025, the DRB met and upheld the USSS Office of Integrity's decision regarding the proposed suspension for the Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC.^{lv} The Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC was issued a ten-day suspension without pay.^{lvi}

As part of the disciplinary process, agents are afforded the opportunity for their direct supervisor to comment on the findings of the Office of Integrity and list any mitigating or aggravated factors related to their proposed disciplinary action. The USSS Office of Integrity relied on the comments of the Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC for at least two personnel on proposed disciplinary action, even though the ATSAIC himself was under investigation and later received disciplinary action for the same incident.^{lvii}

USSS Site Agent

On August 16, 2024, the USSS Site Agent was placed on an unofficial restricted duty status by former Acting Director Rowe.^{lviii}

On November 5, 2024, the USSS Site Agent received a Notice of Proposed Suspension for three days in connection with an incident involving unauthorized contact with the media.^{lix} The USSS Site Agent appealed this proposed suspension and filed a written response via her attorney on December 19, 2024.^{lx}

On December 15, 2024, the USSS Site Agent was reassigned from DTD to the Miami Field Office.^{lxi} Despite this management directed reassignment, the USSS Site Agent remained on restricted duty until April 4, 2025.^{lxii}

On April 3, 2025, the USSS Site Agent was issued a suspension decision by the Chief Integrity Officer of the USSS for her unauthorized contact with the media.^{lxiii} The Office of Integrity considered several factors in her case and decreased her disposition from a three-day suspension without pay to a one-day suspension without pay.^{lxiv} The next day, April 4, 2025, the USSS Site Agent received a separate Notice of Proposed Suspension for forty-two days without pay as a result of her performance at the July 13, 2024, Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign event.^{lxv} This same day, the USSS Site Agent returned from restricted duty to a fully operational status at the USSS Miami Field Office.^{lxvi}

On July 3, 2025, the Site Agent was issued the final suspension for her involvement in planning and securing the July 13, 2024, Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign rally. The Site Agent's final disposition was forty-two days without pay.^{lxvii}

USSS Site Counterpart

On August 14, 2024, the USSS Site Counterpart was placed on telework status by the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC following the orders of former Acting Director Rowe. In mid-December 2024, the Site Counterpart was directed to report back to work but has since been prohibited in participating in her typical day-to-day responsibilities.^{lxviii} On April 4, 2025, the Site Counterpart received a notice from the USSS Office of Integrity proposing a fourteen-day suspension without pay.^{lxix}

USSS Lead Advance Agent

On August 14, 2024, the USSS Lead Advance Agent was placed on telework status by former Acting Director Rowe.^{lxx}

In January of 2025, the Lead Advance Agent returned from the situational telework but was restricted from performing her standard duties until April 8, 2025.^{lxxi}

On April 4, 2025, the USSS Lead Advance Agent received a Notice from the USSS Office of Integrity proposing a twenty-one-day suspension without pay.^{lxxii}

On July 1, 2025, the Lead Advance Agent received her final disciplinary decision from the USSS Office of Integrity. The USSS concluded the charges of negligence in the performance

of official duties were substantiated, but mitigated the proposed suspension of twenty-one days to fourteen days without pay.^{lxxiii}

USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader

On December 20, 2024, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader was placed on restricted duty by former Acting Director Rowe. On April 23, 2025, the Counter Sniper Team Leader received a Notice from the USSS Office of Integrity proposing a fifty-two-day suspension for negligence in the performance of official duties and specific operational failures during the July 13, 2024, Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign rally.^{lxxiv}

On July 3, 2025, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead received his official suspension decision. While he was found negligent, and although aggravating factors initially supported a fifty-two-day suspension, mitigating factors considered by the USSS Office of Integrity decreased his suspension without pay to thirty-five days.^{lxxv} As of July 9, 2025, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead remains on official restricted duty status.^{lxxvi}

IV. TIMELINE OF INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT INFORMATION LEADING UP TO JULY 13, 2024

Background of Threat Intelligence

On January 14, 2022, a video was posted on Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei's website depicting an animated drone strike targeting then-former President Donald Trump playing golf at his Mar-a-Lago estate in West Palm Beach, Florida.^{lxxvii} President Trump and others in his first administration's national security apparatus have long been targets of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) for the U.S. role in a January 3, 2020 drone strike which killed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) General, Qasem Soleimani.^{lxxviii} The threats from Iran continued even after President Trump left office on January 20, 2021.^{lxxix}

On July 12, 2024, one day before the Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign rally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested Asif Raza Merchant, a Pakistani national with ties to Iran and the IRGC.^{lxxx} According to the Department of Justice (DOJ) criminal complaint, after spending approximately two weeks in Iran, Merchant arrived in the U.S. in April 2024 to recruit an individual to assassinate U.S. political officials.^{lxxxi} The now-unsealed DOJ proffer agreement states that Merchant was charged with murder-for-hire.^{lxxxii} While discussing the assassination plot with undercover federal law enforcement officers, Merchant alluded to that he was "the 'representative' in the United States, indicating that there were other people he worked for outside the U.S."^{lxxxiii} After making an agreement with and paying \$5,000 to undercover federal law enforcement officers to commit the murder, Merchant attempted to leave the United States on July 12, 2024, when he was subsequently arrested by the FBI.^{lxxxiv}

On November 8, 2024, the DOJ released a criminal complaint from the Southern District of New York stating Farhad Shakeri, an Afghan national living in Iran, conspired with two United States citizens to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization,

to commit murder-for-hire, money laundering, and to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.^{lxxxv}

The complaint alleges that Shakeri, working on behalf of the IRGC, recruited two United States citizens in order to assassinate enemies of Iran. The complaint lists a total of four victims residing in the United States and one planned mass casualty attack overseas.^{lxxxvi} Among the four listed U.S. based targets, “Victim Four” was identified as President Trump. Shakeri told the FBI that the IRGC has long been targeting President Trump for assassination attempts:

[A]ccording to Shakeri, in approximately mid-to-late September 2024, IRGC Official-1 asked Shakeri to put aside his other efforts on behalf of the IRGC and focus on surveilling, and, ultimately, assassinating, former President of the United States, Donald J. Trump. Shakeri indicated to IRGC Official-1 that this would cost a “huge” amount of money. In response, IRGC Official-1 said that “we have already spent a lot of money. . . [s]o the money’s not an issue,” which Shakeri understood to mean that the IRGC previously had spent a significant sum of money on efforts to murder [President Trump] and was willing to continue spending a lot of money in its attempt to procure [President Trump]’s assassination.

[D]uring his meeting with IRGC Official-1 on or about October 7, 2024, IRGC Official-1 directed Shakeri to provide a plan within seven days to kill [President Trump]. If Shakeri was unable to put forth a plan within that timeframe, IRGC Official-1 continued, the IRGC would pause its plan to kill [President Trump] until after the U.S. Presidential elections, because IRGC Official-1 assessed [President Trump] would lose the election and, afterward, it would be easier to assassinate [President Trump].^{lxxxvii}

Pre-July 13

During the first week of July, several Deputy Assistant Directors met at Secret Service Headquarters to discuss intelligence they had received regarding President Trump.^{lxxxviii} The Director of the Office of Protective Operations told the Committee that the outcome of that meeting was that “if there is actionable intelligence of specific intelligence towards a specific event, that might be an opportunity to leverage different resources if required...one of which could be counter sniper[s].”^{lxxxix} The result of the conversation was that going forward counter sniper assets would be deployed at all of President Trump’s outdoor rallies.^{xc} This directive was then communicated to the SAIC of the Special Operations Division,

On July 3, 2024, an agent from the USSS Protective Intelligence Division (PID) sent an email to the SAIC and DSAIC of DTD, informing them that PID had received approval for a one-time-read-in of classified reports related to their assignment.^{xci} According to the communications reviewed by the Committee, the SAIC and DSAIC of DTD needed to travel to a local FBI office to receive the brief in the FBI’s secure compartmented information facility

(SCIF).^{xcii} The SAIC of DTD responded to the PID agent requesting to attend the briefing at 1:30 p.m. on July 8, 2024, the day before the Doral, Florida, campaign rally.^{xciii} Following the briefing, the DSAIC of DTD sent a text message to an undisclosed number of DTD personnel stating, “It is imperative that 2nd Supervisors focus heavily on line-of-sight mitigation... Exposure time, and line-of-sight mitigation of critical areas of concern. Finally, interact with your site agents early in the advance as we should mandate that [protective asset] is available for ALL DTD outside rallies.”^{xciv}

The timeline of documents provided to the Committee from USSS coincide with what was publicly reported by The New York Times regarding threats to President Trump. The New York Times published that it was FBI leadership, including then Director of the FBI, Christopher Wray, who was personally involved in ensuring the USSS was aware of the threat to President Trump.^{xcv} Moreover, The New York Times claimed that it was in response to the threat posed by Asif Merchant that the USSS made the decision to send counter snipers to the Butler, Pennsylvania, rally on July 13.^{xcvi}

President Trump held a campaign rally in Doral, Florida, on July 9, 2024, the same day USSS decided it would supply counter sniper assets for the former President’s July 13, 2024, rally in Butler, Pennsylvania due to threat intelligence. In his interview with the Committee, the ATSAIC of the DTD, told the Committee he received a phone call from SAIC of DTD on July 8, 2024, informing him that counter sniper assets had already been approved and directed him to complete the request paperwork.^{xcvii} The ATSAIC of DTD told the Committee that he believed the decision by USSS Headquarters to add counter sniper assets was intelligence driven.^{xcviii}

When asked who conveyed the specific intelligence, the ATSAIC of DTD told the Committee that it was the DSAIC of DTD who told him “The information I received was we have a credible, long-range threat to [President Trump] and it’s by the typical actors.”^{xcix}

Despite the claim from the Deputy Assistant Director of OPO asserting that USSS Headquarters had decided to provide DTD with counter sniper assets at all outdoor rallies following the July 8, 2024, PID briefing, counter snipers were not present at the July 9, 2024, Doral rally.^c While USSS counter sniper assets were assigned to the Butler, Pennsylvania, rally three days later, of those who were asked in transcribed interviews with the Committee, none of the USSS counter snipers were informed of the threat intelligence regarding the protectee. In addition to the USSS counter snipers who were not briefed on the threat intelligence regarding President Trump, the ATSAIC of DTD confirmed in his transcribed interview that he never received a verbal briefing from PID indicating the existence of an elevated threat environment.^{ci}

Despite the Butler, Pennsylvania, rally being the first time a former President and candidate has received counter sniper assets from the Secret Service, it was not the first time these assets had been requested by DTD as discussed previously.^{cii}

V. CONCLUSIVE FAILURES OF THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

In a briefing with the Committee, USSS officials stated that the unprecedented nature of having a protectee as both a former President and a candidate for office simultaneously was not appreciated to the degree it should have been.^{ciii} This unique circumstance led to confusion and assumptions made by USSS staff in charge of planning security for the rally. The lack of communication both within USSS and between local law enforcement regarding a suspicious individual, USSS not requesting assets because they believed the assets would be denied, and placing individuals in roles with ill-defined responsibilities culminated in a breakdown of accountability among those individuals the Committee interviewed.

While the Committee discussed the communication failures at length in the interim findings report, additional information became evident in transcribed interviews and documents produced by the USSS following the Committee's initial assessment.

USSS Security Room Agent

The lack of structured communication was likely the greatest contributor to the failures of the USSS on July 13, 2024. At a USSS protected event, the individual in charge of communications is the security room agent. The security room agent's duties include conducting appropriate radio checks, passing all pertinent protectee movement to the post standers, and in the event of an emergency, communicate situational information to the shift and post standers accordingly.^{civ}

At the Butler rally, the security room agent was the SAIC of the USSS Buffalo, New York, Field Office.^{cv} He was assigned the role on July 11, 2024. Although he had originally submitted himself to work the First Lady's trip to Pittsburgh, he was asked by the SAIC of the USSS Pittsburgh Field Office to work the security room at the Butler rally instead.^{cvi} Despite telling the Committee that he had been a security room agent "5 or 6 times" prior to arriving in Butler, he was not cognizant of numerous issues which hindered his ability to perform his duty.^{cvii}

While the USSS Security Room Agent told the Committee "[T]he role of the command post is to ingest information from different sources and then put that information back out", he was simultaneously unaware that Butler County had a separate command post until the afternoon of July 13.^{cviii} He only discovered the existence of another command post after overhearing conversations between the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Officer stationed in the USSS Security Room and other law enforcement.^{cix} By his own admission, he never had direct contact with local law enforcement throughout the day, and that his only method of communication with them was through the PSP officer in the USSS Security Room.^{cx} Moreover, when asked by the Committee if he had viewed the PSP or Butler Emergency Services Unit (ESU) operations plan prior to the event, he stated that his first time seeing either of the operations plans was the day prior to his transcribed interview with the Committee.^{cx}

The USSS Security Room Agent first learned of the suspicious individual, later identified as Thomas Crooks, at 5:45 p.m., 25 minutes before the shooting, when his PSP counterpart in the security room received a call from the Butler County command post reporting that a local tactical team was looking for a suspicious individual.^{cxii} During the conversation between the USSS Security Room Agent and the PSP Security Room Officer, the PSP Security Room Officer relayed that the suspicious individual was outside the perimeter and had a rangefinder.^{cxiii} In a joint interview with the PSP and FBI, the PSP Security Room Officer stated the following regarding the USSS Security Room Agent's reaction to learning of the suspicious individual:

Question: When you made that --- when you relayed the information to him, was this in person?

PSP Officer: Yes. Yes.

Question: Did you see if he communicated that over his radio?

PSP Officer: I don't know, but I know he appeared to, like, it wasn't --- there was, like, after I said outside the perimeter, I got a distinct impression that there's, like, a lack of urgency.

Question: Like, you know, could you go on about, like, -- could you explain more?

PSP Officer: About, like, it was like. Oh, like, okay. Like, it wasn't like he rushed around or did anything. I just told him about this and everything.^{cxiv}

The USSS Security Room agent told the Committee that after learning of the suspicious person, he relayed the information to the USSS C-UAS Advance Agent embedded in the Security Room.^{cxv} In this conversation, the USSS Security Room Agent told the C-UAS Advance Agent to pass the information along to the USSS Counter Sniper Response Agent and have him start looking.^{cxvi} When asked about whether the information was passed to Protective Intelligence (PI) Response Agent, the USSS Security Room Agent stated, "Yeah. I believe that they were notified at the same time as CS Response, but through [the C-UAS Advance Agent]."^{cxvii} According to the PI Response Agent, she heard the information from her PSP Counterpart, not the C-UAS Advance Agent, and stated no one had dispatched her.^{cxviii} The C-UAS Advance agent corroborates what the PI Response Agent told to the Committee stating, "PI also went out to try to locate the individual. I did not speak to her, but possibly it could've been the [USSS] Security Room Agent that did."^{cxix}

Regarding a suspicious individual on the outer perimeter, the USSS Security Room Agent told the Committee, "For someone on the outer perimeter, there's really only two assets available to us from a USSS perspective to dispatch... the [protective intelligence] response and the [counter sniper] response because they're the only people who are capable of leaving the interior secure perimeter to go on the outside to look for somebody."^{cxx} Furthermore, because the information regarding a suspicious individual with a rangefinder was passed verbally from the

PSP Security Room Officer to the USSS Security Room Agent, and the USSS Security Room Agent made the decision for the USSS C-UAS Agent to relay the information over the phone to the USSS Counter Sniper Response Agent, rather than radio, the message did not go out to USSS post standers, counter snipers, and DTD shift detail.^{cxxxi} The ATSAIC of DTD stated in his transcribed interview that the information should have been elevated to someone at his level.^{cxxii} Had the ATSAIC on the DTD shift been aware of the information, he could have potentially prevented the President from taking the stage while the suspicious individual was being tracked down. When asked which USSS individual was responsible for tracking down the suspicious person, he stated, “In this specific instance, a protective intelligence advance agent or a site protective intelligence agent, site agent would be primary.”^{cxxiii}

The job of a Security Room Agent is to be the conduit of communications between all entities involved in a protective site in order to ensure situational awareness of all parties involved in securing the event. The PSP Security Room Officer, when asked during a joint interview with FBI and PSP whether he was aware of a suspicious person being on the roof of the AGR building prior to the shooting responded, “at 1809, I received another call from [Butler ESU Commander] saying that the guy was discovered on top of a roof.”^{cxxiv} The PSP Security Room Officer continues by stating he relayed that information to the USSS Security Room Agent but did not notice if the USSS Security Room Agent did anything with that information.^{cxxv} In the USSS Security Room Agent’s transcribed interview with the Committee the USSS Security Room Agent claims he never heard about the individual on the roof, only that that local police were working a problem at 3 o’clock.^{cxxvi} The USSS Security Room Agent states in his transcribed interview with the Committee, “what I recall is that the local police were working [a] problem at 3 o’clock. And when I heard that on the radio, that’s what I put back out over the Secret Service Radio”.^{cxxvii} However, in the USSS Security Room Agent’s joint interview with PSP and FBI he states:

Question:	Okay. Were you ever made aware of Mr. Crooks being on the roof prior to the shooting?
USSS Agent:	No.
Question:	Okay, so if [PSP Security Room Officer] were to say that he did inform you guys that he was on the roof, that wouldn’t be an accurate statement
USSS Agent:	Yeah, I don’t recall being told that he was on the roof until we heard the radio traffic come across that the local police were working the problem at [3o’clock]. ^{cxxviii}

There are conflicting accounts between the PSP Security Room Officer and the USSS Security Room Agent regarding whether or not the USSS Security Room Agent heard that the suspicious individual was on the roof of the AGR building. The PSP Security Room Officer testifies in his joint interview with PSP and FBI:

Question: And then prior to calling [PSP Corporal], you gave that information to the Secret Service about him being on the rooftop?

PSP Officer: Yes.

Question: And who was that you communicated that to?

PSP Officer: It would be [USSS Security Room Agent]. Like, I was like, you know, it was like, we're in the room and I'm like, moving fast.

Question: He could hear all your communications?

PSP Officer: Yes, yes. Like, 'cause I'm – Yeah. 'Cause I'm like, trying to get— it's like, hey, like— basically, almost like, hey, he's on the roof. And then I need to get our people there because obviously, you know, they're the ones that can get there fastest. ^{cxxxix}

USSS Protective Intelligence Response Agent

The Protective Intelligence (PI) Response Agent at the Butler rally was a Special Agent out of the Phoenix, Arizona Field Office.^{cxxx} In a transcribed interview with the Committee, the PI Response Agent asserted that the job of a PI Response Agent is to respond to any unusual or threatening individuals in the site, including any individual with an unusual interest in the protectee.^{cxxxi} According to documents reviewed by Committee staff, the PI response agent is paired up with a local law enforcement agent, in this case, a Pennsylvania State Trooper, to ensure fluid channels of communication between state and local law enforcement with USSS.

The PI Response Agent told the Committee that her PSP Counterpart had been issued a radio for communication with PSP, who had a presence in the Security Room.^{cxxxii} However, in the Pennsylvania State Trooper's interview with PSP and the FBI, he stated that he did not have his radio and was using his cell phone to communicate with the command post.^{cxxxiii}

Between 5:30 p.m. and 5:45 p.m., the PI Response Agent was told by her PSP Counterpart there was a suspicious individual seen outside the venue with a rangefinder.^{cxxxiv} After arriving at the location where the suspicious individual was last seen, the PI Response Agent spoke with the local tactical team and a Pennsylvania State Trooper posted in the vicinity. She was able to gather a vague description of the individual and was told the individual was no longer in the area.^{cxxxv} The PI Response Agent told the Committee that even if a suspicious person is no longer in the area continuing the behavior, they are still a concern since they could return.^{cxxxvi} Furthermore, she added that a PI Response Agent should not stop searching for the individual until after the visit.^{cxxxvii}

The PI Response Agent then called the Counter Sniper Response Agent asking if either of the USSS counter sniper teams had seen the suspicious individual.^{cxxxviii} After the PI Response Agent ended the phone call with the Counter Sniper Response Agent, she, along with her PSP Counterpart began to drive back to the stage left area to resume crowd control.^{cxxxix} On the way to resuming crowd control, her PSP Counterpart separated from the PI Response Agent and offered to drive his vehicle in order to continue searching for the suspicious individual.^{cxl} When asked by the Committee whether she informed the command post that she stopped looking for the suspicious individual, the PI Response Agent stated, “I did not, my team, meaning that [the PSP Counterpart], was still looking... I was not in a position to leave the venue to keep looking.”^{cxli} She asserted that her primary responsibility and duties would be within the site itself, but that’s not to say that [she] could not respond to something outside the site.^{cxlii} When asked about the difference between a protective intelligence response agent and a counter sniper response agent, the PI Response Agent stated that the counter sniper response agent addresses individuals specifically flagged by the counter sniper team and the protective intelligence response agent responds to anything reported as suspicious.^{cxliii}

The PI Response Agent told the Committee it was not her job to search for a suspicious individual.^{cxliv} Despite this claim by the PI Response Agent, the Counter Sniper Response Agent told the Committee that it was the PI Response Agent’s job to look for suspicious people, and the counter sniper [response agent’s] job is to look for threats.^{cxlv} When confronted with this contradiction, the PI Response Agent stated “He’s not incorrect. I think it depends on your personal definition of suspicious and threat.”^{cxlvi} Furthermore, the PI Response Agent stated that an individual with a rangefinder is what she would consider unusual or suspicious.^{cxlvii}

While the PI Response Agent asserted that her PSP Counterpart was still searching for the suspicious individual, in the PSP Counterpart’s PSP and FBI interview, he stated that as he was leaving the outer perimeter he was stopped by the Secret Service and told that if he exits, he would not be allowed back into the event.^{cxlviii} This interaction prompted the PSP Counterpart to return to the Command Post.^{cxlix} Since the PSP Counterpart did not have a radio and the PI Response Agent only had a USSS post-stander radio, the two could only communicate directly by cell phone after they separated .

The PI Response Agent returned to the stage left to assist with crowd control at approximately 6:00 p.m., despite the ongoing concern of a suspicious individual with a rangefinder.^{cl} Although the PI Response Agent left the area where the individual was last seen, she asserts that she never stopped searching.^{cli} She did not inform the Security Room or USSS personnel responsible for protectee movements because she believed the Security Room was already aware of the suspicious individual and had no additional intelligence.^{clii} When asked if a Counter Surveillance Unit (CSU) would have been helpful in searching for the suspicious individual, the PI Response Agent stated that it would have been beneficial because they would have been moving outside the venue and would have been better positioned to look for this person.^{cliii}


USSS Hercules 1 Counter Sniper

The USSS Counter Sniper partnered with the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader in the Hercules 1 position on the southern barn was the counter sniper who neutralized Thomas Crooks moments after he opened fire injuring President Trump, David Dutch and James Copenhaver, and killing Corey Comperatore. The Hercules 1 Counter Sniper's quick and decisive action to neutralize the threat on July 13 undoubtedly saved countless lives of numerous innocent rallygoers.

The Hercules 1 Counter Sniper learned on the Tuesday prior to the event that he would be covering the Butler, Pennsylvania, rally on July 13.^{cliv} Despite the unusual nature of being tasked with protecting a former President, the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper told the Committee he was unaware of the underlying intelligence which led to the deployment of counter sniper assets.^{clv} While the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper was not the counter sniper team lead advance, he was the highest ranking counter sniper at the event making him the supervisor of the other USSS counter snipers.^{clvi} On July 11, 2024, prior to arriving at the Butler Farm Show site, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader sent a document to all USSS counter snipers titled the Counter Sniper Team Tactical Survey.^{clvii} This document listed primary areas of concern, one of which was the AGR building described as "buildings at three o'clock, approximately."^{clviii}

On the morning of July 13, the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper arrived at the Butler Farm Show site and participated in a walkthrough with other USSS counter snipers.^{clix} In the walkthrough, the Counter Sniper Team Leader pointed out the AGR building stating that there would be a local counter sniper team positioned on the second floor.^{clx} When asked about line-of-sight concerns and mitigation practices, the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper told the Committee, "So we're looking at not just [the AGR] rooftop but all areas within the 360-degree circle. That's our area of responsibility."^{clxi} Despite the USSS counter snipers having a 360-degree area of responsibility, the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper testified to the Committee that at the time, he was unaware of Hercules 2's partially obstructed view of the AGR building's roof.^{clxii} This fact was particularly troubling to the Committee. When asked which USSS counter sniper team had the AGR building in their particular area of responsibility, the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper stated the counter sniper team responsible for securing the roof of the AGR building was Hercules 2, the team which had an obstructed view.^{clxiii}

View from the Roof of AGR Looking Towards the Position of Hercules 1 (right) and Hercules 2 (left)^{clxiv}



The Hercules 1 Counter Sniper first learned of the suspicious individual at 5:53 p.m. after receiving an email from the USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead co-positioned with him at Hercules 1.^{clxv} The email was forwarded to the USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead from the local Butler County ESU counter snipers and stated “If spotted, please notify PI at [redacted] or go direct with the Security Room. Kid [lurking] around building we are in, AGR I believe it is. I did see him with a rangefinder looking towards stage, FYI, if you want to notify SS snipers to look out. I lost sight of him.”^{clxvi} The Hercules 1 Counter Sniper told the Committee that an individual with a rangefinder is not inherently suspicious.^{clxvii} After that information was received by the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, he made the decision to not utilize the counter sniper response agent. When asked by the Committee why he made that decision, the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper responded, “I do not know why he was not sent.”^{clxviii}

However, the Counter Sniper Response Agent was sent to search for the suspicious individual, not by the USSS counter sniper team, but rather the C-UAS agent embedded in the USSS Command Post.^{clxix} Furthermore, as the information regarding the suspicious person was passed to USSS counter snipers via email, the DTD shift detail was not aware of the suspicious individual.^{clxx} Between 6:06 p.m. and 6:09 p.m., a USSS counter sniper in the Hercules 2 position transmitted on the radio channel shared by the DTD, USSS counter snipers and the USSS Security Room that locals are working a problem at the 3 o’clock.^{clxxi} Since the USSS

Security Room Agent did not use the radio to transmit the information about a suspicious individual with a rangefinder, DTD was still unaware. When asked why the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper did not put the BOLO out on the radio, he said that he wanted to keep observing the [3 o'clock] and keep the radio air clear.^{clxxii}

Prior to when shots were fired, the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper testified that he had heard that someone was on the roof of the AGR building.^{clxxiii} He was unaware if it came over his USSS radio or whether it came from the crowd.^{clxxiv} Furthermore, he was unsure if his co-located partner, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead had heard the same.^{clxxv} Again, the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper decided to not radio that information to the Security Room or DTD. Instead, he “was trying to do [his] job and observe the rooftops.”^{clxxvi} While observing the vicinity of the AGR building, he noticed local police running around the building with their weapons drawn.^{clxxvii} While he stated that this raised his suspicion, he was focusing on the building and made the decision to not use his radio in order to notify DTD, the Security Room, or other USSS counter snipers. Former Acting Director Rowe stated in his testimony to a joint committee hearing with the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs that the reason why President Trump was not removed was that USSS did not have any other information aside from the locals working an issue at the 3 o'clock.^{clxxviii}

When asked by the Committee why he did not relay information regarding the suspicious individual with a rangefinder, hearing there was an individual on the roof, or local law enforcement running towards the AGR building with their weapons drawn, the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper stated:

“I’m not the only one that’s observing that area. Someone else could’ve also put out the radio call. I’m not just going to go ahead and, you know, just put it on, just myself. There were other individuals.”^{clxxix}

VI. CONTRADICTORY, FALSE, OR MISLEADING STATEMENTS MADE BY SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS OF THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

Kimberly Cheatle

On July 22, 2024, nine days after the attempted assassination of President Trump, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform held a committee hearing with the then-Director of the USSS, Kimberly Cheatle. In that hearing, Director Cheatle testified under oath in response to questions from multiple Members of Congress that “for the event in Butler, there were no requests that were denied.”^{clxxx} The Committee is aware, by the USSS’ own admission that this claim is false. In fact, the USSS has provided the Committee with a list of all assets requested by DTD and denied by USSS headquarters. The Committee is aware of at least two instances of assets being denied by USSS headquarters as they relate to the July 13, Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign rally.^{clxxxi}

The first example of assets which were requested by DTD and denied by USSS Headquarters is the request for enhanced C-UAS assets. While it is true that the DTD did have C-UAS assets in place at the July 13, Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign rally, enhanced C-UAS assets were also requested.^{clxxxii} The USSS told the Committee that the request for enhanced C-UAS assets went unfulfilled due to the lack of manpower to support the request.^{clxxxiii} Additionally, DTD also requested a USSS CAT LNO or liaison. A CAT LNO is a USSS position within the CAT which the agency uses to coordinate between USSS CAT and local CAT. While this particular asset was not listed in the assets denied by the USSS Headquarters, the Lead Advance Agent testified in her transcribed interview that while the asset was requested by DTD, CAT LNO assets were not “approved or provided” for “manpower reasons.”^{clxxxiv}

Ronald Rowe

Former Acting Director Rowe testified before a joint committee hearing between the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on July 30, 2024.^{clxxxv} Former Acting Director Rowe’s testimony, when cross-referenced with USSS transcribed interviews, was misleading and contradicted by other USSS officials. When asked if the USSS Counter Sniper Advance Lead gave explicit instructions to local counter snipers regarding a plan to cover the roof of the AGR Building, the former Acting Director responded that it was his understanding the locals “had a plan” because they had been there before.^{clxxxvi} However, in interviews with the USSS counter sniper team, specifically the USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead confirmed that he did not instruct the local counter snipers in the AGR building about any role they should [play] in covering the AGR roof specifically.^{clxxxvii}

USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead

The USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead was the individual responsible for completing advance paperwork, ensuring the USSS counter sniper team and local counter sniper teams knew their assignments, acting as the conduit between local counter snipers and USSS counter snipers, and determining placement for counter snipers.^{clxxxviii} While the USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead stated that it was his responsibility to determine positions, when asked whether he either went inside the AGR building or on top of the AGR roof at any point in the planning for the rally the USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead replied, “I did not, no.”^{clxxxix}

When asked by the Committee whether he was comfortable in terms of the ability to accomplish his mission that day from his position, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead stated, “Yes. They were good positions.”^{cxc} During the USSS Hercules 2 Counter Sniper’s transcribed interview, he stated that when he went on post with his partner, they noted several trees which blocked the three o’clock to four o’clock view of the AGR building.^{cxc} When the Committee asked the USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead about the obstruction from the Hercules 2 position, he replied, “But Hercules 1, you had a clear line-of-sight, so I was okay with it.”^{cxcii} Notwithstanding the alleged clear line-of-sight from Hercules 1’s position, USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead’s partner, USSS Hercules 1 Counter Sniper told the Committee that

Hercules 2 was the USSS counter sniper team who held responsibility for “the three o’clock side”, which included the AGR building.^{cxci} Furthermore, despite claiming that Hercules 1 had a clear line-of-sight, when the USSS Hercules 1 Counter Sniper Team Lead was asked by the Committee if he had a clear line-of-sight to the AGR roof he responded, “Not full line-of-sight. I could not see the actual roof itself.”^{cxci}

The USSS Hercules 1 Counter Sniper testified that his and the USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead’s area of responsibility was primarily covering the 6 o’clock to 9 o’clock to 12 o’clock, while Hercules 2 would be covering from the 12 o’clock to 3 o’clock to 6 o’clock.^{cxci} This presents a host of issues which greatly concern the Committee. The first of which is Hercules 2 was responsible for covering the 12 o’clock to 6 o’clock despite the 3 o’clock and 4 o’clock positions being obstructed by foliage.^{cxci} Furthermore, while the USSS counter sniper team had overlapping area of responsibilities, Hercules 1’s primary area of responsibility was that facing away from the AGR building despite being the primary reason the USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead was okay with the obstructed line-of-sight of Hercules 2.

Question: And you mentioned that the line-of-sight concern was mitigated with AGR because there were always Secret Service counter sniper eyes on the rooftop?

USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead: Mitigated as in between Secret Service was looking at them but as well as other local CS had eyes on from the horse stadium, as well.

Question: And so were they just looking at the AGR Roof?

USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead: No. Basically, the Hercules teams CS with the Secret Service, we were looking at everything 180 from the stage. I assumed the local counterparts, as well, as long as it’s in their line of sight and it’s not being obstructed, and there’s no reason you can’t see it, between the horse stadium teams and AGR building itself, if you can see it, you can act on said threats.^{cxci}

The issue with USSS Hercules 1 Counter Sniper Team Lead’s assessment was his reliance on the local counter snipers which the USSS Hercules 1 Counter Sniper Team Lead guessed was between 400 yards and 500 yards away from the AGR building to cover the roof.^{cxci} In comparison, the USSS Hercules 1 counter snipers were approximately 200 yards away.^{cxci}

USSS Site Agent and Site Counterpart

Throughout the Committee’s investigation, the Committee has continuously been told by USSS agents in charge of planning the Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign rally that they did not

request CSU personnel because this asset is typically not provided for a former President. However, in the Committee's review of USSS documents, it was discovered that CSU assets had twice been previously requested by DTD and approved by USSS Headquarters.^{cc}

VII. CHANGES IN SECRET SERVICE POLICY PURSUANT TO THE COMMITTEE'S INTERIM REPORT

An addendum to the USSS' March 12, 2025, document production to the Committee, USSS stated that changes were made to internal policy as a reflection of recommendations provided to the agency in the Committee's interim report. These changes to USSS internal policy largely reflect the Committee's findings regarding the lack of coordination and communication between federal, state, and local law enforcement entities; clarification of protective advance procedures; and the sharing of pertinent intelligence to USSS agents assigned to a protectee or protective event. Further information regarding the changes to USSS policy pursuant to the Committee's interim report recommendations will be released as an addendum to the final report.

VIII. OUTSTANDING REQUESTS AND OBSTRUCTION FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES

The Committee has made numerous requests to components of the Department of Justice which remain outstanding at the close of the investigation. The Committee's request to the FBI was originally transmitted on July 24, 2024. Beginning on October 3, 2024, the Committee went to the Department of Justice (DOJ) four times for the purpose of viewing FBI interview summaries, lab reports, firearms and explosives examinations in-camera. When the Committee arrived, the documents were produced in-camera, redacted. DOJ producing redacted documents in-camera greatly rendered the purpose for the Committee's visit moot. Furthermore, in February 2025, the Committee travelled to FBI Headquarters in Quantico, Virginia to receive an in-person briefing from subject matter experts involved in the case.^{cci} Despite a glimpse of cooperation from the FBI, the Committee's follow-up requests for information remain unanswered. On July 25, 2024, the Committee made a request to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) asking to interview a specific individual involved in the July 13 campaign rally. To date, the Committee has only received a one overly redacted production from the ATF and has not had the opportunity to interview the individual referred to in the Committee's initial letter and a general briefing stating the ATF had no official involvement in the rally.

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- ⁱ Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Mar. 12, 2025).
- ⁱⁱ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 14, 2025).; Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Mar. 12, 2025).
- ⁱⁱⁱ House of Representatives Oversight Committee: *Hearing on the Oversight of the U.S. Secret Service and the Attempted Assassination of President Donald J. Trump, 118th Cong. At min. 52:00* (July 22, 2024) (statement of Director Kimberly Cheatle).
- ^{iv} Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Second Supervisor, at 58 (Dec. 4, 2024).
- ^v U.S. Secret Service, *Email from Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service to Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Donald Trump Division, U.S. Secret Service* (June 28, 2023) at USSS_023585 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).
- ^{vi} U.S. Secret Service, *Email from Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service to Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Donald Trump Division, U.S. Secret Service* (June 28, 2023) at USSS_023585 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).
- ^{vii} U.S. Secret Service, *Email from Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service to Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Donald Trump Division, U.S. Secret Service* (June 28, 2023) at USSS_023585 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).
- ^{viii} U.S. Secret Service, *Email from Donald Trump Division Official, U.S. Secret Service to multiple Donald Trump Division Officials, U.S. Secret Service* (June 28, 2023) at USSS_023619 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).
- ^{ix} Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 14, 2025).
- ^x Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 14, 2025).
- ^{xi} Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 14, 2025).
- ^{xii} Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 14, 2025).
- ^{xiii} U.S. Secret Service, *Email from Donald Trump Division Official, U.S. Secret Service to multiple U.S. Secret Service Officials* (Dec. 27, 2023) at USSS_023547 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).
- ^{xiv} Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service TSD Advance Agent, at 20 (Aug. 13, 2024).
- ^{xv} U.S. Secret Service, *Email from Special Operations Official, U.S. Secret Service to Donald Trump Detail Official* (Jan. 19, 2024) at USSS_023551 and USSS_023552 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).
- ^{xvi} Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Mar. 12, 2025).
- ^{xvii} Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Second Supervisor, at 61 (Dec. 4, 2024).
- ^{xviii} Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Mar. 12, 2025).
- ^{xix} Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 14, 2025).; Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on

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- Investigations , at USSS_023570-023575, USSS_023632 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).
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- clxxix Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 54 (Dec. 5, 2024).
- clxxx House of Representatives Oversight Committee: *Hearing on the Oversight of the U.S. Secret Service and the Attempted Assassination of President Donald J. Trump, 118th Cong. At min. 52:00 (July 22, 2024) (statement of Director Kimberly Cheatle).*
- clxxxi Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Mar. 12, 2025).
- clxxxii Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 34 (Aug. 20, 2024).
- clxxxiii Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, at USSS_023632 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).
- clxxxiv Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 27 (Aug. 26, 2024).

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- clxxxv *See generally* U.S. Senate Joint Committee, Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate Homeland Security Committee: *Hearing on Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
- clxxxvi U.S. Senate Joint Committee, Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate Homeland Security Committee: *Hearing on Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump at Pg. 68*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
- clxxxvii Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Lead, Hercules 1, at 39 (Aug. 28, 2024).
- clxxxviii U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Overview, OPO-03(01), at USSS_006320 (Mar. 11, 2024), (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).
- clxxxix Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 39 (Aug. 28, 2024).
- exc Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1 at 27 (Aug. 28, 2024).
- exci Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper, Hercules 2 at 12 (Aug. 16, 2024).
- excii Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 77 (Aug. 28, 2024).
- exciii Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 28 (Dec. 5, 2024).
- exciv Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Officer Technician, at 43-44 (Aug. 28, 2024).
- excv Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 73 (Dec. 5, 2024).
- excvi Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Officer Technician, at 12 (Aug. 16, 2024).
- excvii Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Officer Technician, at 79-80 (Aug. 28, 2024).
- excviii Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Officer Technician, at 81 (Aug. 28, 2024).
- excix Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 78 (Dec. 5, 2024).
- cc *See generally* Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Mar. 12, 2025).
- cci Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Briefing with Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 21, 2025).