

STATEMENT OF ANNE L. RICHARDS

ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITS

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS

U.S. SENATE

CONCERNING

**BORDER SECURITY: EXAMINING PROVISIONS IN THE BORDER SECURITY,
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, AND IMMIGRATION MODERNIZATION ACT (S. 744)**

MAY 7, 2013



Good morning Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Coburn, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the enforcement provisions of the *Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act* and some of our reviews of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) border security programs.

In your invitation to testify, you asked that we focus on the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) work evaluating DHS border security programs and what steps we believe DHS will need to take to ensure that the metrics required by the Act are verifiable and enforceable. We used a broad interpretation of the question and included in our preparation audit and inspection work that we have conducted looking at border security and immigration issues as well as reviews of DHS management programs that support those efforts.

In the last 10 years, DHS has made progress in coalescing as one Department and in addressing its fundamental missions, including the missions of securing our borders and implementing sound controls, policies, and procedures over immigration programs. However, numerous challenges remain. Among the challenges in implementing this proposed legislation, DHS must develop a thoughtful process to assess the ongoing needs and gaps across its programs and operations as well as a comprehensive strategy to address vulnerabilities. This will require both time and resources to achieve, but ultimately, the Department should have the ability to overcome these challenges.

In my testimony today, I will highlight some overarching issues identified in our audits and inspections that the Department will need to address to achieve the goals and standards established in the proposed legislation—specifically, data reliability, planning, and systems modernization.

Data Reliability

In order to evaluate performance against the metrics in the proposed legislation or complete certain steps in the legislation, the Department needs complete, accurate, and up-to-date information. Several of our audits and inspections have identified instances of incomplete, inaccurate, and out-of-date data in many of the Department's programs and systems. We have also identified instances in which data is not always available to the Department from other entities, such as other Federal agencies and foreign governments. The Department and its components are working to address these issues, which will help them establish the necessary baselines to measure future achievements.

The following reports illustrate some of the challenges we identified related to the quality of the Department's data.

Supervision of Aliens

In December 2011, we issued *Supervision of Aliens Commensurate with Risk*, OIG-11-81, with the objective to assess the effectiveness of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) process for deciding whether to detain aliens in an ICE facility or place them in supervised release. ICE generally had an effective decision making process for determining whether to detain or release aliens. In most of the cases we assessed, officers made reasonable decisions

and complied with the requirements of the *Immigration and Nationality Act*, Supreme Court decisions, and prescribed policies and procedures. However, personnel could not always provide evidence that all aliens were screened against the Terrorist Watchlist; current policy for screening aliens from specially designated countries was not effective; and personnel did not always maintain accurate and up-to-date information in the case management system.

We noted that the component had taken actions to correct deficiencies in its data quality, and we recommended that ICE enforce the requirement to screen aliens against the Terrorist Watchlist, improve its policies and procedures for screening aliens from specially designated countries, and update information in its case management system.

Secure Communities

In March 2012, we issued *Operations of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Secure Communities*, OIG-12-64. In 2008, ICE implemented Secure Communities to enhance its ability to identify criminal aliens nationwide. The key component of Secure Communities is automated information sharing between DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Since 2008, ICE has spent about \$750 million on Secure Communities and identified more than 692,000 criminal aliens.

We performed this audit to determine whether Secure Communities was effective in identifying criminal aliens and if ICE appropriately prioritized cases for removal action. Secure Communities was effective in identifying criminal aliens, and in most cases, ICE officers took enforcement actions according to agency enforcement policy. Under Secure Communities, the agency expanded its ability to identify criminal aliens in areas not covered by its other programs. In addition, it was able to identify criminal aliens earlier in the justice process, some of whom it would not have identified under other programs.

Secure Communities was implemented at little or no additional cost to local law enforcement jurisdictions. Although ICE was able to identify and detain criminal aliens, field offices duplicated the research associated with their detention, and officers did not always sufficiently document their enforcement actions. To improve the transparency and thoroughness of its processes under Secure Communities, the agency needs to eliminate the duplication of research and ensure that officers fully document their actions. We made two recommendations to improve the agency's overall management of Secure Communities.

Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements Program

Our report, *Improvements Needed for SAVE To Accurately Determine Immigration Status of Individuals Ordered Deported*, OIG-13-11, was re-issued in December 2012 based on comments received from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) after the comment period. We determined that the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program provided information to benefit-granting agencies that was sometimes outdated and erroneous about an individual's immigration status. This occurred because status codes in the Central Index System, the primary system SAVE uses to validate an individual's immigrant status, was not immediately updated when the Immigration Court ordered an individual deported, removed, or

excluded. Instead, the codes were updated when the individual physically left the United States, which can take years. This problem could potentially affect the more than 800,000 individuals who have been ordered deported, removed, and excluded but who are still in the United States. Although the SAVE response, in and of itself, did not automatically result in approval of financial or other benefits, an erroneous response could result in agencies granting benefits to unentitled individuals.

Our random statistical sample of individuals ordered deported but who remained in the United States identified a 12 percent error rate in immigration status verification. These individuals had no status, but were erroneously identified as having lawful immigration status. The remaining 88 percent had lawful immigration status at the time of their status verification. Benefits for which individuals were verified ranged from airport badges and Transportation Worker Identification Cards, which provide individuals with access to secure areas, food stamps, driver's licenses, and education assistance. Some individuals included in our sample had committed felonies ranging from citizenship fraud to aggravated assault.

Free and Secure Trade Program

In the report, *Free and Secure Trade Program – Continued Driver Eligibility*, OIG-12-84, which we issued in May 2012, we reviewed the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program to determine whether its continued eligibility processes ensure that only eligible drivers remain in the program. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP's) FAST program is a border accord initiative among the United States, Canada, and Mexico designed to ensure the security and safety of interborder commerce while enhancing the economic prosperity of each country. Under the program, participants who meet certain eligibility criteria are considered low risk and receive expedited border processing. This enables CBP to redirect security efforts and inspections to commerce that is high or unknown risk while ensuring the movement of legitimate, low-risk commerce.

The FAST program's continued eligibility processes do not ensure that only eligible drivers remain in the program. CBP is hampered in its ability to ensure that Mexican citizens and residents in the program are low risk because Mexico does not share information with the United States to vet and continuously monitor drivers' eligibility.

Also, although CBP has a continuous vetting process, some ineligible drivers may be actively enrolled in the program.

In addition, CBP has not implemented a process to assess the program's effect on border security risk. Without a robust risk assessment process, CBP cannot be sure of the program's effect on border security risk at land ports of entry and whether current control measures compensate for any additional risk resulting from its benefits to participants. CBP should determine whether FAST participation has increased or decreased border security risk at land ports of entry and, if needed, establish control measures to mitigate any additional risk.

We made three recommendations intended to improve CBP's processes to ensure continued driver eligibility in the FAST program.

Planning

To fully accomplish both the specific requirements of the Act and its overall intent, the Department will need to do a skillful job in determining requirements, identifying the resources needed to achieve those requirements, and preparing its personnel to conduct those activities. For example, the bill requires 24/7 monitoring of the border by unmanned aerial systems. The Department will need to establish the operating requirements to achieve that goal, including knowing the number of aerial vehicles, pilots, ground support, maintenance, fuel, and repair parts that will be needed, where those resources will be needed, and the lifecycle cost of these operations. The Department has directives and policies in place to accomplish this, but has not yet done so for unmanned aerial systems. In addition to fielding new or improved technology and programs, the Department will need to establish a robust training plan to ensure that it has sufficient trained personnel on hand to implement the provisions of the legislation. Our audits and inspections have identified challenges with planning for resource acquisition and allocation and with training personnel, which may impact its ability to achieve the specifics of the proposed legislation.

We identified planning and training challenges in the following reports.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems

In May 2012, we issued *CBP's Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Nation's Border Security*, OIG-12-85. CBP's Office of Air and Marine (OAM) is responsible for protecting the American people and the Nation's critical infrastructure through the coordinated use of integrated air and marine forces. Air and marine forces are used to detect, interdict, and prevent acts of terrorism and the unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs, and other contraband toward or across U.S. borders. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) provide command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability to complement crewed aircraft and watercraft, and ground interdiction agents.

After the pilot of the UAS program, Congress appropriated more than \$240 million to establish the program within CBP. During our 2012 audit, CBP stated it had expended \$152.3 million to purchase nine unmanned aircraft and related equipment and, at that time, had seven operational aircraft. After our audit, in late 2011, CBP received two additional aircraft and was awaiting delivery of a tenth aircraft purchased with FY 2011 funds. Each aircraft system cost approximately \$18 million.

We reported that CBP had not adequately planned resources needed to support its current unmanned aircraft inventory. CBP's planning did not adequately address processes (1) to ensure that required operational equipment, such as ground control stations and ground support equipment, was provided for each launch and recovery site; (2) for stakeholders to submit unmanned aircraft mission requests; (3) to determine how mission requests would be prioritized; and (4) to obtain reimbursements for missions flown on stakeholders' behalf. With this approach, CBP risked having invested substantial resources in a program that underutilized resources and limited its ability to achieve OAM mission goals.

Interoperable Radio Communications

DHS includes a network of organizations that work together to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other threats. Such collaboration requires that DHS components establish effective communication among external and internal partners during operations. DHS established an internal goal of developing interoperable radio communications and identified common channels. To meet communications requirements, DHS components invested about \$430 million in equipment, infrastructure, and maintenance. Although DHS created policies, guidance, and templates to aid in achieving interoperability and provided more than \$18 million in assistance to State and local agencies, full interoperability remains a distant goal, according to a 2012 Government Accountability Office report.¹

In our November 2012 report, *DHS' Oversight of Interoperable Communications*, OIG-13-16, we noted that, although DHS had established a goal for interoperability and common radio channels, only 1 of 479 radio users we reviewed could access and communicate using the specified channel. Furthermore, only 78 of 382 or 20 percent of radios we tested contained all the correct program settings, including the name, for the common DHS channel. Additionally, DHS did not establish an effective governing structure with authority and responsibility to oversee achievement of department-wide interoperability. Without an authoritative governing structure to oversee emergency communications, DHS had limited interoperability policies and procedures, and the components did not inform radio users of DHS-developed guidance. Because of this limited progress in interoperability, personnel could not rely on interoperable communications during daily operations, planned events, and emergencies.

We made two recommendations to improve DHS' oversight of interoperable communications.

Purchase and Storage of Steel for the Secure Border Initiative

In our report, *U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Management of the Purchase and Storage of Steel in Support of the Secure Border Initiative*, OIG-12-05, we determined that CBP did not effectively manage the purchase and storage of steel in support of the Secure Border Initiative. Since 2008, CBP spent approximately \$1.2 billion to construct physical barriers along the southwest border as part of this initiative. About \$310 million of the cost was to purchase and store steel in support of fence construction. CBP purchased steel based on an estimate before legally acquiring land or meeting international treaty obligations. In addition, it did not provide effective contract oversight during the project: it paid invoices late, did not reconcile invoices with receiving documents, and did not perform a thorough review of the contractor's selection of a higher-priced subcontractor or document the reasons for its approval of the subcontractor. As a result, CBP purchased more steel than needed, incurred additional storage costs, paid interest on late payments, and approved a higher-priced subcontractor, with additional expenditures of about \$69 million that could have been put to better use.

CBP did not efficiently plan the purchase and storage of steel for the Supply and Supply Chain Management (SSCM) task order. It purchased 27,557 tons of extra steel, with a value of about \$44 million, which remained in storage at the end of the task order. Additionally, CBP did not

¹ *Emergency Communications-Variou Challenges Likely to Slow Implementation of a Public Safety Broadband Network* (GAO-12-343, February 2012).

obtain necessary approval to build all planned fence segments before acquiring the steel. In September 2009, CBP purchased 34 tons of steel for \$23,000, even though it had significant quantities of the same steel already in storage. CBP was not proactive and did not efficiently plan for the storage of steel remaining from the task order. Instead of moving the extra steel to a cost-efficient location, CBP extended the original contract and awarded a supplemental storage contract. CBP's decision to extend the storage contracts for 2 years resulted in \$9.8 million in avoidable storage costs.

CBP did not reconcile or promptly pay invoices from the SSCM task order. The cost of the task order increased because CBP paid invoices late, which resulted in late payment interest charges. Furthermore, CBP could not guarantee the government received what it paid for under the task order. CBP did not have policies and procedures for submitting and reviewing invoices. There was no clear guidance on the proper office to route invoices to, no timeline for the review process, and no notification process to remind offices of invoices coming due.

CBP did not perform a thorough review of the consent to subcontract documentation and did not document the reasons for its approval of the higher-price subcontractor. Its approval of a subcontractor may have added about \$13.5 million to the project. The DHS Office of the Chief Procurement Officer recognized the importance of component oversight of subcontractor selection and issued an acquisition alert in April 2011 to DHS heads of contracting activities.

We noted that CBP should ensure it applied lessons learned from this project to future projects. To that end, we made five recommendations to improve CBP's management of future fence construction and contract oversight.

Adjudication of Nonimmigrant Worker Petitions for Visas

Our report, *The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Adjudication of Petitions for Nonimmigrant Workers (I-129 Petitions for H-1B and H-2B Visas)*, OIG-11-105, was issued in August 2011. As a result of our review, we determined that the Immigration Services Officer (ISO) fraud training for adjudicating the H-1B and H-2B visa classifications of I-129 petitions was decentralized and inconsistent. Although USCIS had a process to train newly hired ISOs, on-the-job training procedures varied. Experienced ISOs did not all receive the same type of fraud training, and ongoing fraud training was not updated and provided annually. This occurred because USCIS Headquarters had not implemented a national, ongoing fraud identification and response training program that included standards for annual training and updates. Without a consistent fraud identification training program, USCIS could ensure that fraudulent petitions for H-1B and H-2B visas were consistently identified.

All newly hired ISOs complete the same basic 6-week ISO course before being assigned to a service center. However, local on-the-job training procedures vary. In 2006, both service centers provided I-129 H and L Fraud Training, which discusses the process to adjudicate Form I-129 H and L visa classifications and related fraud cases. However, this training was not provided to all ISOs responsible for adjudicating H-1B and H-2B petitions. Fraud prevention training beyond the H and L courses differed between the two service centers. We made two recommendations to improve the program.

Delegation of Federal Immigration Enforcement Authorities

The Performance of 287(g) Agreements - FY 2011 Update, OIG -11-119, issued in September 2011, examined Section 287(g) of the *Immigration and Nationality Act*, as amended, which authorizes ICE to delegate Federal immigration enforcement authorities (functions) to State and local law enforcement agencies. The *Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010*, requires, and House Report 111-157 and Conference Report 111-298 direct, that we report on the performance of 287(g) agreements with State and local authorities. ICE had improved in some areas of program operations. However, for other important areas, ICE's action plans and related documentation did not address all critical issues we identified in our prior reports. We determined that ICE needed to continue its efforts to implement our prior recommendations. In addition, we identified challenges that might reduce the effectiveness of a review process intended as a resource for ensuring compliance with 287(g) program requirements. ICE needed to (1) provide training for inspectors to ensure that they have sufficient knowledge of the 287(g) program, Memorandums of Agreement with State and local law enforcement agencies, as well as other skills needed to conduct effective inspection reviews; (2) develop and implement comprehensive analytical tools for use as part of the inspection review process; and (3) review and revise Memorandums of Agreement with participating law enforcement agencies to ensure a clear understanding of 287(g) program requirements. We made 13 recommendations to improve overall 287(g) program operations. We looked at the 287(g) program again in FY 2012.

Systems Modernization

To implement the provisions of the proposed legislation, the Department will need to address some longstanding business and Information Technology (IT) systems challenges and continue to pursue additional technologies to address border security issues. Although the Department is taking steps to upgrade and integrate its IT and business systems, including those related to immigration, it has not yet succeeded in fully transforming them. In addition, DHS needs to seek out and adopt new technologies that will take into account the needs of various components and enhance its ability to secure our borders.

Modernizing Information Technology

A report issued in November 2006, *U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Progress in Modernizing Information Technology*, OIG-07-11, included the results of a review of USCIS' efforts to improve its processes and systems. The objectives of the review were to assess USCIS' progress in implementing IT modernization initiatives and examine how it had addressed our prior recommendations.

Although USCIS had taken steps to address the recommendations in our prior report, several challenges continued. Specifically, USCIS faced challenges in finalizing its approach and advancing to business transformation implementation. The component had accomplished the first phase of its IT staffing integration effort; however, remaining phases remained on hold until it addressed organizational deficiencies that hindered day-to-day IT operations. USCIS made progress in applying IT to support mission business operations, but improved strategic planning by the Office of the Chief Information Officer could help in managing IT resources. Process engineering was

contingent on implementing a “to-be” transaction-based environment and a supporting acquisition approach. Although USCIS made significant progress in IT infrastructure upgrades, plans to complete remaining sites were on hold pending funding approval. USCIS had outlined strategies to increase stakeholder involvement in transformation planning to promote buy-in and minimize risks that redesigned processes and systems might not meet user needs.

Business and IT Transformation

In a November 2011 report, *U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ Progress in Transformation*, OIG-12-12, we noted that in 2005, USCIS embarked on an enterprise-wide program to transform its fragmented, paper-based business processes to a flexible and efficient process supported by an integrated technical environment. In July 2009, we reported that USCIS had established a structure to manage transformation initiatives and implemented pilot programs; however, pilot success was restricted by ineffective planning, business process reengineering efforts were incomplete, and stakeholder participation levels fluctuated. We recommended that USCIS communicate an updated transformation approach, include stakeholder participation in defining requirements, and assess pilot program results.

We conducted a follow-up audit to determine USCIS’ progress in implementing its business and IT transformation. Since the 2009 report, USCIS had completed a number of activities to prepare for its first transformation deployment and improved its coordination and communication with stakeholders. However, implementation of the transformation program had been delayed because of changes in the deployment strategy and insufficiently defined system requirements. Other challenges, such as governance and staffing problems, further delayed the program. As a result, USCIS continued to rely on paper-based processes to support its mission, which made it difficult to process immigration benefits efficiently, combat identity fraud, and provide other Government agencies with the information required to identify criminals and possible terrorists quickly.

USCIS took steps to address these challenges by moving to a more agile transformation approach, improving its program monitoring and governance, and focusing on staffing issues. We recommended that USCIS ensure that process documentation provided sufficient detail, develop and implement a governance structure to enable streamlined decisionmaking, and ensure that staff with the necessary skills were in place.

Illicit Cross-Border Tunnels

In our report, *CBP’s Strategy to Address Illicit Cross-Border Tunnels*, OIG 12-132, which was issued in September 2012, we noted that illicit cross-border tunnels along the southwest border of the United States are a significant and growing threat to border security. Criminals primarily use the tunnels to transport illegal narcotics into the United States, but also use them to smuggle contraband, currency, and weapons. Since 1990, law enforcement officials have discovered more than 140 tunnels that have breached the U.S. border, with an 80 percent increase in tunnel activity since 2008. The increase in the number of tunnels over the past 4 years may be attributed to border fencing and an increased number of Border Patrol Agents.

We performed this audit to determine whether CBP developed an operational strategy to detect and remediate cross-border tunnels and acquire tunnel detection technology. As part of its overall border security and law enforcement missions, CBP detects and remediates cross-border tunnels. It has modified its field operations to better detect and respond to the threats posed by the tunnels. However, CBP does not have the technological capability to detect illicit cross-border tunnels routinely and accurately. Until CBP has this capability, criminals may continue to build cross-border tunnels undetected. CBP has stated that it can best address this capability gap through the development and acquisition of detection technology. However, CBP has not been able to identify any existing tunnel detection technology that functions effectively in its operating environment.

CBP is creating a program to address capability gaps in countering the cross-border tunnel threat. As part of this effort, CBP is drafting the documents required by the *DHS Acquisition Instruction/Guidebook 102-01-001* to develop and acquire tunnel detection technology. Additionally, CBP plans to establish a Program Management Office to provide leadership, strategy, and organization to the Department-wide counter-tunnel efforts. The program must address the mission needs of both CBP and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) because both have mission responsibility to combat cross-border tunnels. However, the program has not matured to a point where it demonstrates how it will consider the needs of HSI. The Department has ultimate responsibility for approving CBP's acquisition program, as well as allocating resources and making decisions to counter the tunnel threat. A DHS-designated authority is needed to make strategic decisions on counter-tunnel policies and procedures.

We made two recommendations to CBP to improve consideration of the needs of both CBP and HSI. We also made two recommendations to the Department to improve coordination and oversight of CBP and HSI counter-tunnel efforts.

Conclusion

Through our audits and reviews, we have identified a number of challenges that DHS must overcome to secure our borders and establish effective immigration policies and processes. Some of these challenges are a result of differing legacy systems and programs that need to be integrated and coordinated among the components and with stakeholders outside of the Department. Other challenges are related to inadequate strategic planning, a dearth of performance measures, and data and information that cannot be relied on to make sound decisions.

It is important to note that, based on the Department's response to our numerous reports, it is clear that it is diligently working to address these issues. However, it takes time to develop strategic plans, improve information systems, revise and update guidance, implement and disseminate new policies and procedures, and correct the underlying data. This can be particularly time-consuming when, as is usually the case, such plans, policies, and procedures require coordination and concurrence among multiple entities, including some outside of DHS and its components. Competing and changing priorities and funding uncertainties also affect the Department's ability to address these issues.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I welcome any questions that you or the Members of the Committee may have.

Appendix A: DHS OIG-issued reports on Border Security and Immigration, FY
2005-FY 2013

	Final Report Number	Report Title	Report Link
1	OIG-04-18	Open Inspector General Recommendations Concerning the Former Immigration and Naturalization Service from Unaccompanied Juveniles in INS Custody, A Report by the Department of Justice Inspector General	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/OIG_Juvenile.pdf
2	OIG-04-26	An Evaluation of the Security Implications of the Visa Waiver Program	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_SecurityImpVisaWaiverProg_Eval_Apr04.pdf
3	OIG-04-33	An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_04-33_Aug04.pdf
4	OIG-05-07	A Review of the Use of Stolen Passports from Visa Waiver Countries to Enter the United States	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_05-07_Dec04.pdf
5	OIG-05-11	Implementation of the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program at Land Border Ports of Entry	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_05-11_Feb05.pdf
6	OIG-05-24	Letter Report: Immigration Enforcement Agent Position	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_05-24_Jun05.pdf
7	OIG-05-25	Letter Report: Citizenship Test Redesign	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_05-25_Jun05.pdf
8	OIG-05-28	Improvements Needed in Security Management of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services' CLAIMS 3 Mainframe Financial Application	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_05-28_Jul05.pdf
9	OIG-05-41	USCIS Faces Challenges in Modernizing Information Technology	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_05-41_Sep05.pdf
10	OIG-05-45	A Review of DHS' Responsibilities For Juvenile Aliens	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_05-45_Sep05.pdf
11	OIG-05-49	USCIS Approval of H-1B Petitions Exceeded 65,000 Cap in Fiscal Year 2005	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_05-49_Sep05.pdf

Appendix A: DHS OIG-issued reports on Border Security and Immigration, FY
2005-FY 2013

	Final Report Number	Report Title	Report Link
12	OIG-05-50	Review of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Compliance Enforcement Unit	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_05-50_Sep05.pdf
13	OIG-06-04	An Assessment of the Proposal to Merge Customs and Border Protection with Immigration and Customs Enforcement	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_06-04_Nov05.pdf
14	OIG-06-06	A Review of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Alien Security Checks	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_06-06_Nov05.pdf
15	OIG-06-22	Review of Vulnerabilities and Potential Abuses of the L-1 Visa Program	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_06-22_Jan06.pdf
16	OIG-06-33	Detention and Removal of Illegal Aliens U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_06-33_Apr06.pdf
17	OIG-06-43	Review of CBP Actions Taken to Intercept Suspected Terrorists at U.S. Ports of Entry	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG-06-43_June06.pdf
18	OIG-07-01	Treatment of Immigration Detainees Housed at Immigration and Customs Enforcement Facilities	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_07-01_Dec06.pdf
19	OIG-07-08	Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Detainee Tracking Process	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_07-08_Nov06.pdf
20	OIG-07-11	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Progress in Modernizing Information Technology	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_07-11_Nov06.pdf
21	OIG-07-28	ICE's Compliance With Detention Limits for Aliens With a Final Order of Removal From the United States	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_07-28_Feb07.pdf
22	OIG-07-34	An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fugitive Operations Teams	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_07-34_Mar07.pdf
23	OIG-07-38	DHS' Progress In Addressing Coordination Challenges Between Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_07-38_Apr07.pdf

Appendix A: DHS OIG-issued reports on Border Security and Immigration, FY
2005-FY 2013

	Final Report Number	Report Title	Report Link
24	OIG-07-40	A Review of CBP and ICE Responses to Recent Incidents of Chinese Human Smuggling in Maritime Cargo Containers (Redacted)	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_07-40_Apr07.pdf
25	OIG-08-09	Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process (Redacted – Revised)	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIGr_08-09_Apr08.pdf
26	OIG-08-18	The Removal of a Canadian Citizen to Syria	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIGr_08-18_Jun08.pdf
27	OIG-09-37	Management Oversight of Immigration benefit Application Intake Processes	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_09-37_Mar09.pdf
28	OIG-10-22	Release of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Worksite Enforcement Strategy	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_10-22_Dec09.pdf
29	OIG-10-96	Controls Over SBInet Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_10-96_Jun10.pdf
30	OIG-11-14	Processing of Nonimmigrant Worker Petitions in Support of the Guam Realignment Construction Activities	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-14_Nov10.pdf
31	OIG-11-16	Customs and Border Protection's Implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative at Land Ports of Entry	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-16_Nov10.pdf
32	OIG-11-25	Improvements Needed in the Process to Certify Carriers for the Free and Secure Trade Program	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-25_Mar11.pdf
33	OIG-11-43	Customs and Border Protection Needs to Improve Its Inspection Procedures for the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-43_Feb11.pdf
34	OIG-11-62	Management of Mental Health Cases in Immigration Detention	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-62_Mar11.pdf
35	OIG-11-81	Supervision of Aliens Commensurate with Risk	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-81_Dec11.pdf

Appendix A: DHS OIG-issued reports on Border Security and Immigration, FY
2005-FY 2013

	Final Report Number	Report Title	Report Link
36	OIG-11-85	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Privacy Stewardship	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-85_May11.pdf
37	OIG-11-100	DHS Detainee Removals and Reliance on Assurances	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-100_Nov11.pdf
38	OIG-11-105	The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Adjudication of Petitions for Nonimmigrant Workers (I-129 Petitions for H-1B and H-2B visas)	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-105_Aug11.pdf
39	OIG-11-119	The Performance of 287(g) Agreements FY 2011 Update	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-119_Sep11.pdf
40	OIG-12-05	U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Management of the Purchase and Storage of Steel in Support of the Secure Border Initiative	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_12-05_Nov11.pdf
41	OIG-12-12	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Progress in Transformation	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_12-12_Nov11.pdf
42	OIG-12-64	Operations of United States ICE's Secure Communities	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_12-05_Nov11.pdf
43	OIG-12-66	Communication Regarding Participation in Secure Communities	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-66_Mar12.pdf
44	OIG-12-84	Free and Secure Trade Program – Continued Driver Eligibility	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-84_May12.pdf
45	OIG-12-85	CBP's Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Nation's Border Security	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-85_May12.pdf
46	OIG-12-86	Improvements Needed To Strengthen the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Initial Validation Process for Highway Carriers	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-86_Jun12.pdf
47	OIG-12-125	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements Program Issues	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-86_Jun12.pdf

Appendix A: DHS OIG-issued reports on Border Security and Immigration, FY
2005-FY 2013

	Final Report Number	Report Title	Report Link
48	OIG-12-130	The Performance of 287(g) Agreements FY 2012 Follow-Up	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-130_Sep12.pdf
49	OIG-12-132	CBP's Strategy to Address Illicit Cross-Border Tunnels	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-132_Sep12.pdf
50	OIG-13-07	The Visa Waiver Program	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2013/OIG_13-07_Nov12.pdf
51	OIG-13-11	Improvements Needed for SAVE to Accurately Determine Immigration Status of Individuals Ordered Deported	http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2013/OIG_13-11_Dec12.pdf