

**Opening Statement of Chairman Thomas R. Carper
Lessons Learned from the Boston Marathon Bombing:
Improving Intelligence and Information Sharing
April 30, 2014**

As prepared for delivery:

I would like to call this hearing to order. Thank you all for coming today. It has been just over one year since the cowardly attack on the Boston Marathon.

Today's hearing is an opportunity to review what lessons have been learned from the actions and events leading up to the attack, in order to prevent, to the greatest extent possible, a similar incident from happening again.

We do this, in part, to honor the memory of the four people killed in April 2013, as well as the sacrifices that have been made by the nearly 300 people injured in the attacks.

In particular, we mourn for the friends and family of those killed on April 15, 2013 - Krystle Marie Campbell, Martin William Richard, and Lu Lingzi - and for MIT Police Officer, Sean Collier, who was shot by the suspects three days later.

This is our Committee's second hearing on the Boston Marathon bombing. It is part of our ongoing oversight efforts to understand what went right that fateful day, and what we can do better.

Our first hearing focused on preparedness and response and found – by and large – that the state of Massachusetts, the city of Boston, and the surrounding communities were extremely well trained, coordinated, and prepared.

In my view, this was due in no small part to the assistance provided by DHS through federal grants.

Our focus today is different. We will examine the intelligence collection and information sharing by U.S. agencies with respect to the Tsarnaev family, both before and after the attack, to see what lessons we can learn.

I oftentimes say that everything I do, I know that I can do better. If truth be known, the same is true for most of us. It's also true of the counter-terrorism activities we'll be discussing this morning. My sense is that our information sharing systems work well, but having said that, I know that we always can improve them.

Identifying and deterring terrorist plots by lone wolves like the Tsarnaev brothers is extremely challenging, but we need to continue to refine our efforts to help identify these types of people before they attack and before lives are lost.

I want to thank the four Inspectors General who are with us today, as well as their staffs, who have worked diligently over the past year to complete this report.

While some of the details of the report can only be discussed in the classified portion of today's hearing, I also want to thank the Inspectors General for releasing an unclassified summary of their findings.

That summary will better inform the American public. I hope it will also serve to reassure our citizens that their federal authorities are working tirelessly and learning from what worked and what didn't work – not only in the run-up to this tragedy, but also in its aftermath – in order to improve our ability to prevent future attacks from occurring.

I believe there are at least two key findings in the report by the Inspectors General.

First, the IG's found that federal agencies generally did share information with one another, and they followed the appropriate procedures that were put in place after 9/11.

Second, the Inspectors General identified a number of adjustments and refinements that should be made to further improve our intelligence and information sharing systems. It appears unlikely, however, that any of those changes could have prevented the attack, however.

Still, I was struck by the passages in the report detailing the fact that, if FBI personnel had received more explicit information from a foreign government about Tamerlan Tsarnaev's apparent interest in committing acts of terror, the FBI would likely have taken additional steps to learn more about him and his intentions.

I plan to explore this conclusion further today with our witnesses.

Meanwhile, let me say that I am pleased to learn through this report that U.S. security and intelligence agencies have already begun addressing some of the issues identified in the report, and in other After Action Reports.

The Inspectors General have also put forward two recommendations for further strengthening and improving terrorist-related information sharing practices.

I look forward to having a discussion about these findings and recommendations today.

I also look forward to the opportunity to discuss the refinements that agencies have already begun making, in a classified briefing that the Committee will hold with the agencies after this hearing.