INTERVIEW OF ANTONY JOHN BLINKEN

Room SD-342 and via Webex
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2:04 p.m.
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MR. FOLIO: Good afternoon, everyone. This is a transcribed interview of Antony Blinken conducted by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Senate Committee on Finance. This interview was requested by Chairman Ron Johnson and Chairman Charles Grassley as part of the Committees' investigation of whether there were any actual or apparent conflicts of interest or any other wrongdoing with regard to the Obama administration's Ukraine policy or Burisma Holdings as well as related matters.

On December 18, 2019, Chairmen Grassley and Johnson requested Mr. Blinken appearance for a voluntary transcribed interview and certain categories of records.

In response on February 13, 2019 [sic], through counsel, Mr. Blinken produced to the Committees one record responsive to the categories of requested materials.

Mr. Blinken, can you please state your full name for the record?

MR. BLINKEN: Yes. It's Antony John Blinken.

MR. FOLIO: Thank you. Mr. Blinken, my name is Joseph Folio. I'm the Chief Counsel for the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee staff. I am now going to ask the additional staff in the room to introduce themselves.
First, we'll start with the remainder of Chairman Johnson's staff

MR. WITTMANN: Hi, Mr. Blinken. My name is Scott Wittmann. I work for Chairman Johnson.

MR. DOWNEY: Mr. Blinken, my name's Brian Downey. I'm an Investigator with Chairman Johnson. Thank you for being here today.

MR. SACRIPANTI: Hi, Mr. Blinken. I'm Will Sacripanti with Chairman Johnson. Thank you for your time today.

MR. FOLIO: I'll also just note for the record that Lydia Westlake from Chairman Johnson's staff, I believe is on as well.

Now I'll ask Chairman Grassley's staff to please introduce themselves for the record.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Hi, Mr. Blinken. My name is Josh Flynn-Brown. I'm Deputy Chief Investigative Counsel for Chairman Grassley. Today I'm joined by my colleague Quinton Brady. We appreciate your time today. Thank you.

MR. BRADY: Good afternoon.

MR. FOLIO: I'll ask Ranking Member Peters' staff to introduce themselves, please.

MR. SCHRAM: Good afternoon. My name is Zack Schram. I'm Chief Counsel for Ranking Member Peters. I'm joined by my colleagues Soumya Dayananda, Roy Awabdeh, and Valerie Shen.
In lieu of remarks I usually give at this juncture, I'd like to mark as Exhibit A a letter from Ranking Member Peters to Chairman Johnson in which he writes, "You still have the chance to drop your partisan probe, abandon this destructive behavior, and return to the Committee's bipartisan traditions."

Ranking Member Peters also offers this statement: "This is the final interview of this Congress and the Chairman's protracted efforts to weaponize the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee to influence the 2020 Presidential election in order to benefit President Donald Trump politically. And over the course of that effort, he has allowed this Committee to become a platform for disinformation, conspiracy theories, and lies. The Chairman has discounted any criticism of his actions by falsely accusing his colleagues of the very missteps he has made himself. He has strayed far from this Committee's strong bipartisan traditions, and his actions in this ersatz investigation have only served to undermine our national security, deepen the partisan division in our country, and threaten our most fundamental democratic values. I look forward to moving away from this destructive behavior and restoring the Committee's bipartisan traditions under more responsible leadership next Congress."

MR. FOLIO: So on behalf of Chairman Johnson, we will
object to the entering of that letter into the record. It is not relevant to the interview, Mr. Blinken. Furthermore, it is offensive to Chairman Johnson. It also makes false claims and is dangerous. A core aspect of this Committee's jurisdiction is examining conflicts of interest, full stop. It is undisputed that Hunter Biden, James Biden, Sara Biden, and possibly other members of the Biden family engaged in suspicious financial business arrangements and transactions closely linked to the Vice President's portfolio. The Department of Justice recently confirmed an ongoing investigation of Hunter Biden for tax fraud, money laundering, among other potential criminal violations. And the minority continues to advance false claims untethered from the facts that this somehow advances a Russian disinformation campaign. Ninety-nine percent of our evidence has nothing to do with anything other than U.S. Government records, speaking to U.S. Government officials like Mr. Blinken, but the one thing they try to hang their hat on is the fact that this Committee dared to speak to a Ukrainian national who worked for the Democratic lobbying firm, who had contacts with the Democratic National Committee, and who met several times at the Obama White House with members of President Obama's National Security Council. Again, this is just false and distracting, and I don’t think we need to waste any more time on it.
MR. SCHRAM: Joe, I attempt to use the letter as a interview exhibit. I don't understand the purpose of objecting to that. We've given it to you in advance. And if we wish to ask questions about it, that is not something that you can prevent.

MR. FOLIO: I'd be happy to address it when you actually ask Mr. Blinken questions about a letter you sent us 6 minutes ago.

Ranking Member Wyden's staff, would you please introduce yourselves?

MR. GOSHORN: Mr. Blinken, my name is Dan Goshorn. I'm Chief Investigative Counsel for Senator Wyden on the Senate Finance Committee minority staff. I'm joined by my colleague Josh Heath, who is the Chief Investigator for Senator Wyden in his personal capacity and is shared with the Finance Committee staff, as well.

I'd just like to say we have reviewed the letter that was just offered by Ranking Member Peters' staff, and we support their motion to include it in the record.

Thanks.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Hey, Joe, before we move on, I'd just like to note that I disagree with the minority's opening statement, and I appreciate your rebuttal and associate with it.

I'd like to note that during the September 17, 2020,
interview with Amos Hochstein, a former State Department official, I introduced my opening statement into the record. That opening statement directly addresses some of the issues raised by the minority today. I'd note that the minority's opening statement has changed slightly from interview to interview. However, the essence and the substance is the same, so I feel comfortable incorporating by reference my September 17, 2020, statement into the record today.

I'd also note that Senator Grassley is an equal opportunity overseer. He is engaged in oversight activity of Republican and Democratic administrations and officials. He is interested in the facts and the evidence, regardless of party.

I'd note that Senator Grassley interviewed Donald Trump Jr. and other Republicans during the Trump administration. When we did so, we did not hear any complaints from the Democrats. In fact, we didn't hear a word with the exception of when they leaked to the press about our investigations.

During our investigations, when we begin to interview Democrats, that's usually when we start to hear the Democrats complain. So now who's playing politics? Joe, back to you.

MR. FOLIO: Thank you, Josh. And we also have two officials from the State Department on the line. Can you
please introduce yourselves for the record?

MR. KILLION: Bill Killion.

MR. THOMAS: Ken Thomas from the Office of the Legal Advisor. Thank you.

MR. FOLIO: I believe Bill is with H, just for the record.

MR. KILLION: Oh, yes, sorry, Legislative Affairs.

MR. FOLIO: I don't want to insult you by making you a lawyer, Bill.

MR. KILLION: Thank you very much.

MR. FOLIO: All right, Mr. Blinken. Thanks for your indulgence. Now I'm just going to explain how the interview will proceed.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to any of the Committees' investigative activities, including transcribed interviews.

The way we will proceed is that we will alternate between the majority and minority staff for 1 hour each turn. The majority staff will begin and proceed for an hour. The minority staff will then have their time to ask questions, and we'll rotate back and forth until there are no more questions and the interview will be over. And I know we have spoken with your counsel separately about trying to minimize the time and given all your other responsibilities and obligations.
During the interview we're going to do our best to
limit ourselves to the number of people who are directing
questions at you during any given hour. That said, from
time to time a follow-up question or clarifying question may
be useful, and if that's the case, you will hear from some
other staff members around the virtual table. I'll ask
everyone just to take their time, speak clearly, and let
other people finish talking before they interject.

There is a reporter on the line who is going to create
a verbatim record of what we discuss. With this in mind,
Mr. Blinken, it's important that you respond to questions
verbally. The reporter cannot properly record nonverbal
responses or gestures. Do you understand this?

MR. BLINKEN: I do.

MR. FOLIO: Thank you. We encourage witnesses that
appear before the Committee to freely consult with counsel.
Mr. Blinken, do you have counsel present with you today?

MR. BLINKEN: I do.

MR. FOLIO: Counsel, could you please state your name
for the record?


With us in the room are my colleagues Natalie Rao and Sarah
Grimsdale, also from Latham.

MR. FOLIO: Thank you. Good afternoon, everybody.

MR. SU: Good afternoon.
MR. FOLIO: Mr. Blinken, we want you to answer our questions in the most complete and truthful manner possible, so we're going to take our time. If you have any questions about what we've asked, please let us know. We would be happy to clarify or repeat. Do you understand?

MR. BLINKEN: I do.

MR. FOLIO: Now, this interview is unclassified, so if the questions call for any information that you know to be classified, please state that for the record as well as the reason for the classification. And then once you've clarified to the extent possible, please respond with as much unclassified information as you can. If we need to have a classified follow-on session, we can arrange for that.

MR. BLINKEN: Understood.

MR. FOLIO: It is the Committees' practice to honor valid common law privilege claims as an accommodation to a witness or party when those claims are made in good faith and accompanied by sufficient explanation so the Committees can evaluate the claim. When deciding whether to honor a privilege, the Committee will weigh its need for the information against any legitimate basis for withholding it. This interview is occurring without prejudice to any future discussions with the Committees, and we reserve the right to request your participation in future interviews or to compel
testimony.

Mr. Blinken, if you need to take a break, please let us know. We ordinarily take a 5-minute break between each 1-hour round. If you need something in between then, just let us know.

MR. BLINKEN: Okay. Thank you.

MR. FOLIO: Mr. Blinken, you're required to answer questions before Congress truthfully. Do you understand that?

MR. BLINKEN: I do.

MR. FOLIO: And this also applies to questions posed by congressional staff in an interview. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. Section 1001 makes it a crime to make any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation in the course of a congressional investigation, so this statute applies to your statements here today. Do you understand that?

MR. BLINKEN: I do.

MR. FOLIO: Mr. Blinken, is there any reason that you are unable to provide truthful answers in today's interview?

MR. BLINKEN: There is not.

MR. FOLIO: And, finally, we ask that you not speak about what we discuss in this interview with anyone else who is outside of the virtual room today in order to preserve the integrity of the investigation. We also ask that you
not copy any exhibits from the Committee that are shown to you today. Do you understand and agree?

MR. BLINKEN: I do.

MR. SU: So, Joe, this is Jonathan. I'll just say Tony understands the request that you've made. He will retain his rights to speak about the matter consistent with any obligations that he may have, but he understands and has no intent on interfering with the Committees' investigation in any way.

MR. FOLIO: Thank you. We appreciate that. And, Jonathan, if you have any questions about that, I think you understand where our concerns lie about the integrity of the investigation. I'm happy to have those conversations with you.

MR. SU: I do, so thank you.

MR. FOLIO: Mr. Blinken or Jonathan, do you have any questions before we begin?

MR. BLINKEN: I do not

MR. SU: Tony doesn't have any questions. Just a couple of notes, Joe.

MR. FOLIO: Yes, sir.

MR. SU: In your opening statement, you said that we produced the document in February '19. I think you probably meant to say February 2020.

MR. FOLIO: Okay. I'm sorry. I'll check that.
MR. SU: That's just a small thing. You know, Tony's happy to be here to voluntarily answer the Committees' questions, and so I understand that we're proceeding under the discussions and terms that we've had about the scope of this interview and the notion that it would be focused on his time as Deputy Secretary of State. Tony has not had full access, as you might imagine, to his records. We do appreciate your sending the exhibits that you've sent, and so we have them ready here to refer to if necessary. And, Joe, you and I have had discussions about the notion that the Committees' work is ongoing, but that you felt that this was an appropriate time to conduct the interview of Mr. Blinken, so we are proceeding under, you know, that understanding that, you know, it's your view that this is the right time to do it, and so that's why we're here.

MR. FOLIO: Thank you, Jonathan.

MR. SU: Is that fair?

MR. FOLIO: Yeah, I appreciate that, and I think we'll note just for the record that this was basically the rescheduling of an interview. I forget the day in September we had it scheduled. Then we had to cancel it.

MR. SU: Yeah, that's fair. And then only the last thing I'd say is--and I think folks already have their cameras on. To the extent that you're questioning Mr. Blinken, we'd just ask that you make sure your camera's on
so that we can see you. Otherwise, we're good to go.

MR. FOLIO: Great. That all sounds good.

All right, Mr. Blinken. We'll start the majority's question. Again, good afternoon, and thank you for being here. We appreciate your time, especially given all of your ongoing obligations. And congratulations on your nomination.

MR. BLINKEN: Thank you.

MR. FOLIO: Mr. Blinken, in the Obama administration, can you please tell us what your position was at the Department of State?

MR. BLINKEN: Yes, I was the Deputy Secretary, and that was from--

MR. FOLIO: And when--sorry.

MR. BLINKEN: I'm sorry.

MR. FOLIO: You anticipated my next question.


MR. FOLIO: And at a high level and briefly, what were your responsibilities as Deputy?

MR. BLINKEN: My responsibilities as Deputy included, in effect, being the alter ego of the Secretary of State and covering all of the policy matters that came before the Department as well as overseeing the building, its employees, both in Washington and around the world.
MR. FOLIO: And what were your responsibilities with regard to U.S.-Ukraine policy at the time?

MR. BLINKEN: So the U.S.-Ukraine policy at the time was one of the major issues that was before the Government, and of all of the foreign policy issues and challenges that we faced around the world, the crisis in Ukraine was probably in the top three or four as a result of Russia's intervention in Ukraine. And so as part of my responsibility as a leader of the Department and one of the policymakers there, I was immersed in Ukraine policy.

MR. FOLIO: So we've heard a lot from other witnesses about how the policy process worked given the involvement of the Vice President's office, given the involvement of National Security staff. Can you describe in a little more detail, please, how you fit into that process, whether at State or in the interagency?

MR. BLINKEN: Sure. With Ukraine, as with every policy that we engage, we had a process that had been built up, I might add, over 50 years from Republican to Democratic administrations and back, the so-called interagency process. And this was something that was done very systematically with a series of committees that started primarily with something called an "IPC," Interagency Policy Committee. This was roughly at the level of a senior director on the NSC staff or an Assistant Secretary of State or Assistant
Secretary in other departments.

That committee did the day-in, day-out work of trying to develop policy with regard to any particular issue we were dealing with.

Next up from that was the so-called Deputies Committee, and this was a committee chaired by the Principal Deputy and National Security Adviser, and on the committee were the Deputies in all of the principal departments, as well as representatives typically from the Office of the Vice President, the National Economic Council, the National Security Council, et cetera. And that was the primary engine for deliberating policy, developing options, producing recommendations for the Cabinet-level members of the administration, and they sat on something called "the Principals Committee," chaired by the National Security Adviser.

When the President would come in and chair those meetings, it was, in effect, a meeting of the National Security Council, but in essence, the Deputies Committee was responsible for developing, as I said, the options and recommendations on policy for the principals across the administration.

And so pretty much every issues that we dealt with went through this process. It was something that we took very seriously, and as I said, it's something that's evolved over
time. Probably the best example of this is something we took a lot of inspiration from was the model established by Brent Scowcroft when he was National Security Adviser and Secretary Baker when he was Secretary of State during the first Bush administration.

MR. FOLIO: So was all of your work on Ukraine funneled through the interagency and the Deputies Committee? Or would you do work independently at the State Department that you would manage or oversee?

MR. BLINKEN: Two things. The State Department itself, of course, developed its own positions on issues to bring to the interagency process. The reason for this process is to make sure that on any given policy, every equity, every stakeholder is represented. And so, of course, different departments, different agencies have different equities, and they bring them to the table.

So before they come to the table in the interagency process, whether it is an IPC, whether it is a Deputies meeting, whether it is a principals meeting, the agencies and departments themselves would get together and determine what was most important to them, what they believed should be advanced in the interagency process.

MR. FOLIO: How regularly were you briefed about U.S.-Ukraine policy?

MR. BLINKEN: Gosh, it's hard to put a--hard to put a
number on it, but certainly—well, certainly on a weekly basis, but, you know, you can even say it might even have been as much as daily because we, of course, were receiving reading books in the morning. For example, the President’s Daily Brief that I was a reader of might have an item on Ukraine. Other intelligence that we received might have items on Ukraine. Reports might come in from the embassy. Reports might come in from the bureau at the State Department responsible for Ukraine policy, the Bureau of European Affairs. And so depending on how you characterize "briefed," you know, there were written materials probably on an almost daily basis during the heat of this crisis.

MR. FOLIO: And who are the briefers or other State Department officials who you would speak with Ukraine policy?

MR. BLINKEN: So, primarily, the person responsible in the Department for Ukraine policy at the time I was Deputy Secretary was the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and in my time, that was Victoria Nuland. The other senior official that I engaged with less regularly than with the Assistant Secretary but still with some regularity was our ambassador in Ukraine, Geoff Pyatt. Ms. Nuland had deputies, including deputy assistant secretaries, but my primary interlocuter and the person I looked to for the information, analysis, assessment,
recomendation on Ukraine was the Assistant Secretary, Ms. Nuland.

MR. FOLIO: How often did you speak with Secretary Kerry about U.S.-Ukraine policy?

MR. BLINKEN: It would be hard for me to put a number on it. I would say I suspect it came up certainly every couple of weeks, maybe a little bit less, maybe a little bit more.

MR. FOLIO: Mr. Blinken, at this time, I'm going to turn the questioning over to my colleagues from Chairman Grassley's staff, Joshua Brown.

Thank you.

MR. BLINKEN: Thank you.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Mr. Blinken, can you hear me okay?

MR. BLINKEN: I can. Thank you.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Great. Thanks. Thanks again for your time today.

Mr. Blinken, are you aware of the Biden family's financial links to Burisma?

MR. BLINKEN: I am not. When you say am I aware, in the--I am aware of what I've read in newspapers subsequent to my service, but in the context of what we're talking about, my service as Deputy Secretary of State from 2015 to 2017? No.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Are you aware of the Biden family's
financial links to the Communist Chinese government?

MR. BLINKEN: I am not.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Are you aware of the Biden family's financial links to Ye Jianming, Gongwen Dong, and other Chinese nationals? And I can spell those names, if you prefer, unless you're familiar with those names I just read.

MR. BLINKEN: I am not.

MR. SU: Excuse me. Just so the record is clear, Josh, what Tony is telling you is that he is not aware of any connection between the Biden family and the names that you just referenced.

Is that fair, Tony?

MR. BLINKEN: That's correct.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Thank you. I appreciate that clarification.

Are you aware of Hunter Biden's business association with Devon Archer?

MR. SCHRAM: Sorry to interrupt. Josh, when you say the Biden family, can you be more specific who you're referring to?

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Joe Biden, Hunter Biden, James Biden.

Mr. Blinken, would you like me to restate the question for you?

MR. BLINKEN: Would you please repeat the last question? Thank you.
MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Yes. The question is, are you aware of Hunter Biden's business association with Devon Archer?

MR. BLINKEN: I am aware of things I've read after my service as Deputy Secretary of State in the media. During the time I served as Deputy Secretary of State, I have no awareness.

MR. SU: And, Josh, to confirm, Tony is--what the witness is saying--and, Tony, correct me if I'm wrong--is that any information that you may have on the subject that you just raised, he has read about in the newspaper, in the press. He has no independent awareness even after his service as Deputy Secretary of State about the matters that you just raised.

And, Tony, I think it is fine for you to proceed under the notion that when--unless Josh specified otherwise, he's asking you the questions in your capacity as Deputy Secretary of State.

MR. BLINKEN: Okay.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Thank you for the clarification. That's correct.

MR. SU: Thank you, Josh.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Have you ever discussed any of Hunter Biden's financial or business arrangements with Joe Biden?

MR. BLINKEN: I have not.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Have you ever discussed any of Hunter
Biden's financial or business arrangements with James Biden?
And I should note that with respect to the previous question
and this question, it's not limited to your time at the
Department of State.

MR. BLINKEN: I understand, and I have not.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Did you mention or discuss this
interview with Joe Biden?

MR. BLINKEN: I did not.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Have you ever met James Biden?

MR. BLINKEN: I have.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: How many times?

MR. BLINKEN: Oh, over the course of the, roughly, 20
years that I've worked for the President-elect, hard to say.
A dozen.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Have you ever discussed any of Hunter
Biden's financial or business arrangements with him?

MR. BLINKEN: I have not.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Have you ever discussed any of James
Biden's financial or business arrangements?

MR. BLINKEN: I have not.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Are you aware of James Gilliar?

MR. BLINKEN: Could you repeat that, please?

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Are you aware of James Gilliar? Last
name, G-I-L-L-I-A-R.

MR. BLINKEN: I am not.
MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Are you aware of Tony Bobulinski?

MR. BLINKEN: The name is one I think I've read in the media, but other than that, no.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Are you aware of Eric Schwerin?

MR. BLINKEN: I am.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: How so?

MR. BLINKEN: I believe that he was a business associate of Hunter Biden's.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Have you ever discussed any of Hunter Biden's financial or business arrangements with him?

MR. BLINKEN: I have not.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Have you ever discussed any of James Biden's financial or business arrangements with him?

MR. BLINKEN: I have not.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Have you ever--

MR. SU: And by him, you mean Eric Schwerin, Josh?

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: By him, I mean Eric Schwerin, correct.

MR. SU: Okay. Thank you.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Have you ever discussed any of Joe Biden's financial or business arrangements with Eric Schwerin?

MR. BLINKEN: I have not.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Have you ever worked with Eric Schwerin?
MR. BLINKEN: I have not.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Are you aware of John Robinson Walker?

MR. BLINKEN: No.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Have you ever met Hunter Biden?

MR. BLINKEN: Yes.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Have you ever discussed any of his financial or business arrangements with him?

MR. BLINKEN: I have not.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: At this point, I'm going to turn it over to Scott.

Thank you, Mr. Blinken.

MR. WITTMANN: Hi, Mr. Blinken. Can you hear me okay?

MR. BLINKEN: I can. Thank you.

MR. WITTMANN: Okay. Thank you for your time.

I just want to just go back to a couple of questions that Josh just asked and just drill down a little more just to make sure that the record is clear.

Josh's first question was, are you aware of the Biden family's--or I'll be even more specific--are you aware of Hunter Biden's financial links to Burisma? And I believe you said the answer was you're not. Is that correct?

MR. BLINKEN: In the context of my service as Deputy Secretary of State from 2015 to 2017, I was not, and again, just to be clear, obviously, I've read accounts in the media
since then. So my only--I don't have any independent
awareness. My only awareness is what's been reported in the
media.

MR. WITTMANN: Understood.

So I want to kind of zoom out even more and not specify
financial links but any association with Burisma. During
your time as Deputy Secretary of State, were you aware of
any association that Hunter Biden had with Burisma?

MR. BLINKEN: I was not.

MR. WITTMANN: Okay. The other question I want to go
back to, I think when Josh asked are you aware of Mr. Eric
Schwerin, I believe your answer was with regards to Mr.
Hunter Biden that you knew that he was a business associate
of Mr. Biden's; is that correct?

MR. BLINKEN: That's correct.

MR. WITTMANN: How did you become aware of that?

MR. BLINKEN: We occasionally would run into Mr.
Schwerin at social functions in Washington, and in the
course of those interactions, I think I learned that he was
in business with Hunter Biden.

MR. WITTMANN: And you learned this through Mr.
Schwerin?

MR. BLINKEN: That's right.

MR. WITTMANN: And did Mr. Schwerin provide you any
other information besides the fact that he had business
associations with Hunter Biden?

MR. BLINKEN: No. No discussion of any of those activities, just, I think, establishing the fact that he was a friend of and apparently a business associate of Mr. Biden's.

MR. WITTMANN: And when did you find this out?

MR. BLINKEN: Oh, I couldn't put a date on it, but I think this goes back, oh, maybe 10 or 15 years, something like that.

MR. WITTMANN: Okay. So--

MR. BLINKEN: I don't have it fixed in my mind, but certainly before my service in the State Department.

MR. WITTMANN: Understood. And did you have any other conversations after that initial conversation about Mr. Schwerin's business relationship with Hunter Biden?

MR. BLINKEN: No. We didn't discuss any of his business activities. I'm just aware of the apparent fact of.

MR. WITTMANN: Did Mr. Schwerin specify what type of business association he had with Mr. Blinken?

MR. BLINKEN: I don't recall.

MR. WITTMANN: So just going back to your previous statement when you were Deputy Secretary of State, you were not aware that Hunter Biden served on Burisma's board?

MR. BLINKEN: To the best of my recollection, I was
not.
MR. WITTMANN: How often did you meet with Hunter Biden?
MR. SU: During--
MR. BLINKEN: During my--during the service--
MR. WITTMANN: Yes. Yes, sir.
MR. BLINKEN: So to the best of my recollection, I had one meeting with Hunter Biden, which was a lunch in my office at the State Department. I don't recall any other meetings with him.
MR. WITTMANN: Did you ever talk with him on the phone?
MR. BLINKEN: Not that I recall.
MR. WITTMANN: Did you have any other means of correspondence with him--emails, texts?
MR. BLINKEN: No. The only other times I would have seen Hunter Biden, I think were two. One, I spent a lot of time with his father, the President-elect, sometimes at their--at his home in Delaware or when he was Vice President at the Naval Observatory or in his office at the White House, and on probably a handful of occasions, I would see Hunter Biden or when he was still alive, Beau Biden, or actually Biden and his children either at his home in Delaware, the Naval Observatory, or sometimes in his office at the Office of the Vice President. So those were the other occasions in which I would have seen Hunter, and of
course, I saw him at the funeral of his brother.

MR. WITTMANN: Would you say that you had a personal relationship with Hunter Biden?

MR. BLINKEN: I'd say we had a friendly acquaintanceship. I first met Hunter, I think, probably in the--I don't recall exactly when or where, but probably in the 1990s. I was serving in the Clinton administration at the time. We were in overlapping social circles, so it was the kind of thing where we might see each other at some kind of social function, the same with his brother Beau.

When I began to work for his father, my relationship with Hunter was really through the fact that I worked for his father, again, because spending a lot of time with his father at home, in his office, the children would occasionally be there, and so I would see them on those occasions. And, of course, we were, in that sense, friendly acquaintances because we'd talk, we'd chat on the margins of whatever I was doing with the now President-elect.

MR. WITTMANN: You mentioned that you had your social circles overlap in some cases.

MR. BLINKEN: Mm-hmm.

MR. WITTMANN: And just going back earlier, you said that you had an interaction with Mr. Schwerin, and through Mr. Schwerin, you learned that he had a business association with Hunter Biden. Did anyone else besides Mr. Schwerin
tell you about their business relationship with Hunter Biden besides Mr. Schwerin?

MR. BLINKEN: No.

MR. WITTMANN: During your interactions with Hunter Biden, did you ever--did he ever mention or did you have any awareness of what jobs or job he held?

MR. BLINKEN: I did not. We didn't discuss his business activities. So I couldn't tell you exactly what he did.

MR. WITTMANN: Will, I'd like to go to our first exhibit that I'll enter into the record as Exhibit No. 1. Will, this is Tab 2.

MR. SACRIPANTI: Okay. Pulling that up now.

[Blinken Exhibit No. 1 was marked for identification.]

MR. WITTMANN: And, Mr. Blinken, let me know if you need me to describe it to you and any other terms so it's easier for you to find. I can give you the Bates number if that's helpful.

MR. BLINKEN: Yes. Would you just make sure I'm looking at the right thing?

MR. WITTMANN: Sure. It's the document that ends with Bates No. 33, and it should be on your screen now, to make sure that we're looking at the same thing.

MR. BLINKEN: Yes. Yes, I see it. Thank you.
MR. WITTMANN: And so we're all in different rooms now. So this is going to be a little tricky. So I'll have to tell Will to just scroll down. Will, if you would mind doing that, and pause there, Will, please. Thank you. Will, could you scroll up a little, please, actually? That's good. Thank you.

Mr. Blinken, as you can see in front of you and on the screen, this is a document that appears to show your schedule for May 27th, 2015. It was sent to you the day before on May 26th, 2015, and there's a question for you from someone who's redacted, asking you to please advise on Hunter Biden, "Should I fit him in tomorrow?" You responded on May 26th, "Sure. Let's try to do Hunter tomorrow, maybe after the DC."

Did you meet with Hunter Biden on May 27th, 2015?

MR. BLINKEN: I believe the answer is no. The meeting did not take place.

MR. WITTMANN: Do you know why the meeting did not take place?

MR. BLINKEN: I believe it's because this was, I think, a few days before his brother, Beau Biden, passed away. He was literally, as it turns out, on his death bed. So if any meeting had been on the books, that's why it wouldn't have happened, and I don't--I have no recollection of meeting him then. The only time I remember meeting with Hunter Biden at
the State Department was a couple of months later in my office.

MR. WITTMANN: So we'll turn to that right now.
Will, this is Tab 3, and, Mr. Blinken, this is Bates No. 48.

MR. BLINKEN: Yes. Thank you.

[Blinken Exhibit No. 2 was marked for identification.]

MR. SU: And, Scott, while we're turning to that exhibit, I think just for the record, I think Beau's passing was on May 30th of 2015.

MR. WITTMANN: Thank you.
Will, could you please scroll down so we can see the beginning of the next email? That's good, right there. Thank you.

So, Mr. Blinken, this goes off of what you just stated. Based on the calendar, Hunter Biden—or the schedule, rather, Hunter Biden is listed on your schedule for 12:00 p.m. for July 22nd, 2015. Did you meet with Hunter Biden on this date?

MR. BLINKEN: Yes, I did.

MR. WITTMANN: And what was discussed at this meeting?

MR. BLINKEN: This is actually lunch. He came to have lunch with me in my office at the State Department. This was about two months after his brother Beau had passed away,
and, gosh, I guess a few weeks after the funeral and services and memorial. And we talked about his brother, about the effect the passing of his brother was having on the family, the effect it was having on then Vice President Biden. It was all about the loss the family had suffered and how they were coping with it.

MR. WITTMANN: I'm certainly sorry to hear that. And just for the record, Will, could you—and I'm sorry. I think I need to officially say that I'll enter this as Exhibit 2, and then for Exhibit 3, I'll enter in the next document.

Will, could you go to Tab 22?

[ Blinken Exhibit No. 3 was marked for identification.]

MR. WITTMANN: Mr. Blinken, this is the document that we received from your attorney.

MR. SU: The calendar, the calendar entry that we provided. Okay?


MR. WITTMANN: Which—and I just wanted it to be entered into the record to show, as you mentioned, that you met with Mr. Biden for lunch on that day.

Will, could you scroll down, please, just so Mr. Blinken can see that in the calendar?

MR. BLINKEN: Yes.
MR. WITTMANN: So, Mr. Blinken, obviously, it sounds like the topic was very somber at this meeting, but as you mentioned, this was a reschedule from a previous meeting--

MR. BLINKEN: Mm-hmm.

MR. WITTMANN: --back in May, prior to Beau's death.

Do you know what Mr. Biden originally wanted to speak to you about?

MR. BLINKEN: I do not.

MR. WITTMANN: Did any other topics besides Beau's passing come up at this lunch?

MR. BLINKEN: The only thing I remember was talking about Beau, talking about the impact on the family. It's kind of seared into my--into my memory--

MR. WITTMANN: Sure.

MR. BLINKEN: --even how raw that was.

MR. WITTMANN: Sure, sure. I can understand.

So you mentioned earlier that this was the only meeting that you had with Mr. Biden at the State Department.

MR. BLINKEN: Mm-hmm.

MR. WITTMANN: Did you have other meetings that were scheduled at different locations with Mr. Biden?

MR. BLINKEN: I did not.

MR. WITTMANN: Okay. I want to turn to our next document, which I will enter into the record as Exhibit 4.

[Bracketed: Blinken Exhibit No. 4 was]
Mr. Blinken, on February 4, 2016, William Russo sent you Hunter Biden's tweet regarding Mr. Biden's recent trip to Jordan and Lebanon with the World Food Program USA. Mr. Russo wrote, "Thought you'd want to know in case you see him around and have the chance to chat. I'll keep an eye out for anything we might want to highlight that he puts out."

Who is William Russo?

Mr. Blinken: Mr. Russo was on my staff in the Office of the Deputy Secretary. He was my communications advisor.

Mr. Wittmann: Okay. That might help to answer my next question, which is why was Mr. Russo sending you Hunter Biden's tweets, or this tweet?

Mr. Blinken: Mr. Russo, among other things, established me on Twitter, so he was a voracious Twitter user and somehow brought me into the 21st century. Why he flagged this for me or sent this to me I don't know, but his
responsibilities included managing my Twitter account.

MR. WITTMANN: Did you ask Mr. Russo to flag Hunter Biden's tweets for you?

MR. BLINKEN: I did not.

MR. WITTMANN: Did you ask any other--any State Department employees to flag or monitor Hunter Biden's tweets?

MR. BLINKEN: I did not.

MR. WITTMANN: Was it important for you, at the time, to have awareness of Hunter Biden's activities on social media or in general?

MR. BLINKEN: No.

MR. WITTMANN: Was this particular trip that Mr. Russo mentioned, referenced, did that particular trip have any importance or meaning to you?

MR. BLINKEN: The apparent trip that Mr. Biden took itself? No. The travel to Jordan and Lebanon in the context of something that we were dealing with very much in the Department, which was the global refugee crisis, that was something I was deeply involved in, and so I had a general interest in the countries that were implicated in the refugee crisis and, of course, in parallel to that was the crisis in Syria. But with regard to Hunter Biden's activities there I had no interest or knowledge.

MR. WITTMANN: In this email, at the top, you thank Mr.
Russo for flagging. Did you take any action or mention this information that Mr. Russo sent to anyone else, either in the State Department or in a different government agency?

MR. BLINKEN: Not to the best of my recollection.

MR. WITTMANN: Did you discuss Mr. Biden's activities with Secretary Kerry?

MR. BLINKEN: No.

MR. WITTMANN: Did you discuss Mr. Biden's activities with then Vice President Biden?

MR. BLINKEN: I have no recollection of that.

MR. WITTMANN: Do you know Chris Heinz?

MR. BLINKEN: I think I have met Mr. Heinz in the past. I couldn't tell you where or when. I know who he is by dint of his relationship to John Kerry, and Teresa Heinz Kerry, but I couldn't tell you where or when I met him.

MR. WITTMANN: Were you aware--and again, this is when you were Deputy Secretary of State--were you aware of any business dealings between Hunter Biden and Mr. Heinz?

MR. BLINKEN: I was not.

MR. WITTMANN: Did you ever have any meetings with Mr. Heinz when you served as Deputy Secretary?

MR. BLINKEN: I did not.

MR. WITTMANN: Mr. Blinken, I want to turn to a different topic now, regarding U.S. loan guarantees and the different conditions that are set on these U.S. loan
guarantees, particularly the U.S. loan guarantees to Ukraine.

MR. BLINKEN: Mm-hmm.

MR. WITTMANN: Could you tell us what role or responsibilities you had regarding the setting and monitoring of conditions on U.S. loan guarantees to Ukraine?

MR. WITTMANN: Yes. There were a whole series of issues that were part of the challenge we faced in establishing policy with regard to Ukraine. Some of them had to do, of course, with the Russian intervention and presence on Ukrainian territory and our efforts to help Ukraine secure its own borders and recover its sovereignty. There were issues, of course, of economic support to Ukraine, issues of military and defense support to Ukraine, issues of sanctions regarding Russia, working with European partners and allies, the international financial institutions, et cetera, including on the maintenance of sanctions.

And another big aspect of the policy was combating corruption, because as we saw it, Ukraine was facing aggression from without, from Russia, but also from within, by corruption. This is what was eating away at Ukraine's democracy, or its ability to stand up a strong democracy. And so the fight against corruption in Ukraine was front and center in our policy towards Ukraine. And one of the
challenges was getting the government to take action against corruption, and in that effort we had to look at what leverage we had to get the government to act when it was, frankly, recalcitrant at best sometimes, in dealing with that problem.

And one of the biggest sources of influence or leverage were these loan guarantees. These were economic lifelines for Ukraine. We felt very strongly about supporting Ukraine in order for it to be able to withstand what it was getting from the Russians and to build a strong economy and a strong country. But we saw corruption as being perhaps the biggest impediment to Ukraine's success, and to the extent the government was not taking action against corruption, and to the extent that, in particular, what was supposed to be the leading tool in its fight against corruption, the Office of the Prosecutor General was not only not taking the fight to corruption, it was, at best, acquiescent and, at worst, aiding and abetting corruption.

It got to the point where we had to look for ways to encourage and, indeed, leverage the Ukrainian government to take action. So loan guarantees was one way to do that, which is to say conditioning them on Ukrainian government action on matters of importance to us, notably corruption. That is how you get to the loan guarantees.

MR. WITTmann: I want to dive a little deeper in terms
of, you know, fighting corruption in Ukraine, and just be a little more specific by what was corrupt in Ukraine. Obviously, I am sure it is, you know, it could be a lengthy list, perhaps, but could you talk a little bit more about maybe the roles that oligarchs in Ukraine played and whether that fueled corruption in the country?

MR. BLINKEN: Sure. As a general matter, oligarchs their wealth and their influence with the government, with government officials to advance their own interests, and perhaps in ways contrary to the interests of Ukraine as a country. And that was something that was endemic and, unfortunately, systemic to Ukraine. And we saw that as a serious impediment to Ukraine's development and evolution as a strong democracy that could stand on its own two feet.

MR. WITTMANN: Based on public reporting, we understand that Vice President Biden made a--conditioned the third billion-dollar loan guarantee on the removal of Mr. Viktor Shokin, the now former Prosecutor General of Ukraine. Were you--again, at the time, were you aware of this condition, this specific condition?

MR. BLINKEN: Yes, I was.

MR. WITTMANN: And this is for the third U.S. loan guarantee. Is that correct?

MR. BLINKEN: I believe that's correct.

MR. WITTMANN: And when did you become aware of this
MR. BLINKEN: I couldn't put a date on it but this was a policy decision that evolved through the policy process we talked about earlier in our conversation, which is to say that I believe conditioning the loan guarantee was an idea that rose up from the Interagency Policy Committee, through the Deputies Committee, and ultimately was blessed either by the Deputies Committee or by the Principals Committee, and became policy.

To put it in context, Mr. Shokin was leaving the Office of the Prosecutor General, and as I said a moment ago, that was supposed to be the pointy edge of the spear in Ukraine in combating corruption. And under Mr. Shokin's tenure, it was, unfortunately, exactly the opposite. And this developed over some months, but it became a growing and deep concern across the United States government, with our allies and partners in Europe, with the international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank that were supporting Ukraine, and indeed in Congress, on a bipartisan basis, that the Office of the Prosecutor General, and Mr. Shokin in particular, were sitting on corruption cases and possibly even aiding and abetting corruption.

There was an incident that got a lot of play in the media, around the world, I think in the summer of 2015, in which the offices and homes of two of Mr. Shokin's deputies
were raided, and large amounts of cash and diamonds were found. These deputies were considered to be corrupt. It later turned out that Mr. Shokin had business dealings with them and was trying to protect them.

So this played out over some months, and it got to the point where, as I said, there was widespread concern, deep concern that the Office of the Prosecutor General was the largest impediment to the fight against corruption. And as I said, it was a concern that was shared throughout the U.S. Government, in Congress, and it was actually, I have to tell you, very gratifying to me that we saw this on a bipartisan basis. And in particular, I know Senators Johnson, Portman, Kirk, and others were also leading this effort to get a change in the Prosecutor General's Office, and as I said, our partners in Europe felt exactly the same way.

So this evolved over many months. I think we were looking for tools to get the government in Ukraine to take action, and it wouldn't, it couldn't. It was not clear way. But ultimately, it was recommended as a matter of policy that we condition these loan guarantees on the government's action.

MR. WITTMANN: So I just want to get a better picture of when that decision was finally made. So what you described it sounded like sort of a timeline, I guess, of how the U.S. view of the PGO changed over many months, I
think you mentioned.

MR. BLINKEN: Mm-hmm.

MR. WITTMANN: But could you tell us how the sort of, to the extent that you know, the development of that condition, making that condition, when did that idea, when did that begin to be discussed, and when was it finalized, and then, finally, when was the--well, let's start there and I'll ask later on.

MR. BLINKEN: Look, I'm afraid I don't remember with any specificity the dates or meetings and how it evolved.

MR. WITTMANN: Could you just tell us maybe a range? Was it a month? Two months?

MR. BLINKEN: I believe it would have been in the fall or late fall of 2015, maybe into the winter, but that's about as precise as my memory allows me to get.

MR. WITTMANN: And when was--so you mentioned it may be into the winter. So by--and I understand that the specific dates, you can't recall those, but by winter of 2015, it sounds like the condition was agreed on. Is that--

MR. BLINKEN: Yeah. To the best of my knowledge that's the rough time frame, but I really would be hard pressed to put a, you know, a specific date on it. I couldn't tell you exactly when the idea emerged or how long it took to discuss it, debate it, and decide it. But that was the rough time period.
MR. WITTMANN: Do you know how that condition was conveyed to Ukrainian leadership?

MR. BLINKEN: I don't recall the specifics, and, you know, there were certainly multiple ways of doing that, everything from a private engagement by the Ambassador or a visiting official or a public declaration.

MR. WITTMANN: In the past, Vice President Biden had mentioned that he was the one to convey the condition. Is that accurate?

MR. BLINKEN: I believe that's accurate. I don't have a contemporaneous recollection of exactly what happened. So what I have read since then, it seems entirely accurate to me, but I don't have an actual contemporaneous, independent recollection of who did what when.

MR. WITTMANN: And just to be clear, do you know when he--if he made that condition, do you know when that occurred?

MR. BLINKEN: I don't recall, no.

MR. WITTMANN: Do you know when the Vice President, at the time, was made aware of the proposed condition?

MR. BLINKEN: I do not.

MR. WITTMANN: Were there any individuals, either in the State Department or in other agencies, pushing for this condition to be made?

MR. BLINKEN: Oh, I think this is a widely held view
that this was the right move to make. Certainly, to the
best of my recollection, this was something that was
strongly supported by my Assistant Secretary of State, Ms.
Nuland, by our Ambassador to Ukraine, Mr. Pyatt. It was
widely supported across the interagency.

You know, typically when there was a policy
deliberation on Ukraine it would, in most instances,
involve, of course, the National Security Council staff
itself, the Deputy National Security Advisor, the National
Security Advisor. It would usually involve the National
Economic Council and its senior representative. It would
involve the Office of the Vice President. It would involve
the State Department, the Pentagon, the Treasury, the
Commerce Department, and then depending on the issue, it
might involve a whole series of other agencies, from EXIM
Bank to USTR, you name it. But those core agencies were
always at the table, and to the best of my memory the issue
of conditioning a loan guarantee was broadly, widely
supported across the interagency.

You know, as I say, I don't remember where it
originated. Chances are it was from my Assistant Secretary,
Ms. Nuland, or Ambassador Pyatt, or perhaps the Treasury
Department.

MR. WITTMANN: How often were you briefed on the
development of this condition?
MR. BLINKEN: I don't recall. You know, we probably met, on an interagency basis on Ukraine, certainly—probably maybe every two weeks, give or take, and there was usually a Deputies Committee meeting that dealt with Ukraine. And then, of course, within the Department we also met on a fairly regular basis. So I couldn't tell you how many times or over what period of time the question of the loan guarantee was discussed, but certainly it would have been in multiple meetings over multiple weeks.

MR. WITTMANN: So you mentioned that the condition was finalized roughly in, you know, winter of 2015, and then I imagine it would have been conveyed at some point around that time. Does that--

MR. BLINKEN: Yeah, to the best of my recollection. Again, I may be off by a couple of months here or there. I just don't have a--

MR. WITTMANN: So following the Ukrainians' learning about this condition, could you describe the extent to which you were briefed on—you received briefings on whether or not Ukrainian leadership would comply with this condition, how often you received those briefings?

MR. BLINKEN: Yeah, I don't—I don't recall that with any specificity. You know, again, we were dealing with, talking about, meeting about Ukraine almost on an ongoing basis during this period. So certainly the reaction of the
government to the demand using the loan guarantee would have been something that would have come back in meetings and discussions and deliberations.

I would also certainly have heard a reaction probably from our Ambassador in Ukraine, Mr. Pyatt, or the Assistant Secretary. But I don't have any recollection of exactly when, how often, any of that.

MR. WITTMANN: When were you made aware that the condition of Shokin's removal would be met?

MR. BLINKEN: I don't recall. I couldn't put a date on it.

MR. WITTMANN: When you found out, even though you don't remember when you found out, what was your reaction to that news?

MR. BLINKEN: I don't--I don't remember.

MR. WITTMANN: Do you remember--or did you discuss this news with Ambassador Pyatt or Ms. Nuland?

MR. BLINKEN: In all likelihood, if not certainty, yes. I just don't have a recollection of it.

MR. WITTMANN: Did you discuss this information with anyone in the Vice President's office at the time?

MR. BLINKEN: Oh, I'm sure it was discussed or I discussed it with pretty much everyone involved in Ukraine policy in the interagency. So, you know, after the demand was made and then looking to see if the Ukrainian Government
complied, took action, et cetera, I'm sure that was part of numerous conversations in the interagency process or in any conversations that we had about Ukraine.

MR. WITTMANN: Do you know who, what U.S. official briefed the Vice President about this information at the time?

MR. BLINKEN: I do not.

MR. WITTMANN: If Mr. Shokin had not been removed, would the U.S. have eventually released the third loan guarantee?

MR. BLINKEN: I can't speculate. I don't know.

MR. WITTMANN: At the time--so following Mr. Shokin, eventually Mr. Lutsenko became the PGO. What was your impression of him?

MR. BLINKEN: I don't have a strong memory. I think he--my recollection is that going into the job, he had a good reputation. But how he performed in the job, I don't have a strong recollection. I think that--the nadir of that office was under Mr. Shokin in my memory, but I think it's also fair to say the office has probably never performed as effectively as one would have wanted in advancing the fight against corruption.

MR. WITTMANN: Did you ever share your perspective of Mr. Lutsenko with the Vice President?

MR. BLINKEN: I don't recall doing so, no.
MR. WITTMANN: Did you ever discuss your perspective of Mr. Lutsenko with anyone in the Vice President's office?

MR. BLINKEN: I don't have any memory of actually discussing Mr. Lutsenko with anyone. It's just my impression in thinking back about my own impressions of him. That's what I was referring to.

MR. WITTMANN: And I just want to go back in time a little bit. Prior to Mr. Shokin, the PGO was Mr. Yarema. What was your perspective of Mr. Yarema?

MR. BLINKEN: Again, I have a very vague recollection that he was not seen as an aggressive actor in the fight against corruption. That's as much as I remember. I think, you know, Shokin, besides sitting on cases and doing nothing, the concern was even deeper with him because I think we believe he was actually aiding and abetting corruption, and, of course, the so-called diamond incident was just the most spectacular public evidence of that. But the prior prosecutor general, I don't have a good memory other than that I don't think he was a dynamic actor.

MR. WITTMANN: Were you aware of concerns about Yarema or individuals in Yarema's office accepting bribes?

MR. BLINKEN: Not that I recall, no.

MR. WITTMANN: Okay. At this time, Mr. Blinken, our first hour is almost up. We have about 6 minutes, and I'm going to turn it back over to my colleague Josh. Thank you.
MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Thank you, Scott. Mr. Blinken, can you hear me okay?

MR. BLINKEN: I can. Thank you.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Great. So before we move on, I want to be sure that the scope of our questions relating to the Biden family's financial and business dealings includes your time in the Obama administration, not just during your time at the State Department. And, again, the Biden family would largely include Joe Biden, James Biden, and Hunter Biden, although Sara Biden is sprinkled in there from time to time.

So with respect to the financial and business dealings of the Biden family with Burisma and Chinese nationals, during your time in the Obama administration you were unaware of those dealings and associations. Is that correct?

MR. GOSHORN: Hold on a second, Josh. I just want to clarify the way you're phrasing the question here. When you say "Biden family," you're speaking about any individual member of the Biden family, any one of them, not all of them—not Joe, Hunter, James together. Is that correct?

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: When I refer to the "Biden family," that would include the basis of knowledge that Mr. Blinken has with respect to any one individual member of that family. But I'm specifically, for purposes of clarity and focus, naming Joe Biden, James Biden, and Hunter Biden. You
know, ultimately, the answer is going to rest with Mr. Blinken with respect to the base of his knowledge. And if it extends beyond those three, then so be it.

MR. GOSHORN: Well, yeah, but the way you're asking the question could be interpreted as stating as a fact that the three of them conducted business activities together with Communist China, which I don't think is a fact.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Dan, I didn't know you were a special pleader here for Mr. Blinken. If Mr. Blinken would like clarification, I'm happy to give it to him.

MR. GOSHORN: I want clarification on what your question is.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Mr. Blinken, do you understand my question?

MR. BLINKEN: Would you mind repeating it, please?

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: I will state it in full from the beginning to the end to provide full context. Before we move on, I want to be sure that the scope of our questions relating to the Biden family's financial and business dealings include your time in the Obama administration, not just during your time at the State Department. And, again, the Biden family would largely include Joe Biden, James Biden, and Hunter Biden, although Sara Biden has been involved in some of those transactions which we've highlighted in our public report of September 23, 2020.
So the question then is this: With respect to the financial and business dealings of the Biden family with Burisma and Chinese nationals, during your time in the Obama administration you were unaware of those dealings and associations. Is that correct?

MR. BLINKEN: That is correct.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Thank you. Do you find that the links specifically with respect to Hunter Biden and Chinese nationals connected to the Communist regime, as well as the People's Liberation Army, do you find that those links are problematic?

MR. SU: Josh, so I'm going to stop you there and say that we are here to provide you with agreed-upon information regarding his time as Deputy Secretary of State. That's something that we agreed upon explicitly in our discussions leading up to the interview. The witness has given you his response as to his lack of awareness of any of the Biden family's business activities in a way that you've answered it. I don't think it's within the scope of this interview for you to ask him his current assessment of whether any particular business activities, if they're there, are "problematic." I think it's fine for you to ask him factual questions about the time period that we've agreed upon, but I'm not inclined to have him answer or opine on matters and allegations that he has no information about.
MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Thank you for that, Jonathan. I disagree with your position. He's certainly free to answer.

Mr. Blinken, I have one more question for you. So is it fair to say, then, that with respect to the financial and business links, you know, between Hunter Biden and James Biden, and I guess Joe Biden to some extent, to Ukrainian nationals, Russian nationals, and Chinese nationals, you first became aware of those associations and links because of the Chairman's September 23, 2020, report. Is that correct?

MR. SU: I'm also going to stop you there, Josh, and I'm not going to have--that's not his testimony. The witness' testimony is that--the witness's testimony is that he read about certain information in the press for which he has no basis of personal knowledge. So I don't have a quarrel with your question other than to say and to clarify that he's not aware of the substantive truth or untruth of what's been stated in the press. He simply has no information on it. Otherwise, he's free to answer your question.

Tony, do you understand the question?

MR. BLINKEN: Yes, and I think your answer is exactly right. I have no independent knowledge of any such ties, and any knowledge I have of any such ties or allegations comes from wide coverage in the media.
MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Blinken. Scott, back to you.

MR. SU: So, folks, we're on the hour. Is it okay if we take a 5-minute break?

MR. WITTMANN: That's exactly what I was going to recommend, and that would be fine with us, as long as it's good with Mr. Blinken.

MR. BLINKEN: Yeah, thank you very much. I appreciate it.

MR. SU: Okay. We'll be right back. Thanks, guys.

MR. WITTMANN: Thank you.

[Recess.]

MR. SCHRAM: Mr. Blinken, congratulations again on your--announced intentions to nominate you to be Secretary of State. I know that there are a lot of demands on your time. We appreciate your time today, and we will try to be efficient.

MR. BLINKEN: Thank you.

MR. SCHRAM: Entering again as Exhibit A, the letter today from Ranking Member Peters to Chairman Johnson.

[Blinken Exhibit A was marked for identification.]

MR. FOLIO: And, again, Zack, we object to you entering this letter into the record. It is not relevant to an interview of Mr. Blinken. It is, in fact, about statements
exchanged between the Ranking Member and the Chairman during a hearing last week. It is unfair to the Majority. You provided this letter to everyone six minutes prior to the interview starting and just on a one-sided platform to voice opinions, and frankly, it's just a waste of everyone's times, but as you just acknowledged, perhaps most importantly, Mr. Blinken's time.

I don't know what Mr. Blinken has to say about a letter that the Ranking Member wrote to the Chairman and then you introduced to everyone's world six minutes ago.

MR. SCHRAM: Joe, as you noted at the beginning of this interview, the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply. It's the Ranking Member's judgment that this be included in the record. You're not in a position to substitute your judgment for his.

So I'm going to ask about this letter, and I agree we should not waste Mr. Blinken's time. So I would prefer not to read it in its entirety, but if you require it, I will.

MR. FOLIO: Again, we're objecting to the introduction of this letter as an exhibit, and I'd also invite Mr. Blinken's counsel to express any opinions he has about Mr. Blinken and all of us sitting through questions about a letter, about an exchange between the Ranking Member and the Chairman that everyone received a few minutes ago.

MR. SCHRAM: Joe, you don't know the question that I'm
going to ask. So you're not in a position to predict that.

Sorry, Jonathan. Did you start to say something?

MR. SU: No. I was just going to say, Zack, if you
want to direct your question, maybe we can go from there.

MR. SCHRAM: Okay. Seeing as the Majority maintains
its objection, I regret that I will have to read the letter
into the record. The letter is dated today and was sent
earlier today from Ranking Member Peters to Chairman
Johnson, and it says, "Mr. Chairman, In our Wednesday,
December 16th Committee hearing you made baseless
accusations on the record, including calling me a liar for
my efforts to hold you accountable for your extreme partisan
actions that have undermined our Committee's bipartisan
traditions and our fundamental mission to help protect our
homeland security. Had you made your false accusations on
the Senate floor, it would have been in violation of Senate
Rule XIX. Your outburst was beneath the dignity of the
Senate, the Committee, and simple civil discourse. In fact,
it was the culmination of the committee's dissent under your
chairmanship into a hotbed of dangerous, hyper-partisan,
anti-democratic, and demonstrably false conspiracies that
have no place in the United States Senate. Tragically,
those falsehoods have extended beyond your efforts to
influence the 2020 presidential election to your
amplification of unsound medical information that has the
potential to exacerbate the COVID-19 pandemic and your amplification of conspiracy theories that question the very validity of the election's outcome.

"To be clear, in pursuing my responsibilities as Ranking Member and as a steward of our Committee's bipartisan reputation, I have never lied. To the contrary, every specific allegation you named in your public accusation was false or misleading. To set the record straight:

"First, you claim that I was involved in the creation of a 'false intelligence product.' The accusation itself is false. Specifically, you said, 'Senior Democrat leaders, including Ranking Member Peters, you know, were involved in a process of creating a false intelligence product that was supposedly classified. They leaked to the media that accused Senator Grassley, the president pro tem of the Senate and myself of accepting and disseminating Russian disinformation from Andrii Derkach.'

"You are referring to the July 13th, 2020, letter with a classified annex from Democratic leaders to the FBI requesting a defensive briefing on foreign election interference efforts. As I stated during last week's hearing, I was not involved in the creation of the letter, classified addendum, or subsequent press reports. Your characterization of a classified addendum as a 'false
intelligence product' is also inaccurate. Despite your protestations, I requested defensive briefings that would have given us clear answers about how your allegations related to a foreign attack on our election. Unfortunately, while the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Foreign Influence Task Force was willing to brief our Committee, the Central Intelligence Agency declined. Politico reported that you are 'considered toxic by some members of the intelligence community.'

"Second, you falsely claimed that I 'lied repeatedly in the press' that you were 'spreading Russian disinformation.' To be precise, I have said that you have 'advanced,' and 'amplified,' a Russian attack on our election, which is unequivocally true. Your investigation was the successful culmination of a Russian attack on our election. As then Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs Amos Hochstein testified in this very same investigation:

"Do you remain concerned that Vice President Biden is a target of a Russian disinformation effort?"

"Answer: Yes."

"Question: Why?"

"Answer: Because I see it on a regular basis. I think this investigation is probably the successful outcome of that effort."
"Then Ambassador to Ukraine (later President Trump's appointed Ambassador to Greece) Geoffrey Pyatt also testified that the conspiracy theory that Hunter Biden's position at Burisma undermined anticorruption efforts in Ukraine was in fact rooted in a Russian disinformation effort:

"Question: And the argument that Hunter Biden's position on the board of Burisma corrupted U.S. anticorruption efforts in Ukraine, do you include that as part of the Russian information narrative?

"Answer: Yes, of course. And it's of a pattern with lots of other Russian disinformation. ... This is a toolkit which Russia is using across Europe to undermine security and advance their perceived interests.

"Question: Is the narrative that Vice President Biden's actions in Ukraine were corrupt—is that a false narrative?

"Answer: Yes, it is, and I think that you only need to look at what Secretary Pompeo said about Derkach, what Treasury said about Derkach, and their contemporaneous release of privileged telephone conversations between the Vice President and President Poroshenko by Derkach to understand what's referred to there.

"You seem to think that because you've never spoken to Mr. Derkach that you cannot be held accountable for
amplifying his lies. This reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of how disinformation works and the role you have played in aiding it. A key source for your investigation is Ukrainian national Andrii Telizhenko, who traffics in the same conspiracy theories as Mr. Derkach and is cited 42 times in your letters. You initially sought to authorize a subpoena from the Committee to interview Mr. Telizhenko, but retreated following bipartisan concerns and for Mr. Telizhenko's credibility and associations.

"Both Mr. Derkach and Mr. Telizhenko released records of alleged phone calls between former Vice President Biden and former Ukrainian President Poroshenko one day before you forced this committee to meet in person during a devastating pandemic to vote to obtain records related to Mr. Telizhenko. Mr. Telizhenko translated Mr. Derkach's claims from Russian to English to make his disinformation accessible to an American audience. In October 2020, the State Department reportedly revoked Mr. Telizhenko's visa. "On September 10th, 2020, the U.S. Treasury Department identified Mr. Derkach as an 'active Russian agent' and sanctioned him for 'false and unsubstantiated narratives concerning U.S. officials' in the 2020 election 'spurring corruption investigations in both Ukraine and the United States designed to culminate prior to Election Day.' Two weeks later, you released an investigative report entitled
"I have never accused you of having directly accepted material or Russian disinformation from Andrii Derkach, as you have consistently denied. However, direct contact with Mr. Derkach is not necessary to repeat his disinformation.

I have only made statements that are indisputably true—your 'claims mirror the claims' of Mr. Derkach, relied on 'suspect sources' who have 'extensive ties' to Mr. Derkach and 'amplified a known Russian attack on our election.'

"Finally, in our December 16th, hearing, you again repeated the false claim that the Minority was the only party who introduced Russian disinformation into the record—a transparent attempt to deflect from the clear record of your statements and actions that have repeatedly amplified conspiracy theories rooted in Russian disinformation.

Minority staff identified the document you are referring to as disinformation, as the transcript reflects, 'by introducing this into the record, we are in no way endorsing it but rather trying to expose it.' This document was entered into the record, identified as disinformation at the time, and presented to an expert witness to discuss it in the context of the broader Russian disinformation efforts that have been confirmed by President Trump's own National Counterintelligence and Security Center Director. This exhibit was entered into the record in order to expose
Russian disinformation, educate the public about this complex attack on our election, and with the goal of preventing the Committee from spreading that disinformation further. Unfortunately, that effort failed. You have been credulously repeating Russian disinformation for more than a year now, debasing the committee responsible for oversight of election security by advancing a foreign attack on our democracy.

"You still have a chance to drop your partisan probe, abandon this destructive behavior, and return to the Committee's bipartisan traditions. I urge you to retract your words, cease your political investigations, and apologize for the harm you have done to the reputation of our Committee and the United States Senate over the past year. Sincerely, Gary C. Peters, Ranking Member."

I apologize for having to read that into the record, Mr. Blinken.

Turning your attention to the second page--

MR. FOLIO: Hey, Zack, before you ask a question, I'd just like to note again that you read the letter into the record over our objection. The letter is not grounded in facts, and it was a tremendous waste of time.

As I noted at the beginning, 99.9 percent of the committee's report and work was focused on the financial transactions and business arrangements of the Biden family.
It was based on U.S. financial records, U.S. agency records, conversations with U.S. persons, yet the Ranking Member attempted to smear the entire investigation because there was one foreign national whom the committee spoke with. And I remind everyone that the only reason the committee spoke with that foreign national was because that foreign national met with Obama National Security Council staff, because that information met with people at the Democratic National Committee, because that person worked for a Democratic lobbying firm.

Again, this was a tremendous waste of time, but I will note the greater harm to national security is when terms like "Russian disinformation" are used as a political weapon. There have been numerous instances soused out by this committee in which actual Russian disinformation, that is, false information provided from Russian intelligence services to the DNC, were used to gin up false investigations against the Trump campaign. The Ranking Member is silent about that, but here when it's politically convenient, they'll find any excuse to call something "Russian disinformation," which only desensitizes people to that term and inhibits our ability to combat that. And it's, frankly, just dangerous.

Go ahead, Zack. Ask your question about a letter you sent an hour ago.
MR. SCHRAM: Apparently, the Majority disagrees with the statements of Trump's own National Security Directorate, which clearly demonstrates that this is rooted in Russian disinformation.

Moving on, Mr. Blinken, who is Amos Hochstein?

MR. BLINKEN: I'm sorry. Could you repeat that--oh, Amos Hochstein. Amos Hochstein was, during my time at the State Department, the senior advisor for energy and held various positions with regard to energy, and he was our senior envoy for that issue.

MR. SCHRAM: Was it part of his responsibility to be generally knowledgeable about Russian disinformation efforts related to Ukraine?

MR. BLINKEN: I think that's a fair characterization in that energy was obviously one of the most critical issues we dealt with when it came to Ukraine, in particular, Russia's efforts to use energy as a tool of coercion with regard to Ukraine.

So the energy relationship between Russia and Ukraine was critical to our policies toward Ukraine, and of course, any tools that Russia might use in that regard would be relevant to his portfolio.

MR. SCHRAM: Mr. Blinken, who is Ambassador Pyatt?

MR. BLINKEN: Ambassador Pyatt was, during the time of my service as Deputy Secretary of State, United States
MR. SCHRAM: And is it part of his responsibility to understand the role of Russian disinformation in the region?

MR. BLINKEN: Yes.

MR. SCHRAM: Mr. Blinken, the Majority spent about 30 minutes of its first hour asking you about what we're calling the "third loan guarantee." The context to the question is the theory that Vice President Joe Biden conditioned the loan guarantee on the firing of Prosecutor General Shokin in order to protect Hunter Biden because Prosecutor General Shokin allegedly had an active investigation into Burisma.

Cutting to the chase and hopefully saving everybody's time, is there any factual basis to that theory?

MR. BLINKEN: There is not.

MR. SCHRAM: Mr. Blinken, in an open letter on August 10th, Chairman Johnson wrote, quote, Many in the media in an ongoing attempt to provide cover for former Vice President Biden continue to repeat the mantra that there is, quote, no evidence of wrongdoing or illegal activity related to Hunter Biden's position on Burisma's board. I could not disagree more.

Are you aware of any evidence of wrongdoing or illegal activity by Vice President Biden related to Hunter Biden's position on Burisma's board?
MR. BLINKEN: I am not.

MR. SCHRAM: Was the foreign policy that Vice President Biden pursued in Ukraine intended to advance the interests of the United States of America?

MR. BLINKEN: It was.

MR. SCHRAM: Did a potential conflict of interest related to Hunter Biden influence Obama administration policy decisions with respect to Ukraine and Burisma holdings?

MR. BLINKEN: It did not.

MR. SCHRAM: Was the foreign policy pursued by Vice President Biden in Ukraine corrupt?

MR. BLINKEN: No.

MR. SCHRAM: Did a potential conflict of interest related to Hunter Biden influence Vice President Biden's decisions with respect to Ukraine and Burisma Holdings?

MR. BLINKEN: It did not.

MR. SCHRAM: Did Vice President Biden alter United States government foreign policy concerning Ukraine to assist Burisma or his son?

MR. BLINKEN: He did not.

MR. SCHRAM: Are you aware of any policy changes made in the Obama administration intended specifically to benefit Burisma?

MR. BLINKEN: I am not.
MR. SCHRAM: Did you witness any effort by any U.S. official to shield Burisma from scrutiny?

MR. BLINKEN: I did not.

MR. SCHRAM: Was the U.S. government position advocating for the removal of Prosecutor General Shokin part of an effort to stop an investigation into Burisma?

MR. BLINKEN: It was not.

MR. SCHRAM: Was the policy advocating for the dismissal of Prosecutor General Shokin formulated by Vice President Biden in an effort to assist his son?

MR. BLINKEN: It was not.

MR. SCHRAM: Was it the consensus of the U.S. government to condition foreign aid in part on the removal of Prosecutor General Shokin?

MR. BLINKEN: It was.

MR. SCHRAM: You seem confident in your answers, and I wonder your basis for answering so confidently.

MR. BLINKEN: The basis for the confidence in my answers is that I never saw anything, any outside or alternative interest, influence the formulation of conduct of U.S. foreign policy in general or toward the Ukraine in particular.

The policy that we developed with regard to Ukraine, including with regard to the loan guarantee, was the product of interagency deliberations that brought in all of the
relevant stakeholders in the United States government. It was also the widely held view of not just our administration and all of its component parts from the White House, National Security Council, to the National Economic Council, to the Office of the Vice President, to the State Department, to the Pentagon, to the Commerce Department, to the Treasury Department, and so on. It was also the widely held view of our allies and partners in Europe, France, Germany, and the UK, predominant among them, the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank.

As I noted earlier, it was also the widely held view of leading Members of Congress, and as I said, it was very gratifying to me at the time that we had a very strong bipartisan approach to Ukraine, including with regard to the issue of corruption.

MR. SCHRAM: What are the consequences to casting false doubt on the origins and motives of America's foreign policy in Ukraine?

MR. BLINKEN: Well, look, with respect, I'm not here to opine on those issues. I'm here to help illuminate the facts surrounding events during my time as Deputy Secretary of State from 2015 to 2017. So I don't think that what opinions I have on those issues are relevant to these proceedings.

MR. SCHRAM: At the time as Deputy Secretary, was
Russia seeking to cast dispersions on America's motives in the region?

MR. BLINKEN: It was, yes. We had deep concern about Russian misinformation and disinformation efforts in Europe generally and Ukraine specifically. What we didn't see, unfortunately, at the time were efforts directed at the United States, which only became clear later, but at the time, there was deep concern about the misinformation, disinformation used as a weapon by Russia in Europe and in Ukraine to divide allies and partners.

For example, this was very, very apparent. You may remember the horrific downing of the Malaysian air flight over Ukraine where several hundred people lost their lives, and that was a plane that was shot down by a separatist using technology brought into them by the Russians. The Russians engaged in a very sophisticated misinformation and disinformation campaign to remove blame from them and to create doubt and confusion, and we saw that play out in real time. And it became a growing concern for us, which is Russia's ability to use disinformation and misinformation to advance its policies.

But as I said, that was from where I saw as Deputy Secretary of State in the context of Ukraine and the broader context of Europe.

MR. SCHRAM: Mr. Blinken, as a senior advisor to the
Biden campaign, did you publish a memo on January 20th, 2020, titled "The Imperative for Honest Coverage of Trump's Ukraine Conspiracy Theory"?

MR. BLINKEN: I believe that I did, yes.

MR. SCHRAM: The memo stated that the theory of Vice President Biden's wrongdoing in Ukraine was promoted by, quote, disgraced journalist John Solomon. Can you explain the origins of that theory?

MR. BLINKEN: So, with respect, I think the memo speaks for itself, and again, I'm here to talk about my tenure as Deputy Secretary of State and to help clarify any facts surrounding events during that period.

MR. SCHRAM: During your tenure, were you aware of Andrii Telizhenko?

MR. BLINKEN: No.

MR. SCHRAM: Mr. Blinken, on August 26th, your counsel sent a letter to the Majority chief counsel confirming your voluntary compliance with the Chairman's investigation. Marking that letter was Exhibit B.

MR. BLINKEN: Yes, I have it.

MR. SCHRAM: In the second full paragraph, your counsel writes, At the outset, I note that Chairman Johnson has suggested that an area of focus of the committee's
investigation is the reasons behind the development of U.S. policy in 2015 calling for the removal of then Ukrainian Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin, that Chairman Johnson himself answered that question more than four years ago when he signed a February 12th, 2016, bipartisan letter calling for reform of the Ukraine Prosecutor General's office.

Entering that letter now, the February 12th, 2016, letter as Exhibit C.

MR. BLINKEN: I'm sorry. Did I miss a question?

MR. SU: Tab D.

MR. BLINKEN: Oh, Tab D.

MR. SU: Yeah.

MR. BLINKEN: I'm sorry.

MR. SCHRAM: Just waiting for the document to appear on our screens.

[Pause.] 

MR. SCHRAM: Drawing your attention to the second-to-last paragraph from the bottom, the sentence that begins, "We similarly urge you to press ahead with urgent reforms in the Prosecutor General's Office and Judiciary." You were Deputy Secretary of State when this letter was sent. What did you understand the Ukraine Caucus, including Senator Johnson, who is the signatory of this letter, to mean when
they wrote, "We similarly urge you to press ahead with urgent reforms in the Prosecutor General's Office and Judiciary"?

MR. BLINKEN: As I mentioned earlier, I think one of the most effective aspects of our policy toward Ukraine was the fact that it was bipartisan, not only shared across the administration but with Congress, and as I mentioned as well, with our allies and partners, with the international financial institutions, et cetera. Everyone was on the same page, I believe, about the need to reform the Prosecutor General's Office and to remove Mr. Shokin, and it was very gratifying to hear us speaking with one voice. I think it made our policy more effective. It made it very clear to the government in Ukraine that it needed to take the steps we were asking in order to move forward and in order to have the support of the United States. So I think this is a very important letter, underscoring that the United States had a strong, unified view about the steps Ukraine needed to take to move forward and to continue to have the support of the United States.

MR. SCHRAM: Entering as Exhibit D, an article published in The Hill on October 3, 2019, that your counsel's letter also referenced, titled, "GOP Senator Says He Doesn't Remember Signing 2016 Letter Urging Reform of Ukraine Prosecutor General's Office."
[Blinken Exhibit D was marked for identification.]

MR. SCHRAM: Drawing your attention to the full quote from Chairman Johnson, referenced in the counsel's letter, "The whole world, by the way, including the Ukrainian Caucus, which I signed the letter, the whole world felt that this Shokin wasn't doing a good enough job, so we were saying, hey, you've got to rid yourself of corruption."

Did you understand Chairman Johnson to be supporting the policy of removing Prosecutor General Shokin?

MR. BLINKEN: My understanding from the bipartisan letter that was signed by leading Senators, including Senator Johnson, in 2016, was in support of reforming the Prosecutor General's Office, which required removing Mr. Shokin from his responsibilities.

MR. SCHRAM: I'll stop there.

MR. DOWNEY: Hi, Mr. Blinken. Do you need a break or would you like to continue?

MR. BLINKEN: No, I'm happy to continue. Thank you.

MR. SU: Brian, why don't we stop at about 30 minutes into your, the majority's, second line of questioning, and so we'll be at an hour. Is that okay with you?

MR. DOWNEY: Yeah, we can take a break after 30 minutes, and just for the record, it is 3:55, and the majority is resuming their questioning.
Mr. Blinken, so in our first hour of majority questioning, we discussed during your time as Deputy Secretary of State your awareness of Hunter Biden being on Burisma's board. So as Deputy Secretary, did George Kent raise concerns about potential conflicts, or appearances of potential conflicts of interest relating to Hunter Biden's role on Burisma's board to you?

MR. BLINKEN: Not to me.

MR. DOWNEY: As Deputy Secretary, did Victoria Nuland raise concerns about potential conflicts or appearances of conflicts of interest relating to Hunter Biden's role on Burisma's board to you?

MR. BLINKEN: She did not.

MR. DOWNEY: As Deputy Secretary, did Amos Hochstein raise concerns about potential conflicts or appearance of potential conflicts of interest relating to Hunter Biden's role on Burisma's board to you?

MR. BLINKEN: I don't have any recollection of that.

MR. DOWNEY: And the same question regarding Ambassador Pyatt. Did he raise any concerns about potential conflicts of interest to you?

MR. BLINKEN: Similarly, no.

MR. DOWNEY: Mr. Blinken, should you have known that Hunter Biden served on Burisma's board during your time as Deputy Secretary of State?
MR. SU: Brian, I'm not sure how he answers that question. He can answer factually and he has answered factually. He is here to talk to you about what he was aware of or not aware of during his time as Deputy. And so I just ask that you keep to factual questions.

MR. DOWNEY: Sure. So the majority put out a report on September--

MR. FOLIO: I'm sorry, Brian. Can I interject?

MR. DOWNEY: Sure.

MR. FOLIO: Sorry. Just to clarify the question. Mr. Blinken, do you consider it relevant to your duties and responsibilities as Deputy to know about Hunter Biden's position on Burisma's board of directors?

MR. SU: The same concept, Joe. You can ask him whether--you can ask him was he aware. You can ask him if he wasn't aware. I'm not sure how that's a factual question in terms of do you consider it an area of your responsibility. I'm not even sure how he answers that question.

MR. FOLIO: No, my question is does he find it relevant to his duties? So among his duties are, you know, Ukraine, U.S. policy, participating on the Deputies Committee. So then the question is, is it relevant to his work and his consideration and formulation and execution of U.S. policy to know whether or not that the person in charge of Ukraine
policy at the time had a family member sitting on the board of a company that many considered to be corrupt.

MR. SU: Can we start with, is he aware of any information to suggest that Hunter Biden's service on the Burisma board had any impact on U.S. policy towards Ukraine whatsoever, and then you can follow up from there?

MR. FOLIO: I think the minority asked that question, and I think he has answered it, right?

MR. SU: Well, Tony, if you understand the question you can try to answer it. I'm not sure--I'm really not sure how you would answer that question.

MR. BLINKEN: Here's what I can say, I think is a response to the question. Had I seen, or been aware of, or been made aware of anyone exercising inappropriate influence on our foreign policy, with regard to anything, in general, and with regard to Ukraine, specifically, that would be relevant. The fact of the matter is I was not. I did not see anything, was not aware of anything that exerted any kind of influence on our policy towards Ukraine. To the contrary, what I experienced, what I observed, what I witnessed was a policy driven entirely by our best judgment about what would advance the national interest.

MR. FOLIO: Understood, and I think that part of the question, what we're getting at, too, is to understand how apparent conflicts of interest can influence policy as well.
I'll turn it back to Brian because I know that we have a couple of questions planned for a conversation that Mr. Hochstein had with the Vice President in October of 2016, specifically about how the Russians were using Hunter Biden's position to advance disinformation efforts.

MR. DOWNEY: Thanks, Joe. So just to round out my questions regarding whether senior members of the State Department raised any conflicts of interest concerns to you, Mr. Blinken. The majority put out a report in September of 2020, and one of the findings was that in early 2015, the Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, George Kent, raised concerns to officials in Vice President Joe Biden's office about the perception of conflicts of interest with respect to Hunter Biden's role on Burisma.

Another finding that the Committee put in its report was that in October of 2015, Amos Hochstein raised concerns directly to the Vice President, at the White House, regarding Hunter Biden's position on Burisma's board, and Mr. Hochstein told us, when we spoke with him, that he raised concerns that Hunter's position on Burisma's board enabled Russian disinformation efforts and risked undermining U.S. policy in Ukraine.

Did you review the majority's September 2020 report in preparation of this interview?

MR. SU: So, Brian, I'm not going to have him speak...
about what he did or did not do to prepare for this interview, but you are, of course, welcome to ask him if he was aware of, you know, the references that you made, you know, at the time that he was Deputy Secretary of State.

MR. DOWNEY: Sure. So in those two instances, Mr. Kent and Mr. Hochstein in early 2015, I think it was February of 2015 and then October of 2015, do you know why these individuals did not raise these concerns to your level at the State Department? Why did they go—why did George Kent feel so strongly to tell Vice President Biden's staffers about his concerns, and Mr. Hochstein go directly to Vice President Joe Biden in October 2015? I mean, those are pretty serious issues, raising those concerns about a family member, and you're telling us that you weren't aware of those two situations?

MR. BLINKEN: Correct. I was not aware, and I can't speculate as to why Mr. Kent or Mr. Hochstein acted as they did. All I can tell you is no one brought to me any concerns about Mr. Hunter Biden's service on the Burisma board influencing our policy toward Ukraine.

MR. DOWNEY: So the Committees have uncovered a number of questionable financial arrangements and transactions involving the Biden family, including Hunter, James, Sara, many of which were detailed in the Committee's September 2020 report. Mr. Blinken, do you think this is Russian
disinformation? This information is based off U.S. documents.

MR. BLINKEN: I have no basis for evaluating it.

MR. DOWNEY: How did you become aware of Burisma and its owner, Zlochevsky?

MR. BLINKEN: So to the best of my recollection I became aware of Burisma and Mr. Zlochevsky when press accounts emerged in recent years in which they were featured front and center.

MR. DOWNEY: Do you recall what years you were made aware of this?


MR. DOWNEY: So not during your time as Deputy Secretary of State.

MR. BLINKEN: I don't have any recollection of hearing Burisma or Zlochevsky during my time as Deputy Secretary. I searched my mind thinking about that. And if you had asked me what is Burisma, who is Zlochevsky, I couldn't have answered. Having said that, there, I know, was, in the documents provided, a press account during my tenure as Deputy Secretary, I think in The New York Times that raised the issue of Hunter Biden's service on the Burisma board. I have no recollection of reading it at the time or discussing it with anyone. It was in The New York Times so I probably read it. I simply don't remember doing so. It left no
impression with me if I did read it.

Similarly, in the documents provided, there is a speech by Ambassador Pyatt in which he references Mr. Zlochevsky. I have no recollection of reading the speech or hearing the speech at the time. It is certainly possible that I did. When I reread it, or read it, more accurately now, it didn't trigger any recollection. I noted that in the speech, at least as I remember reading it now, there was no reference to Mr. Zlochevsky in connection with Burisma. I believe it referenced him as a former government official and concerns about his corruption.

MR. DOWNEY: So we'll enter Ambassador Pyatt's September 24, 2015, speech in Odessa as Exhibit 5, and that will be at Tab 1, Will, on our staff.

[ Blinken Exhibit No. 5 was marked for identification. ]

MR. DOWNEY: I believe that's the speech you're referring to, Mr. Blinken.

MR. BLINKEN: I think that's correct. I don't have it in front of me.

MR. DOWNEY: Okay. Well, I think we just put it up on the screen.

MR. BLINKEN: Oh yeah. I see it. Thank you.

MR. DOWNEY: No problem. So just to drill down just a bit, and I know in the majority's first hour this was
briefly raised, but did you have any--were you briefed on
the U.S. Government's involvement with UK authorities in
investigating Burisma's owner, Zlochevsky, during this time
period, in 2014 and 2015?

MR. BLINKEN: I don't have any recollection of being
briefed on that at the time.

MR. DOWNEY: Now I'm going to ask you about after your
time as Deputy Secretary. Have you read anything regarding
what U.S. authorities and UK authorities, their case that
they were attempting to perfect involving Zlochevsky and
Burisma, after he absconded from the country as
Environmental Minister?

MR. SU: Brian, I'm sorry. I just don't think it's
relevant to the Committee's inquiry to determine what Tony
may or may not have done after he finished government
service. But you're certainly welcome to ask him about that
same question during his time in government service.

MR. DOWNEY: Okay.

MR. SU: As Deputy Secretary of State.

MR. DOWNEY: Sure. So during 2015--so you had joined
as Deputy Secretary of State in January of 2015, I believe--

MR. BLINKEN: That's correct.

MR. DOWNEY: --the DCM, George Kent, was made aware of
a potential bribe of about $7 million that Zlochevsky may
have paid to prosecutors in the PGO's office. That
information was provided from the resident legal advisor in
Ukraine to the FBI. Subsequently, during this
investigation, Chairmen Johnson and Grassley have requested
information regarding the FBI's ability to investigate the
allegation, and in classic FBI fashion they won't confirm or
deny that they are looking into it.

So my question is, during your time as Deputy Secretary
of State, were you aware of an alleged bribe by Zlochevsky
to the PGO's Prosecutor's Office?

MR. BLINKEN: I don't have any recollection of having
knowledge of that or being briefed on that.

MR. DOWNEY: Okay. We're going to go to December of
2015, and I want to discuss with you, Mr. Blinken, this is
the time period when Vice President Biden flew over to
Ukraine and gave a speech to the Rada, Ukraine's Parliament.
Did you attend that trip to Ukraine in December of 2015?

MR. BLINKEN: I do not believe so but I don't remember.

I was with the Vice President on at least one trip to
Ukraine when I was serving as his National Security Advisor,
but I believe that was an earlier trip, and so I do not
think I was on the trip you just referenced.

MR. DOWNEY: Okay. So on December 9, 2015, Vice
President Biden gave remarks at Ukraine's Rada. We are
happy to put up the Vice President's speech. That's Tab 6,
Will. This will be Exhibit 6. We'll let that get up on the
MR. DOWNEY: So, Mr. Blinken, did you assist in preparing Vice President Biden's remarks to the Rada?

MR. BLINKEN: I don't have any recollection of doing so.

MR. DOWNEY: Okay. I want to turn our attention to page 5 of the speech. It's specifically to the sentence that begins with--the fourth paragraph, final sentence that says, "Senior elected officials have to remove all conflicts between their business interests and their government responsibilities. Every other democracy in the world that system pertains."

So, Mr. Blinken, do you know what the purpose was of Vice President Biden telling elected Ukrainian officials to remove all conflicts between their business interests and their government responsibilities?

MR. BLINKEN: So I didn't craft this speech with him, but I think as you can see from--as I'm reading it quickly here, this was, I think, a strong exposition of our policy and our concerns about what was endemic and systemic corruption in various manifestations in Ukraine. And as we discussed earlier, the deep concern we had that that corruption in all of its manifestations was eating away at
Ukraine's nascent democracy. And so he was speaking in its most important public forum, its parliament, to make clear our concerns. But I can't do a line-by-line analysis. This is a strong exposition of the deeply held concerns across the United States Government, in Congress and among our allies and partners, about corruption in Ukraine.

MR. DOWNEY: Understood. So going back, Hunter Biden joined Burisma's board in May of 2014. There have been various news articles about Burisma and its owner, Zlochevsky, being under investigation in corruption. And you've told the Committee today that at least in one—you had one lunch meeting with Hunter Biden while he served on Burisma's board. You had the lunch meeting in the summer of 2015. So my question is: Do you know why Hunter Biden would serve on the board of a corrupt company?

MR. BLINKEN: First of all, I have no independent basis of knowledge about whether or not Burisma is or was corrupt, so I can't address the premise of your question. And, similarly, I have no knowledge of Hunter Biden's service on the board period.

MR. DOWNEY: So during your time as Deputy Secretary of State, you're telling the Committee that George Kent, Amos, Hochstein, Victoria Nuland, and Ambassador Pyatt never briefed you regarding Burisma, Zlochevsky, and allegations of corruption?
MR. BLINKEN: That's correct.

MR. DOWNEY: Okay. Josh, are you ready to do your questioning?

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Yes. Thank you, Brian.

MR. DOWNEY: Thank you.

MR. BLINKEN: Thank you.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Mr. Blinken, can you hear me okay?

MR. BLINKEN: I can.

MR. SU: Josh, we can hear you. We can't see you. Oh, there we go.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: The video should be up now. Can you see me?

MR. SU: Yeah.

MR. BLINKEN: Yes, thank you.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: So, Mr. Blinken, kind of dovetailing into what Brian was asking you earlier, are you aware of whether or not the U.S. Government viewed Burisma as a corrupt company?

MR. BLINKEN: I am not.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Do you agree Burisma--

MR. BLINKEN: To be clear, at the time of my service as Deputy Secretary of State, I was not aware of Burisma or whatever views the United States Government had of it.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Based upon the knowledge that you have now, news reports and such in the past months and maybe
1 years, would you agree that Burisma has a reputation for
2 engaging in corrupt activity?
3 MR. BLINKEN: I have no basis for answering that
4 question. All I know about Burisma is what I've read in
5 press accounts.
6 MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Would you consider them to be a
7 corrupt company based upon what you've read in press
8 accounts?
9 MR. BLINKEN: I can't qualify or evaluate or opine on
10 the press accounts. And, again, with respect, I'm very
11 happy to answer every question I can during my tenure as
12 Deputy Secretary of State to help find the facts about
13 events during that period of time. But I don't think it's
14 my place to opine on things ex post facto.
15 MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Okay. Then with respect to the U.S.
16 Government views about Zlochevsky, are you aware of whether
17 or not the U.S. Government viewed him as a corrupt person?
18 MR. BLINKEN: So at the time that I served as Deputy
19 Secretary, he was not on my radar. His name was not on my
20 radar. As we discussed a few minutes ago, he is referenced
21 in the speech by Ambassador Pyatt by name. I don't recall
22 reading the speech. So the best of my recollection, I was
23 not aware of him as an individual at that time.
24 MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Okay. So once you left the State
25 Department then, obviously you've referenced news articles
that relate to Zlochevsky. Would you agree that he has a
to Zlochevsky. Would you agree that he has a
reputation for engaging in corrupt activity?

MR. BLINKEN: Again, I just don't have a basis for
evaluating that, and all I can say is I've read about him in
press accounts, and we can each come to our own judgments
about those press accounts.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: So how would you conclude those press
accounts then? Because, obviously, you read them, and they
do provide information relating to Zlochevsky. Based upon
your knowledge and expertise in government and with respect
to that area of the world, would you view Zlochevsky as a
corrupt individual?

MR. SU: So with respect, Josh, you know, the witness
has answered the question. He has no basis by which to
evaluate the veracity of any statements made in press
accounts. Just because he's read them doesn't mean that
he's able to have an independent basis to evaluate them. So
I'd just ask that you ask—you know, confine your questions
to factual questions about his time as Deputy Secretary.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Jonathan, thank you for that. I
disagree with that position. I think these questions he can
fully and capable answer.

Mr. Blinken, are you aware of reporting that while
Zlochevsky was ecology minister, he issued licenses to oil
and gas companies that belonged to him?
MR. BLINKEN: I'm not. I don't have any--again, I've read articles after my service as Deputy Secretary of State that referenced him, but I don't have any recollection of the details of any allegations or any statements made about Mr. Zlochevsky in those articles.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Was the Ukrainian Government supported by corruption in the natural gas and energy sector?

MR. BLINKEN: As a general matter, yes, there was--corruption was, as I said, endemic and systemic, and that included in the energy sector.

MR. SU: I'm sorry, Josh. Tony, can you give a time frame as to your response?

MR. BLINKEN: Oh, yes. During my tenure as Deputy Secretary, that is, from 2015 to 2017, as I said and as we've discussed, we had deep concerns about the systemic and endemic corruption in Ukraine, and that included in the energy sector.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Did the Ukrainian Government have a strong interest in the United States taking a favorable position regarding Burisma?

MR. BLINKEN: I have--I don't know. I don't know what Ukraine's--the Ukrainian Government's relationship, if any, was to Burisma or how its interests might be affected.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: To your knowledge, did the Ukrainian
Government or any Ukrainian political party express concerns about Burisma's reputation in the United States?

MR. BLINKEN: Not that I'm aware.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Do you know whether Burisma served as a vehicle to enrich Ukrainian Government officials?

MR. BLINKEN: I do not.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Would it surprise you if it did?

MR. BLINKEN: I have no basis for evaluating that. I don't know about the workings of the company. I have no independent basis for evaluating the allegations about it, so the answer is I don't know.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Do you know whether Burisma served as a vehicle to enrich Ukrainian political parties?

MR. BLINKEN: I do not.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Are you aware of whether or not Burisma and Zlochevsky took directions from the Ukrainian Government or any Ukrainian Government officials?

MR. BLINKEN: I am not.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Are you aware of whether or not Burisma and Zlochevsky took directions from any political party?

MR. BLINKEN: I am not.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Brian, back to you.

MR. DOWNEY: I think we have 5 minutes remaining until we wanted to take a break.
I want to switch gears here and talk about Blue Star Strategies. So, Mr. Blinken, when you served as Deputy Secretary, were you familiar with Blue Star Strategies?

MR. BLINKEN: At the time of my service, if you had asked me what or who is Blue Star Strategies, I would not have known the answer. Now, particularly with the documents that I have, I know who Blue Star is now. At the time it would not have resonated with me.

MR. DOWNEY: So at the time that you served as Deputy Secretary, did you know Karen Tramontano, who was Blue Star's chief executive officer?

MR. BLINKEN: Yes, I did.

MR. DOWNEY: And how did you know her?

MR. BLINKEN: Ms. Tramontano was, I believe, the Deputy Chief of Staff in the Clinton administration White House. I served on the staff of the National Security Council, so we knew each other going way back to the 1990s and our joint service in the White House at that time.

MR. DOWNEY: During the time as Deputy Secretary, did you know Sally Painter, the chief operating officer?

MR. BLINKEN: Yes, I did.

MR. DOWNEY: Okay. We're going to do one more exhibit. Then we can take a break. This will be, I believe, Exhibit 7, and it will be Tab 7, Will.

[Blinken Exhibit No. 7 was
MR. DOWNEY: This is Bates number 1878 to 1879. It's a State Department document.

MR. BLINKEN: Yes, I've got it. Thank you.

MR. DOWNEY: Okay. So on July 14, 2016, you asked your colleague at the State Department whether you had received a call from Sally Painter or Karen Tramontano of Blue Star Strategies. On July 15, 2016, you learned that Sally Painter--her office tried to call you. Your colleague at the State Department wrote that Ms. Painter "wanted to inquire about her request to meet with you. She never received word that you've asked Tori Nuland to be with her."

You then asked for a number to return the call, and your colleague provided you Karen Tramontano's cell number.

So, Mr. Blinken, do you recall what this correspondence in the summer of 2016 was about?

MR. BLINKEN: I do not. My only basis of knowledge is this document itself. I don't recall this. I would add only that just as I knew Ms. Tramontano for many years, I also knew Ms. Painter pretty much over the same period of time. She was during the 1990s part of a committee that I was a member of, a bipartisan committee, the U.S. Committee for NATO. This is at the time when the question of NATO's enlargement was front and center in our policy, and there was a very strong bipartisan group that met on a regular
basis in support of NATO and of NATO's enlargement. She was a member of that group, as was Ms. Tramontano. Our acquaintanceship went back to the 1990s.

MR. DOWNEY: So we understand, the Committees understand that Blue Star Strategies began representing Burisma in November of 2015. So in the summer of 2016, did you ever meet with Ms. Tramontano and Ms. Painter, whether officially at the State Department or outside the State Department?

MR. BLINKEN: To the best of my recollection, I did not. The only thing I can think of is running into, at some speech or event, either Ms. Painter or Ms. Tramontano at some point during my service in Government. I don't know if it was during those 2 years at the State Department or just before. But, certainly, I've come across both of them individually at various events, conferences, speeches, et cetera. But I did not meet with them in my official capacity.

MR. DOWNEY: Two more quick questions, and then we'll take that break. So just for clarification, in the summer of 2016, using this exhibit of July of 2016 as kind of a benchmark, did they, meaning Karen or Sally, ever inform you that they were representing Burisma?

MR. BLINKEN: To the best of my recollection, no.

MR. DOWNEY: During your time as Deputy Secretary of
State, were you aware that Blue Star Strategies were requesting and securing meetings with State Department officials?

MR. BLINKEN: So, again, to the best of my memory, I couldn't have told you what Blue Star Strategies was. It's only subsequently that I understand that that was the firm that Ms. Painter and Ms. Tramontano were members of. So the answer is no.

MR. DOWNEY: Okay. It's 4:26, and if it's okay, we'll take a break.

MR. SU: Okay. Thank you.

MR. DOWNEY: Thank you.

[Recess.]

MR. DOWNEY: Okay. It is 4:32. We're back on the record.

Mr. Blinken, just to tie up a few loose ends on Blue Star Strategies and their representation of Burisma during the 2015-2016 time period, we're going to go to Exhibit 8, which is going to be Tab 21, Will. This is a State Department document, Bates numbered 8933. I believe this is the exhibit we had sent your counsel recently.

[Blinken Exhibit No. 8 was marked for identification.]

MR. DOWNEY: This is a June 27, 2016, email from Sally Painter and Blue Star Strategies to a redacted individual, I
believe, I guess, in the State Department; subject line: Coffee with Tony. And in the body of the email, it says, "Per my conversation with Tony at the Truman event, Karen Tramontano and I would like to have a brief coffee with Tony at his earliest convenience regarding some troubling events we are seeing in Ukraine. He said yes."

First off, Mr. Blinken, is this Tony in this email, do you believe that's a reference to you?

MR. BLINKEN: It certainly appears to be.

MR. DOWNEY: Do you recall whether you had coffee with Ms. Painter and Ms. Tramontano in the June-July 2016 time frame?

MR. BLINKEN: I don't recall having a coffee with them. My only basis for recalling this is the email. I don't have any independent recollection of it, but I don't remember meeting with either of them regarding Ukraine, and I believe that I saw somewhere a reference to referring them to our European Affairs Bureau.

MR. DOWNEY: Okay. I apologize if I've asked this or you've answered this, but do you have a recollection of what the conversation with Ms. Painter was at the Truman event in the summer of 2016?

MR. BLINKEN: I don't, and when I referred earlier to, you know, running into Ms. Painter or Ms. Tramontano at events or conferences, it was exactly this kind of thing.
But I don't have a specific recollection of that event or of running into either of them there. So all I know is what's in the text of this email.

MR. DOWNEY: Understand. And just for clarity, I believe I asked you about Blue Star Strategies requesting meetings with State Department officials during this time period. But are you aware of Ms. Tramontano or Ms. Painter contacting the State Department requesting meetings with State Department officials?

MR. BLINKEN: I'm not.

MR. DOWNEY: Okay. Josh, I'm going to turn it back over to you.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Thanks, Brian. My video should be up. Mr. Blinken, is my video working for you?

MR. BLINKEN: Yeah, it is. Thank you.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Great. So just a couple cleanup questions here, and I think I'll be done, and I'll turn it over to HSGAC majority for any questions that they have outstanding. During your time in the Obama administration, were you aware of the Biden family's financial links to Russian nationals?

MR. BLINKEN: I'm not aware of any such links.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: During your time in the Obama administration, were you aware of the Biden family's financial links to Kazakh nationals?
MR. BLINKEN: I'm not aware of any such links.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Were you aware of Devon Archer's financial links to Elena Baturina?

MR. BLINKEN: No, I'm not.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Are you aware of a company called "CEFC China Energy Company Limited"?

MR. BLINKEN: I am not.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: I'm going to list a series of companies. I'm going to group them together, but if you would like me to parcel them out individually, please let me know. But I just think grouping them together may be easiest to get through this question here.

MR. BLINKEN: And could I just ask for clarity's sake?

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Yes.

MR. BLINKEN: We're referencing again the time frame when I served as Deputy Secretary of State, 2015 to 2017. Is that correct?

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: The answers--

MR. BLINKEN: Or are you talking about the entire pendency of the Obama administration? What's the--what time frame are you asking about?

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: The predicate in the question--and the transcript will bear this out, but I started the question by saying, "During your time in the Obama administration."
MR. BLINKEN: Okay. I just wanted to clarify that.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Okay. So your answers still fit?

MR. BLINKEN: Yes, it is.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Thank you, sir. So with respect to these questions, during your time in the Obama administration, were you aware of a company called Rosemont Seneca Partners, Rosemont Seneca Thornton, Rosemont Seneca Advisors, Rosemont Seneca Global Advisors, Rosemont Seneca Technology Partners, or Rosemont Seneca Bohai?

MR. BLINKEN: Yes, I believe that I was aware that Hunter Biden--the name of Hunter Biden's company was Rosemont Seneca. I don't know any of these individual iterations of it, but Rosemont Seneca, the name I knew and I associated it in my mind with Hunter Biden.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: And how did you hear about Rosemont Seneca being associated with Hunter Biden?

MR. BLINKEN: I don't know.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: You just recognized the name, but you're not sure--

MR. BLINKEN: I recognized--yes. I'm sorry. Go ahead, please.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: I was saying that you recognized the name, but you're not sure where you recognized it or from whom you recognized it?

MR. BLINKEN: That is correct.
MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Do you know when you heard the name Rosemont Seneca or any of its derivatives?

MR. BLINKEN: I do not.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Well, during the course of the Obama administration, which was the predicate of the question, so you heard Rosemont Seneca during the Obama administration?

MR. BLINKEN: Yes. The name was familiar to me, and as I think I understood it at the time, that was the name of Hunter Biden's company. I did not know what the company was, what it did, who was involved, but I associated the name Rosemont Seneca with Hunter Biden.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Did you hear this name at work?

MR. BLINKEN: No, because there was no discussion at work of Hunter Biden or his business dealings.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: And your testimony here today is that you don't recall who mentioned Rosemont Seneca to you?

MR. BLINKEN: That's correct.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: And you don't recall the substance of the conversation with respect to Rosemont Seneca other than somebody referencing that it was Hunter Biden's company?

MR. BLINKEN: There was no substantive discussion that I--that I was part of regarding Rosemont Seneca, what it was, what it did. The only thing I can tell you is that when I hear the name, if you ask me if I recognize the name, the answer is yes. And my recognition of the name is in the
context of believing that that was the company that Hunter Biden was a part of.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Why do you think somebody would mention that to you?

MR. SU: Josh, how is he supposed to answer that question?

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Well, if he doesn't want to answer it, then he can say so.

MR. BLINKEN: It's not a question of not wanting to answer. It's a question of I--I don't know. All I can tell you is what I've just said, which is that in my mind, if you had asked me what is Rosemont Seneca, I would have said I believe that's the company that Hunter Biden works for. That was the extent of my knowledge.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Was the conversation in the course of a discussion about any financial or business dealings?

MR. BLINKEN: I had no discussions with anyone about financial or business dealings involving Hunter Biden.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Are you aware of a company called Owasco? I'm going to spell it for you: O-W-A-S-C-O.

MR. BLINKEN: I am not.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Are you aware of a company called Skaneateles? And I'm going to spell this for you because it's difficult to pronounce and I'm sure I mispronounced it. S-K-A-N as in November A-T as in Tango E-L-E-S.
MR. BLINKEN: I am not.

MR. DOWNEY: Hey, Josh?

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Have you ever--

MR. DOWNEY: Just for everyone's help, it might be pronounced Skaneateles, as a New Yorker. Just a guess.

[Laughter.]

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Brian's from New York, so I accept that one. I defer to him.

MR. BLINKEN: I am, too. While the name now makes sense, I have not heard of it in that context.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Yes, I'm pretty sure I mispronounced it, so thank you for that.

Mr. Blinken, have you ever heard of the company called "Hudson West"? And I'd note that it has a number of derivatives such as Hudson West 1 through 8? Have you heard--

MR. BLINKEN: I have not.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: --of any of them?

MR. BLINKEN: I have not.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Have you ever heard of the company called the "Lion Hall Group"?

MR. BLINKEN: Can you repeat that, please?

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Have you ever heard of the company called the "Lion Hall Group"? Lion, L-I-O-N.

MR. BLINKEN: I have not.
MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Thank you, Mr. Blinken.

Brian, did you have any close-out questions? I'll hand it back to you. I'm not sure if you do or not. But thank you for your time today.

MR. BLINKEN: Thank you.

MR. DOWNEY: I think the majority is done for this round, and we're going to toss it over to Senator Peters' and Senator Wyden's staff, and during that time we'll see if there's anything else before we close out. So I'll turn it over to Senator Peters.

MR. SCHRAM: Thank you, Brian.

Mr. Blinken, do you need a break or would you like to keep going?

MR. BLINKEN: No. I'm happy to keep going. Thank you.

MR. SCHRAM: The majority brought up their report in the last hour. The report is entitled "Hunter Biden, Burisma, and Corruption: The Impact on Government Policy and Related Concerns." It has been your testimony that there was no impact on Government policy. Is that correct?

MR. BLINKEN: That's correct.

MR. SCHRAM: After a year of insinuating that the Committee had secret evidence of wrongdoing by Vice President Biden, the report found, "The extent to which Hunter Biden's role on Burisma's board affected U.S. policy toward Ukraine is not clear."
I'll repeat that: "The extent to which Hunter Biden's role on Burisma's board affected U.S. policy toward Ukraine is not clear."

Is it unclear to you?

MR. BLINKEN: It is clear to me from where I sat as Deputy Secretary of State from 2015 to 2017 that Mr. Biden's membership on the board had no impact on the formulation of United States policy toward Ukraine.

MR. SCHRAM: And as the minority report points out, that is consistent with the testimony of all of the witnesses in this matter; Hunter Biden's presence on the board of Burisma had no impact on U.S. foreign policy. So the majority report having debunked the Chairmen's own allegations settled for the consolation prize of laundering unsubstantiated allegations under the Committees' imprimatur. The majority failed to note that the secret documents that they cited were themselves labeled as unsubstantiated. Nor did the majority take even rudimentary steps to verify those allegations. They did not contact the entities or individuals impugned in the report in advance of its publication, contrary to longstanding Committee practice based on due process and the simple concept of notice and common decency. As a result, the report is so filled with falsehoods and material omissions as to discredit the Committee.
It also provides a case study on the dissemination of misinformation. For example, the report's executive summary states, "Hunter Biden received a $3.5 million wire transfer from Elena Baturina, the wife of the former mayor of Moscow." That statement is apparently false.

I'll note that the majority today, in asking about that statement, has made a different allegation and attributed the receipt of that money to Devon Archer and not Mr. Biden. The report states clearly that Hunter Biden received that wire transfer. That statement is apparently false. It is a false characterization of the report's own faulty analysis of secret, unsubstantiated evidence in the documents that the majority made no effort to verify in advance.

MR. FOLIO: Zack, is there a question for Mr. Blinken? Or rather than go back and forth in our respective reports, might it be easier to just enter both of them into the record for completeness?

MR. SCHRAM: And yet the statement was included in the report released just before the Presidential debate where it was repeated by the President on live television in front of tens of millions of people. Ranking Member Peters finds this conduct inappropriate for a member of the Committee and the U.S. Senate and calls on the Chairman to stop his hyper-partisan and politically motivated efforts and return to
this Committee's bipartisan traditions.

Mr. Blinken, Ranking Member Peters deeply regrets that you've been dragged into this, and on his behalf, we are very grateful for your time and, more importantly, for your service and your sacrifice. I think there's nothing more from us. I'd just ask if there's anything that you would like to add.

MR. BLINKEN: I would not. Thank you.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Hey, Joe, this is Josh. Before we move on, I just want to note for the record with respect to the report, I believe our report--I forget what page it is. It notes that Hunter Biden had some sort of an interest, a financial interest or ownership interest, in Rosemont Seneca Thornton, and that wire transfers were sent from Elena Baturina and eventually received by Rosemont Seneca Thornton. So that is the connection between Hunter Biden and Elena Baturina, as described in more detail in the report. I don't have it in front of me, but obviously I'm incorporating it by reference so people can check on their own what the report actually says.

MR. SCHRAM: That analysis is incorrect.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: That analysis--

MR. SCHRAM: It was--and that falsehood was further compounded in the executive summary, which on the basis of that incorrect analysis attributes the receipt of that money
directly to Hunter Biden, which, again, that was misinformation provided to the President in advance of the debate and then just disseminated for tens of millions of people. So that has been one of your contributions to that dialogue.

MR. FOLIO: At this—gentlemen, I would just say at this point in time, in consideration of everyone's time constraints, I'm going to suggest that the majority introduce its report and its supplement and the minority introduce its responsive report into the record. I don't think this is a conversation that we need to have in front of Mr. Blinken. I think that will address the issues, and the majority may also consider adding to the record statements by Mr. Tony Bobulinski, who has confirmed with firsthand knowledge the Biden family's involvement in these various financial transactions [inaudible]. I think—

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Hey, Joe, before we move on, just one second. I just want to be clear, because there was a lot of cross-talk, so I want the record to reflect that Zack's most recent statements—I want the record to reflect that I very much disagree with it. So, Joe, back to you.

MR. FOLIO: I think for the sake of completeness we'll introduce the majority report from September 23rd as our Exhibit 9 to supplement our Exhibit 10 and the minority report. I'm sorry, Zack. I lost track of your exhibit
list. Would you introduce that as your subsequent exhibit?

[Blinken Exhibit 9 was marked for identification.]

[Blinken Exhibit 10 was marked for identification.]

[Blinken Exhibit E was marked for identification.]

MR. SCHRAM: I believe that's Exhibit 3. Someone please correct me if I'm wrong. Got it.

MR. FOLIO: Mr. Blinken, if you'd give us your indulgence for 1 minute, I just want to chat with my colleagues. I think that we have concluded questions from the majority, but I just want to chat with them to make sure we've covered everything. Thank you.

MR. SU: Okay. Go ahead

[Pause.]

MR. FOLIO: Mr. Blinken?

MR. BLINKEN: Yes.

MR. FOLIO: Thanks for your patience. It's harder to confer with everyone in different rooms. I think that the majority has concluded its questioning. I think I did this before, but I'll just note for the record we reserve our right to respond to the letter that the minority staff read into the record. But other than that, again, we very much appreciate you taking the time, given all your other
obligations, to speak with us and address these issues today.

MR. BLINKEN: Thanks, Mr. Folio. I appreciate it.

MR. FOLIO: Thank you, everyone.

MR. SU: We are signed off. Thanks.

[Whereupon, at 4:51 p.m., the interview was concluded.]
Will do, Tony. Thank you!

Sure let's try to do Hunter tomorrow maybe after the DC.

Sent from my iPhone

On May 26, 2015, at 8:53 PM, [Name] wrote:

Hi Tony, this is the schedule on your desk in the morning, a few minor changes.

Please advise on Hunter Biden – should I fit him in tomorrow? Thursday and Friday are already quite full/pending final DC/PC meetings, and a few more approved appts I have to add in.

Thank you,

7:45 PDB (7220)
8:30-8:45 Daily Senior Staff Meeting (S Conf Rm)
9:15-9:45 S Large Expanded "Monday" Staff Mtg w Assistant Secretaries (Holbrooke Conf rm #7516)
9:45-10:30 Desk Time
10:30-10:45 Ambassador Ahn Call (through Ops)
11:00-11:30 Jarrett Blanc - S/RAP
11:45-12:00 Calls (Juan Gonzalez) Desk
12:00-1:00  Lunch/Read Time
1:00-1:45  Desk Time
1:45  Depart HST for WH
2:00-3:30  **DC Meeting on ISIL in Iraq** (General Allen & Brett McGurk ride along) (WHSR)
3:30  Depart WH for HST
4:30-5:00  Toria Nuland - Ukraine (D Office)
5:30-5:45  Call to /General Wesley Clark [redacted]
5:45-6:00  Calls/TBD
6:00-6:45  Hold for possible COS Interview, TBD
From: [redacted]
Sent: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 16:37:37 -0400
To: Blinken, Antony J; Russo, William M; Kim, Yuri J
Cc: 
Subject: UPDATE: Tony's Revised Schedule f/Wednesday, July 22

Professor Neumann had to re-schedule his appointment. He is now meeting w/Tony Friday, July 24 at 6pm.

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 3:16 PM
To: Blinken, Antony J; Russo, William M; Kim, Yuri J
Cc: 
Subject: FYSA: Tony’s Revised Schedule f/Wednesday, July 22
Importance: High

I am sharing Tony’s schedule for tomorrow to ensure you get the necessary papers to in a timely manner for his meetings.

7:15 Depart residence
7:45 Principal's Daily Briefing (your office)
8:30 S Daily Meeting w/Senior Staff (S C.R.)
9:00- Meeting w/Rose Goettmoeller plus 2
9:30 (your outer office)
9:30- Meeting w/Nancy Soderberg + 5 Members of the
10:00 Kurdish TF (your outer office)
10:30- Meeting w/Ambassador Barbara Leaf
11:00 (your outer office)
11:30- Meeting w/Amb. Thorne (your inner office)
11:45
12:00 Lunch w/Hunter Biden (your outer office)
1:30 Prep Time f/2pm Bilat
2:00 Bilat w/Niger Minister of Defense Karidjo Mahamdou
(your outer office)
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<td>Depart for White House</td>
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<td>4:00-5:30</td>
<td>PC Meeting -- Afghanistan (WHSR)</td>
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<td>5:30</td>
<td>Depart White House</td>
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<td>5:45-6:15</td>
<td>Remarks @ Eid-al-Fitr Reception (BFR)</td>
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July 22, 2015
Wednesday

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Lunch w/Hunter Biden
Your outer office
From: Blinken, Antony J  
Sent: Thu, 4 Feb 2016 18:02:39 -0500  
To: Russo, William M  
Cc: Kim, Yuri J  
Subject: Re: Hunter Biden in Jordan/Lebanon

Thanks for flagging.

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 4, 2016, at 4:14 PM, Russo, William M wrote:

Tony –

Per his Twitter, Hunter just got back from a WFP trip to Jordan and Lebanon.

Hunter Biden @HunterBiden 1h1 hour ago
I just came back from a trip to Jordan & Lebanon with @WFPUSA. Follow me over the next 2 days as I share stories & photos. #SyriaCrisis

Thought you’d want to know in case you see him around and have the chance to chat. I’ll keep an eye out for anything we might want to highlight that he puts out.

Bill
Good morning. Thank you, Andy, for your kind introduction. It is my pleasure to be here at the Odesa Financial Forum with such distinguished experts from across Ukraine. I welcome the leadership of the Association of Ukrainian Stock Traders and the Financial Markets Association of Ukraine for organizing this forum. Special thanks to the American Chamber of Commerce for its strong support.

Today’s event is about highlighting the potential of the Odesa region and determining how you, business leaders and investors, can work to sustain progress. How you can demand that things get better, by insisting on accountability, transparency, and fair rules. Without these, business cannot survive and investors will not invest.

During my tenure as U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, I have been inspired by the Ukrainian people’s demand for accountability. During the Revolution of Dignity, and every day since, Ukrainians have persevered, often at great personal cost, in order to determine their own future.

And Ukraine’s leaders are listening. Despite an invader in the east – using weapons and words to weaken, dispirit, and distract – national, regional, and local officials are moving forward with difficult political and economic reforms to bring Ukraine closer to its chosen European future.

However, they – we – must not ignore an equally tenacious enemy dead set on undermining Ukraine’s economic success. One that is equally dangerous to Ukraine’s future. That enemy is corruption.

Corruption kills.

It kills productivity and smothers inspiration. Ideas are lost in its shadow. Innovation and entrepreneurship lag under the weight of bribery, back room dealing, and bullying.

These old ways are not worthy of today’s Ukraine.

Those who gave their lives last year on the Maidan, or in recent weeks the ATO, did not sacrifice themselves for business as usual. The sons, brothers, sisters and mothers defending Ukraine in Donbas today are not there to preserve the status quo. They deserve and demand better.

All of us here today know that Ukraine can, and must, address the problem of corruption now. You, Ukraine’s business leaders, investors, prospective investors and partners, all who want to do business here, can help. You can refuse to participate in corrupt business practices. You can insist that when corruption is found, arrests are made and followed by thorough, properly implemented investigations. And then, when warranted, the guilty should be convicted and punished according to the law.

Imagine the impact if – instead of lining corrupt officials’ pockets – the resources being zapped by corruption were freed up and reinvested in Ukraine’s economy. Imagine what those resources could do to fuel the development and broad-based prosperity the Ukrainian people want and deserve.

The United States is helping to build Ukraine’s capacity to fight corruption, expose the guilty and see them punished appropriately. And we are helping to do it, here in Odesa. Let me give you a few examples.

First, the U.S. government is developing a program to provide training for every judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney in Odesa Oblast on the adversarial process in criminal proceedings as envisioned by the new Criminal Procedure Code.

We hope that this pilot project will demonstrate how Ukraine’s criminal process can be made more effective. If it is successful, the project can be a model for the rest of Ukraine.

Second, we partnered with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Odesa to deploy the new Patrol Police in Odesa. The presence of these officers on the streets is a concrete demonstration of how Ukraine is changing, but more importantly, they are building trust with the public. That trust will give rise to
confidence – the confidence to work together to expose and fight the petty corruption that stifles small business and intimidates average citizens.

Third, we are funding a team of Ukrainian, regional, and international experts who are working with Governor Saakashvili to flesh out an anticorruption and deregulation agenda for Odesa oblast. Odesa’s vision for reform is transformative. If successful, Odesa can be a model of transparent, accountable government and business.

It will be a symbol of success in the new Ukraine. Odesa, long known for corruption, will come clean. Investment and opportunity will follow.

I know that President Poroshenko and Prime Minister Yatsenyuk understand the importance of this issue and recognize the threat that business as usual represents for Ukraine’s hopes of political and economic transformation.

However, there is one glaring problem that threatens all of the good work that regional leaders here in Odesa, in Kharkiv, in Lviv, and elsewhere are doing to improve the business climate and build a new model of government that serves the people.

That problem threatens everything that the Rada, the Cabinet, the National Reform Council, and others are doing to push political and economic reforms forward and make life better for Ukrainians, and it flies in the face of what the Revolution of Dignity is trying to achieve.

That obstacle is the failure of the institution of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine to successfully fight internal corruption. Rather than supporting Ukraine’s reforms and working to root out corruption, corrupt actors within the Prosecutor General’s office are making things worse by openly and aggressively undermining reform.

In defiance of Ukraine’s leaders, these bad actors regularly hinder efforts to investigate and prosecute corrupt officials within the prosecutor general’s office. They intimidate and obstruct the efforts of those working honestly on reform initiatives within that same office.

The United States stands behind those who challenge these bad actors.

We applaud the work of the newly-established Inspector General’s office in the PGO led by David Sakvarelidze and Vitaliy Kasko. Their investigations into corruption within the PGO, have delivered important arrests and have sent the signal that those who abuse their official positions as prosecutors will be investigated and prosecuted.

I encourage all of you to speak up in support of these brave investigators and prosecutors. Give them the resources and support to successfully prosecute these and future cases.

We have learned that there have been times that the PGO not only did not support investigations into corruption, but rather undermined prosecutors working on legitimate corruption cases.

For example, in the case of former Ecology Minister Mykola Zlochevsky, the U.K. authorities had seized 23 million dollars in illicit assets that belonged to the Ukrainian people. Officials at the PGO’s office were asked by the U.K to send documents supporting the seizure.

Instead they sent letters to Zlochevsky’s attorneys attesting that there was no case against him. As a result the money was freed by the U.K. court and shortly thereafter the money was moved to Cyprus.

The misconduct by the PGO officials who wrote those letters should be investigated, and those responsible for subverting the case by authorizing those letters should – at a minimum – be summarily terminated.

Even as we support the work of the new Anti-Corruption Commission, and the recruitment of new prosecutors, we have urged Prosecutor General Shokin to empower Deputy Prosecutors Sakvarelidze and Kasko to implement reforms and bring to justice those who have violated the law, regardless of rank or status. We are prepared to partner with reformers within the PGO in the fight for anticorruption.
That’s why, on August 10, the United States signed a Joint Action Plan with Deputy Prosecutor General Sakvarelidze to provide 2 million dollars in U.S. assistance to support reform, anticorruption, and capacity building at the PGO.

It is critical that these reforms be undertaken in an open and transparent manner – consistent with the Procuracy Reform Law, international standards, and in coordination with national and international stakeholders – so that the Ukrainian people can have full faith and confidence in their laws and in those who have sworn to enforce them.

There are other cases as well, like those involving Former Deputy Chief Prosecutor Volodymyr Shapakin and Former Prosecutor Kornyets that clearly demonstrate that it is critical to cease intimidation and investigations of investigators, prosecutors and witnesses.

We want to work with Prosecutor General Shokin so the PGO is leading the fight against corruption. We want the Ukrainian people to have confidence in the Prosecutor General’s Office, and see that the PGO, like the new patrol police, has been reinvented as an institution to serve the citizens of Ukraine.

Ukraine has every reason to succeed. This country has resources in abundance. Its highly educated workforce can supply Europe and its neighbors with human capital and competitive products. Its famous black earth already feeds the world. Ukraine exported a record-breaking 33.5 million tons of grain last year, and the agricultural sector has tremendous potential to grow even more.

The Deep and Comprehensive Trade Area Agreement with the European Union will help leverage these natural resources and help build even more economic success. Ukraine’s government, spurred on by an active, engaged, and committed civil society, is continuing difficult reforms in the face of armed aggression and economic hardship.

But as I said before, it is up to citizens, business and investors to hold those standing in the way of reform and progress accountable.

Work with the reformers, with new, trustworthy authorities like the patrol police and honest civil servants to make change happen. Think creatively about how to overcome the roadblocks being put up by those, like the bad actors in the Prosecutor General’s office I mentioned before, who want to keep the status quo. Do not take no for an answer, but rather work to strengthen your democracy and push for Ukraine’s European future.

The United States is with you in this difficult process. Through training programs and other assistance, we are working with Ukraine to make judges independent so they can uphold the law free from political pressure. We continue to support your efforts to build a modern police force and public prosecution service focused on serving the citizens, and providing an equal playing field for all.

And U.S. businesses – with the support of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce – will continue to look for opportunities to invest in Ukraine, a Ukraine committed to reform, transparency, accountability, and clear rules properly enforced.

I ask you all to be committed to putting a stop to corruption, wherever it is found.

Ukrainians demanded an end to business as usual on the Maidan. Business leaders here today can help by demanding a better, fairer, corruption-free environment to invest and create opportunities for the future.

In closing, and speaking of creating opportunities for the future, I take great pleasure in announcing that U.S. Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker will return to Ukraine in October. During her visit, Secretary Pritzker will take a serious look at what Ukraine has accomplished since her last visit. I am confident that she will see a government and business community serious about reforms, and ready to establish more connections and partnerships with U.S. businesses and investors.

As the United States Ambassador to Ukraine, I tell you, we stand with you.

Slava Ukraini.
Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden to The Ukrainian Rada

The Rada

Kyiv, Ukraine

11:58 A.M. (Local)

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Thank you. What a great honor for me to be able to represent my country before such an august audience.

Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. Chairman, members of the Rada, ladies and gentlemen, I am deeply honored to be invited to speak to you today at a moment marked by great opportunity, as well as great uncertainty for the people of Ukraine. The stakes for your country and the expectations of your people have never been higher because Ukraine, as you know better than I, has been here before.
In the West, as here we remember, the Orange Revolution -- young men and women who filled the Maidan a decade ago demanding that their voices and their votes both be respected. They refused to back down in the face of rigged elections, and they succeeded.

But as history tells us and shows, and as we know, Ukraine’s leaders proved incapable of delivering on the promise of democratic revolution. We saw reforms put in place only to be rolled back. We saw oligarchs uninterested in change ousted from power only to return. Reformers persecuted, thrown in prison as political retribution. And the bright flame of hope for a new Ukraine snuffed out by the pervasive poison of cronyism, corruption, and kleptocracy.

Nearly a decade later, that flame of hope was reignited by thousands of brave Ukrainians, some of you in this room, storming the Maidan, demanding a Revolution of Dignity. The world was transfixed. This time they were not going to be denied the future that so many of your country have longed for, for so long.

And the world was horrified when peaceful patriots were met by violence. They stayed at the Maidan day and night, facing down the Berkut in riot gear. For the first time since the Middle Ages, the bells of St. Mary [*sic] raised the alarm, calling the citizens of Ukraine to reinforce their brothers and sisters on the Maidan. Tens of thousands heeded the call bringing with them food, clothing, blankets, medical supplies, and their support. As the world watched -- and I was literally on the phone with your former President urging restraint -- as the world watched, the final assault came. Amidst fire and ice, snipers on rooftops, the Heavenly Hundred paid the ultimate price of patriots the world over. Their blood and courage delivering to the Ukrainian people a second chance for freedom. Their sacrifice -- to put it bluntly -- is now your obligation.

You have a historic opportunity to be remembered as the Rada that finally and permanently laid in place the pillars of freedom that your people have longed for, yearned for, for so many years.

I need not tell you this is a joint responsibility. The President, the Prime Minister, the members of this august body -- all of you must put aside parochial differences and make real the Revolution of Dignity.

My country, too, was born of revolution. But the battle for our independence was underway well before the first shots were fired. It began when men of conscience stood up in legislative bodies representing every region in what was then Colonial America -- Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, very different interests -- and declared in each of their regions the inherent rights of free people in different documents, in different language -- but the inherent right to be free.

They took a vast continent and a diverse people -- what John Adams, one of our Founding Fathers and future Presidents once said -- called “an unwieldy machine”. And they molded that unwieldy machine into a united representative democracy where people saw themselves as Americans first and citizens of their region second.

But our union remained imperfect, our democracy incomplete. Seventy years later we went through a second testing during the American Civil War, which nearly tore our still young country asunder. Winning on the field of battle wasn’t sufficient to unite our country. To end slavery and the regional differences we had, to grant former slaves citizenships and rights, the United States Congress assembled -- had to amend our Constitution.

Individual members of that Congress lost their jobs standing up to do the right thing. Everyone took real political risks to overcome entrenched opposition for the good of achieving a truly United States of America.

In the end, it came down to extraordinary patriots -- individuals putting their personal needs behind the needs of their nation, their narrow interest behind unity.

Ladies and gentlemen, I believe the President, the Prime Minister, every member of this body now faces a similar test of courage.

To quote an early American patriot, Thomas Paine, “These are the times that try men’s souls.” These are the times that try men’s souls.

This is your moment. This is your responsibility. Each of you -- if you’ll forgive me for speaking to you this way in your body -- each of you has an obligation to seize the opportunity that the sacrifices made in the Maidan, the sacrifices of
the Heavenly Hundred. Each of you has an obligation to answer the call of history and finally build a united, democratic Ukrainian nation that can stand the test of time.

Edmund Burke said it best in 1774, speaking to his constituency in Bristol, England. Here’s what he said: “Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest -- that of the whole; where not local purpose, not local prejudice ought to guide, but the general good.”

I respectfully suggest this is a standard for which each of you will be judged. This is the standard by which your grandchildren and great grandchildren, your progeny will judge whether or not you had the moral courage to put the general good above local prejudice. And this is all within your power. It’s within your hands. Nobody else’s -- yours.

You can bend the arc of history of this nation toward greater justice and opportunity for the Ukrainian people, and you can do it now.

I’ve had the great privilege and opportunity afforded to me by all of you over the past two years to meet with representatives representing all sectors of this country -- east and west, including the illegally occupied Crimea -- from all walks of life -- civil society, members of this body, your military leaders, your clergy. I’ve met with souls who stood on the Maidan -- some of you are now in this chamber -- a place which I visited yesterday. All one has to do is look at the photographs of the Heavenly Hundred at that spontaneously erected monument where I stood yesterday. Just look at the photographs. This is not hyperbole. I’m not trying to be unduly -- this is real. As a foreigner, all I have to do is look at the photographs. See the photographs of young men as early as their early 20s to those in their early 80s. Every one of them were joined in common purpose, a Revolution of Dignity.

My father had an expression he repeated a thousand times growing up: Every man and woman is entitled to be treated with dignity. Everyone. That’s what your new revolution was about: dignity.

And those martyrs still give voice to the timeless ideals and the timeless ideas, the universal values that unite free people all around the world. I visited every part of this world. There’s fewer than a handful of countries I’ve not been in. I’ve traveled over 1.3 million miles just since being Vice President. The whole world is watching you. That’s a fact. They’re watching you because their hopes for your success as you fight both the unrelenting aggression of the Kremlin and the cancer of corruption will impact on them.

In both these struggles you have the unwavering support of the United States of America and the American people -- including nearly 1 million proud Ukrainian Americans. You have the united support of Europe -- Western, Central, and Eastern Europe -- all invested in your democratic success because your success goes to the heart of an enduring commitment to a Europe whole, free, and at peace. If you fail, the experiment fails. It is no exaggeration to say that the hopes of freedom-loving people the world over are with you because so much rides on your fragile experiment with democracy succeeding.

It’s equally important, by the way, for aggressors around the world to understand that they can’t use coercion, bribery, sending tanks and men across a border to extinguish the dreams and hopes of a people. For if you succeed, that message is sent around the world.

The President asked me back in the late winter, 2009, to come to Europe to speak at the Munich Conference to lay out the principles that would guide our administration; the fundamental elements of American foreign policy under the Obama-Biden administration. And what I said then I will repeat now. I said, we will not recognize any nation having a sphere of influence. Sovereign states have the right to make their own decisions and choose their own alliances. Period. Period. (Applause.)

In the 21st century, nations cannot -- and we cannot allow them to redraw borders by force. These are the ground rules. And if we fail to uphold them, we will rue the day. Russia has violated these ground rules and continues to violate them. Today Russia is occupying sovereign Ukrainian territory. Let me be crystal clear: The United States does not, will not, never will recognize Russia’s attempt to annex the Crimea. (Applause.) It’s that saying -- that simple. There is no justification.
And as Russia continues to send its thugs, its troops, its mercenaries across the border, Russian tanks and missiles still fill the Donbas. Separatist forces are organized, commanded and directed by Moscow -- by Moscow. (Applause.)

So the United States will continue to stand with Ukraine against Russian aggression. We're providing support to help and train and assist your security forces, and we've relied on and rallied the rest of the world to Ukraine's cause.

I have spent hours -- as the President has -- talking to heads of state in Europe and around the world, making it clear that one of the tests for whether or not they are our allies is are they allied with your purpose.

America and Europe now stand together united in our commitment to impose tough economic sanctions on Russia. And while Russian aggression persists, the cost imposed on Moscow will continue to rise. The false propaganda that the Kremlin is disseminating in an attempt to undermine Ukraine and fracture Europe's resolve will not work. No one should mistake saber rattling and bombast for strength. Let me say that again, no one should mistake saber rattling and bombast for real strength.

We're taking steps to bolster Europe's resilience to Russian coercive tactics. We are strengthening NATO as I speak, improving energy security as I speak, and attempting to help spur an economic revival throughout Europe.

The United States and Europe will maintain pressure until Moscow fulfills its commitments under the Minsk Agreement. While there has been some progress in deescalating the violence, there can be no sanctions relief unless and until Russia meets all of its commitments under the Minsk Agreement. (Applause.)

And I might add parenthetically, I don't think the Russian people fully understand what Putin is doing. That's why he spends so much time hiding at home the presence of Russian forces here in your country. Heavy weapons must be withdrawn from the frontlines. The OSCE must be granted full, unencumbered access. Russia must press the separatists to hold elections according to Ukrainian law and OSCE standards and disavow the illegal election that's just taken place. Hostages held by Russia and its proxies must be returned. Russian troops must leave. The Ukrainian side of the border must be returned to Ukrainian control. Unless all -- if they do all of that, and only if they do, Ukraine also has a responsibility it still has to fulfill -- including amnesty for those who have not committed capital offenses; granting devolved administration to the Donbas. But we've made it clear to Russia and the world that continued delay and foot-dragging is unacceptable. That includes elections in the Donbas. They can only go forward as stipulated under the Minsk Agreement. Full access to the media must be provided. Ukrainian political parties allowed to compete openly. Full and unobstructed OSCE election monitoring. Full voting rights for the people displaced from their homes in the Donbas and living elsewhere in Ukraine. And all weapons contained and kept under OSCE supervision. That only happens if Russia lives up to its commitments, if Russia does its part. If it does, then you must follow through with yours because this is the best chance to keep Donbas in Ukraine, end the conflict, and begin restoring Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. (Applause.)

It's hard. There's nothing easy about what you have to do. There's nothing easy. The pressure you will all get will be immense.

I'd like to also speak directly to the people in the Donbas. The alternative to what I just said is to continue to live under separatists thugs, criminals who deny humanitarian aid, keep out organizations like Doctors Without Borders, stealing lifesaving medicine to sell on the black market. That's not a future. That's not a future I believe any Ukrainian wants for their children.

That's why the Minsk Agreement needs to be implemented in full. And truly free and fair elections are exactly what the Kremlin fears the most. It's not just your territory they covet; it's your success that they fear. For if free elections occur, and the people determine, as I am confident they will, that they want to remain and integral part of Ukraine, that they are Ukrainians first, that's what Russia fears. That's what Putin fears.

Because as all of you know the struggle for Ukraine's freedom is not confined to the battlefields of the east. Constitutional reform that includes judicial reform and decentralization does not compromise your sovereignty. It enhances it. It's an important step to building a strong, new nation. And it's important to the Ukrainian-European future.
This issue of federalism is the thing that almost prevented our nation from coming into being. Autonomous independent states, their determination to have their own police forces, their determination to have their own government under the united Constitution.

But in addition, you also have a battle, a historic battle against corruption. Ukraine cannot afford for the people to lose hope again. The only thing worse than having no hope at all is having hopes rise and see them dashed repeatedly on the shoals of corruption.

And if the people resign themselves to exploitation and corruption for fear of losing whatever little they have left, that would be the death knell for Ukrainian democracy. We’ve taken so many critical steps already. But all of you know there’s more to do to finish this race. Not enough has been done yet.

As the Prime Minister and the President heard me often say, I never tell another man or another nation or another woman what’s in their interest. But I can tell you, you cannot name me a single democracy in the world where the cancer of corruption is prevalent. You cannot name me one. They are thoroughly inconsistent. And it’s not enough to set up a new anti-corruption bureau and establish a special prosecutor fighting corruption. The Office of the General Prosecutor desperately needs reform. The judiciary should be overhauled. The energy sector needs to be competitive, ruled by market principles -- not sweetheart deals. It’s not enough to push through laws to increase transparency with regard to official sources of income. Senior elected officials have to remove all conflicts between their business interest and their government responsibilities. Every other democracy in the world -- that system pertains.

Oligarchs and non-oligarchs must play by the same rules. They have to pay their taxes, settle their disputes in court -- not by bullying judges. That’s basic. That’s how nations succeed in the 21st century.

Corruption siphons away resources from the people. It blunts the economic growth, and it affronts the human dignity. We know that. You know that. The Ukrainian people know that. When Russia seeks to use corruption as a tool of coercion, reform isn’t just good governance, it’s self-preservation. It’s in the national security interest of the nation.

Russia is trying to undermine the stability and sovereignty of Ukraine any way they can’t, including squeezing Ukraine financially, trying to undermine your economy. They view that as a cheaper way than sending tanks across the line of contact.

So Ukraine must be strong enough to choose its own future, strongly. Strong defensively. Strong economically. A strong system of democratic governance.

The United States is with you in this fight. We understand we’re with you afar. It’s much harder for you than it is for us. We’ve stepped up with official assistance to help backstop the Ukrainian economy. We’ve rallied the international community to commit a total of $25 billion in bilateral and multilateral financing to support Ukraine. It includes $2 billion in U.S. loan guarantees and the possibility of more.

Yesterday I announced almost $190 million in new American assistance to help Ukraine fight corruption, strengthen the rule of law, implement critical reform, bolster civil society, advance energy security. That brings our total of direct aid to almost $760 million in direct assistance, in addition to loan guarantees since this crisis broke out. And that is not the end of what we’re prepared to do if you keep moving.

But for Ukraine to continue to make progress and to keep the support of the international community you have to do more, as well. The big part of moving forward with your IMF program -- it requires difficult reforms. And they are difficult. Let me say parenthetically here, all the experts from our State Department and all the think tanks, and they come and tell you, that you know what you should do is you should deal with pensions. You should deal with -- as if it’s easy to do. Hell, we’re having trouble in America dealing with it. We’re having trouble. To vote to raise the pension age is to write your political obituary in many places.

Don’t misunderstand that those of us who serve in other democratic institutions don’t understand how hard the conditions are, how difficult it is to cast some of the votes to meet the obligations committed to under the IMF. It requires sacrifices that might not be politically expedient or popular. But they’re critical to putting Ukraine on the path to
a future that is economically secure. And I urge you to stay the course as hard as it is. Ukraine needs a budget that’s consistent with your IMF commitments.

Anything else will jeopardize Ukraine’s hard-won progress and drive down support for Ukraine from the international community, which is always tenuous. It’s always tenuous. We keep pushing that support.

The Ukrainian people have long struggled to direct their own destinies, to carve out a place besides the mighty Dnipro, to claim their own identity, proud and distinct.

A great poet Taras Shevchenko wrote verse after verse declaring the spirit of Ukraine, urging his fellow Ukrainians rise up and claim their liberty. His poem “The Testament” ends with this reflection. And I quote:

Then, in the mighty family

Of all men that are free,

May be sometimes, very softly

You will speak of me?

May be sometimes very softly you will speak of me. (Applause.)

Ladies and Gentlemen, I will speak of Ukraine. I will speak of the writer who took a beating on the Maidan to put him in the hospital. When asked why he sustained those injuries, why he was willing to endure it, he wrote: “People who don’t protest injustice, they have no future.”

I will speak of the young mother who gave up a lucrative career working on government reform. And then when asked why, she replied: “I have two small children and I cannot fight in the east. So this is what I can do for my country.” (Applause.)

I will speak up for the university student who handed out food on the Maidan and later spoke about how those months changed. She said: “Now people don’t think about what Ukraine can give them but about what they can give Ukraine.”

I will speak of the men and women of this institution, a freely elected representative body of the people. I will speak of the sacrifices you’ve made. Nadiya Savchenko, the pioneering Ukrainian helicopter pilot who was elected to the Rada, despite being unjustly imprisoned in [sic] to this day. I will speak of her bravery, and many others will, as well. I will speak about how it’s up to all of you to ensure the people of this land, once and for all -- that mighty family of all men that are free.

Ukraine’s moment. It may be your last moment. Please for the sake of the rest of us, selfishly on my part, don’t waste it. Seize the opportunity. Build a better future for the people of Ukraine.

There was a famous American politician when I was a young senator. He was in the other party -- very different ideology. But he said -- once in response to a question, he said, in your heart, in your heart, you know it’s right. In your heart, you know what’s right. You know. Do it. As long as you remain on that path, as long as you honor the obligation to the Ukrainian people, you never have to worry or doubt America and the United States will be by your side.

I hesitated to come to make this speech. The reason I did is not because a lack of affection for your country. But as a man who sat where you’re sitting for 36 years as a United States senator, sometimes when a foreign leader would come to speak, I resented when he or she appeared to lecture us. I hope I don’t come across as hectoring or lecturing you. Because that’s not my intention. I just have -- as a fellow human being, I just have such hope in the promise of what you could deliver. It will spread far beyond the borders of Ukraine.

I used to wonder as a young senator when I first stood up on the Senate floor, and I’ve never been frightened of standing and speaking, I stood up and all of a sudden I realized that my desk is exactly where a senator, Daniel Webster, spoke from. I mean this sincerely. And for the first and only time in my career, I was seized with, my God, one of the great men in our history stood in this spot. And I wondered what it’d have been like to be in that first Congress that gave us our freedom, created what I consider to be a great and decent nation. Well, that’s where you are. It’s not hyperbole. That’s
where each of you sit. If you succeed, you will be the founders of the first truly free, democratic, united Ukraine. An awesome responsibility, but what an incredible, incredible opportunity to serve your country.

Thank you so much for this opportunity to speak to you today. May God bless our two great nations and may God protect our troops. (Applause.)

END

12:33 P.M. (Local)

*St. Michael’s
From: Kim, Yuri J  
Sent: Sat, 16 Jul 2016 13:48:10 +0000  
To:  
Subject: RE: Message  

Thanks,

From:  
Sent: Friday, July 15, 2016 3:33 PM  
To: ‘Antony Blinken’  
Cc:  
Subject: RE: Message  

Should you decide to call, please reach out to Karen Tramontano and her cell is [REDACTED].

From: Antony Blinken  
Sent: Friday, July 15, 2016 2:53 PM  
To:  
Cc:  
Subject: Re: Message  

Please send me her number. I may call.

Sent from my iPhone

On Jul 15, 2016, at 7:40 AM, [REDACTED] > wrote:

Tony - I did my research on the phone call and it was confirmed by Ms. Painter’s office that she did call you. She wanted to inquire about her request to meet with you. She never received word that you have asked Toria Nuland to meet with her. [REDACTED] will take the mantle from here and ensure that EUR is on top of her request.

Please take action.

Many thanks,

From: Antony Blinken  
Sent: Friday, July 15, 2016 1:30 PM  
To:  
Cc:  
Subject: Re: Message  

Thanks all.

Sent from my iPhone

On Jul 15, 2016, at 2:16 AM, [REDACTED] > wrote:
Me neither.

Office of the Deputy Secretary of State
Tel: 202-647-8636

-----Original Message-----
From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, July 14, 2016 9:53 PM
To: Antony Blinken
Cc: [redacted] Kim, Yuri J
Subject: Re: Message

I did not either.

Sent from my iPhone

> On Jul 14, 2016, at 9:22 PM, Antony Blinken [redacted] wrote:
> 
> Did I get a call Tuesday afternoon from Sally Painter or Karen Tremantano? Thanks. Tony
> 
> > Sent from my iPhone
-----Original Message-----
From: [mailto:Sally.Painter@bluestarstrategies.com] Sally.Painter@bluestarstrategies.com
Sent: Monday, June 27, 2016 9:05 AM
To: [email]
Cc: [email]
Subject: Coffee with Tony

Per my conversation with Tony at the Truman event, Karen Tramontano and I would like to have a brief coffee with Tony at his earliest convenience regarding some troubling events we are seeing in Ukraine. (He said yes).

Karen was President Clinton's Deputy Chief of Staff and we are just back from Kiev.

Many thanks for your help. With warm regards sally

Sent from my iPhone
Hunter Biden, Burisma, and Corruption: The Impact on U.S. Government Policy and Related Concerns

U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

U.S. Senate Committee on Finance Majority Staff Report
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In late 2013 and into 2014, mass protests erupted in Kyiv, Ukraine, demanding integration into western economies and an end to systemic corruption that had plagued the country. At least 82 people were killed during the protests, which culminated on Feb. 21 when Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych abdicated by fleeing the country. Less than two months later, over the span of only 28 days, significant events involving the Bidens unfolded.

On April 16, 2014, Vice President Biden met with his son’s business partner, Devon Archer, at the White House. Five days later, Vice President Biden visited Ukraine, and he soon after was described in the press as the “public face of the administration’s handling of Ukraine.” The day after his visit, on April 22, Archer joined the board of Burisma. Six days later, on April 28, British officials seized $23 million from the London bank accounts of Burisma’s owner, Mykola Zlochevsky. Fourteen days later, on May 12, Hunter Biden joined the board of Burisma, and over the course of the next several years, Hunter Biden and Devon Archer were paid millions of dollars from a corrupt Ukrainian oligarch for their participation on the board.

The 2014 protests in Kyiv came to be known as the Revolution of Dignity — a revolution against corruption in Ukraine. Following that revolution, Ukrainian political figures were desperate for U.S. support. Zlochevsky would have made sure relevant Ukrainian officials were well aware of Hunter’s appointment to Burisma’s board as leverage. Hunter Biden’s position on the board created an immediate potential conflict of interest that would prove to be problematic for both U.S. and Ukrainian officials and would affect the implementation of Ukraine policy.

The Chairmen’s investigation into potential conflicts of interest began in August 2019, with Chairman Grassley’s letter to the Department of Treasury regarding potential conflicts of interest with respect to Obama administration policy relating to the Henniges transaction.1 During the Obama administration, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) approved a transaction that gave control over Henniges, an American maker of anti-vibration technologies with military applications, to a Chinese government-owned aviation company and a China-based investment firm with established ties to the Chinese government. One of the companies involved in the Henniges transaction was a billion-dollar private investment fund called Bohai Harvest RST (BHR). BHR was formed in November 2013 by a merger between the Chinese-government-linked firm Bohai Capital and a company named Rosemont Seneca Partners. Rosemont Seneca was formed in 2009 by Hunter Biden, the son of then-Vice President Joe Biden, by Chris Heinz, the stepson of former Secretary of State John Kerry, and others.2

Access to relevant documents and testimony has been persistently hampered by criminal investigations, impeachment proceedings, COVID-19, and several instances of obstructive behavior. Accordingly, this investigation has taken longer than it should have. The Chairmen’s efforts have always been driven by our belief that the public has the right to know about wrongdoing and conflicts of interest occurring within government, and especially those conflicts brought about by the actions of governmental officials. This is a good-government oversight investigation that relies on documents and testimony from U.S. agencies and officials, not a Russian disinformation campaign, as our Democratic colleagues have falsely stated.

What the Chairmen discovered during the course of this investigation is that the Obama administration knew that Hunter Biden’s position on Burisma’s board was problematic and did interfere in the efficient execution of policy with respect to Ukraine. Moreover, this investigation has illustrated the extent to which officials within the Obama administration ignored the glaring warning signs when the vice president’s son joined the board of a company owned by a corrupt Ukrainian oligarch. And, as will be discussed in later sections, Hunter Biden was not the only Biden who cashed in on Joe Biden’s vice presidency.

This report not only details examples of extensive and complex financial transactions involving the Bidens, it also describes the quandary other U.S. governmental officials faced as they attempted to guide and support Ukraine’s anticorruption efforts. The Committees will continue to evaluate the information and evidence as it becomes available.

**Key Findings**

- In early 2015 the former Acting Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine, George Kent, raised concerns to officials in Vice President Joe Biden’s office about the perception of a conflict of interest with respect to Hunter Biden’s role on Burisma’s board. Kent’s concerns went unaddressed, and in September 2016, he emphasized in an email to his colleagues, **“Furthermore, the presence of Hunter Biden on the Burisma board was very awkward for all U.S. officials pushing an anticorruption agenda in Ukraine.”**

- In October 2015, senior State Department official Amos Hochstein raised concerns with Vice President Biden, as well as with Hunter Biden, that Hunter Biden’s position on Burisma’s board enabled Russian disinformation efforts and risked undermining U.S. policy in Ukraine.

- Although Kent believed that Hunter Biden’s role on Burisma’s board was awkward for all U.S. officials pushing an anti-corruption agenda in Ukraine, the Committees are only aware of two individuals — Kent and former U.S. Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs Amos Hochstein — who raised concerns to Vice President Joe Biden (Hochstein) or his staff (Kent).

- The awkwardness for Obama administration officials continued well past his presidency. Former Secretary of State John Kerry had knowledge of Hunter Biden’s role on
Burisma’s board, but when asked about it at a town hall event in Nashua, N.H. on Dec. 8, 2019, Kerry falsely said, “I had no knowledge about any of that. None. No.” Evidence to the contrary is detailed in Section V.

- Former Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland testified that confronting oligarchs would send an anticorruption message in Ukraine. Kent told the Committees that Zlochevsky was an “odious oligarch.” However, in December 2015, instead of following U.S. objectives of confronting oligarchs, Vice President Biden’s staff advised him to avoid commenting on Zlochevsky and recommended he say, “I’m not going to get into naming names or accusing individuals.”

- Hunter Biden was serving on Burisma’s board (supposedly consulting on corporate governance and transparency) when Zlochevsky allegedly paid a $7 million bribe to officials serving under Ukraine’s prosecutor general, Vitaly Yarema, to “shut the case against Zlochevsky.” Kent testified that this bribe occurred in December 2014 (seven months after Hunter joined Burisma’s board), and, after learning about it, he and the Resident Legal Advisor reported this allegation to the FBI.

- Hunter Biden was a U.S. Secret Service protectee from Jan. 29, 2009 to July 8, 2014. A day before his last trip as a protectee, Time published an article describing Burisma’s ramped up lobbying efforts to U.S. officials and Hunter’s involvement in Burisma’s board. Before ending his protective detail, Hunter Biden received Secret Service protection on trips to multiple foreign locations, including Moscow, Beijing, Doha, Paris, Seoul, Manila, Tokyo, Mexico City, Milan, Florence, Shanghai, Geneva, London, Dublin, Munich, Berlin, Bogota, Abu Dhabi, Nairobi, Hong Kong, Taipei, Buenos Aires, Copenhagen, Johannesburg, Brussels, Madrid, Mumbai and Lake Como.

- Andrii Telizhenko, the Democrats’ personification of Russian disinformation, met with Obama administration officials, including Elisabeth Zentos, a member of Obama’s National Security Council, at least 10 times. A Democrat lobbying firm, Blue Star Strategies, contracted with Telizhenko from 2016 to 2017 and continued to request his assistance as recent as the summer of 2019. A recent news article detailed other extensive contacts between Telizhenko and Obama administration officials.

- In addition to the over $4 million paid by Burisma for Hunter Biden’s and Archer’s board memberships, Hunter Biden, his family, and Archer received millions of dollars from foreign nationals with questionable backgrounds.

- Archer received $142,300 from Kenges Rakishev of Kazakhstan, purportedly for a car, the same day Vice President Joe Biden appeared with Ukrainian Prime Minister Arsemy Yasenyuk and addressed Ukrainian legislators in Kyiv regarding Russia’s actions in Crimea.

- Hunter Biden received a $3.5 million wire transfer from Elena Baturina, the wife of the former mayor of Moscow.
➤ Hunter Biden opened a bank account with Gongwen Dong to fund a $100,000 global spending spree with James Biden and Sara Biden.

➤ Hunter Biden had business associations with Ye Jianming, Gongwen Dong, and other Chinese nationals linked to the Communist government and the People’s Liberation Army. Those associations resulted in millions of dollars in cash flow.

➤ Hunter Biden paid nonresident women who were nationals of Russia or other Eastern European countries and who appear to be linked to an “Eastern European prostitution or human trafficking ring.”
II. **INTRODUCTION**

The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (HSGAC) and the Senate Committee on Finance undertook this investigation into potential conflicts of interest, and the involvement of the Biden family in foreign business ventures while Joe Biden was vice president, following allegations that the Obama administration’s Ukraine policy could have been affected by Hunter Biden’s position on the board of Burisma, and that family members may have improperly sought to benefit from their relationship with the vice president.

The first letter written regarding potential conflicts of interest was sent by Chairman Grassley on Aug. 14, 2019, relating to the Henniges transaction.³ That was an Obama-era Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) approved transaction which gave control over Henniges, an American maker of anti-vibration technologies with military applications, to a Chinese government-owned aviation company and a China-based investment firm with established ties to the communist Chinese government. One of the companies involved in the Henniges transaction was a billion-dollar private investment fund called Bohai Harvest RST (BHR). BHR was reportedly formed in November 2013 by a merger between the Chinese government-linked firm Bohai Capital and a U.S. company named Rosemont Seneca Partners. Rosemont Seneca Partners was reportedly formed in 2009 by Hunter Biden, the son of then-Vice President Joe Biden, by Chris Heinz, the stepson of former Secretary of State John Kerry, and by others.⁴

The direct involvement of Hunter Biden and Heinz in the acquisition of Henniges by the Chinese government creates a potential conflict of interest. Both are directly related to high-ranking Obama administration officials. The Department of State, then under Mr. Kerry’s leadership, is also a CFIUS member and played a direct role in the decision to approve the Henniges transaction. The appearance of a potential conflict of interest in this case was particularly troubling given Hunter Biden’s history of investing in and collaborating with Chinese companies, including at least one that clearly poses significant national security concerns. This history with China precedes and follows the 2015 Henniges transaction. This report will discuss Hunter Biden’s and Devon Archer’s corporate entities and their links to the communist Chinese government in more detail.

In 2019, newly released documents, made public as a result of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and investigative reporting, brought fresh public attention and scrutiny to

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potential conflicts of interest with respect to Ukraine policy in the Obama administration. Additionally, news reporting also raised questions about potential conflicts of interest with respect to Hunter Biden’s business dealings in China, Ukraine and Russia while Joe Biden was serving as vice president. Accordingly, on Nov. 6, 2019, Chairman Grassley and Chairman Johnson wrote a letter to the Department of State regarding potential conflicts of interest due to Hunter Biden’s position on the board of the corrupt Ukrainian gas company Burisma Holdings Limited while Vice President Biden was the “public face of the administration’s handling of Ukraine.”

The Committees’ investigation focused on determining whether Hunter Biden and Devon Archer sought to benefit financially from their relationship with then-Vice President Joe Biden or if they sought to influence U.S. policy in Ukraine on behalf of Burisma. Further, the Committees reviewed and evaluated the Obama administration’s handling of Ukraine policy to determine whether policy decisions related to Ukraine and Burisma were improperly influenced by the employment and financial interests of family members of the administration.

For example, after joining Burisma’s board, Biden and Archer subsequently requested meetings with senior State Department officials, including then-Secretary of State John Kerry and then-Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Further, a Democratic lobbying firm, Blue Star Strategies, working on behalf of Burisma, also invoked Hunter Biden’s association with Burisma while requesting a meeting with then-Under Secretary of State Catherine Novelli to discuss matters of concern related to the Department of State’s position that Burisma was a corrupt company.

In 2016, Ukraine’s top prosecutor, Viktor Shokin, had an active and ongoing investigation into Burisma and its owner, Mykola Zlochevsky. At the time, Archer and Hunter

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8 Emails between Hunter Biden and U.S. Dep’t of St. employees (May 2015) (on file with Comms.), Email between U.S. Dep’t of St. employees (Mar. 2, 2016) (on file with Comms.).


Biden continued to serve on Burisma’s board of directors. According to news reports, then-Vice President Biden “threatened to withhold $1 billion in United States loan guarantees if Ukraine’s leaders did not dismiss [Shokin].”11 After that threat, Ukraine’s Parliament fired Shokin.

Pursuant to the scope of this investigation, the Committees requested relevant Obama administration records from several U.S. federal government agencies and interviewed current and former U.S. government officials with firsthand knowledge of the Obama administration’s handling of U.S. policy in Ukraine. The Committees sent requests for information to the Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Secret Service, Department of the Treasury, and the U.S. Democratic consulting firm Blue Star Strategies.12 Accordingly, this investigation is based on Obama administration federal government records and records from a Democrat lobby shop, Blue Star Strategies.

Senate Resolution 70 gives HSGAC express authority “to study or investigate... the efficiency and economy of operations of all branches of the government, including the possible

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existence of… corruption or unethical practices… [and] conflicts of interest.”

The Committee on Finance has broad jurisdiction over the United States government and, specifically, the Department of Treasury and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which includes oversight jurisdiction over potential financial crimes.

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III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Federal regulation prohibits federal government employees from “us[ing] [] public office for [] private gain … or for the private gain of … relatives.”\textsuperscript{15} This regulation also seeks “[t]o ensure that the performance of [] official duties does not give rise to an appearance of the use of public office for private gain or of giving preferential treatment[].”\textsuperscript{16} This regulation, however, does not apply to the president or vice president.\textsuperscript{17}

Other federal regulations require only the “consideration” of an appearance of a conflict of interest. “Where an employee … knows that a person with whom he has a covered relationship [e.g.,] is or represents a party to [a particular matter involving specific parties], and where the employee determines that the circumstances would cause a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant facts to question his impartiality on the matter, the employee should not participate in the matter unless he has informed [a designated superior] and received authorization[].”\textsuperscript{18}

According to the Office of Government Ethics (OGE), these rules and regulations help to ensure that federal employees “fulfill[] their responsibility to endeavor to act at all times in the public’s interest and avoid losing impartiality or appearing to lose impartiality in carrying out their official duties.”\textsuperscript{19} In the context of U.S. foreign policy, the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) sets forth the policies and procedures for State Department employees working abroad. The FAM includes ethical regulations that take into account foreign policy considerations and treaty and statutory obligations.\textsuperscript{20} Specifically, when a U.S. citizen employee of the State Department\textsuperscript{21} is serving abroad and subject to the authority of that country’s Chief of Mission, that employee’s family members may be prohibited from employment or other outside activity in any foreign country if the Chief of Mission in that country determines it could damage the interests of the United States.\textsuperscript{22} The FAM also requires employees to bring any violations of the FAM or any other applicable regulations to the attention of the appropriate official.\textsuperscript{23}

Although OGE’s authority to investigate and recommend solutions to most employees for conflicts of interest issues is well-established, Congress did not extend this authority to the president and vice president in OGE’s establishment statute. This does not mean there is an absence of any authority to hold the President and Vice President accountable for conflict of interest issues; rather, it demonstrates that the responsibility for holding the President and Vice President responsible for conduct that implicates conflicts of interest lies elsewhere, namely, with Congress and the American people.

\textsuperscript{15} 5 C.F.R. § 2635.702.
\textsuperscript{16} Id. at § 2635.702(d).
\textsuperscript{17} Id. at § 2635.102.
\textsuperscript{18} Id. at § 2635.502.
\textsuperscript{19} Conflicts Analysis & Resolution, Office of Gov’t Ethics, https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/ethicsofficials\_conflict-resolution.
\textsuperscript{20} 3 FAM 4121.3.
\textsuperscript{21} The FAM rules referenced in this section apply to Foreign Service, Foreign Service National, and Civil Service employees. 3 FAM 4123.2-2; 3 FAM 4125.
\textsuperscript{22} 3 FAM 4125.
\textsuperscript{23} 3 FAM 4139.13.
In certain instances, like self-dealing, the harm is plain. In others, the harm — a loss or apparent loss of impartiality — may be less concrete, but the effect is still the same.24 When the impartiality of decision makers is drawn into question, it creates a chilling effect on the credibility of their decision-making processing and the ultimate decision. That, in turn, could undermine the effectiveness of U.S. policy. Although these consequences may sometimes be difficult to measure or quantify, they certainly have an effect, or else there would be little reason to regulate them in the first instance. In the context of foreign affairs, because these subtleties matter, the FAM provides the Chief of Mission with the discretion to make these assessments.

24 The House of Representatives appears to think these issues matter. A House committee has been investigating President Trump and his family for “undisclosed conflicts of interest that may impair [the President’s] ability to make impartial policy decisions.” Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (July 9, 2020) (Quoting Rep. Elijah Cummings, Chairman of the House Oversight Committee.).
IV. THE VICE PRESIDENT’S OFFICE AND STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS WERE AWARE OF BUT IGNORED CONCERNS RELATING TO HUNTER BIDEN’S ROLE ON BURISMA’S BOARD.

a. Introduction

In early 2015, senior State Department official George Kent raised concerns to staff in the Office of the Vice President about Hunter Biden’s role on Burisma’s board. Kent testified that he never heard anything back from the vice president’s office, and although Kent advised that Hunter Biden should step down from Burisma’s board to avoid the perception of a potential conflict of interest, his recommendation was not followed.

Hunter Biden’s role on Burisma’s board continued to be an issue State Department officials had to manage when executing U.S. / Ukraine policy. More than a year after Kent reported his concerns to the vice president’s staff, he wrote to his superiors that Hunter Biden’s role on Burisma’s board was “very awkward” to those on the front lines pushing anticorruption efforts in Ukraine on a daily basis.25 Kent testified that he felt the need to “prepare[e] everybody for ‘what about-ism,’ because we’re pushing what’s right … and we have to be prepared for people who are critics, are opponents, to say, ‘Well, what about? What about Hunter Biden?’”26 Indeed, Kent testified further that he “would have advised any American not to get on the board of Zlochevsky’s company.”27 The Committees are also aware of at least one other senior State Department official, Amos Hochstein, who raised concerns directly to Vice President Biden about potential conflicts of interest relating to Hunter Biden’s role on Burisma’s board.28 Although Hochstein declined to testify about the substance of his conversation with Vice President Biden,29 the New Yorker reported that Hochstein “did not go so far as to recommend that Hunter leave the board.”30 The Committees found that neither the Office of the Vice President nor the State Department ever took any action following these complaints.

b. In February 2015, Kent raised concerns about the perception of a conflict of interest regarding Hunter Biden’s role on Burisma’s board.

According to Kent, in early 2015 when he was still Acting Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, he learned that Hunter Biden was on the board of Burisma.31 Kent stated, “[s]oon after that, in a briefing call with the National Security staff in the Office of the Vice President on other matters, in February 2015, I raised my concern that Hunter Biden’s status as a board member could create the perception of a conflict of interest.”32 Kent continued:

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25 Transcript of Interview at 224, S. Comm. on Fin. and S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff. Interview of George Kent (July 24, 2020). [Hereinafter George Kent Testimony].
26 George Kent Testimony at 221.
27 George Kent Testimony at 110.
28 Transcript of Interview at 98, S. Comm. on Fin. and S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff. Interview of Victoria Nuland (Sept. 3, 2020). [Hereinafter Victoria Nuland Testimony].
29 Amos Hochstein Testimony at 52-58.
31 George Kent Testimony at 16.
32 George Kent Testimony at 16.
I said that I had learned that Hunter Biden had been appointed to a board of this company, that I had just raised U.S. concerns about the owner of the company, who we believed had been engaged in money-laundering. … [T]he bottom line was, I said I believe that this creates the perception of a potential conflict of interest, given Vice President Biden’s role and his very strong advocacy for anticorruption action, and that I thought that someone needed to talk to Hunter Biden, and he should [step] down from the board of Burisma.  

When the Committees asked Kent who he spoke to in Vice President Biden’s office, he stated, “I can’t remember, to be perfectly honest. I don’t remember who I spoke to.” Kent told the Committees that, after raising this concern, he never heard anything back from the vice president’s office.

c. Hunter Biden’s association with Burisma continued to be an “awkward” conflict of interest State Department officials had to manage.

Hunter Biden’s association with Burisma appeared in numerous State Department records, particularly when State officials discussed the company, its owner, and anticorruption efforts in Ukraine. According to records reviewed by the Committees, in 2016, Kent mentioned Hunter Biden when discussing Burisma with his colleagues. Kent told the Committees:

For me it’s preparing everybody for “what about-ism,” because we’re pushing what’s right, and we do what’s right, and we have to be prepared for people who are critics, are opponents, to say, “Well, what about? What about Hunter Biden?”

So there was no time, as I’ve testified, that the U.S. government, the U.S. embassy ever made a decision about Zlochevsky or Burisma where we took the presence of a private citizen on the board into account. We made the decision on the merits. But others might think otherwise. And so everyone needed to be aware of what we were dealing with as we made the right decisions.

The extent to which Hunter Biden’s role on Burisma’s board affected U.S. policy toward Ukraine is not clear. But what is clear from the records, however, is that State Department officials, particularly Kent himself, regularly considered how Hunter Biden’s connection to Burisma might affect the execution of U.S. policy. Moreover, as described previously, this included having to respond to Russian actors attempting to exploit Hunter Biden’s position on

33 George Kent Testimony at 128-29 (emphasis added); see also George Kent Testimony at 110.
34 George Kent Testimony at 128.
35 George Kent Testimony at 226.
36 George Kent Testimony at 221 (emphasis added).
Burisma’s board to drive a wedge between Ukrainian and the U.S. in an effort to undermine U.S. policy toward Ukraine.

For example, Kent raised Hunter Biden’s connection to Burisma during multiple discussions over emails involving the Municipal Energy Reform Program (MERP). In those emails, Kent asked his colleagues, “[H]ow have we traditionally treated/engaged Burisma, given the Zlochevsky connection, but also perhaps US involvement beyond Hunter Biden? In another email chain, Kent also pointed out that “[Zlochevsky] put Hunter Biden on the board of his Burisma Energy company.” When inquiring about the extent to which State Department officials researched Burisma’s past, in order to determine whether to associate with the company, Kent asked his colleagues whether any “‘know your partner’ due diligence was done” before the partnership between MERP and Burisma was established. Kent then described old news stories involving the company: “Zlochevsky as a corrupt mal actor was a 2014 story [and] his control of Burisma, and the very sticky wicket of the Hunter Biden connection on Burisma’s board was circulating in 2015.” As part of that same email chain, Kent asked his colleagues if the U.S. government continues its association with Burisma:

[W]ould we want an article on the front page of the Washington Post (and in this case, the Kyiv Post, and on the FB pages of Sergiy Leshchenko and Mustafa Nayyem) commenting about this public private partnership with Burisma, the link to Hunter Biden, and the link to Zlochevsky, who almost certainly paid off the PGO in December 2014 (I had the then First deputy PG Danylenko tell me the bribe was $7 million) to have the case against him closed and his $23 million in assets frozen in the UK unfrozen?

37 Kent told the Committee that he mentioned Hunter Biden’s name in this context because he believed that “all U.S. Government officials need to be aware of all the factors involved in an issue.” George Kent Testimony at 113. When asked why Kent did not raise the names of other individuals on Burisma’s board he said, “the one American that I was aware of that was on the board [in August 2016] was Hunter Biden.” George Kent Testimony at 114. The MERP was a program funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). According to State Department documents, the MERP and Burisma entered into a Memorandum of Understanding on October 13, 2014. Email from Redacted, U.S. Dep’t of St., to George Kent, et al., U.S. Dep’t of St. (Aug. 12, 2016, 16:47:00), [STATE-2019-18-0000357] (attaching Memorandum of Understanding between the MERP in Ukraine and Burisma Holdings Limited (Oct. 13, 2014), [STATE-2019-18-0000361-364]). Kent testified that, “in 2015, there had been a set of awards given by this program implementer that had been funded by Burisma. They were planning another set of awards, a second set of awards in mid-September […] We pulled the plug and there was no second.” George Kent Testimony at 124. USAID “withdrew its [MERP] cooperation with Burisma” in September 2016. Email from Redacted, U.S. Dep’t of St., to George Kent, U.S. Dep’t of St. (Dec. 6, 2016, 00:18:23 –0500), [STATE-2019-18-0001205] (attaching Briefing Checklist: Ambassador Yovanovitch’s Meeting with Karen Tramontano, Blue Star Strategies [STATE-2019-18-0001207]).


So even though the total amount of time State Department officials spent accounting for Hunter Biden’s association with Burisma is unclear, the records show that it was an issue that had to be addressed repeatedly.

d. More than one year after Kent reported his concerns about Hunter Biden to the vice president’s office, he once again raised the issue — this time to his superiors at the State Department.

On Sept. 6, 2016, Kent wrote an email to senior State Department officials, including Deputy Assistant Secretary Bridget Brink and U.S. Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, and offered his contemporaneous view of Hunter Biden’s association with Burisma. Kent wrote, “the presence of Hunter Biden on the Burisma board was very awkward for all U.S. officials pushing an anti-corruption agenda in Ukraine.”43 In testimony Kent expanded on this comment:

I meant that people who talk the talk need to walk the walk, and for the U.S. government, collectively, when we talk about the need to have high standards of integrity, again, as I’ve said, the presence of [Hunter Biden] on the board created the perception of a potential conflict of interest.44

The Committees learned, through document requests, that Victoria Nuland, then-Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, also received a forwarded copy of Kent’s September 2016 email outlining his concerns about Hunter Biden being on Burisma’s board. Nuland testified that she “was always open to hearing the concerns of subordinates and trying to address them in an open and transparent manner.”45 Yet when the Committee asked Nuland to explain what actions she took when she received Kent’s email, she said that Kent’s concerns about Hunter Biden were “clearly, way deep down in an email, late in 2016” and “they were not brought to my specific attention by George Kent, who is an old friend and had plenty of opportunity to do so, had he so wanted.”46 Despite senior State Department officials clearly being made aware of the situation, Kent’s concerns remained unaddressed.

e. Hochstein spoke to Vice President Biden about concerns relating to Hunter Biden’s role on Burisma’s board because, according to Hochstein, Russians were using it to advance disinformation.

According to testimony and public reports, Hochstein, then-U.S. Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs, raised concerns about Hunter Biden’s role on Burisma’s board directly to Vice President Biden. Nuland told the Committees:

43 Email from George Kent, U.S. Dep’t of St., to Bridget Brink, et al., U.S. Dep’t of St. (Sept. 6, 2016, 09:55:14 -0400) [STATE-2019-18-0000345-347] (emphasis added).
44 George Kent Testimony at 220.
45 Victoria Nuland Testimony at 121.
46 Victoria Nuland Testimony at 121-22.
Amos Hochstein had had a conversation with the vice president and his staff about this, and he also had another conversation on the plane ride to Ukraine for that December 2015 trip.\textsuperscript{47} Public reporting also confirms Hochstein’s discussion with Vice President Biden. According to one report, “Amos Hochstein, the Obama Administration’s special envoy for energy policy, raised the matter with Biden, but did not go so far as to recommend that Hunter leave the board.”\textsuperscript{48} When Hochstein testified before the Committees, he declined on advice of counsel to testify about the substance of his conversation with Vice President Biden.\textsuperscript{49} The New Yorker, however, reported that Hochstein “did not go so far as to recommend that Hunter leave the board.”\textsuperscript{50} It is unclear how Vice President Biden responded to this conversation.

According to Hochstein, he raised this issue with Vice President Biden because he was concerned that the Russians were using Hunter Biden’s role with Burisma to sow disinformation.\textsuperscript{51} Hochstein recounted that he spoke with Vice President Biden in the West Wing of the White House in October 2015.\textsuperscript{52} When asked why he decided to raise the issue of Hunter Biden’s position on Burisma’s board with Vice President Biden, Hochstein testified:

Hochstein: We were starting to think about a trip to Ukraine, and I wanted to make sure that he [Vice President Biden] was aware that there was an increase in chatter on media outlets close to Russians and corrupt oligarchs-owned media outlets about undermining his message—to try to undermine his [Vice President Biden’s] message and including Hunter Biden being part of the board of Burisma.\textsuperscript{53}

Hochstein also raised his concerns about Russian disinformation with Hunter Biden. Shortly after his conversation with Vice President Biden, Hunter Biden contacted Hochstein and asked to meet. According to Hochstein, Hunter became aware of Hochstein’s West Wing conversation with the Vice President, who had mentioned it to Hunter.\textsuperscript{54} Hochstein described what he and Hunter Biden discussed at this November 2015 meeting at a coffee shop in Georgetown.\textsuperscript{55}

Question: And could you expand on that? Why did you discuss Burisma with him [Hunter Biden]?

\textsuperscript{47} Victoria Nuland Testimony at 98.
\textsuperscript{49} Amos Hochstein Testimony at 52-58.
\textsuperscript{50} Adam Entous, Will Hunter Biden Jeopardize His Father’s Campaign?, New Yorker (July 1, 2019).
\textsuperscript{51} Transcript of Interview at 50, S. Comm. on Fin. and S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff. Interview of Amos Hochstein Testimony (Sept. 17, 2020). [Hereinafter Amos Hochstein Testimony].
\textsuperscript{52} Id. at 51.
\textsuperscript{53} Id. at 112-13. (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{54} Id. at 117.
\textsuperscript{55} Id. at 118.
Hochstein: Well, he [Hunter Biden] asked me for a meeting. I think he wanted to know my views on Burisma and Zlochevsky. **And so I shared with him that the Russians were using his name in order to sow disinformation—attempt to sow disinformation among Ukrainians.**

During the November 2015 conversation with Hunter Biden, Hochstein did not recommend that Hunter leave Burisma’s board because he did not “believe that was my place to have that discussion, one way or the other.”

**f. Conclusion**

Hunter Biden’s role on Burisma’s board hindered the efforts of dedicated career-service individuals who were fighting for anticorruption measures in Ukraine. Because the vice president’s son had a direct link to a corrupt company and its owner, State Department officials were required to maintain situational awareness of Hunter Biden’s association with Burisma. Unfortunately, U.S. officials had no other choice but to endure the “awkward[ness]” of continuing to push an anticorruption agenda in Ukraine while the vice president’s son sat on the board of a Ukrainian company with a corrupt owner, earning tens of thousands of dollars a month. As Kent testified, he “would have advised any American not to get on the board of Zlochevsky’s company.”

Yet even though Hunter Biden’s position on Burisma’s board cast a shadow over the work of those advancing anticorruption reforms in Ukraine, the Committees are only aware of two individuals who raised concerns to their superiors. Despite the efforts of these individuals, their concerns appear to have fallen on deaf ears.

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56 Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
57 Id. at 117.
58 George Kent Testimony at 110.
V. SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN KERRY FALSELY CLAIMED HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE ABOUT HUNTER BIDEN’S ROLE ON BURISMA’S BOARD.

a. Introduction

On Dec. 8, 2019, a reporter asked former Secretary of State John Kerry about his awareness of Hunter Biden on Burisma’s board during his time at the State Department. Kerry responded, “I had no knowledge about any of that. None. No.” The reporter pressed for more information and Kerry said, “What would I know about any—no. Why would I know about any company or any individual? No. The answer is no. No communication. No nothing.”

Testimony and documents obtained by the Committees call into question the accuracy of Kerry’s statement. On May 13, 2014, the day after Hunter Biden joined Burisma’s board, Secretary Kerry’s stepson, Christopher Heinz — who was also Hunter Biden’s business partner — emailed to inform Kerry’s chief of staff, and to distance himself, from that decision. Moreover, in May 2014, Secretary Kerry’s chief of staff, David Wade, briefed him about press inquiries specifically relating to Heinz, Hunter Biden, and Burisma. Separately, State Department officials wrote that they sent the secretary articles with the headlines, “Biden’s son joins Ukrainian gas company’s board,” “Biden’s son joins Ukrainian gas producer board,” and “White House says no issue with Biden’s son, Ukraine gas company.” Accordingly, these records suggest that Kerry did, in fact, know about Hunter Biden and Burisma.

b. In May 2014, Wade, Secretary Kerry’s chief of staff, briefed him about press inquiries relating to Heinz, Hunter Biden, and Burisma.

On May 13, 2014, State Department officials began fielding press inquiries relating to Hunter Biden joining Burisma’s board and the extent to which Secretary Kerry’s stepson, Heinz, was involved. That day Heinz emailed Secretary Kerry’s chief of staff about Burisma’s announcement in an apparent attempt to distance himself from Hunter Biden’s decision.

Heinz wrote to Special Assistant Matt Summers and Chief of Staff Wade:

> Apparently Devon [Archer] and Hunter [Biden] both joined the board of Burisma and a press release went out today. I can’t speak [sic] why they decided to, but there was no investment by our firm in their company.

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60 Id.

61 Id.


63 Christopher Heinz had business dealings with Hunter Biden and Devon Archer through their firm Rosemont Seneca. According to Heinz’s spokesman he “strongly warned Mr. Archer that working with Burisma was unacceptable” and “[the lack of judgment in this matter was a major catalyst for Mr. Heinz ending his business relationships with Mr. Archer and Mr. Biden.” Paul Sonne, Michael Kranish, Matt Viser, The gas tycoon and the vice president’s son: The story of Hunter Biden’s foray into Ukraine, THE WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 28, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-gas-tycoon-and-the-vice-presidents-son-the-story-of-hunter-bidens-foray-in-ukraine/2019/09/28/1aadf70-dfd9-11e9-8fd3-d943b4ed57e0_story.html.

64 Email from Chris Heinz to Matt Summers and David Wade, U.S. Dep’t of St. (May 13, 2014), https://www.scribd.com/document/433436789/CU-v-State-FOIA-Doc-Ukraine; see also Alana Goodman, John Kerry’s son cut
Wade testified that he did not recall receiving this email from Heinz, but he did, to the best of his recollection, reach out to speak with Heinz the following day to “try to confirm since we were being asked whether he, or that Rosemont Seneca was buying or investing in Burisma.”\textsuperscript{65} Wade testified that he spoke to Heinz on May 14, 2014, and confirmed, based only on Heinz’s assurances, that “Rosemont Seneca was not involved” with Burisma.\textsuperscript{66}

According to Wade, that same day he spoke to Secretary Kerry and “let him know that Chris Heinz and Rosemont Seneca were not involved [with Burisma], that the media questions [about Rosemont Seneca buying or investing in Burisma] were inaccurate, and that Chris Heinz was not buying or investing in a Ukrainian natural gas company, but that my understanding was that … Hunter Biden and Devon Archer, according to the stories, that that was accurate, that they were … joining a board.”\textsuperscript{67} Wade confirmed that Secretary Kerry learned about Hunter Biden’s association with Burisma through him:

Question: What was Secretary Kerry’s reaction to you informing him of these news inquiries about Mr. Heinz and the additional information regarding Mr. Archer’s [and] Mr. Hunter Biden’s connection and involvement with Burisma?

Wade: He knew nothing about it.

**Question:** So he learned about this information from you?

**Wade:** I believe so, yeah.

Question: And when you told him that the information that you were able to confirm with Mr. Heinz that Rosemont Seneca had … not invested or bought Burisma, what was Mr. Kerry's reaction to that?

Wade: If I recall, his reaction was that he was comfortable answering a press question if he got it.

... ...

**Question:** [T]hat he was comfortable answering the media question regarding what?

Wade: Regarding … Christopher Heinz or Rosemont Seneca investing in — in a Ukrainian natural gas company or buying a Ukrainian natural gas

\textsuperscript{65} Transcript of Interview at 39, S. Comm. on Fin. and S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff. Interview of David Wade (Aug. 3, 2020). [Hereinafter David Wade Testimony].

\textsuperscript{66} David Wade Testimony at 41.

\textsuperscript{67} David Wade Testimony at 47.
company.

Question: And did you discuss with Mr. Kerry what his response to that type of inquiry would have been?

Wade: I'm sure — I'm sure I did. I don't — I don’t … remember those details of the conversation. 68

c. In May 2014, State Department staff sent news articles to Secretary Kerry relating to Hunter Biden and Burisma.

David Thorne, who served as a senior adviser to Secretary Kerry, informed Wade that he sent the following collection of press clips and articles to the secretary on May 14, 2014:69

![Image of email]

Thorne forwarded these clips to Wade and wrote, “I sent it to JK[.]” 70 Wade told the Committees that “JK” stood for “John Kerry.” 71 The headlines of the articles that Thorne sent to Kerry included, “Biden’s son joins Ukrainian gas company’s board,” “Biden’s son joins Ukrainian gas producer board,” and “White House says no issue with Biden's son, Ukraine gas company.” 72

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68 David Wade Testimony at 50-51 (emphasis added).
69 Email from David Thorne, U.S. Dep’t of St., to David Wade, U.S. Dep’t of St. (May 16, 2014, 20:52:30 -0000), [STATE-2019-18-0000733].
70 Email from David Thorne, U.S. Dep’t of St., to David Wade, U.S. Dep’t of St. (May 16, 2014, 20:52:30 -0000), [STATE-2019-18-0000733].
71 David Wade Testimony at 79.
72 Thorne’s email did not include the headlines of the articles, but it did contain links to the articles and a description of the article including the publication date and the author’s name. Based on this information, the Committees were able to find the headlines of the articles that Throne sent to Kerry. Emails between David Thorne, U.S. Dep’t of St., and David Wade, U.S. Dep’t of St. (May 16, 2014), [STATE-2019-18-0000733].
d. Conclusion

Former Secretary Kerry’s December 2019 denial of having any knowledge about Hunter Biden or Burisma is inconsistent with the evidence uncovered by the Committees. Kerry was briefed about Hunter Biden, Burisma and Heinz the day after Burisma announced Hunter Biden joined its board. Additionally, Secretary Kerry’s senior advisor sent him press clips and articles relating to Hunter Biden’s board membership. This appears to be yet another example of high-ranking Obama administration officials blatantly ignoring Hunter Biden’s association with Burisma.
VI. STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS VIEWED ZLOCHEVSKY AS A CORRUPT, “ODIOUS OLIGARCH,” BUT VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN WAS ADVISED NOT TO ACCUSE ZLOCHEVSKY OF CORRUPTION.

a. Introduction

The State Department clearly viewed Burisma and its owner, Mykola Zlochevsky, as corrupt, and did not want to have any association with either one. For example, as soon as Deputy Chief of Mission George Kent learned of a de minimis USAID arrangement with Burisma, and succeeded in severing that relationship. As U.S. officials pressed Ukrainian officials to hold Zlochevsky accountable for his actions, Vice President Biden was “leading the policy charge” of pushing anticorruption measures in Ukraine, which included confronting oligarchs.\(^{73}\) Yet as staff prepared talking points for Vice President Biden to answer questions about whether he viewed Zlochevsky as corrupt, they suggested that he “not … get into naming names or accusing individuals.”\(^{74}\) Biden’s spokeswoman told reporters, “the vice president does not endorse any particular company and has no involvement with this company.”\(^{75}\) This stands in stark contrast to the decision of then-Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt to call out Zlochevsky by name as an example of corruption in a September 2015 speech. Biden’s unwillingness to confront a man whom State officials considered to be an “odious oligarch”\(^{76}\) demonstrated a lack of leadership, but also raises a serious question about why Vice President Biden would avoid linking Zlochevsky with corruption.

b. State Department officials viewed Zlochevsky and Burisma as corrupt.

According to testimony and documents obtained by the Committees, State Department officials viewed Burisma and its owner, Zlochevsky, as corrupt. Insofar as the link between Zlochevsky and corruption was not already clear to State Department officials, in early 2015 they learned that Zlochevsky likely bribed Ukrainian prosecutors to interfere in a United Kingdom criminal proceeding against him, which was subsequently closed. (Section VII of this report will describe this bribe and its consequences in more detail.) In short, State Department officials’ understanding of Zlochevsky’s actions relating to the U.K. criminal case strongly influenced their perspective of him and Burisma. Below are several examples of State Department officials sharing their perspective of Zlochevsky and Burisma:

- “Zlochevsky was viewed as corrupt, not just in Ukraine but by the USG/FBI[.]” – George Kent, Department of State, Sept. 2016\(^{77}\)

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\(^{73}\) George Kent Testimony at 21; Victoria Nuland Testimony at 99.

\(^{74}\) Email from Kate Bedingfield, Off. of the Vice President, to Michael Carpenter, Off. of the Vice President, et al. (Dec. 6, 2015, 6:04 PM) [STATE-2019-18-0000553-554].


\(^{76}\) George Kent Testimony at 104.

• “[W]e have extensive concerns about corruption in Ukraine, and we believe Mr. Zlochevsky is an example.” – Memo to then-U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch, Dec. 2016

• “Burisma’s owner was a poster child for corrupt behavior[.]” – George Kent Testimony to the Committees

• “I would have advised any American not to get on the board of Zlochevsky’s company.” – George Kent Testimony to the Committees

• “The proliferation of Ukrainian companies clearly (and not so clearly owned/controlled by odious oligarchs or those who outright stole assets and absconded (like Zlochevsky) is likely a long one.” – George Kent, Department of State, Aug. 2016

• “Throughout 2015 and 2016, U.S. officials, particularly those at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, consistently pressed Ukrainian officials to hold Zlochevsky to account and made clear our negative view about Burisma.” – George Kent Testimony to the Committees

• “…our focus was on [Zlochevsky’s] corrupt acts as minister when he abused the office to award national gas exploration contracts to companies that he controlled through shell companies.” – George Kent Testimony to the Committees

• “[I]n the case of former Ecology Minister Mykola Zlochevsky, the U.K. authorities had seized $23 million in illicit assets that belonged to the Ukrainian people.” – Geoffrey Pyatt, then-U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, Sept. 2015

• The closing of the U.K. case against Zlochevsky was a “gross miscarriage of justice that undermined months of U.S. assistance … [a]fter the FBI and MI5 spent months and arguably millions working to try to put together the first possible asset recover case (against former Minister of Ecology Zlochevsky)[.]” – George Kent, State Department, Aug. 2016

79 George Kent Testimony at 21.
80 George Kent Testimony at 110.
82 George Kent Testimony at 20 (emphasis added).
83 George Kent Testimony at 20 (emphasis added).
• “[The] U.S. and U.K. were cooperating on a case to seize [Zlochevsky’s] corrupt assets overseas (which had passed through the U.S.).” – Geoffrey Pyatt, then-U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, Dec. 201586

• There is “a moral hazard associated with publicly associating/promoting our assistance projects with companies/individuals seen in Ukrainian society as corrupt/comromised.” – George Kent on whether any U.S. agency should cooperate or associate with Burisma or Zlochevsky, Aug. 201687

• “[United States Government (USG)] cooperation on the project [with Burisma] would make us look bad. Not to mention the [Members of Parliament] on the energy committee and others would wonder how we speak about anti corruption [sic], but work with those that were associated with corrupt practices.” – Redacted State Department official in an email to colleagues, Sept. 201688

• “[There] is a clear link between the company and its primary owner. . . . From the rumors that we hear in the energy sector, there is no sense that Burisma has changed how it conducts its business. . . . I fall on the side of not having anything to do with the company to avoid undermining our broader efforts to promote transparency and [anticorruption].” – Redacted State Department official in an email to colleagues, Sept. 201689

c. State Department officials viewed Vice President Biden as a “warrior” and “leading the policy charge” on anticorruption measures in Ukraine.

According to testimony, former State Department officials saw Vice President Biden as a leading U.S. figure who pushed for anticorruption measures in Ukraine. Kent testified, “Vice President Biden was leading the policy charge, pushing President Poroshenko and Prime Minister Yatsenyuk to take more decisive anticorruption action.”90 Ambassador Victoria Nuland called Vice President Biden a “warrior” on this issue and said, “I was proud to work with Vice President Biden on Ukraine policy and especially on trying to help the Ukrainian period [sic] root out corruption in their country.”91

On December 9, 2015, Vice President Biden spoke in Ukraine in front of the parliament of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada, and told the members that they are facing a “test of courage”

86 Email from Geoffrey Pyatt, Ambassador to Ukraine, U.S. Dep’t of St., to Victoria Nuland, et al., U.S. Dep’t of St. (Dec. 6, 2015, 11:13:00 -0500), [STATE-2019-18-0000325] (emphasis added).
88 The project referenced in this email related to Burisma’s association with the MERP. Email from Redacted, U.S. Dep’t of St., to George Kent et al., U.S. Dep’t of St. (Sept. 1, 2016, 7:15 AM), [State-2019-18-0000505-506] (emphasis added). Kent would later call the Burisma-MERP relationship as an “ill-advised USAID co-branding effort.” Email from George Kent, U.S. Dep’t of St., to Jorgan Andrew, et al., U.S. Dep’t of St. (Nov. 22, 2016, 00:46:32 -0500), [State-2019-18-0000479].
89 Email from Redacted, U.S. Dep’t of St., to George Kent, et al., U.S. Dep’t of St. (Sept. 1, 2016, 7:46 AM), [State-2019-18-0000505] (emphasis added).
90 George Kent Testimony at 21.
91 Victoria Nuland Testimony at 70.
and have an “obligation” to Ukrainians to reform their country to “build a united, democratic Ukrainian nation that can stand the test of time.”92 In doing so, Biden stated that Ukrainians have “a historic battle against corruption.”93 He said “[o]ligarchs and non-oligarchs must play by the same rules.”94 Biden called on the Rada to “[s]eize the opportunity. Build a better future for the people of Ukraine.”95 Biden’s speech, which pushed anticorruption measures, was, according to Nuland, “very powerful and powerfully received by the Rada.”96 Yet, while Vice President Biden called for members of the Rada to have courage to confront corruption in Ukraine, the vice president’s staff was advising otherwise.

d. Vice President Biden’s staff recommended he not link Zlochevsky with corruption.

Nuland told the Committees that by confronting oligarchs, the U.S. would send an anticorruption message.97 Yet as Vice President Biden’s staff responded to press inquiries relating to Burisma and Zlochevsky, one staffer wrote, “I am concerned about getting into anything relating to Mr. Zlochevsky directly.”98 Just a few days before the vice president gave his December 2015 speech at the Rada pushing anticorruption measures, his staff prepared talking points for him and included a response to the question: “Do you think Zlochevsky is corrupt?”99 His staff wrote:

I’m not going to get into naming names or accusing individuals.
We have been working consistently to push the Ukrainian leadership to make meaningful changes in the Prosecutor General’s office and across the government to help ensure that the Ukrainian people are represented fairly and fully.100

It is clear that members of Vice President Biden’s staff wanted to distance him from an individual whom the State Department clearly believed was corrupt and an individual who employed his son. This stands in stark contrast to then-Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt, who identified Zlochevsky by name as a corrupt actor during a September 2015 speech in Odessa, Ukraine. But the Committees were not able to locate any public statements Vice President Biden gave from 2014 to 2016 in which he called Zlochevsky corrupt. Instead, in December 2015,

93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Victoria Nuland Testimony at 96.
97 Victoria Nuland Testimony at 99.
98 Email from Kendra Barkoff, Off. of the Vice President, to Michael Carpenter, Off. of the Vice President, et al. (Oct. 23, 2015, 10:00 AM), [STATE-2019-18-0000339-340].
99 Email from Kate Bedingfield, Off. of the Vice President, to Michael Carpenter, Off. of the Vice President, et al. (Oct. 23, 2015, 11:13 AM), [STATE-2019-18-0000553-554].
100 Email from Kate Bedingfield, Off. of the Vice President, to Michael Carpenter, Off. of the Vice President, et al. (Oct. 23, 2015, 6:04 PM), [STATE-2019-18-0000553-554] (emphasis added). Ambassador Pyatt recommended changing the last sentence of that answer to “Something like ‘… begin rooting out the cancer of corruption that has done so much over the years to hold back economic growth and sap the confidence of Ukrainians in those who govern them.’” Email from Geoffrey Pyatt, Ambassador to Ukraine, to Kate Bedingfield, Off. of the Vice President, et al. (Dec. 6, 2015, 11:13 AM), [STATE-2019-18-0000553].
Biden’s spokeswoman told reporters, “the vice president does not endorse any particular company and has no involvement with this company.”

**e. Conclusion**

In his December 2015 speech at the Rada, Vice President Biden told members to have courage to confront corruption and change the course of history for their country. Yet when it came to calling out an individual whom the State Department viewed as a “corrupt” and “odious oligarch,” Vice President Biden’s staff advised him to not accuse Zlochevsky of corruption. In December 2015, while in Ukraine, Biden did not link Zlochevsky with corruption and did not demonstrate the same level of courageousness that he encouraged Ukrainian political leaders to pursue.

Several witnesses highlighted efforts by certain U.S. officials to enable a successful investigation of Zlochevsky, and also noted that the U.S. decision to condition a $1 billion loan guarantee was made in part because of the then-Ukrainian prosecutor general’s failure to pursue a case against Zlochevsky. But at the end of the day, between 2014 through 2017, despite the concerted effort of many U.S. officials, not one of the three different Ukrainian prosecutor generals held Zlochevsky accountable.

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VII. WHILE HUNTER BIDEN SERVED ON BURISMA’S BOARD, BURISMA’S OWNER, ZLOCHEVSKY, ALLEGEDLY PAID A $7 MILLION BRIBE TO UKRAINE’S PROSECUTOR GENERAL’S OFFICE TO CLOSE THE CASE.

On May 12, 2014, Burisma trumpeted the addition of Hunter Biden to its board of directors, stating, “Biden will be in charge of the [Burisma] Holdings’ legal unit and will provide support for the Company among international organizations.” In that same press release, Hunter Biden stated, “As a new member of the Board, I believe that my assistance in consulting the company on matters of transparency, corporate governance and responsibility, international expansion and other priorities will contribute to the economy and benefit the people of Ukraine.” The company’s release went on to say that, Hunter was “a well-known public figure,” but the release did not mention Hunter’s connection to a more well-known public figure, his father, the vice president of the United States.

When Hunter Biden joined Burisma’s board in May 2014, the prosecutor general of Ukraine was Oleh Makhnitskyi. Makhnitskyi served as the acting prosecutor general for only a few months before resigning from the post. His resignation gave way to Vitaly Yarema, who on June 19, 2014, became the prosecutor general of Ukraine.

George Kent, a career diplomat who served in a number of roles at the State Department over his career, including several tours in Ukraine, did not hold Prosecutor General Yarema or his team in high regard. In fact, he testified, “[Yarema’s] team failed to bring a single prosecution over a seven-month period, and which allegedly took a bribe from [Burisma’s owner] Zlochevsky to close the case against him and collapse our effort to recover the $23 million frozen in the United Kingdom”

a. Allegations that Zlochevsky bribed Ukraine’s Prosecutor General Office

In January 2015, Kent arrived in Kyiv and learned that the U.S. embassy was not communicating with the Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO). Shortly after his arrival, Kent asked a Department of Justice (DOJ) official posted at U.S. Embassy Kyiv to set up a high-level meeting with the PGO. According to Kent, the goal of this meeting was for U.S. officials to raise the money-laundering case against Burisma’s owner, Zlochevsky.

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103 Id.
104 Id.
108 George Kent Testimony at 128.
109 George Kent Testimony at 128-29.
secured a Feb. 3, 2015, appointment with the First Deputy Prosecutor General, who was the “number two prosecutor in the country at the time, Anatoliy Danylenko.”

Kent testified that, during the Feb. 3, 2015 meeting with the PGO, he “confronted the First Deputy Prosecutor General, Anatoliy Danylenko, demanding to know who had paid the bribe and how much it was. I also demanded that the case against Zlochevsky be resumed.”

During testimony, Kent provided the Committees additional insight into what occurred during the Feb. 3, 2015, meeting at the PGO:

> When I asked the question [to Danylenko], ‘How much was the [Zlochevsky] bribe and who took it?’ [Danylenko] laughed and said, ‘That’s exactly what President Poroshenko asked us last week.’ And I [Kent] said, ‘So what did you tell the President [Poroshenko]?’ and [Danylenko] said, ‘Seven million dollars and last May [2014], before we came into office.’

Kent apparently did not believe that Zlochevsky’s bribe occurred in May 2014. He responded to Mr. Danylenko,

> “Nice try, but the letter that someone—some prosecutor in your office [PGO] wrote was signed in late December [2014], six months after you all [Yarema’s team] came into office.”

On Feb. 10, 2015, one week after Kent’s conversation with the PGO, President Poroshenko dismissed General Prosecutor Yarema and other members of his team.

b. George Kent reporting of the Zlochevsky’s bribe allegation to U.S. officials

Kent told the Committees that after the meeting with Danylenko, the DOJ official at U.S. Embassy Kyiv reported the allegation — that Zlochevsky paid the PGO a $7 million bribe — to the FBI. At this time, the Committees are seeking an explanation from the FBI about what, if any, actions they took after receiving this information from U.S. Embassy Kyiv.

Kent testified that it was not until sometime after the Feb. 3, 2015, meeting with the PGO that he became aware that Hunter Biden was on the board of Burisma.

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110 George Kent Testimony at 20.
111 George Kent Testimony at 129.
112 George Kent Testimony at 20 (emphasis added).
113 George Kent Testimony at 130 (emphasis added).
114 Id. (emphasis added).
115 Id.
116 George Kent Testimony at 131.
117 George Kent Testimony at 16.
After Kent learned of the alleged Zlochevsky bribe, he became aware of Hunter Biden’s connection to Burisma. Soon after, Kent spoke with Vice President Biden’s office about his concerns. This conversation occurred sometime between Feb. 3 and Feb. 14, 2015, when Kent ended up on a phone call with a staffer from Vice President Biden’s office.\footnote{George Kent Testimony at 127.} He could not recall the exact date of the phone call,\footnote{Id.} and when asked whether he apprised the staffer for Vice President Biden about Zlochevsky’s alleged bribe, Kent testified, “I can’t remember — to be perfectly honest, I don’t remember who I spoke to.”\footnote{George Kent Testimony at 129.} Kent told the Committees he did not memorialize this February 2015 phone call with Vice President Biden’s office.\footnote{George Kent Testimony at 226.}

Despite not recalling whether he mentioned the alleged Zlochevsky bribe to Vice President Biden’s office, or to a member of the Obama National Security Council, over the years, Kent did mention his knowledge of the alleged Zlochevsky bribe to high-ranking State Department officials. For example, on Aug. 31, 2016, Kent told State Department colleagues that “[Zlochevsky] who almost certainly paid off the PGO in December 2014 (I had the then First deputy PG Danylenko tell me the bribe was $7 million) to have the case against him closed and his $23 million in assets frozen in the UK unfrozen?”\footnote{Email from George Kent, U.S. Dep’t of St., to Deputy Mission Dir., U.S. Embassy Kyiv, et al., (Aug. 31, 2016, 9:55 PM), [State-2019-18-0000398-399] (emphasis added).}

c. Conclusion

Based on Kent’s testimony, the alleged $7 million bribe from Zlochevsky to Ukraine’s PGO likely occurred while Hunter Biden was on Burisma’s board. Hunter Biden has stated that his position on the board was to “consult on matters of transparency, corporate governance and responsibility[.]”\footnote{Press Release, Burisma Holdings, Hunter Biden joins the team of Burisma Holdings (May 12, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20140606004334/http://burisma.com/hunter-biden-joins-the-team-of-burisma-holdings/.} The Committees requested information from the FBI about what, if any, actions it took in regard to this allegation.\footnote{Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff., and Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin., to Hon. Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Dep’t of Justice. (Sep. 15, 2020).} The FBI has not yet responded to that request.
VIII. HUNTER BIDEN: A U.S. SECRET SERVICE PROTECTEE WHILE ON BURISMA’S BOARD

When Vice President Biden traveled overseas on Air Force Two, he was often accompanied by members of his family.125 Hunter Biden joined his father on a number of trips and, as the son of the vice president, he could enroll as a protectee and receive armed protection from the U.S. Secret Service (USSS). In an effort to determine how much of Hunter Biden’s scheduled travel occurred as a protectee and whether that overlapped with his private business dealings, the Committees requested and received documents from the USSS detailing Hunter Biden’s scheduled travel as a protectee.126

The Committees found that Hunter Biden scheduled travel as a protectee after joining Burisma’s board in May 2014.127 The Committees also determined that Hunter Biden declined USSS protection after a scheduled July 8, 2014, trip to Michigan City, Ind.128 At this time, the Committees have not determined why Hunter Biden declined USSS protection after July 8, 2014.

a. Hunter Biden, USSS protectee

According to USSS records, Hunter Biden enrolled as a protectee starting in January 2009, after his father was elected vice president.129 He remained a protectee for about 4.5 years, and records indicate an extensive amount of scheduled foreign travel as a protectee. Although the majority of his trips were domestic, the Committees identified nearly 70 trips that Hunter Biden scheduled to foreign countries while he was a protectee.130 Hunter Biden, here identified by the USSS using his full name, Robert H. Biden, scheduled foreign travel as a protectee to a wide array of foreign cities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrival Date</th>
<th>Departure Date</th>
<th>City/Country</th>
<th>Protectee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

126 Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff., and Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin., to Mr. James M. Murray, Director, U.S. Secret Serv., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 5, 2020); Letter from Faron K. Paramore, Assistant Dir., U.S. Secret Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Chairman Ron Johnson, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov. Affairs, and Chairman Charles Grassley, S. Comm. on Fin. (Apr. 6, 2020).
127 Protectee Visits Detail Reports for Robert H. Biden, U.S. Secret Serv., Date Range: January 1, 2008 - January 31, 2017. The U.S. Secret Service cannot confirm that the trips occurred or if protection was provided for the entirety of the trip due to the age of the records at issue.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Protectee Visits Detail Reports for Robert H. Biden, U.S. Secret Serv., Date Range: January 1, 2008 - January 31, 2017. The U.S. Secret Service cannot confirm that the trips occurred or if protection was provided for the entirety of the trip due to the age of the records at issue. The nearly 70 trips to foreign countries includes travel to cities within one foreign country.
Joe Biden has been asked about his son, Hunter, joining him on foreign trips to China while he was vice president.¹³¹ In response to questions about whether this arrangement was a conflict of interest, Joe Biden has told the media, “I have never spoken to my son [Hunter] about his overseas business dealings.”¹³² The USSS records indicate Hunter Biden scheduled at least six trips to China while a protectee, including a trip to Beijing in May 2014 right before he joined Burisma’s board:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrival Date</th>
<th>Departure Date</th>
<th>City/Country</th>
<th>Protectee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8/9/2010</td>
<td>8/14/2010</td>
<td>Copenhagen, Denmark</td>
<td>Robert H. Biden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/19/2011</td>
<td>10/21/2011</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Robert H. Biden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/15/2012</td>
<td>2/18/2012</td>
<td>Moscow, Russia</td>
<td>Robert H. Biden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/30/2013</td>
<td>8/1/2013</td>
<td>Milan, Italy</td>
<td>Robert H. Biden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/1/2013</td>
<td>8/6/2013</td>
<td>Florence, Italy</td>
<td>Robert H. Biden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/31/2013</td>
<td>11/5/2013</td>
<td>Abu Dhabi, UAE</td>
<td>Robert H. Biden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/2/2013</td>
<td>12/4/2013</td>
<td>Tokyo, Japan</td>
<td>Robert H. Biden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/5/2013</td>
<td>12/6/2013</td>
<td>Seoul, South Korea</td>
<td>Robert H. Biden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


¹³² *Id.*
During his December 2013 trip to China, during which Hunter Biden flew on Air Force Two, Hunter Biden admitted he met with a Chinese banker. According to news reports, Hunter Biden appeared to be conducting his own private business during this specific trip and was working to secure a deal in the hopes of creating a Chinese equity fund.

b. Hunter Biden, USSS protectee and Burisma board member.

According to USSS records, Hunter Biden was a protectee at the time he joined Burisma’s board in May 2014. Hunter Biden scheduled at least seven trips after he joined Burisma’s board on May 13, 2014. These trips took him to the foreign cities of Doha, Qatar, and Paris, France, and stateside to New York, Newark, N.J., and Michigan City, Ind.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrival Date</th>
<th>Departure Date</th>
<th>City/Country</th>
<th>Protectee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5/11/2014</td>
<td>5/14/2014</td>
<td>Doha, Qatar</td>
<td>Robert H. Biden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

133 *Id.*
134 *Id.*
135 *Id.*
136 *Id.*
137 *Id.*
The Committees did not determine why Hunter Biden declined USSS protection following the July 8, 2014, trip in Michigan City. But it should be noted that, the day before his last trip as a protectee, Time published an article describing Burisma’s ramped up lobbying efforts to U.S. officials and Hunter’s involvement in Burisma’s board. The Committees requested additional information from the USSS about the lack of records after July 8, 2014. The USSS did not provide greater detail other than Hunter Biden declined protection.

c. Conclusion

Hunter Biden scheduled hundreds of trips while he was a protectee. He was a Burisma board member while a protectee. Whether Hunter Biden conducted additional private business dealings while a protectee is unknown. Further, the Committees do not know why Hunter Biden declined USSS protection, and whether or not media scrutiny was a factor for Hunter to decline protection in July 2014.

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IX. **OBAMA ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AND A DEMOCRAT LOBBYING FIRM HAD CONSISTENT AND SIGNIFICANT CONTACT WITH FORMER UKRAINIAN OFFICIAL ANDRII TELIZHENKO.**

a. **Introduction**

Despite claims from Ranking Member Peters, Ranking Member Wyden and Democrat leadership, the Committees reject all assertions that this investigation has been influenced by Russian disinformation. To be crystal clear, the Committees’ work has focused only on Obama administration records from the State Department, National Archives and Records Administration, Department of Justice, other federal agencies, and the U.S. consulting firm Blue Star Strategies, as well as interviews with current and former U.S. government officials. The Committees have spoken with one foreign national about his ties to the Obama administration, a DNC operative, and Blue Star Strategies.

In 2016, Andrii Telizhenko was an official at the Ukrainian embassy in Washington.\(^{139}\) In that position, Telizhenko met several times with Obama administration officials, a consultant for the Democratic National Committee,\(^ {140}\) and the Democrat lobbying firm, Blue Star Strategies (which later employed him from 2016 to 2017). Blue Star Strategies officials continued to contact and request his assistance as recently as the summer of 2019.

b. **Communication and meetings between Obama administration officials and Telizhenko.**

As far as the Committees are aware, the majority of Telizhenko’s interactions with Obama administration officials occurred during 2015 and 2016. The Committees possess records of some of these communications from their request to the National Archives.\(^ {141}\)

According to documents, on July 19, 2013, Telizhenko attended a meeting at the White House with two other Ukrainians to meet with Lyn Debevoise.\(^ {142}\) At that time, Telizhenko was the counselor to a deputy of the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s Parliament.\(^ {143}\) It is unknown what was discussed at this meeting.

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\(^{139}\) The Committees attempted to obtain Telizhenko’s Blue Star Strategies documents that are subject to a non-disclosure agreement, but Democrat obstruction shielded Blue Star Strategies from providing these relevant documents.

\(^{140}\) Kenneth Vogel and David Stern, *Ukrainian efforts to sabotage Trump backfire*, Politico (Jan. 11, 2017).

\(^{141}\) Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff., and Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin., to Hon. David S. Ferriero, Archivist, Nat’l Archives and Records Admin, (Nov. 21, 2019).

\(^{142}\) Email from Waves Request, U.S. Secret Serv. to Marisa Donelson (Jul. 11, 2013, 1:18 PM), [000064].

\(^{143}\) Email from Andrii Telizhenko, Counsellor to the Deputy of Verkhovna Rada, to Lyn Debevoise (Aug. 5, 2013, 8:39 AM), [000217].
On July 21, 2015, Telizhenko was scheduled to meet in the Old Executive Office Building with Michael Carpenter, who was a foreign policy advisor to Vice President Biden. It is unknown what was discussed at this meeting.

c. January 2016 Ukrainian delegation visit to Obama’s White House.

Telizhenko’s interactions with Obama administration officials became more frequent starting in January 2016. According to a document with a DOJ logo, a Ukrainian delegation that included senior-level Ukrainian prosecutors arrived in Washington on Jan. 18, 2016. The agenda shows that their first official meeting was confirmed for Jan. 19, 2016, at the White House, from 11 a.m. to noon with “Eric Ciaramella, Elizabeth [sic] Zentos and others TBD, National Security Council.”

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144 Email from Andrii Telizhenko to Frances Castro (Jul. 21, 2015, 10:01 AM), [000140].
145 Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy & Global Engagement, Michael Carpenter, https://global.upenn.edu/penn-biden-center/person/michael-carpenter. Michael Carpenter served in the White House as a foreign policy advisor to Vice President Joe Biden as well as on the National Security Council as Director for Russia.
146 Email from Eric Ciaramella, Nat’l Sec. Council, to Catherine Croft, U.S. Dep’t of St. (Jan. 19, 2016, 7:26 PM), [001753] (attaching Agenda for Examination of the U.S. Adversarial Criminal Justice System for senior-level Ukrainian prosecutors (Jan. 18, 2016 to Jan. 23, 2016), [001755]).
In the middle of the night on Jan. 19, 2016, Telizhenko contacted Elisabeth Zentos, a member of the Obama administration’s National Security Council (NSC) asking to join the NSC-Ukrainian delegation meeting scheduled at 11 a.m. that morning. It is not known if Zentos responded to Telizhenko’s email, but she did forward Telizhenko’s request to her colleague on the NSC, Eric Ciaramella, after the Jan. 19, 2016, meeting. According to Telizhenko’s email to Zentos, Artem Sytnyk, Nazar Kholodnickiy, and David Sakvarelidze, among others, were listed as participants in the meeting with the NSC.

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147 Email from Andrii Telizhenko to Elisabeth Zentos, Nat’l Sec. Council (Jan. 19, 2016, 12:22 AM), [000074].
148 Email from Elisabeth Zentos, National Security Council to Eric Ciaramella, Nat’l Sec. Council (Jan. 19, 2016, 9:42 PM), [000074].
149 Email from Andrii Telizhenko to Elisabeth Zentos, Nat’l Sec. Council (Jan. 19, 2016, 12:22 AM), [000074].
Over the next two days, Jan. 20-21, 2016, the Ukrainian delegation was scheduled to meet with a slew of U.S. officials, including representatives of the DOJ Office of the Inspector General, the DOJ, the FBI and the Department of State.\footnote{Email from Eric Ciaramella, Nat’l Sec. Council, to Catherine Croft, U.S. Dep’t of St. (Jan. 19, 2016, 7:26 PM), [001753] (attaching Agenda for Examination of the U.S. Adversarial Criminal Justice System for senior-level Ukrainian prosecutors (Jan. 18, 2016 to Jan. 23, 2016), [001755-001756]).}

At this time, the Committees have not confirmed whether all the scheduled meeting entries on the agenda occurred. Further, despite the Committees’ efforts, no U.S. officials have confirmed what was discussed at any of these January 2016 meetings with the senior-level Ukrainian prosecutors.\footnote{Transcript of Interview at 174-75, S. Comm. on Fin. and S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff. Interview of Elisabeth Zentos (July 20, 2020), [Hereinafter Elisabeth Zentos Testimony].}

d. Interactions between Obama NSC official Elisabeth Zentos and Andrii Telizhenko.

The Committees interviewed Zentos and during that interview discussed her interactions with Telizhenko. Zentos testified that she didn’t “remember exactly when [she] first communicated with [Telizhenko], but [she] believe[s] it was while [she] was working at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, so it would have been between 2012 and 2014.”\footnote{Elisabeth Zentos Testimony 182.} Zentos was less cooperative than any other witness the Committees interviewed. She refused to provide the
names of officials to whom she directly reported, nor would she name individuals who reported to her, either at the NSC or the State Department.\(^{153}\)

In relation to her meetings and communications with Telizhenko, starting in January 2016, Zentos testified that she met and communicated with Telizhenko as “he was a representative of the Ukrainian Government. Part of my job was to be in touch with the Ukrainian Government.”\(^{154}\) During the spring of 2016, records indicate, Zentos and Telizhenko would meet at coffee shops, among other venues, around Washington, and they met at least one time while in Ukraine. Overall, records indicate that they would meet a number of times during the first half of 2016. For example, on Feb. 9, 2016, less than a month after the White House meeting, Zentos and Telizhenko met at Cosi in Washington.\(^{155}\) It is not known what was discussed at this meeting. In addition, on Feb. 23, 2016, Telizhenko and Zentos emailed about meeting. In her reply, Zentos asked, “Ok if I bring my colleague Eric, who works on Ukraine with me?” She ended the email by asking, “[D]id you get Trump’s autograph for me?”\(^{156}\)

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153 Elisabeth Zentos Testimony at 34 and 38.
154 Elisabeth Zentos Testimony at 187.
155 Email from Andrii Telizhenko to Elisabeth Zentos, Nat’l Sec. Council (Feb. 9, 2016, 2:07 PM), [000021].
156 Emails between Elisabeth Zentos, Nat’l Sec. Council, and Andrii Telizhenko (Feb. 23, 2016), [000058].
On March 1, 2016, Zentos and Telizhenko agreed over email to meet on March 3, 2016, at a Washington bar called The Exchange. Before the planned meeting, Zentos told Telizhenko, “I’ll see if my colleague Eric is up for joining.” When asked whether “Eric” was Ciaramella, Zentos declined to answer. This meeting ultimately occurred on March 4, 2016, but it is unclear what was discussed.157

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**Emails**

From: Andrii Telizhenko <telizhenko.andriy@gmail.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Zentos, Elisabeth; Zentos, Elisabeth
Subject: Re: Andrii Telizhenko

That would good)

On Tuesday, March 1, 2016, Zentos, Elisabeth <Elisabeth_F_Zentos@nsc.eop.gov> wrote:

Perfect! I'll see if my colleague Eric is up for joining.

From: Andrii Telizhenko <telizhenko.andriy@gmail.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 4:27 PM
To: Zentos, Elisabeth <Elisabeth_F_Zentos@nsc.eop.gov>
Subject: Re: Andrii Telizhenko

That is great if it fits you, I could give you a lift back) see you Thursday)

On Tuesday, March 1, 2016, Zentos, Elisabeth <Elisabeth_F_Zentos@nsc.eop.gov> wrote:

Yes, let's do it!

Want to plan on 5 p.m. at “The Exchange” – a little drive bar on H between 17th and 18th? I'll probably have to come back here afterward, hence why my suggestion is close to the White House...

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Additional meetings between Zentos and Telizhenko included:

- **March 4, 2016:** Zentos and Telizhenko met at Swing’s coffee house in Washington.158 Telizhenko emailed Zentos after the meeting and discussed how an individual was seeking a meeting with Obama NSC official Charles Kupchan.

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157 Emails between Andrii Telizhenko and Elisabeth Zentos, Nat’l Sec. Council (Mar. 1, 2016), [000113-000114].
158 Emails between Elisabeth Zentos, Nat’l Sec. Council, and Andrii Telizhenko (Mar. 4, 2016), [000018-000019].
• **March 10, 2016:** Telizhenko emailed Zentos asking to meet that afternoon for five minutes. Based on the email, it appears they met at 5 p.m. that day at Cosi. Despite this email, Zentos testified, “I do not remember if this occurred. As you can probably see from the email, Mr. Telizhenko likes to ask me to meet. I don’t remember if this specific meeting happened.”

• **April 13, 2016:** Zentos and Telizhenko apparently met. When asked about this meeting, Zentos testified, “I do not recall when any specific meeting was with Mr. Telizhenko.” Zentos said this despite her own email to Telizhenko saying, “No worries! Just got here. See you soon.”

• **May 4, 2016:** Zentos and Telizhenko apparently met.

• **July 9, 2016:** Zentos emailed Telizhenko suggesting they meet. The email suggested that Zentos was in Ukraine at this time, and Zentos testified that she joined Secretary Kerry’s delegation to Ukraine around this time. Zentos does not recall if she met Telizhenko while she was in Ukraine despite emails indicating she planned to see Telizhenko and he was “downstairs in the lobby” on the next day.

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159 Emails between Elisabeth Zentos, Nat’l Sec. Council, and Andrii Telizhenko (Mar. 10, 2016), [000043-000045].
160 Elisabeth Zentos Testimony at 193.
161 Emails between Andrii Telizhenko and Elisabeth Zentos, Nat’l Sec. Council (Apr. 13, 2016), [000161].
162 Elisabeth Zentos Testimony at 195.
163 *Id.*
164 Emails between Andrii Telizhenko and Elisabeth Zentos, Nat’l Sec. Council (May 4, 2016), [000109-000111].
165 Elisabeth Zentos Testimony at 198.
166 Emails between Andrii Telizhenko and Elisabeth Zentos, Nat’l Sec. Council (July 9, 2016), [000275-000276].
e. Blue Star Strategies’ relationship with Andrii Telizhenko.

Burisma hired Blue Star Strategies, a Democrat lobbying firm, in November 2015.167 Blue Star was founded by Chief Executive Officer Karen Tramontano and Chief Operating Officer Sally Painter. Both Tramontano and Painter interacted with Telizhenko when he was an official at the Ukraine embassy, and Blue Star eventually employed Telizhenko starting in July 2016.168 Telizhenko’s contract with Blue Star overlapped with the firm’s representation of Burisma.169 Blue Star refused to provide Telizhenko’s documents from his time as a contractor to the Committees, and it refused the Committees’ request to release Telizhenko from his non-disclosure agreement.

168 Karen Tramontano Testimony at 57.
169 Transcript of Interview at 151, S. Comm. on Fin. and S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff. Interview of Sally Painter (Aug. 31, 2020). [Hereinafter Sally Painter Testimony].
March 2016 was a pivotal month for Blue Star and its work for Burisma. In response to calls for his termination by then-Vice President Biden, Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin was about to be removed, and Blue Star increased its outreach to, and meetings with, both U.S. officials and Ukrainian officials.\(^{170}\) On March 21, 2016, a Blue Star employee emailed State Department official Amos Hochstein to request a meeting with CEO Tramontano, COO Painter, and John Buretta, a private attorney, to discuss “a sensitive energy matter ahead of [Ukraine] President Poroshenko’s upcoming visit to DC next week.”\(^{171}\)

The next day, on March 22, 2016, Vice President Biden called President Poroshenko about U.S. loan guarantees.\(^{172}\)

As Blue Star officials waited for a response from Hochstein, they met with Ukrainian officials. Specifically, Tramontano testified that she and Painter met with Ukrainian officials on March 22, 2016 at the Ukraine embassy.\(^{173}\) Telizhenko joined this meeting, and Tramontano testified that Burisma was a topic of discussion:

**Question:** So at this point in this discussion you referenced with Mr. Telizhenko, you had not brought up Burisma specifically?

**Tramontano:** Oh. No, we had — I’m sorry. **To be clear, yes, we had brought up Burisma,** and my — we did not bring up, you know, specific cases that were pending.

**Question:** I understand. And did you just bring up Burisma to Mr. Telizhenko, or did this come up in your meeting with Ms. [Oksana] Shulyar?

**Tramontano:** **It came up in our meeting [March 22, 2016] with Ms. Shulyar that Mr. Telizhenko attended.** We had the meeting to inform them of the clients we had, including Burisma, and the meetings that we were seeking. **So, yes, it [Burisma] came up in that discussion.**\(^{174}\)

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\(^{170}\) Tramontano told the Committees that Blue Star Strategies engaged in “government relations assistance” for Burisma. Oddly, Painter said the exact opposite. See, Karen Tramontano Testimony at 39; Sally Painter Testimony at 39. Moreover, when questioned whether Blue Star Strategies engaged in “government relations assistance” in Ukraine on behalf of Burisma, Painter implied that it did: “I mean, we were engaging with the government, yes.” Sally Painter Testimony at 40. In addition, both Tramontano and Painter denied that they lobbied the U.S. Government on behalf of Burisma and denied that they intended to influence U.S. policy with respect to Burisma; however, that testimony is contradicted by Amos Hochstein’s. See Karen Tramontano Testimony at 48 (“We didn’t lobby the U.S. government.”) and Sally Painter Testimony at 49 (“In our representation of Burisma, we did not try to influence U.S. policy with respect to Ukraine.”) and Sally Painter Testimony at 43 (Question: “When meeting with U.S. government officials, did you intend to influence U.S. policy towards Burisma?” Answer: “No.”) and 167 (“I do not consider them to be lobbying. I consider that to be exploring to understand the position of the U.S. government.”) compared to Amos Hochstein’s Testimony at 138 (“They did not like my answer, and they tried to convince me otherwise.”).

\(^{171}\) Email from Sean Keeley, Blue Star Strategies, to Amos Hochstein, U.S. Dep’t of St. (Mar. 21, 2016), [STATE-2019-18-0001124].


\(^{173}\) Karen Tramontano Testimony at 123.

\(^{174}\) Karen Tramontano Testimony at 124-25 (emphasis added).
According to documents, after their meeting at the Ukraine embassy, Tramontano replied to Telizhenko, asking him about scheduling a meeting with the Prosecutor General for Ukraine.\textsuperscript{175} Her email also informed Telizhenko that Buretta, an attorney and former DOJ official, planned to be in Ukraine for a day.\textsuperscript{176}

Additionally, the day after their meeting, Painter sent Shulyar and Telizhenko an email with the subject line: “Many Thanks.” Painter’s March 23, 2016, email noted, “As Karen said, please think of us as an extension of your team. We are available to be helpful in any way.”\textsuperscript{177} Further, Painter said that Blue Star was working with “Morgan Williams on their piece of the [Ukrainian] President’s visit and would be honored to help set up something for Mr. Lozhkin\textsuperscript{178} with Denis McDonough, the President’s Chief of Staff, or with anyone else he is interested in meeting.”\textsuperscript{179} Blue Star did not produce these company records to the Committees; instead, the Committees received them from Telizhenko.\textsuperscript{180}

\textsuperscript{175} Karen Tramontano Testimony at Exhibit 9.
\textsuperscript{176} Id.
\textsuperscript{177} Email from Sally Painter, Blue Star Strategies, to Oksana Shulyar and Andrii Telizhenko (Mar. 23, 2016).
\textsuperscript{178} “Mr. Lozhkin” most likely refers to Boris Lozhkin who served as the Head of the Presidential Administration for Ukraine from June 2014 to August 2016. See World Jewish Congress, Boris Lozhkin, https://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/bio/boris-lozhkin.
\textsuperscript{179} Email from Sally Painter, Blue Star Strategies, to Oksana Shulyar and Andrii Telizhenko (Mar. 23, 2016).
\textsuperscript{180} Id.
On March 24, 2016 — three days after Blue Star requested a meeting to “discuss a sensitive energy matter” and two days after meeting with Telizhenko and Shulyar — Painter and Buretta met with Hochstein at the State Department. According to Painter, during this March 2016 meeting with Hochstein, she provided him a summary of Blue Star’s December 2015 meeting with Ambassador Pyatt. She also told the Committees that Buretta provided Hochstein a briefing on the U.K. court case. Hochstein testified that he decided to meet with Blue Star officials, “Because until that meeting I was still under the impression from the first meeting that they were looking to conduct a report. I was – I didn’t have an issue with meeting with them again and hearing where they were in their process.” He did not recall Blue Star providing him a report but they gave him a verbal view of where they stood and they also tried to “convince” him to change his position.

181 Email from Redacted, U.S. Dep’t of St., to Amos Hochstein, U.S. Dep’t of St. (Mar. 22, 2016, 10:43:00 -0400), [STATE-2019-18-0001125].
182 Sally Painter Testimony at 116.
183 Sally Painter Testimony at 117.
184 Amos Hochstein Testimony at 131-32.
185 Amos Hochstein Testimony at 132-33, 138.
f. **Blue Star takes Telizhenko’s recommendation to remove Burisma’s name to secure a June 2016 meeting with the PGO.**

While strategizing about how to secure a June 2016 meeting with Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office, Blue Star officials and Telizhenko discussed how they should craft the meeting request to the PGO. Blue Star sought this meeting to discuss the ongoing PGO cases against Burisma and Zlochevsky. On June 7, 2016, Telizhenko offered his advice in an email to Tramontano:

> I wanted to recommend to, in the official request letter, to take away Mr. Zlochevsky’s company name and his name. Just request a meeting an [sic] put just the topics you wanted to discuss, expect [sic] Zlochevsky. I will brief you more when you come to Kiev, but because the President [Poroshenko] does not really like Zlochevsky (he has personal issues), Mr. Lutsenko will deny the meeting if his name stays in the letter. You can raise the issue during the meeting, but on the official letters I would recommend to remove it. I spoke to the chief of staff. He is ready to meet, but please take off the name of the company and his name.186

On June 10, 2016, Tramontano replied to Telizhenko, saying, “Thank you for your assistance. I hope you received the revised letter.”187

Tramontano testified that some of Telizhenko’s recommendations were adopted:188

**Question:** Did Blue Star make the changes to the letter that was sent to the Prosecutor General that Mr. Telizhenko recommended?

**Tramontano:** John Buretta made the changes.

**Question:** And what changes did Mr. Buretta make?

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186 Karen Tramontano Testimony at 136-37.
187 Karen Tramontano Testimony at 139.
188 Karen Tramontano Testimony at 139-140.
Tramontano: As I recall, and I believe this document is in the submission, he changed the agenda items to take the name of the company [Burisma] off the agenda items.\textsuperscript{189}

On June 22, 2016, Tramontano, Buretta and Burisma’s Vadym Pozharskiy met with Prosecutor General Lutsenko.\textsuperscript{190}

\textbf{g. Blue Star official communicates with Telizhenko in 2019.}

Blue Star’s contract with Telizhenko ended in May 2017, yet Blue Star officials continued to communicate with Telizhenko.

Tramontano testified that after ending the contract with Telizhenko, “we remained in contact, I would say, you know, from time to time. When he came to Washington, he would, you know, let us know. But I haven’t talked to him in quite some time, I would say.”\textsuperscript{191} When asked if this was the same for Painter, Tramontano replied, “I would think it’s the same.”\textsuperscript{192} Further, when Tramontano was asked whether Painter communicated more with Telizhenko, she responded, “I don’t even know how to answer that question. I’m sorry[.]”\textsuperscript{193}

When the Committees interviewed Painter, she explained how she communicated with Telizhenko:

\begin{verbatim}
Question: How did you communicate with Mr. Telizhenko?
Painter: We communicated by email and on the telephone.
Question: By telephone, you mean phone calls?
Painter: Yes.\textsuperscript{194}
\end{verbatim}

At that point of the interview, Painter failed to mention that she communicated via WhatsApp with Telizhenko.\textsuperscript{195} The Committees have obtained some images of WhatsApp messages between Painter (white colored boxes) and Telizhenko (green colored boxes) starting in April 2019 and ending in August 2019. These texts show that Blue Star and Telizhenko maintained consistent contact even after he left their employment and that Blue Star continued to rely on his advice.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{189} \textit{Id.} (emphasis added).
\item \textsuperscript{190} Karen Tramontano Testimony at 140.
\item \textsuperscript{191} Karen Tramontano Testimony at 161.
\item \textsuperscript{192} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{193} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{194} Sally Painter Testimony at 150.
\item \textsuperscript{195} Sally Painter failed to produce any WhatsApp communications to the Committees, and the communications were provide by Andrii Telizhenko.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Messages exchanged between Sally Painter (white background) and Andrii Telizhenko (green background)\textsuperscript{196}

\textsuperscript{196} WhatsApp messages between Sally Painter, Blue Star Strategies, and Andrii Telizhenko (on file with Comms.).
Messages exchanged between Sally Painter (white background) and Andrii Telizhenko (green background)\textsuperscript{197}

\textsuperscript{197} Id.
Messages exchanged between Sally Painter (white background) and Andrii Telizhenko (green background)\textsuperscript{198}

\textsuperscript{198} Id.
Messages exchanged between Sally Painter (white background) and Andrii Telizhenko (green background)\textsuperscript{199}

\textsuperscript{199} Id.
When the Committees presented these WhatsApp messages to Painter, she confirmed that these messages were authentic:

**Question:** Did you text with Andrii Telizhenko?

**Painter:** I believe so, yes.

**Question:** Do these appear to be messages between yourself and Mr. Telizhenko?

**Painter:** Yes.

**Question:** How often do you text with Mr. Telizhenko?

**Painter:** I can't quantify. I don't recall the number.

Painter did not provide these WhatsApp messages to the Committees despite repeated requests. When asked whether she still possessed these messages with Telizhenko, Painter testified, “I do not keep my WhatsApp messages.” And when questioned why she doesn’t keep the messages, Painter said, “I like to get rid of them. It makes me know that I finished a task. So I get rid of my texts and my WhatsApp and any of my traffic like that. I like to have a clean file.”

When asked why she was communicating with Telizhenko in July 2019, Painter testified, “We had a fine rapport, and he would communicate with me periodically.”

According to these messages, on April 30, 2019, Painter told Telizhenko to “please Take [sic] blue star off resume.” The Committees asked Painter about this message:

**Question:** It sounds like you're ordering him to do that [Remove Blue Star from his resume]. No?

**Painter:** As I stated before — this will be the third time — Mr. Telizhenko was working more and more with Mr. Giuliani, and we had a conversation about whether it would hurt him with the Republicans if he had Blue Star on his résumé. So this is not a characterization of our conversation.

**Question:** So is that connected to the message you sent above on April 26, 2019, that says, “Have you seen what Solomon has written about what you said?”

**Painter:** I don't think the — I can't comment on that because I don't think this is an accurate representation of the chain of events.

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200 Sally Painter Testimony at 153-54 (emphasis added).
201 Sally Painter Testimony at 157 (emphasis added).
202 Sally Painter Testimony at 158 (emphasis added).
Question: So you’re advising Mr. Telizhenko how to better work with Rudy Giuliani and Republicans?

Painter: Ironically, Mr. Telizhenko was asking my advice.203

In another message, on June 18, 2019, Painter messaged Telizhenko, “Complaint filed.” The Committees asked Painter about this message and she explained:

Question: On June 18th, 2019, you wrote “Complaint filed.” What is this reference to?

Painter: I don't recall.

Question: You have no recollection?

Painter: I do not.

Question: Why would you have to tell Mr. Telizhenko that a complaint was filed?

Painter: I don't recall.204

h. Conclusion

The Obama administration and the Democrat lobby shop Blue Star Strategies had consistent and extensive contact with Andrii Telizhenko over a period of years. Yet despite these well-documented contacts with Democratic officials, Democrats have attempted to impugn this investigation for having received some Blue Star-related records from him. Some Democrats have even (incorrectly) identified Telizhenko as the Committees’ “star witness.”205 Although he produced a small number of Blue Star-related records to the Committees, the Committees never interviewed him as part of this investigation.206 Nonetheless, Democrats have claimed that Telizhenko is involved in a Russian disinformation campaign. Even though almost all of the Committees’ records are from U.S. agencies and U.S. officials or persons, Democrats have repeatedly misconstrued the facts of this investigation. In doing so, they conveniently have ignored their own long history of meeting with Telizhenko and his year-long work for a Democrat lobby shop. If Democrats are concerned that Telizhenko presents any risk of advancing disinformation, it is notable that the Ranking Members have not expressed any curiosity about his work with the Obama administration or Blue Star Strategies.

203 Sally Painter Testimony at 161.
204 Sally Painter Testimony at 156.
205The Committees received a small number of records from Telizhenko related to his communications with and subsequent work for Blue Star Strategies. Ranking Member Peters and Ranking Member Wyden have access to these records but have refused to receive or review them. Had they done so, they would have observed that the State Department, National Archives, and Blue Star Strategies (after it received a subpoena) produced most of the same records to the Committees. They also would have noticed the emails and text messages that Blue Star failed to produce to the Committees.
X. THE MINORITY FALSELY ACCUSED THE CHAIRMEN OF ENGAGING IN A RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN AND USED OTHER TACTICS TO INTERFERE IN THE INVESTIGATION.

a. Introduction

Since the majority began its investigation, the Ranking Members have attempted to mischaracterize its scope in an effort to cast doubt on its eventual findings. They have done so, in part, by spreading an unfounded conspiracy theory rooted in a foreign-sourced influence campaign publicly identified by the Intelligence Community (IC).\(^{207}\) Specifically, Democrats, not just the Ranking Members, relied upon materials and statements from foreign nationals who are attempting to influence U.S. politics to levy unsupported and demonstrably inaccurate allegations linking the majority’s investigation to those same unreliable foreign nationals.

As part of their efforts, Democrats laundered their unclassified speculation through classified analysis of intelligence reporting to fabricate a veneer of credibility in an effort to shield their claims from public scrutiny. Those false claims were then leaked to friendly media outlets, which reported them as fact. Together, these networks of Democratic offices and liberal press outlets have worked to weave fact with fiction in order to construct a false narrative designed to undercut and discredit the Chairmen’s investigation and its eventual findings. In the process, Democrats relied upon and disseminated disinformation from foreign sources, such as Ukrainian official Andriy Derkach, whom the IC has publicly warned are actively seeking to influence U.S. politics.\(^{208}\) Thus the Democrats, specifically the Ranking Members, have engaged in a disinformation campaign, not Chairmen Grassley or Johnson.

b. Beginnings of the investigation, early leaks, and unequal information sharing

On Nov. 15, 2019, Chairman Grassley and Chairman Johnson wrote a non-public letter to the Department of Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), seeking Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) on individuals and entities, including Hunter Biden, Burisma Holdings (Burisma), and others. Although most of the letters sent during the investigation have been released to the public shortly after being transmitted, this letter was not released at the time because of the sensitive nature of the underlying records and the need to ensure the integrity of the investigation with respect to those records. SARs often contain evidence of potential criminal activities, such as money laundering and fraud, and at the time, there was no evidence that SARs existed for the individuals mentioned in the request.\(^{209}\) The letter was, however, shared with Ranking Member Peters’ office. Just one week later, on Nov.


\(^{208}\) See id.

22, 2019, a copy of the letter was leaked to Reuters, which published an article containing a link to a full and unredacted copy of the letter.210 According to the Treasury, the department’s protocol requires stamping the document, which the leaked version did not contain.

The next major leak came in February 2020, just one day after the Committees sent a public letter to the Secret Service requesting Hunter Biden’s travel records.211 The Committees had requested the travel records in order to assess claims that Hunter Biden may have used government-sponsored travel to conduct private business. The leaks were unrelated to the Secret Service letter but they were designed to undermine the Treasury request. For example, these disclosures to the media included the fact that the Treasury had been producing information responsive to the Committees’ requests as well as the approximate date when the Treasury had begun its production to the Committees.212 The Yahoo News article also stated, “[t]he senators’ requests to the Treasury have borne fruit, according to the ranking Democratic senator on the Finance Committee, Ron Wyden of Oregon].”213 Senator Wyden’s spokesperson was also quoted as saying, “the Treasury Department [is] rapidly complying with Senate Republican requests — no subpoenas necessary — and producing ‘evidence’ of questionable origin.”214 The Yahoo News article stated that the Department of Treasury had “complied with Republican senators’ requests for highly sensitive and closely held financial records about Hunter Biden and his associates[.].”215 Further, on the same day the Yahoo News article published, Buzzfeed News reported that the Committees had begun coordinating interviews with potential witnesses.216

Contrary to the allegation that the Chairmen have not included the Ranking Members in the Chairmen’s investigation, Ranking Member Wyden and Ranking Member Peters are not a party to the majority’s investigation. However, Chairman Grassley and Chairman Johnson have included them in all document productions and interviews even though the Ranking Members have failed to abide by the same principles of inclusion with respect to their investigations.217 As one example, on July 1, 2020, Ranking Member Wyden and Ranking Member Peters released a COVID-19 report that included non-public government information that was not shared with

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212 See id.


214 Id.

215 Id.


217 Email correspondences between Majority and Minority Staff (on file with Comms.).
Chairman Grassley and Chairman Johnson or their staff.\textsuperscript{218} The Ranking Members failed to include the Chairmen and their staff in all document production requests related to this review.\textsuperscript{219} Moreover, Ranking Member Wyden and Ranking Member Peters provided Chairmen’s staff with a draft of this report that totaled 30 pages in length and represented that it was the final version, to be publicly released.\textsuperscript{220} Days later, the Ranking Members made public the “final” report, which was 98 pages in length, not the 30 pages that was represented to the Chairmen and their staff.\textsuperscript{221}

As another example, Ranking Member Wyden conducted a year-long investigation into Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Administrator Seema Verma with the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, the House Committee on Oversight and Reform, and the minority on the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. On Sept. 9, 2020, at 6:16 p.m., Ranking Member Wyden’s staff notified Chairman Grassley’s staff that the report would be issued the following morning.\textsuperscript{222} Ranking Member Wyden’s staff did not include Chairman Grassley’s staff in any document productions, witness interviews, report drafts, or communications relating to that investigation.

Further, the Ranking Members have repeatedly made public previously undisclosed and non-public information pertaining to the majority’s investigation. On Feb. 11, May 6, and July 7, 2020, Ranking Member Wyden used the majority’s investigation to request sensitive materials from the State Department relating to Ukraine.\textsuperscript{223} In doing so, the May 6 and July 7 letters also made unauthorized releases of previously non-public information, including details regarding the number of documents produced by the State Department in response to Committees’ requests, information which they would not have known if they were not included in the document productions.\textsuperscript{224} News outlets used that information to report that the administration was responding to the Chairmen’s requests with unusual speed, which was false.\textsuperscript{225}

Moreover, staff for the Chairmen and Ranking Members had a phone call with Victoria Nuland’s attorneys on Aug. 29, 2020. During the course of that phone call, staff for Ranking


\textsuperscript{219} Email correspondences between Majority and Minority Staff (on file with Comms.).

\textsuperscript{220} Id. (on file with Comms.).


\textsuperscript{222} Email correspondences between Majority and Minority Staff (on file with Comms.).


\textsuperscript{224} See id.

Member Wyden attempted to disclose to Nuland’s counsel the transcribed testimony of another witness. The Chairmen’s staff immediately interceded to stop the communication and made clear that such a disclosure would negatively affect the integrity of the investigation. In addition, the Ranking Members’ staff have had contact with counsel for the witnesses without the Chairmen’s staff present; in the context of an investigation conducted by only the Chairmen and opposed by the Ranking Members, this unilateral contact raises concerns about any communications, purposeful or inadvertent, that might harm the integrity of the investigation.

House Democrats have also tried to involve themselves in this inquiry. On May 21, 2020, Representative Eliot Engel, who serves as Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, wrote to the State Department to request that the documents provided to the Senate Committees be provided to his committee as well.226 (Of course, Ranking Member Wyden and Ranking Member Peters received contemporaneous productions of all records provided to the Committees.) Citing Ranking Member Wyden, Chairman Engel did not request the materials in connection with any investigation of his own.227 Instead, he merely requested all records that have been produced to the Committees.228 His inadequately predicated request appears to be another effort to gather information for the purpose of running political interference. Further, Chairman Engel has subpoenaed records and, in an attempt to strong-arm Secretary Pompeo into turning over documents, has threatened to initiate contempt proceedings against him.229 Based on communications with the State Department, Chairman Engel’s actions have directly interfered with the State Department producing records to the Chairmen. On Sept. 18, 2020, the State Department provided copies of records produced to the Committees to Chairman Engel without providing any prior notice to the Chairmen.

c. Conspiracy theory claims

On July 13, 2020, Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, Senator Mark Warner, Speaker Nancy Pelosi, and Representative Adam Schiff sent a letter, with a classified attachment, to the FBI to express a purported belief that Congress is the subject of a foreign disinformation campaign.230 In that letter, which was publicly released on July 20, 2020, they requested a defensive briefing on foreign efforts to interfere in the 2020 U.S. presidential election.231 The classified attachment included unclassified elements that, among other things, attempted — and failed — to tie the joint Committees’ investigation to foreign disinformation.

227 See id.
228 See id.
One of those elements was an unclassified paragraph that summarized an open source document created by Russia-aligned Ukrainian Andriy Derkach, which mentions the Chairmen along with other Republican senators and administration officials. In that document, the Chairmen are labeled as individuals who are fighting against Ukrainian corruption and under their pictures is an envelope icon. The Democrats speculated that the envelope icon possibly suggests that the Chairmen might have received information from this Ukrainian national. Liberal media outlets picked up that reference, clearly from a leak, even though the Chairmen had not received any information from that Ukrainian national, including any alleged tapes. Those media outlets reported that the Chairmen had in fact received information from Derkach, which is false. Indeed, clicking on the envelope icon in the document produces a collection of public letters the Chairmen have sent during the investigation, not any additional documents that Derkach allegedly sent to them. Although the Democrats’ letter and attachment from July 13 targeted the Chairmen’s investigation, they were not copied on the letter and were not granted access to the classified portion until two weeks after it was sent to FBI and one week after portions of it were publicly reported.

On July 16, mere days before the Democrats’ July 13 letter became public, Ranking Member Peters and Ranking Member Wyden wrote to the Chairmen to request a briefing from the FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force and other relevant members of the IC on matters related to the Committees’ investigation. On July 28, 2020, the Chairmen responded to the Ranking Members and reminded them that in March 2020, the FBI and relevant members of the IC had briefed the Committees regarding the investigation and provided assurances at that time that there was no reason that the Committees should not continue their investigation. Those assurances were provided with knowledge of public reporting that Andrii Telizhenko provided records to the Committees. Notably, Telizhenko had extensive and consistent contact with Obama administration officials and a DNC consultant, and worked for the U.S.-based Democrat firm Blue Star Strategies on matters relevant to the Committees’ investigation. As such, the only records he provided to the Committees related to his work for Blue Star Strategies and his interactions with Obama administration officials. Additionally, during that briefing, the agencies made clear to the Committees’ staff that they did not have any additional information to provide and that the relevant written products, which members have had access to for months, speak for themselves. Subsequently, on Aug. 6, 2020, Chairman Grassley and Chairman Johnson received another briefing from the FBI on behalf of the IC, in which the FBI stated that it is not attempting to “quash, curtail, or interfere” in the investigation in any way.

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232 See Natasha Bertrand, Andrew Desiderio, and Kyle Cheney, Democrats: Packets sent to Trump allies are Part of Foreign Plot to Damage Biden, POLITICO (July 23, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/23/democrats-letters-to-trump-allies-are-foreign-plot-to-damage-biden-380217. As the Chairmen have repeatedly said, they and their staff have not received, relied upon, or solicited information from Derkach.


On July 20, 2020, POLITICO reported on the contents of the Democrats’ July 13, 2020 letter.\(^\text{235}\) Unnamed sources for the article alleged that the classified attachment cited the investigation into Hunter Biden and others as “one of the sources of … concern.”\(^\text{236}\) A subsequent POLITICO article, again citing unnamed sources, reported that in 2019, Derkach allegedly sent information to several members of Congress, including the Chairmen and Ranking Member Wyden and Ranking Member Peters.\(^\text{237}\) The article then further suggested that these weak parallels reinforced the “suspicions” of some Democrats that the Committees’ investigation was “‘laundering’ a foreign influence campaign to damage Biden.”\(^\text{238}\) The POLITICO article also suggested that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs George Kent and several other individuals have been the subject of Committee information requests.\(^\text{239}\) The Chairmen repeatedly rejected claims that they had any engagement with Derkach. In August 2020, Derkach was publicly identified by the IC as a proponent of a foreign-sourced influence campaign to influence the 2020 election. He was later sanctioned by the U.S. Department of Treasury for the same activity.\(^\text{240}\) Chairman Grassley and Chairman Johnson praised the Treasury for imposing those sanctions.\(^\text{241}\)

Since the offices of Chairman Johnson and Chairman Grassley did not receive, and were unaware of, the information that Derkach had allegedly sent, it is impossible that Derkach’s efforts could have shaped the Committees’ investigation in any way. Furthermore, it should now be clear that Derkach’s core claims are in no way a part of the Committees’ investigative work. For example, according to media reports, Derkach is responsible for spreading allegations that Burisma made direct payments to Joe Biden in the amount of $900,000, which were allegedly funneled to Biden through his son’s consulting firm, Rosemont Seneca Partners, and marked for “consultative services.”\(^\text{242}\) This claim about direct payments made to Joe Biden is not evaluated in the Committees’ report of investigation, nor has it ever been cited as a predicate for any of the Committees’ information requests. However, during the Chairmen’s staff interview of George Kent, Ranking Member Peters’ staff inserted into the interview record the same Derkach-created


\(^{236}\) See *id.*

\(^{237}\) See Natasha Bertrand, Andrew Desiderio, and Kyle Cheney, *Democrats: Packets sent to Trump allies are Part of Foreign Plot to Damage Biden*, POLITICO (July 23, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/23/democrats-letters-to-trump-allies-are-foreign-plot-to-damage-biden-380217. As the Chairmen have repeatedly said, they and their staff have not received, relied upon, or solicited information from Derkach.

\(^{238}\) See *id.*


document that Democrats relied on in their July 13 letter to falsely accuse the Chairmen of relying on disinformation. Kent described Derkach’s document as disinformation, but Ranking Member Peters’ staff used it anyway. Thus, the Ranking Members introduced disinformation into the record, not the Chairmen.

In summary, the Democrats’ July 13, 2020, letter relied on foreign disinformation to create a false and harmful innuendo about the Chairmen’s oversight work. That innuendo was then wrapped in a classified attachment in an apparent effort to fabricate a veneer of credibility and shield their analysis from public scrutiny before being disseminated to news media, which reported their speculation as fact. Ironically, the Democrats relied on and disseminated foreign-sourced disinformation to falsely accuse Republicans of relying on that same foreign-sourced disinformation.

Despite its inaccuracies, the Democrats’ false narrative has continued to be picked up, amplified and circulated by a broad network of Democrat-friendly media outlets and Democratic members of Congress. MSNBC has reported extensively on the Derkach allegations. Further, on Aug. 7, 2020, Senator Richard Blumenthal published an op-ed in The Washington Post in which he repeated many of these baseless allegations as if they were fact. He wrote:

[I]t now appears that … disinformation and deception are gaining a toehold in Congress as well: On Wednesday, The Post reported that Sen. Ron Johnson (R-Wis.), chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, is moving ahead with an investigation into presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden’s family using documents provided to the senator by the son of a former KGB officer. Johnson’s actions are of such concern to the CIA, according to news reports, that the agency has refused to brief him. Think of it: Congress may become a forum for debunked conspiracy theories peddled by Kremlin proxies. There is no excuse for perpetuating Russian disinformation in the U.S. Senate, just as there is no excuse for barring the American public from learning more about the genuine foreign threats to the November election.

Senator Blumenthal’s reference to documents provided by a former KGB officer is a reference to the debunked conspiracy theory that Derkach sent documents to the Chairmen. His reference to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) briefing relates to false allegations spread in an Aug. 5, 2020, Politico article that suggested that the CIA has refused to cooperate with an offer to brief

243 George Kent Testimony at 150.
244 George Kent Testimony at 156.
245 George Kent Testimony at 150.
248 Id.
the Committees because its officers have “deep skepticism of the probe[.]”\(^{249}\) In reality, the CIA declined to provide a briefing because it considers any additional briefings to be unnecessary. The FBI is the lead agency for the IC in matters related to foreign election interference, and the FBI already has repeatedly briefed the Committees on behalf of the IC. As previously noted, at a March 2020 briefing, which included the Ranking Members’ staff, the FBI informed the Committees that there was no reason they should not continue with their investigation. On Aug. 6, 2020, the FBI reiterated the same to the Chairmen.

The Chairmen responded to Senator Blumenthal, as well as Senator Chris Van Hollen’s false statements regarding the investigation.\(^{250}\) In their response, the Chairmen reasserted that they have not received any information from Derkach and that their focus is on government records from the Obama administration and records from a Democrat lobby shop. The Chairmen also noted to both senators that for years the senators peddled and pushed the now-debunked Russian collusion narrative and used the “Steele dossier”—a Democrat bought-and-paid-for document filled with Russian disinformation—to do so.\(^{251}\) Senators Blumenthal and Van Hollen never responded to the Chairmen.

\subsection*{d. Ongoing leaks}

While these false narratives have developed and spread, leaks to the media have continued. The same team of writers responsible for the above-referenced July 23, 2020, Politico article have published several other pieces that contained leaked Committee information related to the Ukraine investigation. On July 16, 2020, Politico published the names of individuals who the Committees requested to interview, including David Wade, Antony Blinken, Amos Hochstein, Victoria Nuland and Catherine Novelli.\(^{252}\) The article detailed areas of interest for the investigation and stated that subpoenas could be issued as soon as July 22, 2020.\(^{253}\) None of this information was made public by the Chairmen. Although the sources for the leaked information contained in the article are unknown, the article states that a spokesman for Chairman Johnson declined to comment on ongoing discussions with witnesses and Chairman Grassley has not confirmed to the media any interviewees, whether potential or actual.\(^{254}\) On July 22, Politico published an article stating that the Committees had secured an interview with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs George Kent.\(^{255}\) The article contained non-public scheduling details and indicated that Kent could be interviewed as


\(^{253}\) \textit{Id.}

\(^{254}\) \textit{Id.}

e. Preferential treatment

Throughout this investigation, the Ranking Members have tried to create the narrative that the Chairmen have received preferential treatment from the executive branch. The Ranking Members have asserted that the executive branch has been too quick and too thorough in its responses to Committee information requests.\textsuperscript{257} Ranking Member Wyden has made this allegation repeatedly and has said they are legitimate efforts to raise awareness of a “double standard of Trump administration cooperation with Congress.”\textsuperscript{258} The suggested implication is that the Trump administration is working to quickly release information to the Committees because the investigation includes Hunter Biden, the son of Joe Biden, President Trump’s political opponent in the 2020 presidential election.

Allegations suggesting the existence of a double standard ring hollow. By no stretch has the Trump administration responded to all of the Committees’ requests in a timely manner. The Chairmen have dozens of outstanding requests related to the investigation, and on literally hundreds of occasions, the Chairmen’s staff have had to remind the executive branch, particularly the State Department, to comply with their requests.\textsuperscript{259} Indeed, in some cases, the Committees have received relevant records from the administration after interviewing witnesses who could have been asked about the information. That is the absence of cooperation.

Finally, recently released emails show that in the past, Democrats have exhibited the very type of behavior they are now accusing Republicans of engaging in. These documents show officials in the Obama administration scrambling to produce highly sensitive documents in response to requests made by Democrat offices on Capitol Hill during the final days of the Obama administration and before President Trump assumed office. In one email on Jan. 13, 2017, a State Department staffer pointedly remarked, “The clock is ticking.”\textsuperscript{260} That same day, another urged, “Both Senators [Cardin and Warner] want the package by Thursday Jan. 19.”\textsuperscript{261}

\textsuperscript{256} Id.


\textsuperscript{259} See Letters from Chairman Charles Grassley, S. Comm. on Fin., and Chairman Ron Johnson, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff., to U.S. Dep’t of St., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Off. of the Dir. of Nat. Intelligence, and Cent. Intelligence Agency (July 28, 2020) (on file with Comms.) (Each letter indicates that there is a number of outstanding requests for records and information from each respective department.).

\textsuperscript{260} Email from Naz Durakoglu, U.S. Dep’t of St., to Kerem Bilge, Eric Green, and Maria Germano, U.S. Dep’t of St. (Jan. 13, 2017, 10:56 a.m. EST) (on file with Comms.).

\textsuperscript{261} Email from Naz Durakoglu, U.S. Dep’t of St., to Elizabeth Lawrence, Hera Abbasi, Kerem Bilge, Katherine Harris, Eric Green, Christopher Robinson, et al., U.S. Dep’t of St. (Jan. 18, 2017, 3:10 p.m. EST) (on file with Comms.).
As the deadline for President Trump’s inauguration approached, on Jan. 18, one of the same individuals wrote, “Is it possible for me to act as the courier and drop [the information] off to the Hill tomorrow? There is a time sensitivity to these docs.”

f. Conclusion

Many of the allegations Democrats have made against Republicans — that they are relying on foreign disinformation, that they are carrying out a politicized investigation in an effort to bring down their political opponents, and that they are working covertly with the executive branch to quickly release sensitive information for political reasons — reflect the very patterns of behavior that Democrats themselves have engaged in, and continue to engage in, on a regular basis.

Let us not forget how the Democratic National Committee and the Hillary Clinton campaign paid for the Steele dossier, which was created by a foreign national, a former MI6 employee, and is based on Russian government sources. Some of those Russian government sources were part of the Russian presidential administration and supported Hillary Clinton. Moreover, in January 2017 and February 2017, the FBI received reporting, some from the IC, that assessed portions of the Steele dossier were the product of a Russian disinformation campaign. That’s no surprise, since the Russian Intelligence Services were also aware of the dossier in early 2016 before the FBI opened Crossfire Hurricane. Thus, the Steele dossier was the perfect vehicle for disinformation to affect multiple elections and to sow discord and chaos. Yet Democrats had no qualms about disseminating information from the dossier far and wide, reading parts of the dossier into the congressional record, and using its allegations as the basis for years of investigations and false claims against the Trump administration. Moreover, since the Chairmen made public in April 2020 the fact that the Steele dossier contained Russian disinformation, it does not appear that any Democrats have commented upon this revelation or expressed concern about their previous reliance on Russian disinformation. Here, the Democrats are again relying on unverified foreign disinformation to falsely accuse their political rivals of doing the same.

Congressional oversight can and should be nonpartisan. It should be focused on exposing wrongdoing regardless of who is involved and on ensuring transparency and accountability in government on behalf of the American people. Efforts to discredit legitimate oversight, especially using foreign disinformation to sow discord, only serves to benefit our foreign adversaries at the expense of our own democratic institutions.

262 See Email from Julia Frifield, U.S. Dep’t of St., to Hera Abbasi, Anthony Wier, Rori Kramer, Lauren Gillis, Zachary Schram, et al., U.S. Dep’t of St. (Jan. 5, 2017 9:52 a.m. EST) (on file with Comms.).
264 See id.
265 See id.
XI. HUNTER BIDEN’S AND HIS FAMILY’S FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS WITH UKRAINIAN, RUSSIAN, KAZAKH, AND CHINESE NATIONALS RAISE CRIMINAL CONCERNS AND EXTORTION THREATS.

Hunter Biden was paid as much as $50,000 per month to serve on the board of Burisma, a Ukrainian natural gas company with a corrupt owner, while his father was the public face of the Obama administration’s Ukraine policy. But Burisma was not the only example of Hunter Biden seeking to monetize his family name. During the course of our investigation, Chairman Grassley and Chairman Johnson uncovered additional examples of Hunter Biden, other family members, and their business associates pursuing financial arrangements with foreign nationals in various parts of the world.

The Treasury records acquired by the Chairmen show potential criminal activity relating to transactions among and between Hunter Biden, his family, and his associates with Ukrainian, Russian, Kazakh and Chinese nationals. In particular, these documents show that Hunter Biden received millions of dollars from foreign sources as a result of business relationships that he built during the period when his father was vice president of the United States and after. In addition to providing new and descriptive details about the nature, origin and extent of payments from Burisma Holdings to Hunter Biden, the documents acquired by the Committees also shed light on a much broader array of questionable financial transactions involving Hunter Biden, other members of the Biden family, and their associations with foreign nationals. These foreign nationals have questionable backgrounds that have been identified as being consistent with a range of criminal activities, including but not limited to organized prostitution and/or human trafficking, money laundering, fraud, and embezzlement.

The following transactions are designed to illustrate the financial associations between and among subjects in the inquiry. Much has been reported about Hunter Biden and Devon Archer and their corporate entities and foreign and domestic financial associations. The transactions discussed below do not illustrate the full extent of the material the Committees possess. The transactions discussed below are designed to illustrate the depth and extent of some questionable financial transactions. Moreover, the financial transactions illustrate serious counterintelligence and extortion concerns relating to Hunter Biden and his family. The Committees will continue to analyze the records in their possession.


267 There is extensive public reporting concerning Hunter Biden’s alleged involvement with prostitution services. Records on file with the Committees do not directly confirm or refute these individual reports. However, they do confirm that Hunter Biden sent thousands of dollars to individuals who have either: 1) been involved in transactions consistent with possible human trafficking; 2) an association with the adult entertainment industry; or 3) potential association with prostitution. Some recipients of those funds are Ukrainian and Russian citizens. The records note that it is a documented fact that Hunter Biden has sent funds to non-resident alien women in the United States who are citizens of Russia and Ukraine and who have subsequently wired funds they have received from Hunter Biden to individuals located in Russia and Ukraine. The records also note that some of these transactions are linked to what “appears to be an Eastern European prostitution or human trafficking ring.”
a. Burisma Holdings Limited

On April 15, 2014, Burisma Holdings (Burisma), a Ukrainian private oil and gas company owned by corrupt Ukrainian oligarch Mykola Zlochevsky, sent two wires totaling $112,758.15 to Rosemont Seneca Bohai LLC. Rosemont Seneca Bohai is an apparent shell entity owned by Hunter Biden’s long-time business associate, Devon Archer, which was first registered in Delaware on Feb. 13, 2014.

According to Real Clear Politics, on the following day, April 16, 2014, Archer visited Vice President Biden at the White House. One week later, on April 22, 2014, Vice President Biden appeared with Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk and addressed Ukrainian legislators in Kyiv regarding Russia’s actions in Crimea. That same day, Burisma announced that Archer had joined its board of directors. In the wake of Vice President Biden’s visit, the press described him as “the public face of the administration’s handling of Ukraine.”

The earliest payment from Burisma related to Hunter Biden appears to have been made to Boies, Schiller, and Flexner LLP (Boies Schiller), the Washington law firm where he was employed as a counsel in 2014. On May 7, 2014, mere weeks after Vice President Biden took lead of the Obama administration’s Ukraine policy, Burisma sent Boies Schiller a payment of $250,000. Approximately one week later, on May 12, 2014, Hunter Biden joined Archer on Burisma’s board of directors. Burisma made a second payment to Boies Schiller on Sept. 16, 2014, in the amount of $33,039.77. Both the May 7 and Sept. 16 payments state in the transaction notes that they were “for Legal and Consulting Services.”

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268 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 1 (on file with Comms.).
269 See id.
275 Id.
277 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 2 (on file with Comms.).
278 Id.
Payments from Burisma to Boies Schiller have been the subject of past news reporting.\(^{279}\) According to Hunter Biden’s attorney, George Mesires, at Biden’s urging, Boies Schiller performed the following services for Burisma:

> [E]ngaged Nardello & Co., a leading global investigative firm, to assess, among other things, Burisma’s corporate structure and government practices. Burisma agreed to pay the legal expenses of Boies Schiller to support Hunter in developing corporate reform initiatives.\(^{280}\)

However, according to statements made at the time by both Hunter Biden and Burisma, these were Hunter Biden’s responsibilities as a member of Burisma’s board of directors. In a press release issued on May 12, 2014, Biden stated:

> I believe that my assistance in consulting the Company on matters of transparency, corporate governance and responsibility, international expansion and other priorities will contribute to the economy and benefit the people of Ukraine.\(^{281}\)

Alan Apter, the chairman of Burisma’s board of directors, also said “[t]he company’s strategy is aimed at the strongest concentration of professional staff and the introduction of best corporate practices, and we’re delighted that Mr. Biden is joining us to help us achieve these goals.”\(^{282}\)

It is unclear whether any of the funds sent from Burisma to Boies Schiller were used to pay for services that Hunter Biden was supposed to provide to Burisma as a member of the board. Additionally, if Burisma was paying Boies Schiller for consulting services provided by third-party firm Nardello & Co, as Mesires has indicated, it remains unclear why Hunter Biden did not provide or arrange those services himself, on his own time, in exchange for the compensation he was receiving from Burisma as a member of the board.

Between May 15, 2014 and Feb. 12, 2016, Burisma sent another 48 wires to Rosemont Seneca Bohai, totaling $3,489,490.78.\(^{283}\) Of the 48 transactions, 39 are described as “Consulting Services” and 39 of the 48 are in the amount of $83,333.33, with the last of the payments occurring on Feb. 12, 2016.\(^{284}\) Between June 5, 2014, and Oct. 5, 2015, Rosemont Seneca Bohai sent 38 wires totaling $701,979 to three of Hunter Biden’s bank accounts.\(^{285}\) These transfers


\(^{282}\) Id.

\(^{283}\) CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 1 (on file with Comms.); CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 3 (on file with Comms.); CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 4 (on file with Comms.).

\(^{284}\) Id.

\(^{285}\) CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 1 (on file with Comms.).
may represent the final step in the flow of funds from Burisma to Rosemont Seneca Bohai to Biden during this period.

The nature of the payment arrangement between Biden and Burisma appears to have changed over time. In May 2016, Hunter Biden’s business partner, Archer, and five others were arrested and criminally charged in a scheme to defraud investors and a tribal entity of millions of dollars.\textsuperscript{286} Starting Jan. 25, 2016, Burisma began sending regular payments for Biden to his Washington law firm, Owasco PC (Owasco).\textsuperscript{287} Owasco was incorporated on Jan. 19, 2006, lists an agent address in Washington, and lists its executing officer and governor as Robert Hunter Biden.\textsuperscript{288}

Payments from Burisma to Owasco continued throughout most of 2016 and ceased eight days after Donald Trump defeated Hillary Clinton in the Nov. 8, 2016 presidential election.\textsuperscript{289} Between Jan. 25, 2016, and Nov. 16, 2016, Burisma sent nine wires totaling $752,054.99 to Owasco with each of the nine transactions listing “Owasco, PC/Robert Biden” as the recipient.\textsuperscript{290} Of the nine, two payments were for $83,333.33, five were for $83,333 one was for $84,992.33, and one was for $83,731.\textsuperscript{291} The records acquired by the Committees show the last documented payment was made on Nov. 16, 2016.\textsuperscript{292} Biden continued to serve on Burisma’s board of directors until April 2019.\textsuperscript{293}

In addition to being the owner of Burisma, Zlochevsky made at least two large cash transfers to Burisma during the time that Archer and Biden served on its board of directors.\textsuperscript{294} On April 30, 2014, around the dates when Archer and Hunter Biden first joined Burisma’s board of directors, Zlochevsky wired $12.3 million from another one of his companies, Brociti Investments Limited (Brociti), to Burisma.\textsuperscript{295} Brociti is based in Kyiv, Ukraine, and is registered in Limassol, Cyprus.\textsuperscript{296} Zlochevsky sent another wire from Brociti to Burisma on April 20, 2015, in the amount of $212,000.\textsuperscript{297} It’s unclear exactly how much, if any, of the funds wired by Zlochevsky on April 30, 2014, and April 20, 2015, were used to cover the payments made from Burisma to Rosemont Seneca, Owasco, and Boies Schiller. However, these transactions,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{287} CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 2 (on file with Comms.).
\item \textsuperscript{288} See Owasco P.C., OpenCorporates, https://opencorporates.com/companies/us_dc/EXTUID_2684079. Owasco P.C. was incorporated in January 2006; Eric Schwerin was a governor and executing officer, and Hunter Biden was an agent. In December 2019, both Schwerin and Hunter Biden rescinded those affiliations with Owasco. See Events for Owasco P.C., OpenCorporates, https://opencorporates.com/companies/us_dc/EXTUID_2684079/events.
\item \textsuperscript{289} CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 5 (on file with Comms.).
\item \textsuperscript{290} CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 5 (on file with Comms.); CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 2 (on file with Comms.).
\item \textsuperscript{291} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{292} CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 5 (on file with Comms.).
\item \textsuperscript{294} CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 2 (on file with Comms.).
\item \textsuperscript{295} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{296} Lobbying registration, ML Strategies, https://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?event=getFilingDetails&filingID=C4C8E1E0-861C4F02-B73E-0FE6578BD4D8&filingTypeID=1.
\item \textsuperscript{297} CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 2 (on file with Comms.).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
including those to Biden and his companies, were identified for potential financial criminal activity.

b. Russia

Hunter Biden and his associate, Archer, had a financial relationship with Russian businesswoman Elena Baturina. Baturina is the former wife of the late Yuri Luzhkov, who was the mayor of Moscow and was fired in 2010 by then-Russian president Dmitry Medvedev over corruption allegations. Baturina became Russia’s only female billionaire when her plastics company, Inteko, received a series of Moscow municipal contracts while her husband was mayor. According to reporting, “Luzhkov used his position as mayor to approve over 20 real estate projects that were built by a Baturina-owned construction company and ultimately generated multibillion-ruble profits for his family.” In addition, a Russian investigation led to a criminal case against the former head of the Bank of Moscow, Andrey Borodin, who “allegedly used money from the Moscow City Budget to lend money to shell companies, which ultimately transferred $443 million to Baturina.”

On Feb. 14, 2014, Baturina wired $3.5 million to a Rosemont Seneca Thornton LLC (Rosemont Seneca Thornton) bank account for a “Consultancy Agreement DD12.02.2014.” Rosemont Seneca Thornton is an investment firm co-founded by Hunter Biden that was incorporated on May 28, 2013 in Wilmington, Del. According to The Financial Times, Rosemont Seneca Thornton is a consortium that consists of Rosemont Seneca Partners and the Thornton Group, a Massachusetts-based firm. In June 2009, Biden co-founded Rosemont Seneca Partners with Archer and Christopher Heinz. The Thornton Group’s website states that it has offices in Boston and Beijing, lists Rosemont Seneca Partners among its list of alliances and clients, and includes photographs from multiple events attended by Hunter Biden.

299 Id.
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id.
Separately, between May 6, 2015 and Dec. 8, 2015, Baturina sent 11 wires in the amount of $391,968.21 to a bank account belonging to BAK USA LLC (BAK USA).307 Nine of the 11 transactions, totaling $241,797.14 were sent from Baturina’s accounts to a Rosemont Seneca Thornton bank account, which then transferred the money to BAK USA.308 The 11 transactions all listed “Loan Agreement” in the payment details section.309 BAK USA was a startup technology company headquartered in Buffalo, N.Y., that produced tablet computers in cooperation with unnamed Chinese business partners.310 BAK USA filed for bankruptcy on March 29, 2019, with a reported loss of $39 million.311 These transactions were identified because of Baturina’s reported criminal activity.

c. Kazakhstan

On April 22, 2014, Vice President Joe Biden appeared with Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and addressed Ukrainian legislators in Kyiv regarding Russia’s actions in Crimea.312 The same day, Novatus Holding PTE. LTD. (Novatus Holding), a private holding company in Singapore, used a Latvian bank to wire $142,300 to Archer’s company, Rosemont Seneca Bohai.313 The currency transaction report states, “For Rosemont Seneca Bohai LLC, … For a Car.”314

According to a Securities and Exchange Commission report, Kenges Rakishev of Kazakhstan is the sole shareholder of Novatus Holding and has a business address associated with a company in Kazakhstan called SAT & Company.315 Rakishev is the son-in-law of now-retired Kazakhstan politician, Imangali Tasmagambetov.316 At the time that Rakishev sent the money to Rosemont Seneca Bohai, Tasmagambetov was serving as the mayor of Astana (now called Nur-Sultan), the capital city of Kazakhstan.317 Tasmagambetov is reportedly a longtime

307 Confidential Document 6 (on file with Comms.).
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Samantha Christmann, Microsoft contract is a boon for Buffalo tablet-maker BAK USA, BUFFALO NEWS (Mar. 16, 2016), https://buffalonews.com/business/local/microsoft-contract-is-a-boon-for-buffalo-tablet-maker-bak-usa/article_a31de7bd-81c1-5646-89dc-032333a9e9cd.html.
313 Confidential Document 4 (on file with Comms.).
314 Id.
confidant of then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Tasmagambetov has since served as prime minister of Kazakhstan as well as Kazakh ambassador to Russia.

At the time of Vice President Biden’s visit to Kyiv, there were divided opinions in Kazakhstan over Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the international situation had produced tension in the region generally. Nazarbayev’s government reportedly shifted positions over time, and Nazarbayev reportedly made some statements supportive of Russia’s actions. Given Rakishev’s close connection to political leadership in Kazakhstan, the tense political situation, Hunter Biden’s longstanding relationship with Archer and involvement in transactions with Rosemont Seneca Bohai, and the fact that the payment was timed perfectly with Vice President Biden’s visit to Kyiv to discuss U.S. sanctions against Russia for the invasion of Crimea, the April 22, 2014 payment from Rakishev to Rosemont Seneca Bohai raises serious questions. It is unclear why a foreign company, Novatus Holding, would purchase a $142,300 car for Rosemont Seneca Bohai when the company does not deal in vehicles.

d. China

Hunter Biden and Devon Archer engaged in numerous financial transactions with Chinese nationals who had deep connections to the Communist Chinese government. These Chinese nationals included Ye Jianming, founder of CEFC China Energy Co. Ltd (CEFC) and chairman of the board for its subsidiary, the China Energy Fund Committee (CE Fund). They also included Gongwen Dong, who was Ye Jianming’s associate and reportedly executed transactions for his companies. Ye’s connections to the Communist government are extensive and, as explained below, he has been previous affiliations with the People’s Liberation Army. Based on the information received by the Committees, Ye was also financially connected to Vice President Biden’s brother, James Biden. Thus, there exists a vast web of corporate connections and financial transactions between and among the Biden family and Chinese nationals.

i. Hunter Biden Has Extensive Financial Connections to the Chinese Government.

Hunter Biden has extensive connections to Chinese businesses and Chinese foreign nationals that are linked to the Communist government. Those contacts bore financial fruit when his father was vice president and after he left office. For example, in June 2009, Hunter Biden had co-founded Rosemont Seneca Partners with Archer and Heinz. During 2010-2011, as a representative of Rosemont Seneca, Hunter Biden networked with representatives from Chinese state-owned enterprises and representatives of the Boston-based Thornton Group,

321 Id.
which today describes itself as “a cross-border capital intermediary.”

On its current website, the Thornton Group includes among its alliances and clients a variety of Chinese state-owned enterprises, including actors linked to Ye Jianming and his associates.

Ye Jianming is a Chinese businessman and a frequent figure in Hunter Biden’s financial dealings in China. Based on public reports that were available in 2015, when his contact with Biden began to ramp up, Ye was a founder of CEFC China Energy Co. Ltd (CEFC) and served as chairman of the board for its subsidiary, the China Energy Fund Committee (CE Fund). CEFC had a reported income estimated at $33.4 billion, according to 2013 figures that were available at the time. Although CEFC reportedly remained a private company until state-owned enterprises assumed control of it in 2018, reporting in 2017 indicated that it received financing from the China Development Bank, “hired a number of former top officials from state-owned energy companies” and had “layers of Communist Party committees across its subsidiaries — more than at many private Chinese companies.” Thus, it had significant connections to the Communist government and its subsidiaries had associations with the Thornton Group. For example, according to the Thornton Group’s website, its list of Chinese partners currently includes:

- the Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of Beijing, the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, the CAIFC, the China Electricity Council, CITIC Group, China Life, the China State Construction Engineering Corporation, the China Railway Construction Corporation, the Council for Industrial and Commercial Development, the Chinese International Economy Cooperation Association, the China Mining Association, the government-owned Founder Group, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited, and Peking University.

A Thornton Group press release dated April 12, 2010, provides an example of an early event in China involving Rosemont Seneca Partners and the Thornton Group. It states the following:

Thornton Group and its US partner Rosemont Seneca Chairman Hunter Biden (the second son of the US Vice President Joe Biden) and other high-level officials visited Chinese financial institutions

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326 See id.

327 Chen Aizhu and Jan Lopatka, China’s CEFC has big ambitions, but little known about ownership, funding, REUTERS (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cefc-china/chinas-cefc-has-big-ambitions-but-little-known-about-ownership-funding-idUSKBN14X0B5; see CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 7 (on file with Comms.).

and fund companies from April 7th to 9th. Including China Investment Co., Ltd., National Council of Social Security Funds, China Life Asset Management Co., Ltd., Postal Savings Bank of China, Hillhouse Capital and Founder Group, etc., aiming to further deepen mutual understanding and explore the possibility of commercial cooperation and opportunity. The Chinese companies and financial institutions visited expressed a warm welcome to Thornton Group and Rosemont Seneca, and hoped to strengthen exchanges, in-depth discussions and reach cooperation.

The delegation was led by James Bulger, Chairman of Thornton Group, and Lin Junliang, Chief Executive Officer, to visit and meet Chinese personnel including: Gao Xiqing, General Manager and Chief Investment Officer of China Investment Corporation, Equity Assets Department (Industrial Investment Department) of the National Council of Social Security Fund person in charge Ji Guoqiang, Vice President Cui Yong of China Life Asset Management Co. Ltd., Peng Zuogang, General Manager of Postal Savings Bank of China, Zhang Lei, Founder of Hillhouse Capital, Wei Xin, Chairman of Founder Group, and Xia Yangjun, Vice President of Founder Group.329

Pictures from the event posted by the Thornton Group show Hunter Biden standing with the chairman of the Founder Group, general manager of the China Investment Corporation, the vice president of the China Life Asset Management Company, the general manager of the Postal Savings Bank, and others.330

In 2012, Archer and Biden reportedly spoke with Jonathan Li of the Chinese private equity fund Bohai Capital about the possibility of forming a company, Bohai Harvest RST (Shanghai) Equity Investment Fund Management Co. (BHR), that would invest Chinese capital in companies outside of China.331 BHR was eventually formed as an investment fund and is reportedly “controlled and funded primarily by large Chinese government-owned shareholders” and is 80% controlled by Chinese entities.332 That list of entities includes the government’s postal savings bank, with which Hunter Biden had networked in 2011, its main development bank, as well as the Bank of China.333 Hunter Biden served on its board of directors and

330 See id.
“joined based on his interest in seeking ways to bring Chinese capital to international markets.”

He served unpaid but reportedly acquired a 10% stake in the company in 2017. Prior to its creation, in December 2013 and one month after the shareholders signed contracts relating to the creation of the company, Hunter Biden reportedly flew aboard Air Force Two with then-Vice President Biden to Beijing. While in China, Hunter Biden reportedly helped arrange for Li to “shake hands” with Vice President Biden. Afterward, Hunter Biden met with Li for what was reportedly a “social meeting.” After the China trip, BHR’s business license was reportedly approved.

In September 2014, BHR had become a private equity shareholder in Sinopec Chemical Commercial Holding Company Limited, a subsidiary of Sinopec. Sinopec is reportedly the second largest oil and gas company in China and the largest refiner of oil in Asia. In 2016, Ye announced at a board meeting that he wanted CEFC “to become a second Sinopec … by acquiring global assets and consolidating ‘teapot’ [independent] refineries.” Hunter Biden’s position of influence and connections to Chinese business interests, which were further strengthened while his father was vice president, most likely appealed to Ye, a man who The New York Times has since described as “[wanting] access to the corridors of power in Washington.”

BHR’s extensive connections to Chinese government intertwined its existence with the decision-making of Communist party rulers. For example, the China Development Bank (CDB) is one of member of a consortium that controls 30% of BHR. Other members of that particular consortium are the government’s postal savings bank and the Bank of China. Importantly, the CDB appears to have been connected to Ye Jianming’s CEFC. Records acquired by the Committees note that, according to reports, after CEFC and Ye fell out of favor with the Chinese government in 2018, “at the orders of President Xi Jinping, China Development Bank abruptly pulled its lines of credit on offshore bonds for CEFC[...].” Moreover, the former chairman of the CDB, Hu Huaibang, was accused in a 2018 court case of helping a CEFC subsidiary to obtain billions in financing during his time at the CDB and of

335 Id.
337 Id.
338 Id.
342 Id.
345 See id.
346 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 7 (on file with Commns.).
channeling bribes on behalf of Ye while serving in a previous position at the Bank of Communications, another Chinese government entity.347

Hunter Biden’s business associations in China were not limited to investment funds like BHR and those additional connections created questionable associations with Communist government elements. For example, in 2015, while his father was vice president, Hunter Biden reportedly met with an aide to Ye.348 In addition to the Communist government, Ye also had reported connections and affiliations to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).349 For example, from 2003 to 2005, Ye reportedly served as deputy secretary general of the China Association for International Friendly Contacts (CAIFC), which is the public name for the PLA General Political Department’s International Liaison Department.350 Additionally, in 2014, under Ye’s leadership, CE Fund had co-organized events with the China Huayi Broadcasting Corporation (CHBC), a company incorporated by the PLA General Political Department.351 The CEO of CHBC, Wang Shu, was commander of the PLA General Political Department base “[a]t the forefront of applied psychological operations and propaganda directed against Taiwan,” which was managed by a training center funded by a subsidiary of CEFC.352 The general manager of that subsidiary, Lan Huasheng, was deputy secretary general of Ye’s CE Fund.353 Wang reportedly attended the 2014 CE Fund and CHBC event along with Xu Jialu, a man who was associated with the PLA’s CAIFC as well as CE Fund and China’s Confucius Institutes.354 Huasheng served as executive director of CE Fund’s China Institute of Culture Limited (CIOC), “a nationally supported organization in charge of ‘promoting Chinese culture.’”355 Accordingly, Ye and his associates had robust relationships with China’s military units, some of which were involved in matters in direct opposition to U.S. policy in the region.

348 Alexandra Stevenson, David Barboza, Matthew Goldstein, and Paul Mozur, “A Chinese Tycoon Sought Power and Influence. Washington Responded.” The New York Times (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/12/business/cefc-biden-china-washington-ye-jianming.html. (The name of Ye’s aide and the exact date of the meeting have not been publically reported. The aforementioned meeting, and another meeting between Hunter Biden and Ye that took place in May 2017, were confirmed by “people with direct knowledge of the meetings who were not authorized to speak publicly because the meetings were private.”).
352 Id.
353 Id.
354 J. Michael Cole, “Unstoppable: China’s Secret Plan to Subvert Taiwan,” The National Interest (Mar. 23, 2015), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/unstopabble-chinas-secret-plan-subvert-taiwan-12463. (According to records on file with the Committees, it appears that Gongwen Dong, a mutual associate of Ye Jianming, James Biden, Sara Biden, and Hunter Biden, recently contributed to the Confucius Foundation Inc. On July 29, 2019, there was a wire for $5,000 from a Golden Coast Asset Management LLC account that is linked to both Gongwen Dong and Shan Gao to the Confucius Foundation Inc. with memo, “Gongwen Dong.”) Confidential Document 8 (on file with Comms.).
It is unclear whether Hunter Biden was aware of Ye’s close relationship with the PLA or involvement in efforts to develop and spread Chinese propaganda at the time of his 2015 meeting with Ye’s associate. However, public reporting did make those connections.\textsuperscript{356}

Hunter Biden’s connections with Ye continued into the summer of 2017, when he met with Ye while soliciting donations for World Food Program USA in his capacity as a member of its board of directors.\textsuperscript{357} At the time, Ye continued to operate the CE Fund, which has since been found to have engaged in criminal activities.\textsuperscript{358} During their interactions in 2017, Hunter Biden reportedly agreed to assist Ye by using his contacts to help Ye locate potential investments for CEFC in the United States.\textsuperscript{359} In keeping with that agreement, after meeting Ye, Hunter Biden stated that he began working on a deal for Ye that involved a $40 million investment in a natural gas project on Monkey Island in Louisiana that reportedly fell through the following year.\textsuperscript{360} Around the same time that Hunter Biden began this work, Ye raised concerns with Hunter Biden that one of his associates, Patrick Ho, was under investigation by U.S. law enforcement.\textsuperscript{361} Hunter Biden subsequently agreed to represent Ho.\textsuperscript{362}

On Sept. 8, 2017, a $9.1 billion deal was announced whereby Ye’s company, CEFC, would acquire a stake in the state-owned Russian energy company, Rosneft.\textsuperscript{363} Ye’s efforts to acquire a stake in Rosneft appear fully consistent with his vision of turning CEFC into a “second Sinopec” with holdings across the world.\textsuperscript{364}

**ii. Hunter Biden and his Family had Extensive Financial Connections to Ye Jianming, Gongwen Dong and other Chinese Nationals.**

On the same day that the impending Rosneft deal was announced, Hunter Biden and Gongwen Dong, a Chinese national who has reportedly executed transactions for limited liability companies controlled by Ye Jianming, applied to a bank and opened a line of credit under the business name Hudson West III LLC (Hudson West III).\textsuperscript{365} Hunter Biden, James Biden, and James Biden’s wife, Sara Biden, were all authorized users of credit cards associated with the

\textsuperscript{356} See id.
\textsuperscript{360} Id.
\textsuperscript{361} Id.
\textsuperscript{362} Id.
\textsuperscript{363} Olesya Astakhova and Chen Aizhu, *China invests $9.1 billion in Rosneft as Glencore, Qatar cut stakes* *Reuters* (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rosneft-cefc-glencore/china-invests-9-1-billion-in-rosneft-as-glencore-qatar-cut-stakes-idUSKCN1BJ1HT.
The Bidens subsequently used the credit cards they opened to purchase $101,291.46 worth of extravagant items, including airline tickets and multiple items at Apple Inc. stores, pharmacies, hotels and restaurants. The cards were collateralized by transferring $99,000 from a Hudson West III account to a separate account, where the funds were held until the cards were closed. The transaction was identified for potential financial criminal activity. The Committees prepared the following chart which displays transactions related to the line of credit:

![Diagram of financial transactions]

Hudson West III was incorporated on April 19, 2016, more than a year before the credit cards were issued. Hudson West III, which is now dissolved, changed ownership at some unknown point. After that change, ownership was divided between Hunter Biden’s law firm, Owasco PC (50%) and Coldharbour Capital LLC (50%). Although ownership in Coldharbour Capital is equally divided between two individuals, Mervyn Yan and Tian Zhang, it has a business address identified as the address of Gongwen Dong. According to records on file with the Committees, Hudson West III checking accounts were opened on Aug. 3, 2017, and Sept. 6, 2017, with Yan and Robert Hunter Biden. Gongwen Dong was a former signer, which suggests that at one time he was associated with Hudson West III’s bank accounts and finances.

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366 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 9 (on file with Comms.).
367 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 9 (on file with Comms.); CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 10 (on file with Comms.).
368 Id.
370 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 7 (on file with Comms.).
371 Id.
372 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 7 (on file with Comms.); CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 11 (on file with Comms.); see also Coldharbour Capital, LLC, OpenCorporates, https://opencorporates.com/companies/us_ny/4703700.
373 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 7 (on file with Comms.).
374 Id.
On Aug. 4, 2017, CEFC Infrastructure Investment (US) LLC, a subsidiary of Ye Jianming’s CEFC China Energy Company that listed Gongwen Dong as its director, sent Hunter Biden’s law firm, Owasco, a payment for $100,000. This transaction was identified for potential criminal financial activity. One of the investment entities of CEFC Infrastructure Investment is reportedly Shanghai Huaxin Group, a Chinese state-owned enterprise “engaged in petroleum products.” That company is owned by CEFC Shanghai International Group Ltd., which is controlled by Shanghai Guosheng Group, another state-owned enterprise. According to reporting, CEFC Shanghai was a CEFC subsidiary linked to the aforementioned corruption allegations involving the head of the China Development Bank. These examples further illustrate the deep financial connections between Biden, Owasco, and the Chinese government.

On Aug. 8, 2017, CEFC Infrastructure Investment wired $5 million to the bank account for Hudson West III. These funds may have originated from a loan issued from the account of a company called Northern International Capital Holdings, a Hong Kong-based investment company identified at one time as a “substantial shareholder” in CEFC International Limited along with Ye. It is unclear whether Hunter Biden was half-owner of Hudson West III at that time. However, starting on Aug. 8, the same day the $5 million was received, and continuing through Sept. 25, 2018, Hudson West III sent frequent payments to Owasco, Hunter Biden’s firm. These payments, which were described as consulting fees, reached $4,790,375.25 in just over a year.

There are conflicting explanations for an additional $1 million sent to Hudson West III by CEFC Limited Foundation (CEFC Limited) on Nov. 2, 2017, that appears to have been refunded to CEFC Limited on Nov. 21, 2017 with a memo marked “refund.” According to records on file with the Committees:

[Records indicated that] ‘CEFC paid the consultation fee to HW III for the purpose of conducting a market investigation of [a] natural gas project; however, the project was deemed unnecessary at the time so CEFC Limited decided to postpone the market investigation. Therefore, HW III provided the refund to CEFC Limited’. In another email correspondence dated 4/2/2018, Mr. Biden stated that the incoming wire amounting to $1MM on 11/2/2017 from CEFC Limited foundation should have gone to Owasco LLC, however, he provided the wrong wire instructions, and due to the large amount

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375 Id.
376 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 11 (on file with Comms.).
377 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 7 (on file with Comms.).
378 Id.
380 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 7 (on file with Comms.).
381 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 11 (on file with Comms.).
382 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 7 (on file with Comms.).
383 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 7 (on file with Comms.); CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 11 (on file with Comms.).
384 Id.
the transactions was not corrected until 3/22/2018, which consisted of an outgoing wire for the same amount benefiting Owasco LLC.385

On March 22, 2018, a $1 million payment was sent from Hudson West III to Owasco with a memo line for “Dr Patrick Ho Chi Ping Representation.”386 In his alternative explanation, Hunter Biden indicated that the misdirected $1 million was related to his representation of Ye’s associate, Patrick Ho.387 These transactions illustrate the financial connections between Gongwen Dong’s Hudson West III, Ye Jianming’s CEFC, and Hunter Biden’s Owasco. Biden stated that:

Boies Schiller Flexner is co-counsel for Dr. Patrick Ho’s case. Hudson West III LLC has no involvement with Patrick Ho Chi Ping[‘]s case and won[‘]t expect further transaction related to Dr. Patrick Ho Chi Ping trail [sic] for Hudson West III LLC. Owasco LLC and co- Counsel Boies Schiller Flexner will represent Dr. Patrick Ho Chi Ping [at] trial.388

During the same period, there is also evidence that Hunter Biden moved large sums of money from his firm, Owasco, to James Biden’s consulting firm, the Lion Hall Group.389 Between Aug. 14, 2017 and Aug. 3, 2018, Owasco sent 20 wires totaling $1,398,999 to the Lion Hall Group, a consulting firm that lists James Biden and his wife, Sara Biden, on the bank account.390 This transaction was identified for potential criminal financial activity. These transfers began less than one week after CEFC Infrastructure Investment wired $5 million to Hudson West III and Hudson West III sent its first payment of $400,000 to Owasco.391 Most of the payments from Owasco to the Lion Hall Group had vague notes in the memo lines, 15 of which simply indicated that they were for further credit to James Biden; however, the memo line for one of the payments read “HW3,” which indicates some of the transferred money could be from Hudson West III.392 When the bank contacted Sara Biden regarding the overall wire activity, she stated that the Lion Hall Group and Owasco provide international and business consulting and that the Lion Hall Group was assisting Owasco with an international client through a contract that had since terminated.393 Sara Biden told the bank that she would not provide any supporting documentation, and she also refused to provide additional information to more clearly explain the activity.394 Consequently, the bank submitted the account for closure.395 The Committees created the following chart with respect to this transaction.

385 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 11 (on file with Comms.).
386 Id.
387 Id.
388 Id.
389 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 12 (on file with Comms.).
390 Id.
391 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 12 (on file with Comms.); CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 7 (on file with Comms.).
392 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 12 (on file with Comms.).
393 Id.
394 Id.
395 Id.
Hudson West III also sent funds directly to the Lion Hall Group. According to records on file with the Committees, James B. Biden is the principal contact for the Lion Hall Group, and between January 2018 and October 2018, Hudson West III sent the Lion Hall Group outgoing wires totaling $76,746.15 with the memo, “office expense and reimbursement.” These transactions illustrate a direct financial link between Hudson West III (which was connected to CEFC, the Chinese government, and Gongwen Dong) and James Biden.

On Aug. 17, 2017, three days after the first transfer from Owasco to The Lion Hall Group, it was publicly announced that Ye’s CEFC Energy was in talks to purchase a stake in the Russian state-owned energy company Rosneft, which, as noted, later fell through.\(^{397}\)

Around the same time, there were also outgoing wires from Hudson West III to various accounts associated with Ye and Gongwen, including CEFC Infrastructure Investment, Coldharbour Capital (located at Gongwen Dong’s address), Gongwen’s personal bank account, a separate bank account for Hudson West V, and Bo Jian Group Investment Company (a company with a complex ownership structure controlled by Ye in which Gongwen Dong is also reportedly a part owner).\(^{398}\) These transactions and the transacting entities begin to paint a mosaic of the complex corporate structure that existed between entities linked to Hunter Biden and his associates and family and Chinese companies linked to the Communist government.

iii. \textit{Financial Transactions by these Companies Illustrate a Complex Web of Corporate Entities, Money Transfers and Potential Criminal Financial Activity.}

The Committees were able to confirm that Hunter Biden’s associate, Gongwen Dong, is connected to seven of the eight numbered Hudson West corporate entities. The exception is

\(^{396}\) CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 11 (on file with Comms.).


\(^{398}\) CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 7 (on file with Comms.).
Hudson West II; however, that entity shares a permanent mailing address with Hudson West V, which has a bank account that is connected to Gongwen. Thus, it appears that Hudson West II is most likely connected to him. The Hudson West entities are important entities in the flow of funds among and between Ye, Gongwen, and Hunter Biden and his associates. There are frequent fund transfers across these numbered Hudson West entities, and transactions involving all eight have been identified for potential criminal financial activity. For example, Hudson West III was not the only Hudson West entity associated with CEFC, Ye’s business. According to reporting, Hudson West V maintains an ownership interest in CEFC Infrastructure Investment, a subsidiary of CEFC.  

By extension, this means Hudson West V is linked to Ye and the aforementioned $5 million payment to Hudson West III on Aug. 8, 2017. Hudson West V also reportedly had ownership in a series of other companies: Hudson West Partners LLC, Hudson West Aggregator LLC, Hudson West VIII LLC, and Hudson West VII LLC which begins to show the complex corporate structure at play. 

Between July 2017 and November 2018, Hudson West V received wires totaling $20,310,396.79 with $20,893,505.07 leaving that same account. All but $259,845 of the total amount transferred out of the account went to U.S. bank accounts for various LLCs, most of which were documented to be involved in the business of real estate investment and management. Several of those LLCs are also tied to Gongwen.

Twenty million dollars of the $20,310,396.79 going into the aforementioned Hudson West V US account was transferred into that account from another Hudson West V account at the Bank of China. Between Feb. 9, 2017, and April 12, 2017, a Hudson West V Bank of China account received three incoming wires totaling $27,917,665.45 from an entity called Kaiyan US Fund III LP and one wire for $100,000 from a company called Foxwood Asset Management Co. Limited. Both Kaiyan US Fund III LP and Foxwood Asset Management Co Limited have addresses in Beijing. On March 19, 2018, Kaiyan US Fund III LP also sent one wire for $50,551.79 directly to a different account for Hudson West V, which is included in the aforementioned $20,310,396.79 total of incoming wires for that account.

These transactions offer a window into a much larger web of transactions carried out among a vast network of corporate entities, many with complex ownership structures, variously owned and operated by Gongwen Dong, Ye Jianming, an individual named Shan Gao, and other individuals associated with CEFC China energy, Chinese state-owned enterprises, and unknown

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399 Id.
400 See id. 
401 Id. Records indicate that the ownership structures of Gongwen Dong’s companies are extraordinarily complex, and sometimes unknown, and that many of his corporate entities have shifted over time. The same is true of Ye Jianming’s corporate entities. The complexities illustrate the challenges in fully knowing the depth and extent of potential criminal activity. 
402 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 7 (on file with Comms.). 
403 See CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 7 (on file with Comms.); see also CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 11 (on file with Comms.); CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 13 (on file with Comms.); CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 14 (on file with Comms.).
404 Id. 
405 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 7 (on file with Comms.). 
406 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 2 (on file with Comms.).
407 Id. 
408 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 2 (on file with Comms.); CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 7 (on file with Comms.).
individuals based primarily in China. Little is known about Shan Gao, other than the fact that banks found her, through complex ownership structures, to be the owner of multiple entities involved in the transactions. For multiple entities involved in these transactions, banks were not able to determine ownership at all.

As an example of the size and scope of the networks involving Gongwen, between Oct. 23, 2017, and Dec. 20, 2018, Hudson West I, for which Gongwen is also listed as an account signer, received incoming wires totaling over $114 million and sent outgoing wires totaling over $113 million. Between Jan. 25, 2018, and Dec. 28, 2018, Hudson West Aggregator, another LLC associated with Gongwen that was involved in three transactions with Hudson West V, received incoming transfers totaling more than $3 million and sent outgoing transfers totaling more than $13 million. Records examining these transactions by Gongwen and his associates explained:

We opt to include wires, which appear to be conducted for investment purposes, as we believe that fund movement is ultimately conducted in an effort to layer funds. Conclusion: Unusual movement of funds between various entities with a complex ownership structures, at times involving funds originating from Chinese [state-owned enterprises] SOE, Chinese based entities registered with [a] high-risk tax heaven country, and [politically exposed persons] PEPs. It is to note that fund movement appears to be an effort to introduce foreign funds from unknown sources into in [sic] the U.S. by investing in large projects and by purchasing luxury goods and properties. Total [] filing amounts to $902,200,297.

Certain transactions involving Hudson West III, CEFC Infrastructure, and Hudson West V were among those identified as potential efforts to layer funds.
iv. **Chinese Nationals Linked with Hunter Biden Faced Criminal Probes.**

In November 2017, Ye Jianming’s associate and Hunter Biden’s reported client, Patrick Ho, was arrested and charged with violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, international money laundering, and conspiracy to commit both.416 The first call that he reportedly made was to James Biden, who reportedly referred him to Hunter Biden.417 Ho was convicted in March 2019 on charges of money laundering, conspiracy, and violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and was sentenced to three years in U.S. prison for his role in a multimillion-dollar scheme to bribe officials in Chad and Uganda in exchange for business advantages for CEFC, Ye’s company.418 Department of Justice documents describe Ye as Patrick Ho’s boss and, again, note that Ye’s company supplied funding to the China Energy Fund Committee.419 Ho worked as the secretary-general of the committee during the period when he was carrying out his illegal schemes.420

In February 2018, it was reported that Ye was also under investigation in China for “suspected economic crimes.”421 Ye was subsequently detained, and to date, there have been no reports of his release.

Shortly thereafter, on May 4, 2018, there were reports that the deal for CEFC to purchase a stake in Rosneft had fallen through.422 The credit cards used by the Bidens for the $100,000 spending spree were closed the same month, and the last payments for the account were made on May 25, 2018.423 It is not clear who made the fund transfer payments that were used to cover the charges.424

After Ye was detained by the Chinese government in February 2018, there were reports that Shanghai Guosheng Group, a Chinese agency reportedly controlled by Shanghai’s municipal government, had taken over management and daily operations at CEFC.425 Additionally, in

420 *Id.*
423 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 9 (on file with Comms.).
424 *Id.* (The funds used to collateralize the account were returned in the form of a check payable to Hudson West III and Robert H. Biden and deposited back into the same account from which they were initially withdrawn.).
March 2018, it was announced that the Chinese state-owned enterprise Citic Group was negotiating to take a stake of up to 49 percent in CEFC’s European unit.\(^{426}\) Again, Citic is listed among the Chinese partners and alliances of the Thornton group.\(^{427}\) Following these Chinese government takeovers, the payments from Hudson West III to Owasco appear to have continued through September 2018.\(^{428}\)

e. Conclusion

The records acquired by the Committees show that Hunter Biden and his family were involved in a vast financial network that connected them to foreign nationals and foreign governments across the globe. Hunter Biden and Archer, in particular, formed significant and consistent financial relationships with the corrupt oligarch Mykola Zlochevsky during their time working for Burisma and their firms made millions of dollars from that association while Joe Biden was vice president and the public face of the Obama administration’s Ukraine policy. Rosemont Seneca Thornton, an investment firm co-founded by Hunter Biden, received $3.5 million in a wire transfer from Elena Baturina, who allegedly received illegal construction contracts from her husband, the former mayor of Moscow. Moreover, Archer’s apparent receipt of money for a car from Kenges Rakishev of Kazakhstan while Vice President Biden was in Kyiv is especially concerning in light of the timing. And finally, Biden and Archer’s work with Chinese nationals connected to the Communist regime illustrate the deep financial connections that accelerated while his father was vice president and continued after he left office.

Biden and Archer found willing partners in Chinese nationals connected to the Communist regime. Their work in China began at least in 2009, with the creation of Rosemont Seneca Partners with Heinz, Secretary of State John Kerry’s stepson. Then, several years later, Biden and Archer formed BHR with Bohai Capital and received their business license approval in China shortly after Biden visited China with his father, Vice President Biden.

Hunter Biden’s connections and financial associations appear to have accelerated significantly after he associated himself with Ye Jianming, who had deep connections with the Communist regime and PLA. However, that didn’t seem to have any impact on Hunter Biden, who made millions from the relationship. Indeed, Hunter Biden and his family, to include James and Sara Biden, associated with other Chinese nationals such as Gongwen Dong. In one case, the three of them went on a $100,000 global spending spree after Gongwen Dong and Hunter Biden opened a joint account. In addition, Hunter Biden received millions of dollars over a period of years from Gongwen Dong’s companies. According to records acquired by the Committees, many of these transactions involved potential criminal financial activity.

The records acquired by the Committees show consistent, significant and extensive financial connections among and between Hunter Biden, James Biden, Sara Biden, Devon Archer, and Chinese nationals connected to the Communist regime and PLA as well as other foreign nationals with questionable backgrounds. These connections and the vast amount of


\(^{428}\) CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 7 (on file with Comms.).
money transferred among and between them don’t just raise conflicts of interest concerns, they raise criminal financial, counterintelligence and extortion concerns. The Committees will continue to evaluate the evidence in their possession.
XII. CONCLUSION.

As the Chairmen’s report details, Hunter Biden’s role on Burisma’s board negatively impacted the efforts of dedicated career-service individuals who were fighting to push for anticorruption measures in Ukraine. Because the vice president’s son had a direct link to a corrupt company and its owner, State Department officials were required to maintain situational awareness of Hunter Biden’s association with Burisma. Unfortunately, U.S. officials had no other choice but to endure the “awkward[ness]” of continuing to push an anticorruption agenda in Ukraine while the vice president’s son sat on the board of a Ukrainian company with a corrupt owner. As George Kent testified, he “would have advised any American not to get on the board of Zlochevsky’s company.”429 Yet, even though Hunter Biden’s position on Burisma’s board cast a shadow over the work of those advancing anticorruption reforms in Ukraine, the Committees are only aware of two individuals who raised concerns to their superiors. Despite the efforts of these individuals, their concerns appear to have fallen on deaf ears.

Former Secretary Kerry’s December 2019 denial of having any knowledge about Hunter Biden or Burisma is inconsistent with the evidence uncovered by the Committees. Kerry was briefed about Hunter Biden, Burisma and Christopher Heinz the day after Burisma announced Hunter Biden joined its board. Additionally, Secretary Kerry’s senior advisor sent him press clips and articles relating to Hunter Biden’s board membership. This appears to be yet another example of high-ranking Obama administration officials blatantly ignoring Hunter Biden’s association with Burisma.

Several witnesses highlighted efforts to enable a successful investigation of Zlochevsky, and also noted that the U.S. decision to condition a $1 billion loan guarantee was made in part because of the then-Ukrainian prosecutor general’s failure to pursue a case against Zlochevsky. But at the end of the day, between 2014 through 2017, despite the concerted effort of many U.S. officials, not one of the three different Ukrainian prosecutor generals held Zlochevsky accountable.

The Obama administration and the Democrat lobby shop Blue Star Strategies had consistent and extensive contact with Andrii Telizhenko over a period of years. Yet despite these well-documented contacts with Democratic officials, Democrats have attempted to impugn this investigation for having received some Blue Star-related records from Telizhenko. Some Democrats have even (incorrectly) identified Telizhenko as the Committees’ “star witness.”430 Although he produced a small number of Blue Star-related records to the Committees, the Committees never interviewed him as part of this investigation.431

429 George Kent Testimony at 110.
431 The Committees received a small number of records from Telizhenko related to his communications with and subsequent work for Blue Star Strategies. Ranking Member Peters and Ranking Member Wyden have access to these records but have refused to receive or review them. Had they done so, they would have observed that the State Department, National Archives, and Blue Star Strategies (after it received a subpoena) produced most of the same records to the Committees. They also would have noticed the emails and text messages that Blue Star failed to produce to the Committees.
Even though almost all of the Committees’ records are from U.S. agencies and U.S. officials or persons, Democrats have repeatedly misconstrued the facts of this investigation and have smeared it as a Russian disinformation campaign. In doing so, they conveniently have ignored their own long history of meeting with Telizhenko and his yearlong work for a Democrat lobby shop. If Democrats are concerned that Telizhenko presents any risk of advancing disinformation, it is notable that the Ranking Members have not expressed any curiosity about his work with the Obama administration or Blue Star Strategies.

The records acquired by the Committees also show that Hunter Biden and his family were involved in a vast financial network that connected them to foreign nationals and foreign governments across the globe. Hunter Biden and Devon Archer, in particular, formed significant and consistent financial relationships with the corrupt oligarch Mykola Zlochevsky during their time working for Burisma, and their firms made millions of dollars from that association while Joe Biden was vice president and the public face of the Obama administration’s Ukraine policy. Rosemont Seneca Thornton, an investment firm co-founded by Hunter Biden, received $3.5 million in a wire transfer from Elena Baturina, who allegedly received illegal construction contracts from her husband, the then-mayor of Moscow. Moreover, Archer’s apparent receipt of money for a car from Kenges Rakishev of Kazakhstan while Vice President Biden was in Kyiv is especially concerning in light of the timing. And finally, Biden and Archer’s work with Chinese nationals connected to the Communist regime illustrate the deep financial connections that accelerated while Joe Biden was vice president and continued after he left office.

The Chairmen’s investigation has faced many obstacles from the minority and from executive agencies that have failed to comply with document requests. Accordingly, there remains much work to be done.
On September 23, 2020, the Senate Committee on Finance and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs released a majority staff report entitled, “Hunter Biden, Burisma and Corruption: The Impact on U.S. Government Policy and Related Concerns.”1 After the report was issued, new sources went public with additional information about business relationships and financial arrangements among and between the Biden family and their business associates, including several foreign nationals. In particular, some of that information concerned John Robinson Walker (“Rob Walker”) and his company, Robinson Walker LLC. The new information is consistent with other records within the Committees’ possession which show millions of dollars being transferred from a Chinese entity linked to the communist party to Robinson Walker LLC. Those transactions are described in more detail herein.

Robinson Walker LLC is controlled by Hunter Biden’s longtime business associate, Rob Walker.2 Walker appears to have been associated with at least three companies connected to Hunter Biden: Oldaker, Biden and Belair LLP; Seneca Global Advisors; and Rosemont Seneca Advisors.3 Hunter Biden was a founding partner at Oldaker, Biden and Belair LLP, and he reportedly maintained an ownership stake in Seneca Global Advisors.4 Hunter Biden reportedly

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2 According to Delaware records, a company named Robinson Walker, LLC was formed on February 28, 2008. According to Committee records, a company named Robinson Walker LLC, located at an address on V Street NW Washington, DC 20007, received $6,000,000 in wire transfers from the CEFC China Energy-affiliated company, State Energy HK Limited. In a text exchange with Tony Bobulinski, a “Rob Walker” stated that he controls a single person entity incorporated in Delaware called “Robinson Walker LLC.” In another text message exchange with Tony Bobulinski, Rob Walker gave an address for Robinson Walker LLC located on Hawthorne Road in Little Rock, AR 72207. Publicly available address listings show that an individual named John Robinson Walker is associated with the V Street address and the Hawthorne Road address that Walker provided to Bobulinski. A confidential document on file with the Committees shows that the Arkansas address is associated with a “John R. Walker,” the Managing Director of Rosemont Seneca Advisors and includes a “robinsonwalker,” “pilotgrowth” (referring to a company associated with Walker) and “rstp” (most likely referring to Rosemont Seneca Technology Partners) email address. Further, public lobbying registration filings show that in the past, an individual named “John Walker” registered in association with lobbying work done for a company called Advanced Navigation and Positioning Corporation. Specifically, between June 2008 and July 2011 those lobbying registration filings show that a “John Walker” and “John Robinson Walker” was registered as a lobbyist for Advanced Navigation and Positioning Corporation, and, at different points during that timeframe, the registrants for the lobbying work were two Hunter Biden-linked companies, Oldaker, Biden & Belair LLP and Seneca Global Advisors, LLC, as well as Robinson Walker LLC. Addresses on lobbying disclosure forms for Robinson Walker LLC list the V Street NW Washington, DC 20007 address. See Lobbying Registration, Oldaker, Biden & Belair LLP (June 1, 2008), https://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?event=getFilingDetails&filingID=1D1CC1DD-8996-47B7-8F14-CB928FD2B71&filingTypeID=1; see also Lobbying Registration, Seneca Global Advisors, LLC (Oct. 1, 2008), https://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?event=getFilingDetails&filingID=475013C1-BF46-49C0-8ECE-E4646F01AAF1&filingTypeID=1; Lobbying Registration, Robinson Walker LLC (Dec. 7, 2009), https://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?event=getFilingDetails&filingID=FE81B108-FEDA-4C87-BCDF-CC3B56924186&filingTypeID=1; CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 16, 17 (on file with Comms.); Hunter Biden reportedly has an ownership stake in Seneca Global Advisors. CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 15 (on file with Comms.); Text message exchange between Rob Walker and Tony Bobulinski (May 21 and 22, 2017).
3 Id.
served as Chairman of Rosemont Seneca Advisors, and Walker reportedly served as its Managing Director.5

In October 2020, Tony Bobulinski came forward with a series of public statements and interviews in which he described his personal experience working with the Biden family and their associates, including Walker. When Bobulinski publicly disclosed his relationship with the Biden family, he also disclosed information about Walker’s connection to the Biden family.

For example, in a May 21, 2017 WhatsApp message that Bobulinski produced to the Committees, Walker told Bobulinski that he was the owner of Robinson Walker LLC and confirmed that it was a single member LLC based in Delaware:

**Rob Walker:** I can. I have an llc: Robinson walker llc. Dont really know the pros and cons. Let’s do Robinson walker llc if not too late.

**Tony Bobulinski:** it’s a single member delaware llc?

**Rob Walker:** Yes6

Other WhatsApp exchanges between Walker and Bobulinski demonstrate a close working relationship between Walker and the Biden family. In a May 22, 2017, WhatsApp message from Walker to Bobulinski, Walker provided James Biden’s contact information to Bobulinski for inclusion in a corporate agreement:

**Tony Bobulinski:** Plse docusign the O agreement and herd up H and Jim

**Rob Walker:** Jim is [address listed] Merion Station, Pa. 19066.

**Tony Bobulinski:** Thx James has signed it, we are waiting on u 3 I need it signed so when I get confirmation from China we can execute7

During an interview with Tucker Carlson that aired on Fox News, Bobulinski stated:

**Tucker Carlson:** Let me ask you to pause. Will you explain to us who Rob Walker is?

**Tony Bobulinski:** Yes. Rob Walker was a partner in Rosemont Seneca and had a very close relationship with the Biden family and had developed and been working with James Gilliar throughout 2015 and 2016 to develop this deal with the Chinese and CEFC.

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6 Text message exchange between Rob Walker and Tony Bobulinski (May 21, 2017).

7 Text message exchange between Rob Walker and Tony Bobulinski (May 22, 2017).
**Tucker Carlson**: What was his relationship with the Biden family?

**Tony Bobulinski**: So my understanding is, Rob had worked in prior administrations and had a very, very close relationship. In fact, in Rob Walker's own words, in an e-mail to me, he states that, you know, everyone was contributing or telling me how they wanted to participate in Sinohawk. And in an e-mail, he basically states in his own words, to me, I want to continue acting as a proxy for Hunter Biden, Jim Biden and the Bidens around the world.8

In a May 15, 2017, e-mail from Walker to Bobulinski, Walker explained to Bobulinski that in the context of their financial relationship, he saw himself as “[b]eing a surrogate for H or Jim when gauging opportunities.”9 In this e-mail, H appears to refer to Hunter Biden, and Jim appears to refer to Joe Biden’s brother, James Biden.

According to records on file with the Committees, on February 23, 2017, and March 1, 2017, a Shanghai-based company called State Energy HK Limited sent two wires, each in the amount of $3,000,000, to a bank account for Robinson Walker LLC.10 The records note that “[i]t is unclear what the true purpose is behind these transactions and who the ultimate beneficiary is.”11

These transactions are a direct link between Walker and the communist Chinese government and, because of his close association with Hunter Biden, yet another tie between Hunter Biden’s financial arrangements and the communist Chinese government. At the time of the transfers, State Energy HK Limited was affiliated with CEFC China Energy, which was under the leadership of Ye Jianming.12 In the past, State Energy HK Limited transferred funds to at least one company associated with Hunter Biden’s business associate, Gongwen Dong.13 As detailed in the Committees’ September 23, 2020 report, Hunter Biden’s business partner, Ye Jianming, had established ties to the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese military, the People’s Liberation Army.14 So, too, did Gongwen Dong, in light of his relationship with Ye.

In 2017, Ye was actively working to build CEFC by making investments around the world. According to news reports, Ye actually “appeared to be China[’]s unofficial energy

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9 E-mail from Rob Walker to Tony Bobulinski (May 15, 2017).
10 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 16 (on file with Comms.).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 7 (on file with Comms.); CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 16 (on file with Comms.).
envoy, meeting presidents across the globe and even becoming an adviser to a European
government.”15

According to open source reporting, these efforts involved cultivating ties with Russia
and actors connected to Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Committees’ September 23,
2020, report illustrated several financial links between Hunter Biden, his business associates and
Russian interests.16 In 2017, during the time that Ye’s companies were sending millions of
dollars to Hunter Biden associated companies, Ye had business dealings with Kremlin-controlled
companies and Kremlin-aligned businessmen. In effect, Ye appears to have been China’s
unofficial bridge to Russia on energy.17 As noted in the Committees’ September 23, 2020 report,
in September 2017, CEFC announced its intention to purchase a 14.2 percent stake in the
Russian state-owned energy company, Rosneft, for approximately $9 billion.18 CEFC
subsequently agreed to a reported 5 billion euro loan deal with Russian state-owned VTB Bank
to finance the purchase.19 The 14.2 percent stake would have come from the 19.5 percent stake
in Rosneft previously purchased by a consortium of Glencore (a Swiss mining company) and the
Qatar Investment Authority (the sovereign wealth fund of the Qatari government).20 According
to one report, the fact that VTB agreed to loan CEFC money to assist in financing the purchase
showed the links between Beijing and Moscow:

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15 Jenni Marsh, The rise and fall of a Belt and Road billionaire, CNN (Dec. 5, 2018)
on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff. and S. Comm. on Fin., 116TH CONG. (2020).
report stated that a tablet company called “BAK USA LLC” received money transfers from Elena Baturina. Since the
Committees published the report, former officials from that tablet company—which dissolved years ago—contacted the
Committees and denied that it received money from Baturina, and denied having connections to Baturina or Hunter Biden and his
associates. Finance Committee staff immediately attempted to resolve this apparent discrepancy. As part of these efforts,
Committee staff have made multiple efforts to cure the ambiguity, including several discussions with and records requests to
officials of the tablet company to ensure that it was not the company involved in the stated transactions and was not associated
with Baturina, Hunter Biden, and his associates. But the former officials from the now-dissolved tablet company refused to
provide any records each time they were requested. In one conversation, in response to questioning about whether an investor in
the tablet company could have had access to accounts and engaged in activity unknown to other officials, the official responded
that it was “entirely possible.” The Committees nevertheless continued to investigate in order to definitively exclude the tablet
company from the transactions and determined that an identically named company, and not the tablet company, was the likely
recipient of the wire transfers from Baturina. Specifically, around the time of those wire transfers, two companies named “BAK
USA LLC” operated in the New York area; one made tablets, the other did not. After reviewing this information and additional
records that have recently been made public and which were not previously available to the Committees, it appears that the tablet
company did not receive the wires, but rather the other entity under the name BAK USA LLC was the recipient of those funds.
17 See, e.g., Dmitry Zhdannikov, China's CEFIC investigation hits $9 billion Russian oil deal, REUTERS (Mar. 22, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rosneft-cefc/chinas-cefc-investigation-hits-9-billion-russian-oil-deal-idUSKBN1GY1V0;
Reuters Staff, VTB claims repayment from Singapore's AnAn over En+ shares, REUTERS (July 30, 2018),
shares-idUSKBN1KK19P.
18 Scott Patterson and James Marson, Glencore, Qatar Sell Rosneft Stake to Chinese Firm in $9 deal, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
19 Katya Golubkova and Dmitry Antonov, Russia's VTB CEO says ready to provide loan to CEFC for Rosneft stake, REUTERS
rosneft-stake-idUSKBN1FB0Z2; Reuters Staff, Russia's VTB agrees to 5 bln euro loan to China's CEFC – RIA, REUTERS (Jan.
idUSR4N1PE005.
20 Scott Patterson and James Marson, Glencore, Qatar Sell Rosneft Stake to Chinese Firm in $9 deal, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Though the state-private distinction is incredibly blurry and often irrelevant in both Russia and China, [Igor] Sechin and his own network benefited from Ye’s assumed connections to China’s military-intelligence structures. That CEFC expected to raise $5.1 billion in short-term loans from Russia’s VTB – a funding vehicle for projects the Kremlin prioritizes – evidenced substantial support in Moscow.\(^{21}\)

Hunter Biden was in close contact with Ye in 2017 and was aware of these developments. In an October 2017 message exchange produced to the Committees by Bobulinski, Hunter Biden told Bobulinski that although he “stayed out of that Russian mess,” he “discussed the Roseneft [sic] deal” with Ye personally and was familiar with the deal, including the fact that Ye was “pissed off…by the execution[.]”\(^{22}\) In the same exchange, Biden explained that he spoke to Ye on a “regular basis,” they have a “standing once a week call,” was the “first guest in his new apartment,” “he cooked me lunch himself and we ate in the kitchen together,” and was helping Ye “on a number of his personal issues (staff visas and some more sensitive things).”\(^{23}\)

Another document produced by Bobulinski and dated May 15, 2017, outlined plans for the expansion of CEFC in Oman, Colombia, Luxembourg, Romania, and other countries.\(^{24}\) With regard to Oman, the document noted that Hunter Biden “was key in relationship set up, messaging the good will around the chairman [Ye Jianming] and the non-conflict status of CEFC entry, ‘a bridge between two great nations,’”\(^{25}\) It also identified Hunter Biden as being responsible for “[w]riting to all parties and organizing meetings to continue CEFC promote [sic], as well as approving step-by-step strategic and operational elements.”\(^{26}\) The document further referenced efforts by James Gilliar and his team and characterized their role as that of “liaison and confidant of HB [Hunter Biden] and partners[.]”\(^{27}\)

Accordingly, these new records confirm the connections between the Biden family and the communist Chinese government, as well as the links between Hunter Biden’s business associates and the Russian government, and further support the Committees’ September 23, 2020 report’s finding that such relationships created counterintelligence and extortion concerns.

To date, the Committees have requested records from Hunter Biden, James Biden, James Gilliar, Tony Bobulinski, and Rob Walker. At this time, only Bobulinski has cooperated with the Committees.

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\(^{22}\) Text Message from Hunter Biden to Tony Bobulinski (October 16, 2017).

\(^{23}\) *Id.* Notably, in one exchange, Hunter Biden referred to himself as Ye’s attorney.


\(^{25}\) *Id.* at 19.

\(^{26}\) *Id.* at 19.

\(^{27}\) *Id.* at 19.
I can. I have an LLC: Robinson Walker LLC. Don't really know the pros and cons. Let's do Robinson Walker LLC if not too late.

May 21

✔️ it's a single member Delaware LLC?

Yes

May 21

✔️ Up to you, I just use my LLC for all my

You can't send messages to this chat because WhatsApp no longer supports this phone.
I don't.

OK m gng to bed

For Robinson walker LLC
Hawthorne Road
Little Rock, AR 72207

Thx can u plse track down Jim and h and get me their info asap

You can't send messages to this chat because WhatsApp no longer supports this phone.
CEFC China Energy Proposal for Investment Vehicle

Program Outline

April 10, 2017

Sensitive and Confidential

EEIG
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Part I: R. Hunter Biden Biography

R. HUNTER BIDEN

Hunter Biden is currently a partner at the investment advisory company Rosemont Seneca Partners, LLC and also serves as Counsel to Boies, Schiller, Flexner, LLP, a New York based law firm. Mr. Biden has been a member of the Board at World Food Program USA since 2009, serving as Chairman of the Board from 2012 to 2017. He also worked as Honorary Co-Chair of the 2009 Presidential Inaugural Committee, the Jesuit Volunteer Corps, and was a founding member of the law firm, Oldaker, Biden and Belair, LLP.

Prior to that, he worked on the Board of Directors of Amtrak for three years. In 1998, President Clinton appointed him to the U.S. Department of Commerce as Executive Director of E-Commerce Policy Coordination.

Hunter received a bachelor’s degree from Georgetown University and a J.D. from Yale Law School. He has three daughters, Naomi, Finnegan and Maisy.

In terms of what Mr. Biden is going to keep or let go, he will likely drop all nonprofits to focus on getting the investment vehicle off the ground. He may keep his board member status at the Ukrainian gas company Burisma board member and will recuse himself where/when needed. He has a small interest as a General Partner in the BHR fund (Bohai Harvest Rosemont Seneca). His role here is quite passive, but he may decide to put that in trust. He has a stake in Eudora Global and will probably put that in trust. The vehicle would be his full-time job while possibly serving on a few boards.

Professional Experience

ROSEMONT SENeca ADVISORS, Washington, DC
August, 2008 – Present
Founder and Chairman

Rosemont Seneca Advisors is an advisory firm focused on providing strategic advice and business development assistance to firms in the infrastructure, energy, technology and alternative investment sectors.

BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP, New York, New York
June, 2009 – Present
Counsel

Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, founded in 1997, is one of the nation's premier law firms. Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP represents some of the largest and most sophisticated organizations in the world and serves as lead counsel in many significant and highest profile disputes.
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, Washington, DC
December 2011- April 2014
Adjunct Professor, Master’s Program, School of Foreign Service
"The Art of Advocacy- Inside and Outside of Government" - The course examines the impact of advocacy on political leaders, staff, and other stakeholders responsible for shaping international policy and managing global crisis and conflict.

OLDAKER, BIDEN & BELAIR LLP, Washington, DC
2001-2008
Founding Partner
As a founding partner of the Washington, D.C, based law firm that provided a wide array of professional services to companies, organizations and individuals, Mr. Biden’s primary focus was in the firm’s representation of not-for-profit institutions and organizations.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, Washington, DC
1999 - 2001
Executive Director for E-Commerce Policy Coordination
A Presidential appointee to the U.S. Department of Commerce under Secretaries Daley and Mineta. As Executive Director, participated in the President’s U.S. Government Working Group on Electronic Commerce, and helped to develop the Administration’s position on such issues as the digital divide, on-line gambling and internet privacy initiatives and legislation.

MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., Wilmington, Delaware
November 1996 – 1999
Senior Vice President – Counsel
Worked with the following departments: Law, Personnel, Fraud Control, Office of the CFO and Project Manager for “Year 2000” Task Force.

JESUIT VOLUNTEER CORPS: NORTHWEST, Portland, Oregon
August 1992 – July 1993
Emergency Services Center Coordinator & Asst. Director of an After School Program
The Jesuit Volunteer Corps is a non-ecumenical organization devoted to assisting the impoverished and disenfranchised. Volunteers earn $80 per month, and live in the communities where they work.

Professional Memberships and Board Positions
THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAM, USA
Chairman, Board of Directors
WFP, USA is a U.S.-based, nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that focuses on building support in the United States for the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) and other hunger relief operations.

TRUMAN CENTER
Member, Board of Directors
The Truman Center is an independent think tank dedicated to advancing the economic and
national security of the United States.

TRUMAN NATIONAL SECURITY PROJECT  
*Vice-Chairman, Board of Directors*  
The Truman National Security Project is a national security leadership institute, the nation's only organization that recruits, trains, and positions a new generation of progressives across America to lead on national security.

U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP COALITION  
*Member, Board of Directors*  
The U.S. Global Leadership Coalition is a broad-based network of businesses and NGOs; national security and foreign policy experts; and business, faith-based, academic and community leaders in the U.S. who support a smart power approach of elevating diplomacy and development alongside defense to build a better, safer world.

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE  
*Member, Chairman’s Council*  
NDI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization working to support and strengthen democratic institutions worldwide through citizen participation, openness and accountability in government.

CATHOLIC CHARITIES, ARCHDIOCESE OF WASHINGTON D.C.  
*Member, President’s Council*  

THE ISRAEL IDONIJE FOUNDATION  
*Member, Board of Directors*  
The Israel Idonije Foundation helps underprivileged children in Chicago, Winnipeg, Canada and West Africa

BALTIMORE COLLEGIATE SCHOOL FOR BOYS  
*Founding Member, Board of Trustees*  

AMTRAK  
*2008 – 2009, Vice-Chairman; 2006-2009, Member, Board of Directors*  
Served On the Board of Directors of Amtrak (The National Passenger Rail Corporation), having been appointed by President George W. Bush and confirmed unanimously by the United States Senate.

45th PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURAL COMMITTEE  
*January 2009, Honorary Co-Chair*  

BAR MEMBERSHIPS:  
State of Connecticut, the District of Columbia, the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.

Educational Background  
YALE LAW SCHOOL
Juris Doctor, May 1996

**GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY**
*B.A., History, May 1992*
Part II: Key Individuals and Profiles in the Investment Vehicle

Management/Board

R. Hunter Biden
Full profile above.

Tony Bobulinski
Managing Member, Global Investment Ventures (GIV). GIV is the investment vehicle that Tony uses to invest his own money in a variety of industries such as technology, manufacturing, hospitality, consumer goods, real estate and other operating businesses around the world. He is very well versed in everything from investing in startups to late stage cash flowing businesses directly and/or side by side with some of the world's top Venture, Private Equity, Distressed and Growth firms. He is the former CIO for the Nazarian family based in LA, who cofounded Qualcomm. He sits on a variety of boards of both public and private companies. He is also an entrepreneur and has built and sold companies he has founded and funded. He holds a Masters Equivalent in Electrical/Nuclear Engineering from Naval Nuclear Power Training Command where he was a Master Training Specialist Instructor and selected as the #1 Direct Input Officer @ the US Navy's most Elite Academic Command. He also holds a BS w Distinction Penn State University in Mechanical Engineering. While @ Penn State he was the Team Captain of Penn State's Wrestling Team and was voted the Big Ten Male Academic Athlete of the Year in 1995. He supports a variety of charities and philanthropic causes around the world.

CEO/CIO Responsibilities – Responsible leadership to build out a world class organization of the best human capital in the investment community we can find strategically situated in NYC, LA with a US focus as well as Prague and Asia with more of a global focus. He will define the business strategy of the firm working with the Chairman, Board of Directors and Advisors to deploy capital in a variety of businesses focused in the US but also that can expand globally. These businesses will be focused in finance, finance technology, banking, infrastructure, real estate, technology and manufacturing.

Advisors

James B. Biden, Sr.
James B. Biden (Jim) has 40 years of experience dealing with principals in business, political, legal and financial circles both domestically and internationally. At the age of 22, James was the finance chairman of his then 29-year-old brother's bid for a U.S. Senate seat in Delaware and successfully enlisted the support of unions, political leaders and financiers across the country.
Following the first campaign, James obtained his securities, insurance and real estate licenses and began consulting with national business leaders and developers. Jim honed his business development skills through a wide variety of commercial endeavors.

Since 1997, he has been the managing partner for the Lion Hall Group, a boutique domestic and international business consulting firm he founded. Jim is currently a partner with Argentum Health Partners, Trina Health, Earthcare International and BBS Benefit Solutions, among other socially and environmentally oriented businesses. Jim currently serves as a Global Strategic Advisor to Integra Capital headquartered in Buenos Aires and was instrumental in aggregating and resolving much of the Argentinian debt repositioning Argentina on the world stage. Jim was on the ground floor of developing the African Presidential Archives with Ambassador Charles Stith at Boston University and served on the first African Presidential Roundtable. Jim was an executive Vice President of Hill International, globally developing low cost housing through its subsidiary Hillstone International. Through the years, Jim personally met many key governmental and business leaders throughout the world. He remains a personal advisor to his brother.

James A. Gilliar
U.K. Passport [redacted]

Background

Specialist training In Civil / Military security operations and analysis, counter terrorism, close protection and firearms, armed and unarmed combat.

Security and intelligence based analytics and systems. Support for international path finding and mediation programs. Certified instructor and training specialist.

Commercial history

- 1997- 2002 Global communications Limited. Media and marketing, founder and CEO until sold to international partner
- 2003-to date Partner and advisor to H.H Dr Sheikh Sultan bin Khalifa al Nahyan, minister of presidential affairs of the U.A.E. Founder of SBK Holding
- 2004-2010 Advisor to Bilfinger Berger Chairman and board of Bilfinger Berger Middle East.
- 2009 – 2016 Advisor to E.C Harris London and Arcadis board. (US$80bn of deliverable programs)
- 2010 - 2012 Advisor to Tae Sik Lee, Chairman of Kepco, South Korea
- 2011-2016 Advisor on internationalization to South Korean Foreign ministry.
- Advisor and partner, both equity and operationally of many companies including:
  - Metro AG. World’s fourth largest retailer.
  - Mittal group.
  - Hochtief / Strabag / Alpine
  - Porsche
• Capita (UK Gov. contracts)
• Shell global solutions
• CEZ

Current roles with private and government Law enforcement, anti-smuggling and anti-human trafficking organizations and international legal agencies.

Numerous international and high net worth individuals as partner and advisor.

**Rob Walker**

Rob Walker serves as Co-Founder and Managing Director of Pilot Growth Equity, a technology growth equity firm providing world class operating, company building and advisory expertise, as well as global access to private and public sector customers for our portfolio companies. Rob has extensive private and public sector experience in international affairs, politics and government. After an influential role in both of President Clinton’s successful campaigns, Rob worked at the Department of Transportation and Federal Aviation Administration – working directly for Secretary Rodney Slater and then Administrator Jane Garvey. Rob represented and furthered these officials’ interests to other federal agencies, on Capitol Hill and with foreign governments. After leaving government, Rob created a robust international consulting practice aimed at assisting U.S. companies establish their operations internationally. Rob graduated with a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Arkansas.

**Operations**

**Sanan S. Phuttrakul**

U.S. Passport [Redacted]

Partner and director of international programs of EEIG, working closely with James Gilliar for the last 15 years. Manages technical oversight and program implementation, specifically, due diligence, research, technical evaluations and reports for governmental clients, and project management of delivery partners in large infrastructure. He has 15 years of experience in high security data implementation, network security and IP peering and transit portals. Thematic expert in information security and systems protection, cybersecurity, and serves as a member of the Czech government’s GDPR Working Group. Sanan is fluent in English, Spanish and Czech. He speaks German at a conversational level. He is a PRINCE2 certified project manager and holds a Master’s Degree in Comparative Sociology from Florida International University. Trusted person by the partnership, authorized person to handle classified information.
Part III: Target Geographies for Development - Phase 1
These are countries where we have already entered and are actively developing, or have developed the opportunities by applying our strategies and connections. In these countries, the prestige has been established, there is an entry to market and an established deal flow.

- Colombia
- Luxembourg
- Oman
- Romania

Part IV: Target Geographies for Development - Phase 2
These are countries where we have engaged in-country contacts and are actively developing the opportunities. In these countries, the prestige has yet to be established, yet there is an identified entry to market.

- Argentina
- Belgium
- France
- Mexico
- United Arab Emirates

Part V: Target Geographies for Development - Phase 3
These are countries where we can make a difference, but haven’t yet started to lay the groundwork for market entry.

- United States
Market Entry

For each level of development outlined above, we have laid the groundwork for rapid market entry by having spent a significant amount of time and resources in creating the deal flow and the necessary in-country connections necessary to ensure CEFC China has success from the start. We have forged alliances with the highest levels of government, banking and enterprise.

Based on our evaluation process, the common entry criteria for an attractive geographically based market entry are:

1. Strong and easily definable relationship between our key U.S. executive(s) and their relations with the target country with the following persons:
   a. senior political figures
   b. royal family and/or aristocracy if they exist
   c. dominant commercial/business figures and/or oligarchs

2. Definable and close relations with other countries which historically have close relations or support roles within the target countries’ establishment (governance, commercial)
   a. e.g. Oman has an establishment based on the UK judicial and framework/relationship systems. Egypt would be related to France. The Congo > Belgium.
   b. We will demonstrate how this effect works when we define the proven market entry utilizing our strategy in Oman. How we delivered an exceptional condition for entry based on our previous level of understanding in a short timeframe, which we call the AEP (Accelerated Entry Process).

3. Establish the area of opportunity within each target country for CEFC to quickly and effectively establish prestige.
Rob Walker - RSTP

- Please docusign the O agreement
- And herd up H and Jim

Jim is Merion Station, Pa. 19066.

- Thx
- James has signed it, we are waiting on u 3
- I need it signed so when I get confirmation from China we can execute

You can't send messages to this chat because WhatsApp no longer supports this phone.
Hey Tony - Hope you're doing well. I'm on the road to Little Rock today with the family.

Here's what I've been working on:

- Provided a list of all of Trump's infrastructure desires ranking in every State with State input. Its a couple of months old and funding for infrastructure is popular among Dems, but not with republican budget hawks, so not positive we'll see a lot of funding, but might open up more space for private funding. James has this and has probably incorporated it into some sort of document already I believe. I will track down tonight if you like.

- Have an angle in Puerto Rico and have been provided a document on their priority infrastructure projects. One of my DC friends is based out of San Juan now as he's the new Governor's guy and acts like a liaison to DC. James has this doc. too. Again, I can forward.

- Romania - We are working on it from two angles. It's the Baneasa Land Development you've seen the piece from James in his doc. James' angle of Chinese purchasing some of Gabriel's assets to show goodwill and Romanian commitment is one way. Me? Probably better that I brief you over the phone on the whole project as there are many moving pieces and players that an email won't begin to touch it. Better in a brief where I can answer all questions.

- I've generally been acting as a surrogate for H around the country and abroad pursing opportunities and.... I see myself continuing to do that. described more below.

What I see myself spending most of my time on:

-Being a surrogate for H or Jim when gauging opportunities, i.e. digging around in Texas on high speed rail with some of my republican friends or with board members of the project to see if our group would be welcomed or not. OR hitting new countries and contacts abroad where things are Luke warm, but not hot enough for H to close or too odd for H to be present, like . Been doing this with James for a bit already and it seems to work well. Places in Africa, such as Angola, where James and I have been planning to go to for a bit to take a look at forestry/timber operation....would be a good idea for me to go w/James and show an American face that has the political knowledge and BS that may not be time spent wisely for H or Jim....just an example.
- CEO support

General suggestions:

- I rarely see us all in the same location in the same time unless it's at the office in New York or if we're all summoned somewhere by CEFC... or if we just need to be face to face somewhere for a few days for a team meeting, which I think will be necessary every quarter. I think we rely on you and James a little with collaboration from the group on who is needed where.

Conflicts that I plan to resolve:

- I'm a co-founder in Pilot Growth Equity Fund, which is a growth tech fund. I plan to become an advisor to the fund and minimize my role as I plan to spend all my time on SinoHawk. I don't see an advantage of dropping it all together as I franking think it looks good on my resume, although they may ask me to step away. We will see.

- I do some NGO work on behalf of CARE that requires a lot of time in Africa, Middle East, Central America, but I've transferred all contracts to a friend. I only plan to support CARE if we collectively believe there's a benefit with regards to the countries visited or if we identify individuals as key people to know in the traveling delegation, i.e. General Wesley Clark or CEO of a company or fund, etc.

-Upcoming travel/conflicts:

The only things solid that I have a commitment for is June 8th..... Need to be in DC. Family vacation first week in August. I'm usually very avail and down for most anything.

Sorry for the shorter email and I can put it in more detailed form if preferred. This is more stream of consciousness while I'm on the plane. Will add a bit tonight. Happy to discuss all or more in detail. Just landing in Atlanta and about to transport a three year old through the airport to the next flight. Talk soon. Rob

--

Rob Walker
Trying to manage all the moving parts @ CEFC, hoping u didn't go down a different path as lots of noise in the channel

Director Zang had his visa denied 3x and his kids and wife's Visas denied 3x

I know. Zhang continues to have his Visa issues handled by that lawyer in VA. We are out of it per the instructions of the Chairman last time I saw him.

What's the word on all the deals you were negotiating? Wow they are taking a long time? Oman? Luxembourg? Russia? I’ve simply stayed out of that Russian mess. And I just assumed that you’re plugging away.

Sat 10:38 PM

When was the last time u saw the Chairman
Zang create a mess w that rosneft deal

Pics of himw Putin all over the place

Well that’s actually good for us. Chinese bailing out feckless Putin. Ze sticking it to him through the pictures along with Xe. Their saying just another business partner now.— here hang this on your office wall.

So u 1000% didnt reach out to Chairman Ye or Director Zang and create parallel noise? I didn't thin so but just trying to manage chaos

I am just trying to manage chaos

No I’ve been talking to the Chairman on a regular basis. I was his first guest in his new apartment/ he cooked me lunch himself and we ate in the kitchen together. He has me helping him on a
No I’ve been talking to the Chairman on a regular basis. I was his first guest in his new apartment/ he cooked me lunch himself and we ate in the kitchen together. He has me helping him on a number of his personal issues (staff visas and some more sensitive things) but I was told to not engage with Zhang by you James and the Chairman.

He and I discussed the Roseneft deal and he is pissed off but only by the execution which I guess was Zhang’s deal.

Anyway, he and I are solid so when and if you or James feel like I’m capable of telling him about your Oman or Luxembourg or The Russian guys deal just let me know. We have a standing once a week call as I am also his personal counsel (we signed an attorney client engagement letter) in the US.
Well he has not funded the $10 MM so am sure or would be surprised if u have discussed that?

When did u sign a US attorney client engagement letter?

I never said anything about engaging with Zang so not sure what u r referencing

US Attorney??? What do you mean? I’m his lawyer in the US. Never talked to him about your deals. I said “I haven’t” engaged with Zhang in months. I only talk to Chairman and in person. I assumed you lost interest as we haven’t spoken for so long. Are any of the deals that you said were closing—

About "my deals", they apparently are our deals not my deals
US Attorney??? What do you mean? I’m his lawyer in the US. Never talked to him about your deals. I said “I haven’t” engaged with Zhang in months. I only talk to Chairman and in person. I assumed you lost interest as we haven’t spoken for so long. Are any of the deals that you said were closing—

About "my deals", they apparently are our deals not my deals

HB - not much for games, they were supposed to fund 10 MM USD, which they never did, and am assuming u know that

I lost interest? Really? They were supposed to fund $10 MM USD into Sinohawk accounts

U know that, so not much for games!!
Hunter Biden - DC

assumed you lost interest as we haven’t spoken for so long. Are any of the deals that you said were closing—

About "my deals", they apparently are our deals not my deals

HB - not much for games, they were supposed to fund 10 MM USD, which they never did, and am assuming u know that

I lost interest? Really? They were supposed to fund $10 MM USD into Sinohawk accounts

U know that, so not much for games!!

The wall street journal has been fighting to get a hold of the Sinohawk documents to tie u to the Chairman given the rosnelt deal and your father
From: James Gilliar  
Sent: Sunday, May 14, 2017 11:39 PM  
To: Tony Bobulinski  
Cc: Rob Walker; Jim Biden  
Subject: Phase one countries

Guys

AS per discussions this morning these are phase one countries and the defined targets

Input welcome

KR

Pass

James Gilliar
President and managing partner
Email: [redacted]
Skype ID: [redacted]
CEFC China Energy Investment Vehicle

Phase I Countries Outline

May 15, 2017

Sensitive and Confidential

EEIG
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Target Geographies for Development - Phase 1

These are countries where we have already entered and are actively developing, or have developed the opportunities, applying the strategies and connections from the Tao. In these countries, the prestige has been established, there is an entry to market and an established deal flow.
Oman – A Proven Strategic Approach and Philosophy

Executive Summary

Real GDP growth rate (MENA Economic Monitor Report) is estimated at 3.3% in 2015. New oil recovery technologies and greater efficiency led to record production levels in 2015, peaking at 0.98 million barrels per day. Hydrocarbon GDP grew by 4% in 2015, compared to a contraction of 0.8% in 2014. Non-hydrocarbon GDP is estimated to have grown by 3% in 2015. The central bank enacted expansionary monetary policy by reducing lending rates to support economic growth. The current account balance recorded a deficit in the first half of 2015. Consumer price inflation averaged 0.1% in 2015. A record high fiscal deficit is estimated for 2015, at 17.7% of GDP. Hydrocarbon revenue fell by 45% in 2015, which stymied government spending hindering potential economic growth and decreasing tax receipts. Approximately half of the deficit in 2015 was financed by drawing on reserves, and the remainder by borrowing from domestic and external sources. Oman issued its first sovereign Islamic bond (sukuk) for USD 519.5 million, and USD 1 billion through syndicated loan. Standard & Poor’s downgraded the country’s debt to BBB-/A-3 in February. The central bank is currently marketing an OMR 100 million 5-year bond, and announcing plans to raise between USD 5 and USD 10 billion from the international market, to avoid squeezing the domestic banking liquidity further.

The government reduced spending in 2015, avoiding an even larger deficit, and has laid out an extensive austerity plan for 2016. Reforms included the doubling of gas prices for industrial users, amending labor laws and designating an office for speeding up the process for issuing licenses. The 2016 budget indicates further reforms; with subsidy spending expected to fall by 64% in 2016 and diesel and petrol prices increasing by up to 33%. Revenue is expected to increase through a higher corporate income tax (from 12% to 15%), the removal of some tax exemptions, and the implementation of a GCC-wide VAT. Other measures envisaged to enhance revenue include: revising electricity and water tariffs and increasing fees for government services.

The macroeconomic outlook is highly vulnerable to the behavior of oil prices and hinges on the success of the government’s efforts to capitalize on non-hydrocarbon revenues. Real GDP growth is projected at 1.6% in 2016, lower than in 2015, reflecting lower oil revenue and the associated dampening of spending and domestic demand. Growth is projected to pick up again starting 2017, as the non-oil sector expands, despite lower levels of investment spending, which
will constrain growth in the oil sector. Non-urgent projects are expected to be postponed. The
government will continue to prioritize infrastructure investment, including tourism, airports,
railways, ports and oil and gas. A new mining law is expected to streamline and centralize
licensing processes and to improve the industry’s efficiency. Since Oman has maintained
consistently good relations with Iran, new trade and investment opportunities are expected
including a gas pipeline between the two countries. However, in light of the projected level of oil
prices, the fiscal and current account are estimated to be in deficit at 16.8% and 14.1% of GDP
respectively in 2016. Oman is expected to maintain its peg to the U.S. dollar (1 USD = 0.38450
OMR), despite pressures, and raise interest rates Q4 2016.

The 9th Five-Year Plan for the Sultanate of Oman (2016-2020), which is the last in a series of
five-year plans for the vision 2020, includes numerous policies and programs to diversify the
Omani economy into sectors such as manufacturing, mining, transport and tourism. Targeted
projects for private sector include Oman Rail (around OMR 5-6bn investment), tourism projects,
logistics, fisheries projects and others. This will help expand the role of the private sector and
reflects prudent and realistic goals.

The government’s aim is to cut non-core expenditure in favor of additional attention towards
investment spending on selected key programs and projects. The private sector’s role is the
backbone of the plan and the government have already been engaged in supporting this view
through either public private partnerships (PPP’s) or providing additional facilities.

As per the ninth plan statement, total targeted investments stand at OMR 41bn to be funded by
52% from private investments with the balance coming from public investments. The private
investments shall be in the commodities production activities (32.6%), services activities (37%)
and (29%) in infrastructure. Targeted projects for the private sector (on either an individual or
partnership basis) cover Oman railway, tourism structures within Port Sultan Qaboos, Port
Khasab, South Batinah Logistics Area and some fishing projects, which include investment into
shrimp farms, Al Dhahirah Economic Area and Shinas Port. Historically, the government
succeeds in engaging the private sector in vital capital projects, such as power and water. This
will continue.

In addition, the government is keen to engage with strategic investors, particularly companies
and investment groups seeking to expand international economic cooperation in the energy
sector.

Omani History
In answer to a regional stability of operations question from DZ. Oman has long tradition of
trading with Iran and other gulf countries and holds a unsurpassed friendship and trust with
principals. The Sultanate constitutes one of the oldest communities in Arabia. A distinguishable
ethnic and political entity as far back as two thousand years ago, its people were trading with
distant lands as early as the third millennium B.C. From the second century B.C. onward,
Oman's Arab population played an especially important role in shaping the country's culture and
in influencing its history and development. Oman was one of the first countries to accept Islam,
and its mariners helped to spread the faith to distant lands. In the process, the country was a
pioneer in establishing Arab and Islamic links with Asia, eastern and central Africa and the Indian subcontinent. Oman was also the first eastern Arab country to establish diplomatic relations with the United States – in 1833 – and in 1840 was the first Arab country to send an ambassador to the United States.

Oman's global and regional significance derives in large measure from its geographic location. The Sultanate has a 1,200-mile coastline along the Arabian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. It is adjacent to the sea lanes leading to Europe and Asia, Iraq and Iran, and its fellow members in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

The Sultanate is keenly aware of its pivotal position in terms of global real estate - at the north-western comer of the Indian Ocean, at the gateway to the Gulf. For these and other reasons - including, most recently, the fall of the Shah of Iran, the rise of Khomeini-inspired radicalism, and the Soviet invasion and occupation of nearby Afghanistan - Oman, many would argue, might well be spelled with italics by geo-strategic cartographers.

Certainly, such features of the Sultanate's international significance – although hardly in need of underlining for Britain and numerous other countries – have become increasingly apparent to many Americans. Indeed, from the almost unending flow of first-time American official visitors to the country during the past ten years, it has seemed at times as though the Sultanate was being not so much discovered as uncovered, stripped bare, as it were, in the eyes of the global strategist and the military planner. A decade and more into the effort, there is every evidence that the ensuing gaze is still in place, having become for some almost a fixation. The consequences of this concentrated focus by one country on another from halfway round the world are, in their broadest outlines, already clear: they have reshaped U.S. thinking about the Sultanate's role in regional and world affairs and the implications of that role for allied interests and policies.

**U.S.-Omani Relations**

While the foregoing developments have heightened U.S. appreciation of Oman's changing international and regional role, there have been parallel changes in the U.S.-Oman bilateral relationship. Such changes have been no less significant for their impact on the policies and attitudes of the two countries towards each other and, to a degree as well, on U.S.-British relations with respect to Oman.

Viewed from the perspective of the mid-1980s, American firms and individuals are currently playing more important roles in Oman's plans for development than at any point in the history of the relationship between the two countries. Quite apart from the military component of the overall U.S. involvement in contemporary Oman, Americans have been, and in some cases still are, involved in fishing surveys, the construction of processing plants for dates, the development of plans to mine copper, and the provision of agricultural, communications and computer technology expertise. Several companies – e.g. Amoco, Chevron, Mobil and Occidental – are partners in oil concessions.
Members of the Peace Corps have served in Omani villages, several hundred Omani students are currently attending American universities, and a dozen Omani army officers are enrolled in professional management and training programs at leading U.S. service institutions.

Signifying the symbolic importance of Oman's substantially broadened strategic orientation to the West, Sultan Qabus himself visited Washington in January 1975 and again in April 1983. On both occasions, he completed a full round of meetings with every high-ranking American official involved in the U.S.-Oman relationship. As the new ruler, Sultan Qabus immediately sought to involve the country more actively in the affairs of the outside world and, towards that end, channeled the Sultanate's modest oil income into an ambitious program of development.

Muscat's century-old isolation was swept away in a burst of enthusiasm over the change in rulership, as the government was expanded, new buildings went up, and Omanis returned from exile abroad. The cobwebs which had long surrounded the Sultanate were swept aside and relationships were eagerly sought with many states around the world. For the first time, Oman became a member of the Arab League and the United Nations. After a hiatus of over 130 years, an Omani ambassador returned to the United States and the first U.S. Ambassador to Oman took up residence in Muscat.

The growing significance of Oman to both GCC and Western planning interests in this regard is beyond argument. Regardless of the nature, pace or extent of progress on this front in the immediately foreseeable future, the Sultanate is likely to continue to serve simultaneously as guarantor of one of the world's most strategically vital lifelines – regardless of the day-to-day ups and downs of its growing defense and security relationships with the United States, Britain and others – and as an increasingly important actor in the Gulf region.

**Investment environment**

The sharp downturn in oil prices will mean the budget and the current account will remain in deficit in 2016-20, and efforts to rein in public spending and diversify the economy will be pushed forward. As a result of austerity measures, real GDP growth will slow to 1.6% in 2016 before gradually picking up to an average of 2.5% in 2018-20.

There are a number of high value projects that are available to strategic foreign investment in the Sultanate of Oman. These include: the Oman Railway (USD 15bn); the 200-million-ton tank storage for crude oil at Ras Markaz and terminal (USD 300-400 mil), which will be able to accommodate VLCC’s (Very Large Crude Carriers); the establishment of new bunker hubs in the Port of Sohar, Port Al Duqm and possibly the Port of Salalah. A 240,000bbls a day refinery at Duqm (USD5bn) and South Al Batina Logistics Hub, which will cover an area of approximately 90 million m² (or 90 km²). In addition to a number of very large government construction projects. The fishing sector is seeking investment for research and shrimp farming.
Oman Economic Risk Assessments

**Sovereign Risk – Rated A – Very Low**
Low overall risk for Oman’s credit worthiness, but lower oil prices could potentially reduce government revenue generation. However, the government can leverage its foreign exchange reserves and wealth funds to settle debt obligations should they rise.

**Currency Risk - Rated A - Very Low**
Comfortable levels of foreign exchange reserves will help sustain OMR peg to the USD. The USD is forecasted to remain firm against major currencies in 2016-2017.

**Banking Risk – Rated BBB- Low**
Overall, Oman’s banking sector is low at low risk.

**Economic Risk – Rated A – Very Low**
Although the economy remains highly dependent on hydrocarbon revenues and therefore vulnerable to changes in oil and gas prices, Oman’s growing plans to diversify its economy through tourism and services sector keeps the country’s economic structure safe.

**Population – October 2016**
Current population – 5,001,528
Current male population – 2,951,200 (59%)
Current female population - 2,050,327 (41.0%)

**Oman Economic Forecasts 2016-2020 Outlook**

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<th>Economy</th>
<th>Actual</th>
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<th>Q1/2017</th>
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<th>Q3/2017</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>Units</th>
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<th>Units</th>
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<td>GDP Annual Growth Rate</td>
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<td>28877.00</td>
<td>31269.00</td>
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### Gross Fixed Capital
- **Formation**: 8534.10 9392.00 9587.00 9782.00 9976.00 11286.00 OMR Million
- **GDP per capita**: 15305.67 15028.00 14949.00 14871.00 14792.00 18750.00 USD
- **GDP per capita PPP**: 35982.75 35388.00 35279.00 35169.00 35060.00 38966.00 USD
- **Gross National Product**: 25960.30 31150.00 31371.00 31593.00 31814.00 35698.00 OMR Million
- **GDP From Agriculture**: 427.40 468.00 476.00 485.00 494.00 621.00 OMR Million
- **GDP From Construction**: 2230.00 2340.00 2356.00 2372.00 2388.00 2423.00 OMR Million
- **GDP From Manufacturing**: 2939.60 3002.00 3002.00 3001.00 3000.00 3001.00 OMR Million
- **GDP From Mining**: 141.70 150.00 153.00 156.00 159.00 194.00 OMR Million
- **GDP From Public**: 3304.00 3469.00 3506.00 3543.00 3580.00 3967.00 OMR Million
- **GDP From Services**: 13215.90 13801.00 13816.00 13832.00 13848.00 13293.00 OMR Million
- **GDP From Transport**: 1636.50 1813.00 1845.00 1877.00 1909.00 2376.00 OMR Million
- **GDP From Utilities**: 417.60 431.00 435.00 439.00 443.00 501.00 OMR Million

### Labour
- **Unemployment Rate**: 7.20 7.60 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.80 %
- **Population**: 4.15 4.26 4.26 4.26 4.27 3.85 Million

### Prices
- **Inflation Rate**: 1.34 1.90 1.80 2.10 2.30 3.67 %
- **Consumer Price Index CPI**: 104.00 104.00 105.00 105.00 105.00 108.00 Index Points
- **Producer Prices**: 89.70 83.61 81.75 80.53 79.43 76.04 Index Points
- **Producer Prices Change**:
  - -19.10 -9.84 -10.22 -9.16 -12.74 -16.32 %
- **Inflation Rate Mom**:
  - -0.09 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 %
- **Food Inflation**:
  - -1.10 -1.35 -1.28 -1.25 -1.26 -1.26 %

### Money
- **Interest Rate**: 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 %
- **Money Supply M0**: 1697.50 1903.00 1942.00 1982.00 2023.00 2651.00 OMR Million
- **Money Supply M1**: 5402.30 5641.00 5791.00 5944.00 6103.00 8585.00 OMR Million
- **Money Supply M2**: 15808.00 16339.00 16835.00 17191.00 17578.00 24226.00 OMR Million
- **Foreign Exchange Reserves**: 8725.00 9001.00 8850.00 8807.00 8810.00 8818.00 OMR Million
- **Deposit Interest Rate**: 1.90 1.93 1.96 1.98 2.00 2.24 %
- **Loan Growth**: 8.30 7.18 6.77 6.47 6.31 5.99 %
- **Central Bank Balance Sheet**: 9046.20 9190.00 9174.00 9178.00 9174.00 9175.00 OMR Million

### Trade
- **Balance of Trade**:
  - -45.20 -166.00 49.00 49.00 -199.00 248.00 OMR Million
- **Exports**: 845.20 924.00 1030.00 1030.00 832.00 1680.00 OMR Million
- **Imports**: 829.90 1090.00 980.00 980.00 707.00 1400.00 OMR Million
- **Current Account**:
  - -4155.00 594.00 536.00 478.00 420.00 82.54 OMR Million
- **Current Account to GDP**: -15.40 -3.90 -2.37 -0.84 0.68 -2.44 %
- **Capital Flows**: 4741.00 2959.00 3418.00 3878.00 4337.00 4894.00 OMR Million
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Q4/2016</th>
<th>Q1/2017</th>
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<th>Q3/2017</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>Units</th>
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<td>Gold Reserves</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
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Government

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<td>9.72</td>
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<td>10.50</td>
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Business

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Consumer

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<th>Q3/2017</th>
<th>2020</th>
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<tr>
<td>Private Sector Credit</td>
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Housing

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<th>Q1/2017</th>
<th>Q2/2017</th>
<th>Q3/2017</th>
<th>2020</th>
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Taxes

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<th>2020</th>
<th>Units</th>
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<tr>
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<td>12.00</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Income Tax Rate</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sales Tax Rate</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Why invest in Oman?

1. **Prime Location** – Connectivity - Less than 2-hours from the major business centers of Asia and fast sailing times to Asia, Africa, Europe and North America.
2. **Established Trade Route** – At the center of the east-west nexus joining markets in Europe, Asia, Africa and North America.
3. **Non-Oil Exports** – Exporting USD 10.7 billion to 176 countries.
4. **International Appeal**
5. **Investment Strength** – Attracting USD 19.3 billion FDI (foreign direct investment) in 2014/2015.
6. **International Links** – Powerful concentration of international companies including BP, Shell, Vale, Air Liquide, Larsen & Toubro, Jindal Power & Steel, Huawei, Al Futtaim Group, Rio Tinto Alcan, Carrefour and Lulu.
7. **Trade Agreements** – Signatory to WTO, GCC common market, GAFTA, FTAs with U.S. and Singapore, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein.
8. **Safe Environment**
9. **Transparency** – Investor friendly legislative environment and no restrictions on repatriation of capital or profits.
10. **Taxation** – Currently Flat 12% corporate tax on a profit over USD 77,720.
11. **Foreign Ownership** – 70% foreign ownership in most sectors 100% in special cases and specific economic zone.
12. **Local Talent** – A young multilingual and educated talent pool equipped for the 21st century.
13. **Workforce** – 5 million people 1.7 million employees over 239,000 registered businesses.
14. **Competitive Salary** – Some of the most competitive salary rates in the Gulf.
15. **Research** – 55 tertiary institutes with strong industry links and thriving R&D culture.
16. **Transportation** – Globally ranked ports, airports and roads and some of the most strategically placed ports in the world.
17. **Communications** – Advanced telecommunications Infrastructure - mobile penetration rate 150.18%.
18. **Property** – Some of the most competitively priced land and commercial property in the Gulf.
19. **Railway** – US$ 15 billion of government funds allocated for a rail network covering 2,244km.
Promising Sectors for Investment

Important development projects include air traffic, both passenger and cargo, which has greatly increased over the past few years especially at Muscat International Airport. The existing terminal, built many years ago, is not big enough to cater for either present or future growth. Thus the government started a massive project of a new airport terminal, close to the existing terminal. The new airport is due for completion Q4 2016, commissioning / licensing Q4/2017.

Key Goals

- To achieve an average annual GDP growth rate of 3%
- To reduce the contribution of oil in GDP at current prices from 44% in 8th 5-year plan to 26%.
- To maintain inflation rate within safe levels at an average of 2.9%.
- Focus on private sector and activate the public private partnerships (PPPs)
- Create job opportunities
- Focus on SMEs

Key Promising Sectors

- Manufacturing
- Transportation and logistics
- Tourism
- Fisheries
- Mining
- Oil and Gas

Key Challenges

- Volatility and low oil prices.
- Creating jobs
- Geopolitical tensions in the region.
- Acceleration of the diversification process
- Minimize the elasticity towards external shocks

Key Developments

- Prioritizing of spending on projects
- Establishment of general department within the Supreme Council for Planning to coordinate with ministries and specialized institutions.
- Dynamic plan; goals and procedures are subject to changes on developments
- Key projects through the public private partnerships (PPPs)
- New projects to be considered after first three years.

To support this initiative some six prime sectors are targeted:

- Manufacturing
• Transportation and Logistics
• Tourism
• Fisheries
• Mining
• Oil and Gas

Other than the oil and gas sector, these are prime sectors with untapped potential, and by the government opening these sectors up for foreign investment, demonstrates the country’s determination to move from an oil producing economy to a mixed (diversified) economy.

Manufacturing

It is estimated to contribute 15% to the GDP by 2020 (Oman vision). The 1H’15 contribution stood at 9.3% while 10% for FY’14. It is worth stating that the average annual growth rate during the 8th five-year plan stood at 18.4%.

- The major ongoing project within the sector is Liwa Plastic Industries Complex, which is expected to create around 13,000 jobs (1,000 direct, 12,000 indirect). Key facts about the project:
  - Will contribute by 2-3% to GDP.
  - The total cost is around USD 6.4bn, to be funded by international financial institutions (60%), local banks (20%) and government as well as Oman Oil Company (20%).
  - It will result in Oil Refineries and Petroleum Industries Co (Orpic) contribution to GDP to reach 9% by 2020.
  - It will enable Oman, for the first time, to produce polyethylene. This form of plastic is rated high in terms of global demand. It represents 40% of the total plastic applications worldwide.

Transportation and Logistics

Oman continues to focus on establishing itself as major trans-shipment center for traffic across continents of Europe, Asia and Africa. One of the key goals is to place Oman within top 30 in the World Bank Logistic Performance Index by 2020. In FY’14, the country was ranked 59 out of 160. The country is well placed to act as a redistribution point for east and central Africa. According to Oman Logistics Strategy (SOLS) 2040, handling shipments, with a particular focus on efficiency and cost is to remain under focus. Moreover, the strategy aims to double employment by 2020 to 80,000 jobs. It also looks for doubling the industry’s contribution to the economy to RO 3bn by 2020. As per the Ninth plan statement, transportation, storage and telecom shall grow on annual average at constant prices by 5% during the plan.

Key projects within the sector include:

- Duqm, the sleeping giant
  - Billions of dollars to be invested.
  - Port, dry dock complex, an international airport, industrial and special economic zone in addition to the 230,000bbl per day Duqm refinery and oil storage.
- The Special Economic Zone At Duqm (SEZAD launched much initiative to attract private investors resulting in many on ground key investments.
  - Oman Rail Project
    - The estimated total length of the Oman National railway network is 2135km.
    - The total investments is projected between OMR 5 – 6bn.
  - The South Al Batinah Logistics Area
    - This project is 95 square kilometers in size it includes four main activities: logistics services, commercial activities, light industries and public services. Full development to be completed by 2030.

In addition to the above, the ongoing expansion in Muscat International Airport, establishing new airports, ports, free zones and infrastructure are a few to name about the hyperactivities within transport and logistic sector.

**Tourism**

As per the Ministry of Tourism, the tourism sector’s direct contribution to GDP is expected to increase from around 2% to 5% by 2020. The added value of the sector reached OMR 724 million by the end of 2014, the same sources stated. The strategy for tourism is based on two foundations: 1) a series of tourist facilities in one location, and 2) the distinctive tourist experiences. It is expected that more than 100,000 jobs will be created within the sector by 2024. There are around 39 projects in various stages of design, construction or tendering including: Oman Exhibition and Convention Centre; Wadi Bani Habib; the Al Hoota Cave redevelopment; the Duqm frontier town and; the Ras Al Hadd development. The country emphasis on archaeology, conservation, and natural beauty is a key distinguishing factor from its neighbors in the region.

*Figure 1- Oman Exhibition and Convention Centre*
Key projects within the sector include:

- Madinat Al Irfan
  - It is a mixed use development project and investments to be in billions of dollars.
  - It is expected to generate notable inbound revenues, and through Public Private Partnerships model, it is targeted to contribute around OMR 450-500 million annually to the GDP upon completion.

- The waterfront development around Port Sultan Qaboos
  - It is a partnership between the private sector and pension investment funds.
  - Planned investments around OMR 500 million of which 50% will come for the private sector/foreign investment.
  - Expected to provide 12,000 direct jobs and 7,000 indirect jobs.
  - Shall attract 70% of the tourists visiting the port to tour the Sultanate

Fisheries
The focus is mainly to boost fisheries production from currently around 200,000 tons per year to around 480,000 tons by 2020 and to create additional 20,000 jobs, as per Under-Secretary for Fisheries Wealth. It is expected that by 2020, the direct return from fishing and fish processing activities to be around OMR 739.2 million. Key projects within the sector include the Duqm Fishery Harbour with estimated investments of OMR 100 million in addition to the adjoining industrial fisheries cluster and investment in the growing prawn sector.

Mining
Oman produces aluminum, clay, copper, gypsum, iron and steel, low-grade iron oxide, cement, chromite, quartz, salt, limestone, marble and has recently identified gold deposits. Although, mining and quarrying contributed only 0.4% to GDP in 2014 and 0.5% in 1H’15, the mining sector increased by 20% YoY in 2015. The new mining law (awaiting completion) shall ease the procedures and attract more investments in the sector. Moreover, the discovery of sizeable reserves of minerals such as gold, copper and rare earth shall boost the growth in the coming years. Key projects within the sector include mineral processing and refining facilities in the Port of Duqm’s industrial zone. On a different note, it is worth stating that the port of Duqm plans to start the export of minerals for the first time in February 2017. The port has already set up facilities of its break bulk terminal for exporting 50,000 tons of dolomite as the first shipment. Another key development is related to recent key move about the launching of OMR 100 million mining development company called Mining Development through a partnership between government funds, Oman Oil Company and Oman National Investments Development Company (Tanmia). As per the plan statement, it is expected to register an average increase of 6% during the plan in constant prices.

Oil and Gas
Background: The first oil found was low sulphur, high salt, moderately light 34 degrees API oil at Yibal 2 in September 1962 and then at Naith in April 1963 and Jebal Faud in February 1964.
PDO (Petroleum Development Oman) built a 289km pipeline to the coast at Saith al-Malih and a terminal at Minah al-Fahl, all at a cost of GBP 25 million. The Yibal field went online in 1070 and PDO struck oil in Huwaisa field the same year as the Sultanate exported about 350,000bbl per day at $1.82bbl.

Today PDO is Oman’s largest company with 35,000 employees/subcontractors and has been supporting wider Omani society for 40 years. It buys in excess of USD 5 billion worth of goods and services a year from many suppliers to operate oil and deliver to the Government and its shareholders. 72% of all oil production and nearly all of the Sultanate’s gas production is from its Block 6 concession. PDO is 60% owned by the government of Oman, U.K./Royal Dutch Shell Group 34%, France’s Total 4% and Portugal’s Parted, 2%.

PDO develops and produces crude on behalf of its shareholders, all its gas activities are undertaken solely on behalf of the government.

Additionally, there are a number of oil and gas related projects that require various levels of capital (foreign) investment. These include, tank storage (Ras Markaz Oil Storage Terminal).

Oman strives to maintain positive relations with countries in its region, pursuing strong and stable diplomatic and economic ties. Muscat is now uniquely positioned for economic cooperation with Iran as its neighbor across the Strait of Hormuz opens new trade ties. The sultanate’s quiet approach to foreign relations has benefited its stability at home and opportunities for trade abroad.

**Exploration & Production**

Omani oil production reached 992,700 barrels per day in June 2015. The country’s target is 980,000 barrels per day for the year. The government is expanding its push to step up the use of enhanced oil recovery techniques in its maturing assets and heavy oilfields, an approach that has turned around a decline in output over the past decade. Developments such as the Khazzan tight gas project and Amal West’s heavy oil extraction are expected to boost production in coming years.

Gas–LNG: as of September 1, 2013, Oman LNG officially integrated with Qalhat LNG, Oman LNG's Liquefaction Plant, which is located on the coast at Qalhat near Sur in the South Sharqiyyah Governorate. The integrated entity operates under the name of Oman LNG. Bunkering by barge (particularly by barge in Port Al Duqm). In addition to Duqm, the Ports of Sohar and Salalah are ready for bunkering upgrade.
IPIC (International Petroleum Investment Company, formed by the Abu Dhabi government in 1984) entered an agreement in October 2009 with the state-owned Oman Oil Company (OOC) to assess the feasibility of building an oil refinery in the southern coastal town of Duqm, in the Sultanate of Oman. The successful completion of the feasibility study led to the formation of a new 50/50 joint venture company, the Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company, owned by IPIC and OOC.

The new company will construct, operate and maintain a refinery complex with a processing capacity of about 230,000 barrels per day, designed to process a mixture of Abu Dhabi, Omani and other UAE crude oil to be shipped out as refined products, and as petrochemicals in later phases.

Duqm has been designated as Oman’s next industrial center, with investments of up to USD 15 billion targeted in petrochemicals and infrastructure over the next 10 years.

The refinery will be built at a 900-hectare site located just north of the Port of Duqm and connected to a proposed Liquid Jetty by a pipeline system. Duqm Petroleum Terminal Company (DPTC), a joint venture of the Port of Duqm Company (10%), and Oman Oil Company (90%), will operate and manage the jetty. The facility will be designed to accommodate ships of around 150,000 deadweight ton (DWT) capacity, bringing crude feedstock or loading refined products for export.

**Offshore**

In June 2016 Oman’s Ministry of Oil & Gas has extended Masirah Oil’s exploration and production-sharing agreement for block 50 offshore Oman by three years to March 2020. Masirah’s parent company Rex International Holding plans are in motion for another exploration well on the concession early next year. This will also be the first well using the new multi-attribute version of Rex Virtual Drilling, which enables the company to be independent from traditional geological inputs on porosity and permeability. The Manarah-1 exploratory well drilled in 1Q confirmed the presence of a source rock and a working petroleum system in the 17,000 square km (6,564-sq mi) block 50. It followed Masirah’s Ga South oil discovery in 2014, the first offshore Oman. Investigations are under way for a revised, lower service cost extended-
well test and early production system on block 50, which Rex International claims could lead to profitable development even at an oil price of USD 40/bbl.

Public-Private Partnership (PPP)
Oman will witness an increase in public-private partnership deals following a reduction in government spending and other austerity measures, particularly in the oil and gas, water and electricity sectors. The government is inclined to continue with major infrastructure projects but requires more private sector participation in project financing. Hence, greater collaboration between the public and private sector in infrastructure projects of national importance can give a boost to the economy. The recently announced redevelopment plan of Port Sultan Qaboos is a good example whereby the government is seeking to own 51% and the rest to be funded by pension funds and the private sector.

Oman’s capital markets will play an important role in funding government projects as issuances of government bonds will stimulate an otherwise inactive debt market, and privatization of state enterprises will lead to a bigger, more liquid and diversified stock market.

Key set up and operational persons to date

David Holtom, MBE
Moved to Oman in 2008 as the Political Counselor for the British Embassy. His primary role was to manage the strategic bilateral relationship between senior members of the U.K. Government, Royal Family and His Majesty (HM), Sultan Qaboos bin Said. He left the Diplomatic Service in 2011 resides in Oman and the U.A.E. maintaining his portfolio of business interests. A highly trusted and efficient person with the highest references and efficiency’s, a deep understanding of regional and domestic political and commercial relations. Critical person with communication with Royal court.

Dr. Salem Ben Nasser Al-Ismaily
Dr. Salem Ben Nasser Al-Ismaily is the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Sultanate of Oman Public Authority for Investment Promotion and Export Development (Ithraa). Al Ismaily has been conferred by His Majesty the Sultan of Oman, the third and second class orders of Oman.

The team selected the Doctor as his close relations with U.S relative to his negotiating of the Iranian Nuclear deal with secretary Clinton and John Kerry.  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-omani-back-channel-to-iran-and-the-secrecy-surrounding-the-nuclear-deal/2016/06/07/0b9e27d4-2ce1-11e6-b5db-e9bc84a2c8e4_story.html?utm_term=.bd469ae16d78

Dr. Salem as the full support of His Majesty’s government, as expressed in a letter dated December 13, 2016 addressed to Chairman Ye Jianming.
Hunter Biden.

HB was key in relationship set up, messaging the good will around the chairman and the non-conflict status of CEFC entry, “a bridge between two great nations”.

Writing to all parties and organizing meetings to continue CEFC promote, as well approving step-by-step strategic and operational elements.

James Gilliar & his team.

Head of international day to day operation, geographic location assessment and targeting, operation and planning, partner selection, liaison and confidant of HB and partners, planning in Oman with DH and CEFC (DZ and his team).

Assurance Note: Important future relations should be managed by David Holtom, who has a detailed relationship network from 2008. Trusted by U.K., U.S. and JG/HB/DZ.

Once we had established the original agreed geography with the director we began to plan and initiate the strategic entry that would secure a preferred, unobstructed entry to market, led by JG, aligned through U.K. connections, for personal relationship entry to Sultan Q, Then support from U.S (HB’s family & friends, Davos) to qualify and endorse the chairman, DZ and the company, and solicit a special mandate to establish onshore CEFC vehicle that is uniquely sanction by His Highness to omit the required local partner element. (work undertaken by DH).

This is as we believe only the second company of such stature in the sultanate after, Babcock the U.K. based defense company.

Target opportunities

1. **NBO (National Bank of Oman) 38% CEFC are undertaking DD with teams arriving 5/6 April**

---

**Major Shareholders (September 2015)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shareholder Name</th>
<th>Share %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Bank (Qatar)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suhail Bahwan Group Holding Llc</td>
<td>14.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service Employees Pension Fund</td>
<td>10.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsbc A/C Ministry Of Defence Pension Fund</td>
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</table>
The National Bank of Oman SAOG (the Bank) was established in the Sultanate of Oman in 1973 as a joint stock company (under registration no. 1003704) and is engaged in retail banking, corporate banking, investment, treasury, international and Islamic banking services. In Arabic, it is known as "Bank Al Watan" and its registered address is P.O. Box 751, postal code 112 Ruwi, Muscat, Oman. The Bank's website address is www.NBO.co.om. The Bank's shares are listed in the Muscat Stock Exchange under the company code "NBOB". As at 31 December 2013, the Bank was the second largest listed bank in Oman by total assets, representing approximately 13.0 per cent of total assets, 13.9 per cent of total loans and 13.6 per cent of total deposits (source Central Bank's 2013 Consolidated Balance Sheet).

As of 31 December 2013, National Bank of Oman had a network of 65 branches and 169 automatic teller machines (ATMs) and cash and cheque deposit machines (CCDMs). The Bank provides banking services to approximately 367,000 individual customers and approximately 18,000 corporate and SME customers.

As of 30 June 2014, its international operations accounted for 3.8 per cent of its total assets. In 2013, the Bank secured a banking license to open a branch in Dubai and as a result it now has two branches in UAE, one in Abu Dhabi and one in Dubai. The Bank also has operations in Egypt, although these operations are not significant, accounting for 0.6 per cent of the Bank's total assets as at 30 June 2014. In 2013, the Bank also launched Islamic banking operations in Oman under the brand name "Muzn". During the first half of 2014, two Islamic banking branches were opened, in addition to one branch, which opened in 2013.

For the six-month period from 1 January to 30 June 2014, the Bank achieved a net profit of OMR 23 million, an increase of 22.3 per cent, compared to OMR 18.8 million for the same period the previous year.

For the year 2013, the Bank achieved a net profit of OMR 41.4 million, an increase of 1.8 per cent compared to OMR 40.7 million in 2012. National Bank of Oman’s total assets amounted to OMR 3.5 billion as at 30 June 2014, an increase of 21.5 per cent against OMR 2.9 billion as at
31 December 2013, which in turn constituted an increase of 14.1 per cent compared to OMR 2.5 billion as at 31 December 2012.

Shareholders’ equity amounted to OMR 334.7 million as at 30 June 2014, an increase of 2.3 per cent from OMR 328.1 million as at 31 December 2013, which in turn constituted an increase of 7.8 per cent from OMR 304.5 million as at 31 December 2012.

Since 1 January 2014, the Bank has been required by the Central Bank to maintain a minimum total capital adequacy ratio of 12.625 per cent. The Bank's total capital adequacy ratio is calculated in accordance with Central Bank guidelines, and as at 30 June 2014 was 14.1 per cent, compared to 14.6 per cent as at 31 December 2013 and 14.4 per cent as at 31 December 2012. The Bank's Tier 1 capital ratio was 11.3 per cent as at 30 June 2014, compared to 11.8 per cent as at 31 December 2013 and 11.7 per cent as at 31 December 2012. Capital ratios as at 30 June 2014 are calculated without including interim profits, whereas capital ratios as at 31 December 2013 and 31 December 2012 are calculated to include full-year retained profits.

As of 31 December 2013, the authorised ordinary share capital of the Bank comprised 2,000,000,000 ordinary shares of OMR 0.100 each and the issued and fully paid-up ordinary share capital of the Bank comprised 1,108,025,000 ordinary shares of OMR 0.100 each. As at 30 June 2014, 34.9 per cent of the Bank's issued share capital was held by the Commercial Bank of Qatar Q.S.C. (CBQ). The Bank operates as one of CBQ's "alliance banks", enabling it to partner with other alliance banks on specific cross-border/international.

The banking industry in Oman is regulated by the Central Bank, which regularly carries out on- and off-site examinations of financial institutions. The Central Bank has imposed guidelines that monitor capital, liquidity, funding mismatches, investments and overseas exposures in addition to general banking operations.

Credit Rating
National Bank of Oman has been accorded the following credit ratings by the industry’s leading rating institutions:

**Moody’s (June 2016)**

<table>
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**Capital Intelligence (June 2016)**

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Fitch Ratings (June 2016)

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<th>Support rating</th>
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<tr>
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<td>F2</td>
<td>bbb−</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>BBB</td>
<td>Stable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Fincorp

Outside of getting clearances from Oman’s leadership, CEFC clearly needs to be in a position to understand the local market better. From the meetings to date, we have tried to leverage banking/financial institutions for CEFC to invest in. We’ve enjoyed plenty of correspondence since; however, we have been conscious that we needed to reach out further in order to provide CEFC with a better intelligence picture to leverage.

David Holtom met with Nasr al-Housani, the CEO of Fincorp (http://www.fincorp.org/), a local investment bank and asset management company. Nasr’s company is well plugged into the local and regional securities market. It’s a small company with capital of OMR 7 million (c. US$ 18 million) dealing with a portfolio of OMR 50 million OMR (c. US$ 130 million). Fincorp is a locally listed company. Nasr stated that he could materialize a 75% stake in Fincorp for CEFC to use as its investment vehicle locally, if you were interested. The advantage of purchasing Fincorp would be owning an established business with significant knowledge of the local finance/e-commerce market etc.

Nasr also stated that through Fincorp (through their local mandate), CEFC could purchase up to 25 percent of Bank Sohar (which was available) and that 12 per cent of Bank Muscat’s shares were still on offer too.

Nasr also passed on details regarding OMINVEST. 15 per cent of OMINVEST was available, of which 10 per cent could be bought immediately (the remaining 5 per cent would need to be done slowly as not to shake the market). OMINVEST’s investments include a controlling stake in Oman Arab Bank, and several other sizeable stakes in other local banks and financial institutions.

Nasr stated that if CEFC was interested, it may be best that he meets you prior to your team’s visits to Oman, perhaps in Dubai as he would prefer smaller sized meetings to deliver an accurate, tailored and focused brief.
3. **Opportunities open only to CEFC China**

Dear James (and Caesar),

As discussed, and after several weeks of negotiating, I have managed to persuade The Royal Office and Omani government to deliver a host of projects that are **only open to CEFC China to invest in**; a unique series of opportunities. In brief and in no particular order (I will write these up more fully next week and after more discussions with The Royal Office):

a. Oman Infrastructure Fund (Financial) - to invest in viable projects in the Omani market;
b. Set up an Oman China Bank (Banking) - A new investment bank in Oman that will be the bridge for Chinese investors to Oman;
c. Fisheries Industry in Oman (Fisheries) - The relevant ministry is keen to step change and globalise production. Including boat building;
d. New Government Oman refinery (Oil and Gas) - Build and operate a new refinery at Duqm. Supply of Crude shall be Oman’s own crude oil;
e. Shinas Port Projects (transportation and logistics) - Development of the port for industrial and the tourism trade.
f. Yiti Resort (Tourism) - Development of the coastal site to be a world-class tourism destination;
g. Al-Dhaahirah County Project (industrial development) - Service and knowledge centre for oil fields in Saudi Arabia. Railway terminals, mining infrastructure.
h. Sohar Port Container Terminal (transportation and logistics) - Development of terminal 2 with 40 km2 plot of land in the Sohar Free Zone.
i. Sur - new port and township (transportation and logistics) - Development of Sur’s new port and township, maximising its strategic location;
j. Development of Oman China Freezone (industrial development) - Development of an autonomous 100 km2 land in Duqm (but out of SEZAD) as an Oman-China Free Zone with Port and other facilities for mixed use;
k. East-West Medical facility (healthcare) - Development of a medical city in Muscat tapping on medical care and sciences of the East and West.
l. Oman National Railway Project (transportation and logistics) - Development of Oman’s national railway covering 2400 km of tracks and 9 segments.

I have not shared any of the above with Fincorp. I have only tasked Fincorp with NBO and cleared the NBO approach with the government. The above are government owned projects which have been given to CEFC China exclusively (**The Royal Office have closed the TfI chapter at our request**).

The above are government owned projects which have been given to CEFC China **exclusively** (**The Royal Office have closed the TfI chapter at our request**).

**James** - I would be grateful if these could be raised with Chairman Ye during his visit to the US.

**Cui Can** - I would like to share these with the Shanghai team, but I am yet to be convinced that I have the right reporting channels. These projects are sensitive to the Omani government, and
offering them up to CEFC has been quite a task. We should await perhaps comments from the US, The Chairman and Director Zhang before disseminating further. Some of these projects, seen from here, are exceptional and very unique opportunities.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Kind regards,

David

4. Plan B’s

HSBC (Oman) 51% Stake in bank offered by HSBC through local share holder partner Mr. Omar Zawawi

Various Oil and Gas Deals. (New deals will be direct through ministry after entry).

Additional important domestic relationships. D.H to maintain

Qais bin Abdul Munim Al Zawawi (27 August 1935 – September 11, 1995), was the second foreign minister for the Sultanate of Oman, and later from 1982 served as Deputy Prime Minister for Economic and Financial affairs until his death on September 11, 1995 in a Salalah accident, whilst in the car with His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said, and his brother Dr. Omar bin Abdul Munim Al Zawawi, the external liaison for His Majesty the Sultan.

Before returning to Oman, after the Sultan deposed his father in a bloodless coup, Al Zawawi studied in India and then moved to Dubai, where he helped set up the Pepsi-Cola Operations with Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum, the then Ruler of Dubai (1958–1990), H.E. Sultan bin Ali Al Owais and Mohamed Yehia Zakaria, both prominent business men.

General Sultan bin Muhammad al-Nu'aman – Minister for the Royal Office. Arguably runs the country beneath The Sultan. (All Ministers answer to him).

Lt. General Sayyid (Highness) Mundhir bin Majid Al-Said – Also a Minister for the Royal Office, and Head of the Liaison and Coordination Service.

Dr Muhammad bin Hamad al-Rumhy – Minister for Oil and Gas.

Note: There are probably better Oil and gas deals once the relationship is formed, once this relationship has been established.
Colombia – Gateway to Latin America

The relationship between Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos and Joe Biden has been a strong one throughout the Obama administration. Mr. Santos made his first official visit to the White House in 2013, during which both Mr. Santos and Mr. Obama were highly supportive of the U.S.-Colombian alliance. The United States’ attitude towards Latin America during the Obama administration changed dramatically compared to previous Republican and Democratic administrations. A pragmatic approach became the underlying theme for U.S. relations with Latin America. During a speech at the Annual Washington Conference, Vice President Biden summed up the new attitude to Latin America explicitly. “Whether it’s Mexico hosting the G20 or Colombia preparing to join the OECD, this is not your father’s Latin America… We have already changed the way we do business and the way we frame it.” The question, Mr. Biden said, is no longer about what can we do for Latin America but what we can do with Latin America. Things have changed a great deal. The following analysis by Eric Farnsworth succinctly describes the changed economic and political climate and is worth quoting in full.

Much of the region, particularly South America, is now emerging from a dispiriting period of populist anti-Americanism that, along with depressed global commodities markets, has stunted economies. Deteriorating economic prospects have in turn caused electorates to reject ideological solutions in favor of policies of pragmatism. The economic downturn has also exposed the voracious levels of corruption among political and business elites. When they can, voters have shown an increasing willingness to remove or rebuke leaders who have promoted the sort of populist authoritarianism that has strained relations with Washington over the past decade and a half. At the same time, as corruption is rejected and thoroughly delegitimized across the region, the United States becomes more important than ever [emphasis added] in terms of support for strengthened judicial systems and best practices toward strengthening the rule of law… This opens the door across the Americas to a greater appreciation of the United States as an economic and even political partner [emphasis added], providing the possibility for renewed

engagement moving forward. The region’s circumstances are now more amenable to U.S. partnerships than they have been in the past decade. Arguably, the Obama administration’s approach has facilitated, if not necessarily hastened, these trends by allowing events to take a natural, unimpeded course, and by remaining available as a partner once circumstances became more favorable. At this point, so long as commodities prices remain low, playing a longer game appears to be paying important dividends. So far, so good. But there are also unintended consequences of this policy shift. True partnership requires actual partners [emphasis added], with both the capability and desire to pursue a joint agenda. That implies more than simply a series of bilateral agendas, no matter how robust. It also requires mutual engagement to address the most pressing issues at the subregional, regional and eventually global levels.3

With this in mind, EEIG has built he framework for partnership between CEFC China and local partners in Colombia, with a solid basis starting at the very foundations of the country’s administration. With the peace accords between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) culminating in a bilateral ceasefire between both parties on June 23, 2016, Colombia has created a much safer environment to deal in. Mr. Biden pledged his strong personal support of the peace process and offered congratulations to Mr. Santos while underscoring “the importance of maintaining bipartisan support for Colombia in the United States Congress.”4

Commercial Entry

For decades, the Santo Domingo family has controlled a web of enterprises. Their sale of Colombian brewer Bavaria in 2005 to SABMiller saw the clan’s $2.2 billion fortune multiply many times over. The family’s holdings are now valued at $14.8 billion, according to the Bloomberg Billionaire’s Index. We have already laid the groundwork in-country with the Santo Domingo family as potential local partners.

Alejandro Santo Domingo serves as the public face of the Santo Domingo family, which holds a massive stake in beer giant Anheuser-Busch. In 2005 his father, Julio Mario Santo, Domingo traded his brewery, Bavaria, for a 15% stake in SABMiller, which in turn merged with Anheuser-Busch InBev in 2016. When Julio Mario died in 2011, he passed down his shares to his sons, Alejandro and Andres, along with his grandchildren, Julio Mario III and Tatiana Casiraghi. All four are now billionaires. A Harvard graduate, Alejandro is the managing director of New York-based Quadrant Capital Advisors and also sits on the board of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, alongside fellow billionaires Leon Black, John Paulson and David Koch. He got


married in 2016, reportedly to a direct descendant of the British general who vanquished Napoleon at Waterloo.

**Target Opportunities**

1. *El Remanso Oil Field.*

We have a relationship with Rattan Holding, who control the “El Remanso” oil field. The field is approximately 19,553 hectares large and is located across the Departments of Antioquia (Puerto Berrío, Puerto Nare and Puerto Triunfo) and Boyacá (Puerto Boyacá).

Proven = 17,500,000

Probable = 59,970,000

Possible = 114,530,000

The oil field has combined (possible, probable and proven) reserves of 192,000,000 barrels.
2. CIL Port Buenaventura (Centro Internacional Logistico y Portuario de Buenaventura)

The new port of Buenaventura in the Pacific Ocean could be very attractive for CEFC China due to all the windows it opens for trans-Pacific commerce without having to use the Panama Canal. We have a great project to bring an oil pipe from Venezuela to this port to fill huge tankers that can't go through Panama Canal and thus are forced to travel all the way around, which increases cost drastically. On the other side is ICSA (Ingeniería y Consultoría S.A.,), the newest company acquired under the Rattan holding umbrella, who has the mandate to act as principal to provide advice, financial consultancy to the "CIL PORT" Project, as well as managing the financial resources, funds or capital necessary for its development in each of its stages. The mandate also states that ICSA acts as Strategic Partner within the framework of guarantees offered by the CIL PORT for the Project, shareholding, construction, and real guarantees such as that derived from the collateral of the property of development of the same project, and other infrastructures to be built.

ICSA does everything ranging from power grid to airport. In fact, most of the airways in Colombia on ground and off ground have been set up by ICSA. ICSA’s capacities mainly target the following sectors: infrastructure, hydrocarbons, mining, large surfaces, aircraft, airports and air fields of flight, energy and military, in the disciplines of civil, mechanical, electrical, telecommunications, control and instrumentation.

Besides these two opportunities are ready now, many more are lining up. For example, the sale next year of the main power generation company in the coast of Colombia that covers almost the country. We have full support and high interest from the congress to attract foreign investment and especially China which has had a great relationship with Colombia over the years.

Planned CEFC China Welcome to Colombia

We are close with the Consul here as well. CEFC China’s Mr. Zang Jiunjun will be awarded at the congress by the senators of the 5 commission. This is the senate commission that handles all energy and oil sector matters of the country. After the ceremony, there will be a dinner at the Nogal Club where 15 senators and business leaders will meet and greet the honored guest. The next day, the delegation will fly to Barranquilla where all the governors from the coast of Colombia will come and give the keys of the cities and recognitions to the CEFC China members on tour. Most of these leaders are very eager for this visit and are looking forward to open Colombia's door to Chinese investments.
Luxembourg

Political Framework

The politics of Luxembourg takes place in a framework of a parliamentary representative democratic monarchy, whereby the Prime Minister of Luxembourg is the head of government, and of a multi-party system. Executive power is under the constitution of 1868, as amended, exercised by the government, by the Grand Duke and the Council of Government (cabinet), which consists of a prime minister and several other ministers. Usually the prime minister is the leader of the political party or coalition of parties having the most seats in parliament. Legislative power is vested in both the government and parliament. The judiciary is independent of the executive and the legislature.

Legislative power is vested in the Chamber of Deputies, elected directly to five-year terms.

The economy of Luxembourg is largely dependent on the banking, steel, and industrial sectors. Luxembourgers enjoy the second highest per capita gross domestic product in the world (CIA 2007 est.), behind Qatar. Luxembourg is seen as a diversified industrialized nation, contrasting the oil boom in Qatar, the major monetary source of the southwest Asian state.

Although Luxembourg in tourist literature is aptly called the "Green Heart of Europe", its pastoral land coexists with a highly industrialized and export-intensive area. Luxembourg's economy is quite similar to Germany's. Luxembourg enjoys a degree of economic prosperity very rare among industrialized democracies.

In 2009, a budget deficit of 5% resulted from government measures to stimulate the economy, especially the banking sector, as a result of the world economic crisis. This was however reduced to 1.4% in 2010.

Why Luxembourg?

Banking is the largest sector in the Luxembourg economy. The country has specialized in the cross-border fund administration business. As Luxembourg's domestic market is relatively small, the country's financial center is predominantly international. At the end of March 2009, there were 152 banks in Luxembourg, with over 27,000 employees. Political stability, good communications, easy access to other European centers, skilled multilingual staff, a tradition of banking secrecy and cross-border financial expertise have all contributed to the growth of the financial sector. These factors have contributed to a Corruption Perceptions Index of 8.3 and a DAW Index ranking of 10 in 2012; the latter the highest in Europe. Germany accounts for the largest-single grouping of banks, with Scandinavian, Japanese, and major U.S. banks also heavily represented. Total assets exceeded EUR 929 billion at the end of 2008. More than 9,000 holding companies are established in Luxembourg. The European Investment Bank—the financial institution of the European Union—is also located there.

Luxembourg is the second largest investment fund center in the world after the United States, the premier captive reinsurance market in the European Union and the premier private banking
center in the Eurozone. The financial sector is the largest contributor to the Luxembourg economy.

From its origins as a Euroloan center, the city subsequently developed as a private banking center and then, from the 1980s, as a leading domicile for investment funds. The success of the financial center is founded on the social and political stability of the Grand Duchy and on a modern legal and regulatory framework that is continuously updated, inspired by regular consultation between the government, the legislator and the private sector. Thus, over the years, specific regulatory frameworks have been created for alternative investment funds, venture capital investment funds, international pension funds, specialized investment funds, captive reinsurance companies, covered bond issuing banks, securitization vehicles and family wealth management companies.

This legal framework, combined with Luxembourg’s openness to the world, has attracted banks, insurance companies, investment fund promoters and specialist service providers from all over the world.

The Luxembourg financial center is characterized by a strong culture of investor protection and rigorous anti money-laundering policies. Its specialist teams are multilingual and multicultural, with a long tradition of financial expertise and extensive knowledge of the needs of an international clientele.

**Target Opportunity**

Banque Internationale à Luxembourg S.A. (BIL) is a Luxembourgish bank. The bank is owned by Precision Capital and the Luxembourg government. Along with its sister bank KBL European Private Bankers, it was supervised by European Central Bank due to their size.

KBL European Private Bankers, founded in 1949, is headquartered in Luxembourg with a pan-European presence in nine countries. With over 2,000 staff and €41 billion in assets under management and €39 billion in assets under custody (as of December 31, 2012), KBL is widely recognized as a private banking leader.

The group provides a range of additional investment solutions through its Global Investor Services, Global Financial Markets and Asset Management departments. The group has subsidiaries across eight European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.

With the full support of its shareholder, Precision Capital, a Luxembourg-based bank holding company, KBL is consolidating its presence across Europe and expanding its horizons to capture future opportunities in high-growth emerging markets, including the Middle East and Asia. Precision Capital is ultimately owned by members of the Al Thani family of Qatar.
We have prepared the groundwork to purchase major stakes in both of these banks, up to 90% in both.

Market Entry
We have an understanding with Prince Félix of Luxembourg, that under his father Henri, Grand Duke of Luxembourg’s auspices two banking institutions will be introduced to use as investment vehicles. Luxembourg in general has a great market position for German, French & Benelux entry. Furthermore, the nobility in Luxembourg is related to all EU nobility, meaning that further opportunities will be open for investment. Chairman Ye is also slated to receive a national Honor.
Romania
PROPOSAL FOR THE COOPERATION BETWEEN ALLTROM GROUP & CEFC CHINA

Target Opportunities

_Baneasa Group_
This document aims in describing the potential collaboration platform between:

ALLTROM GROUP [AG]
Being the Group of companies owned by Mr. Gabriel Popoviciu. These companies include among others:

- The Baneasa Group [Baneasa Project]
  - Baneasa Investments SA
  - Baneasa Developments SRL
  - Baneasa Business & Technology Park SA
- Metav SA
- Univresal SA
- Meteor SA
- Belvedere Developments SRL

And

CEFC Ghina [CEFC]
A Global Investment Group active in energy and financial services

Where As:

CEFC is active in Romania through its holding KAZMunayGas and its local subsidiary Rompetrol and wishes to expand its presence in the continent and the country investing in large scale projects.

AG is a major local investor with a leading position in its core business which is Real Estate development and a major candidate for becoming CEFC’s local partner through its own businesses and projects and its capability to define new ones.

An initial visit of Mr. Qinxin Ren took place on 5-6 March and preliminary discussions were held between him and Mr. Popoviciu and his associate Mr. George Argentopoulos. A site visit took also place during this visits and was decided that AG will produce this document to facilitate further discussions among the parties.

Proposal

Context

- This cooperation is a strategic alliance driven by the magnitude, timeframe and particularities of the potential projects.
• Its purpose is a long term one and its objective is to become the biggest developer in Romania and one of the biggest in the region of SE Europe
• Its initial focus would be the projects under the command of AG, especially the Baneasa Project followed shortly by a series of specific other investment opportunities; two of them are mentioned in the last section of this document
• The fundamental values of this cooperation are Trust, Transparency, Growth, Efficiency and Social Responsibility

Formation

It is envisaged the creation of an Investment Fund with the initial main partners being CEFC and AG. It is expected that certain minority partners will also be involved as presented at the following sections. The initial effective structure is presented in the scheme below:

The Fund may include other AG holdings from the beginning (i.e. Metav)

Baneasa Project magnitude

• Further to the existing developments the platform provides for more than 100 hectares for further developments in the most successful and lucrative platform in Bucharest and the country. The future development is subject to a redesigned master plan; however, as a high-level estimation it should include around 250,000m² of retail, 200,000m² offices and almost 1,000,000m² of residential developments of a total development cost value of EUR 1 billion.
• The offices platform should provide for the headquarters of Rompetrol as a signage building in to north west corner of the land.
• The total development timespan should be 7-10 years if properly sourced and managed
• Based on low-end current market values the residual value of the project will by far exceed the EUR 2 billion value.

**Steps to Formation**

• AG will contribute to the Fund its participations in the Baenasa project:
  o 50% of BD [the mall business]
  o 32.5% of BBTP [the offices business]
  o 25% of BISA [the land business] [indirectly also another 8.75% of the BBTP business]
  o The total estimated value of the above contribution is EUR 300 million

• CEFC will contribute all the funds necessary for the following transactions:
  o To buy out the existing individual partner of AG in the project holding exactly the same shares (through jointly held holding companies). It is expected that this transaction can take place at an estimated and negotiated total value of 200mEuro
  o To buy out 40% of the existing 50% of BISA currently held by the University of Agriculture in Bucharest. This is proposed to be executed through the issuance of a bond from the Fund [guaranteed by CEFC] with the following specifications:
    ▪ Value EUR 100 million
    ▪ Tenure 10 years
    ▪ Coupon 5% annually = EUR 5 million
    ▪ At maturity, the bond can be either cashed out or deemed in shares in the Fund at the market price of the shares at that time
    ▪ Prudently the funds to be available at the Fund level for the bond payouts should be at the level 25mEuro covering the coupons of 5 years.
      Thereafter the bond will be served from the Fund’s net profits
  o CEFC will also contribute to the Fund cash equal to EUR 75 million for funding the Fund’s operations and development plans
  o CEFC will procure the debt financing required for the Fund’s development plans

• The Fund’s initial value would be EUR 600 million out of which EUR 100 million in cash.

**Important Note**

Our scenario implies a resolution of the current legal dispute over parts of the project for which all owners of the Fund will seek to resolve with the Romanian State. The proposal is built in such a manner to provide for a mutually beneficial framework to facilitate this resolution. More Specifically:

• It allows the State (the University or either wise to remain as participant to the project directly (10% of BISA).
It provides a steady annual income for long term for the State budget (EUR 5 million annually through the bond); combined with a significant value of EUR 100 million at the maturity of the bond or;
It also gives the opportunity for future uplifts should the state decides to deem the bonds into shares of the Fund.
It goes without saying that this proposal needs further elaboration and its subject to successful negotiations with the State.

Metav
Metav is one of the biggest business parks in Bucharest urban area. 80 companies from different industries have chosen Metav as their main facility.

Location highlights:

- Operating in Northern area (Baneasa), the main business district of Bucharest;
- Easy access from city center (Piata Victoriei, Universitate, Charles de Gaulle), Floreasca area and “Henri Coanda” Airport.

Existing buildings are designed for large open spaces, suitable for commercial, storage and office activities with over 500 parking places available for tenants and visitors.

Technical Specifications
Utilities:

- Inner electrical network, including high capacity transformation stations;
- Water & sewage infrastructure, pumping station and fire suppression ring;
- Gas station and a well dimensioned infrastructure;
- HVAC systems for office buildings;
- All utilities allow independent metering per tenant and can be easily adapted to tenant needs and space specific;

Amenities:

- Concrete structure fixed on frames and beams
- Power generators where needed;
- 10-12 m height for storage; some buildings are equipped with traversing cranes;
- Suspended ceiling in office spaces;
- Lightning systems, power sockets and low voltage networks;
- CCTV systems in at the critical points;
- Perimetral infrared barriers;
- 24/7 hours security guards;

Revenue from streams
Main revenue stream of the company is letting its own assets. Several renting tariffs were significantly adjusted in 2016 and 2017.
Service Charges - gradually introduced in 2017 and fully implemented from 2018.

Distribution tariff for electricity – applied for tenants own consumption.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metav (Euro)</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lease Revenue</td>
<td>3,937,099</td>
<td>3,793,228</td>
<td>3,955,804</td>
<td>4,124,675</td>
<td>4,281,464</td>
<td>4,381,964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity Distribution Revenue</td>
<td>89,430</td>
<td>85,946</td>
<td>93,037</td>
<td>101,616</td>
<td>108,670</td>
<td>108,670</td>
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<tr>
<td>Service Charges Recovered</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>172,039</td>
<td>597,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Lease Related Revenues</td>
<td>4,026,529</td>
<td>3,879,174</td>
<td>4,048,841</td>
<td>4,226,291</td>
<td>4,562,173</td>
<td>5,088,233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Future

**Baneasa Project**
- If the issue with the State mentioned above is resolved the Fund’s value will double without even further developments as a result of the appreciation of land and the yield on the existing businesses
- This in turn will allow for a strong leverage base to raise debt capital in order to develop the plan fast
- At that point a listing of the Fund should be considered attracting equity investors for both quick returns to the strategic partners and further capitalization for other projects

**Other Major Projects**
Besides the Baneasa Project the parties should investigate the following identified opportunities:
- The development of a country-wide network of gas stations (Rompetrol) combined with (mainly) drive through commercial outlets. This can be done in a joint venture with Rompetrol or in the form of a BOT project (Build Operate and Transfer)
- The acquisition of majority (51% at least) of the existing two Bucharest airports or the development of a 3rd one
France

Political Framework

The politics of France take place with the framework of a semi-presidential system determined by the French Constitution of the French Fifth Republic. The nation declares itself to be an "indivisible, secular, democratic, and social Republic." The constitution provides for a separation of powers and proclaims France's "attachment to the Rights of Man and the principles of national sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789."

The political system of France consists of an executive branch, a legislative branch and a judicial branch. Executive power is exercised by the President of the Republic and the Government. The Government consists of the Prime Minister and ministers. The Prime Minister is appointed by the President, and is responsible to Parliament. The government, including the Prime Minister, can be revoked by the National Assembly, the lower house of Parliament, through a "censure motion"; this ensures that the Prime Minister is always supported by a majority of the lower house (which, on most topics, has prominence over the upper house).

Parliament comprises the National Assembly and the Senate. It passes statutes and votes on the budget; it controls the action of the executive through formal questioning on the floor of the houses of Parliament and by establishing commissions of inquiry. The constitutionality of the statutes is checked by the Constitutional Council, members of which are appointed by the President of the Republic, the President of the National Assembly, and the President of the Senate. Former presidents of the Republic also are members of the Council.

France is a unitary state. However, its administrative subdivisions—regions, departments and communes—have various legal functions, and the national government is prohibited from intruding into their normal operations.

France was a founding member of the European Coal and Steel Community, later the European Union. As such, France has transferred part of its sovereignty to European institutions, as provided by its constitution. The French government therefore has to abide by European treaties, directives and regulations.

Overseas Regions

Overseas France (French: France d'outre-mer) consists of all the French-administered territories outside of the European continent. These territories have varying legal status and different levels of autonomy, although all (except those with no permanent inhabitants) have representation in both France's National Assembly and Senate, which together make up the French Parliament. Their citizens have French nationality and vote for the president of France. They have the right to vote in elections to the European Parliament (French citizens living overseas currently vote in the Overseas constituency). Overseas France includes island territories in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans, French Guiana on the South American continent, and several Antarctic islands as well as a claim in Antarctica.

The following have overseas region status:
• French Guiana in South America
• Guadeloupe in the Caribbean (Americas)
• Martinique in the Caribbean (Americas)
• Mayotte in the Indian Ocean (Africa)
• Réunion in the Indian Ocean (Africa)

Overseas Collectivity

The French overseas collectivities (French: collectivité d'outre-mer or COM), like the French regions, are first-order administrative divisions of France. The COMs include some former French overseas territories and other French overseas entities with a particular status, all of which became COMs by constitutional reform on 28 March 2003. The COMs should not be confused with the overseas regions and overseas departments, which have no particular status. As integral parts of France, overseas collectivities are represented in the National Assembly, Senate and Economic and Social Council. Only one COM, Saint Martin, is part of the European Union and can vote to elect members of the European Parliament (MEP). The Pacific COMs use the CFP franc, a currency pegged to the euro, whereas the Atlantic COMs use the euro directly. As of 31 March 2011, there were five COMs:

• French Polynesia became a COM in 2003. Its statutory law of 27 February 2004 gives it the designation of overseas country inside the Republic (French: pays d'outre-mer au sein de la République, or POM), but without legal modification of its status. French Polynesia has a great degree of autonomy, two symbolic manifestations of which are the title of the President of French Polynesia (Le président de la Polynésie française) and its additional designation as a pays d'outre-mer. Legislature: Assembly of French Polynesia since 2004.
• Saint Barthélemy, an island in the Lesser Antilles. It has a territorial council and executive council since 2007.
• Saint Martin, the northern part of the island of Saint Martin in the Lesser Antilles. Saint Martin remains part of the European Union. Both it and St. Barthelemy were separated from the overseas department of Guadeloupe in 2007 and made into their own collectivities. It has a territorial council and executive council since 2007.
• Saint Pierre and Miquelon, a group of islands in the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Newfoundland, Canada. It has a territorial council. It is the last remaining part of New France not ceded by France.
• Wallis and Futuna, three small islands in the Pacific Ocean. Has a high administrator and territorial assembly.

As you can see, when we speak of France, we are not speaking only the country located on the European continent, but also of several other autonomous and semi-autonomous regions throughout the globe with significant influence from Paris.
The French Culture of Economic Intelligence

The tensions underlying international exchange are indicative of the importance of cultural factors in economic warfare and oblige companies to be aware of the scientific progress if they intend to continue developing.

It took France a long time to define a culture of its own in the field of intelligence, and until the previous century, the French word *renseignement*, or “intelligence”, had a negative connotation. The political elite considered this activity to be degrading and comparable to dirty police work.

The French government felt the need to launch certain reforms in both its external and internal services only after the First Gulf War, thanks also to constructive political consensus. This reform process focused on security that did not give due consideration to the decisive role that finance and markets have come to assume today in determining a people’s and a nation’s future, in an offensive context in which Western countries are not the only protagonists.

The main concerns of the French political elite regarded the use of *renseignement* in increasing the nation’s power and the ways that the offensive practices, typical of the information warfare, could be used while maintaining respect for the rules of democracy.

The management of conflicts linked to information has now become more complex due to the lack of strategies capable of managing and controlling virtual markets, the immaterial world represented by Internet, and the presence of new weapons capable of influencing public opinion.5

And thus, came ADIT.

**Agence pour la diffusion de l'information technologique (ADIT)**

ADIT SA provides strategic analysis and business diplomacy, territorial innovation, and risk management services. It offers strategic analysis in the areas of technology and regulation watch, image and reputation, and ethics and compliance; and anticipation, investigation, and strategic advisory services. The company also provides decision-making channel analysis, due diligence, anti-counterfeiting, and business diplomacy services. In addition, it detects the medium and long-term development opportunities in the areas of investment projects, key technologies, and business opportunities; and anticipates risks, such as competitive environment and economic changes for local and regional authorities, SME/SMI, and clusters. Further, the company offers corporate risk management, building security policy, and support services. The company was founded in 1992 and is based in Paris, France. Its CEO is Mr. Philippe Caduc. ADIT, through Ministerial Decree in May, 1992, came under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Aerospace and Research Ministry. It is the state authority collective for French embassies worldwide.

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Caisse des dépôts et consignations

CEO: Pierre-René Lemas

The Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations is a French public sector financial institution created in 1816, and part of the government institutions under the control of the Parliament. Often described as the “investment arm” of the French State, it is defined in the French Monetary and Financial Code as a “public group serving the public interest” and a “long-term investor”. It contributes to the development of enterprises in line with its own proprietary interests, and may also exercise competitive activities. It ensures, on behalf of the State and local authorities, missions of general interest.

The group’s priorities are in support of major public policy, serving growth, employment and the economic and territorial development of the country. As a long-term investor, Caisse des Dépôts has supported the development of French society during every era. Now, they are mainly working on four transitions: territorial transition, ecological and energy transition, digital transition, demographic and social transition.

Independently of the presence of the operational subsidiaries, the Caisse des Dépôts group ensures an institutional presence internationally. Caisse des Dépôts develops bilateral and multilateral relations with partner institutions which allow for the promotion of long-term investment and the development of investment projects in France and abroad, particularly in projects relating to the energy transition.

The European level takes on a crucial importance for the Caisse des Dépôts group taking into account the drive and influence of the European Union on investments and public interventions in France.

IDEX Groupe

President: Thierry Franck de Preaumont

Founded in 1963, Idex is an independent leader in the Energy and Environmental Services sectors and a forerunner in the development of renewable energy. Comprised of 3,500 engineers and specialized technicians in France, the group designs and develops energy efficient solutions for its clients’ heating and cooling network needs (clients include: industrial and third-party sites, government-owned buildings, hospitals, residential and commercial complexes, etc.). It also offers facilities management services for its installations. Idex implements and optimizes various
types of classic and renewable energy sources (wood boilers, wind power, geothermal power, combined heat power, waste to energy power, etc.) The group helps its clients find effective ways to reduce energy consumption, regardless of the type of energy used. The Idex group is present throughout France with more than 100 regional branches.

**MCE-5 Development**

![MCE-5 Development](image)

**CEO: Henri Trintignac**

France-based MCE-5 Development was founded in the year 2000 by a small group of engineers from a school in Paris dedicated to developing VCR technology. The company quickly teamed up with a number of European automakers and auto parts suppliers and has been trying to perfect an engine design originally conceived back in 1997.

Since January 2000, MCE-5 Development has been conducting the MCE-5 VCRi project through different Research & Development programs. A carmaker, different engine development laboratories and Tier 1 automotive industry OEMs are among its partners.

The R&D programs, initially focused on the validation of the MCE-5 VCRi principle, have resulted in the step-by-step improvement of the innovative components and the identification and implementation of their mass-production manufacturing processes. Today, multicylinder engines nearing their final definition have been installed in demonstration vehicles.

MCE-5’s business model consists in selling IP rights and expertise supplying prototypes (single and multicylinder engines, demonstrator cars), testing means and services (engineering research & design, calculations, simulations, testing, validations).
January 2, 2021

The Honorable Gary C. Peters  
Ranking Member  
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs  
U.S. Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Ranking Member Peters:

In a December 22, 2020 letter, you accused me of making “baseless accusations on the record, including calling [you] a liar for [your] efforts to hold [me] accountable for [my] extreme partisan actions.” Let me remind you of the facts. For months, you and your staff have repeatedly alleged that my joint investigation with Senator Grassley into apparent conflicts of interest and the Biden family was “rooted in Russian disinformation.”¹ As you know, these claims are demonstrably false. Yet you continue to repeat this debunked Russian-disinformation conspiracy theory. Moreover, by misusing the term “Russian disinformation” to advance a political smear campaign against me, you and your colleagues are only making it harder to confront actual disinformation that threatens our national security.

Among other problems, it is undisputed that members of the Biden family engaged in questionable financial conduct that, at the very least, created the appearance of several conflicts of interest and present counterintelligence concerns. In fact, news reports recently confirmed that Hunter Biden’s finances have been the subject of an ongoing criminal investigation since 2018.²

¹ HSGAC Minority Press Release, “Peters, Wyden Respond to Republican Effort to Amplify Russian Disinformation & Manufacture Dirt on Vice President Biden,” (Sept. 23, 2020) (claiming also that our investigation “advance[d] false information”); see also, e.g., Letter from Sen. Gary Peters, et al. to Sen. Ron Johnson (Dec. 17, 2019) (stating that the investigation “could advance the Russian disinformation and election interference efforts”); Stefan Becket & Olivia Gazi, Senator Chris Murphy requests investigation into agencies’ cooperation on Biden, Trump probes, CBS News (Mar. 11, 2020) (“Democratic Senator Gary Peters …has raised concerns that the investigation could further Russian objectives to disrupt U.S. political processes.”); Jacob Knutson, Senate committee subpoenas documents in probe of Hunter Biden and Burisma, Axios (May 20, 2020) (“Sen. Gary Peters (D-Mich.) has even suggested that the probe is aiding a Russian disinformation campaign.”); Transcript of Interview at 6, S. Comm. on Fin. & S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs Interview of Amos Hochstein (Sept. 17, 2020) (“[HSGAC Minority Chief Counsel]: This investigation advances a Russian disinformation effort[.]”) (“Hochstein Interview”).

Moreover, your false claims grossly mischaracterized the evidence from our investigation. Our investigation focused almost entirely on U.S. records and interviews with current and former U.S. officials, as well as two executives from a Democrat lobbying firm. The September 23, 2020 report that Senator Grassley and I released analyzed the financial arrangements and transactions of Hunter, James, and Sarah Biden, and examined how those finances were related to U.S. policymaking. You and your staff know this because you received contemporaneous copies of those records and participated in those witness interviews.

To distract from these facts, you constructed a false narrative that relies heavily on misdirection and innuendo. Your foundational false claim is that Ukrainian national Andrii Telizhenko was a “key source” for our investigation. Nothing could be further from the truth. Notably, your letter conveniently ignores that the only reason Mr. Telizhenko was relevant to our investigation was because of his extensive work with your Democratic colleagues—his multiple meetings with Obama administration officials, his meetings with a Democratic National Committee official, and his 13-month employment with a Democratic lobbying firm—related to these matters.3 Additionally, despite your professed interest in “expos[ing]” disinformation, you remain incurious about the nature and extent of Mr. Telizhenko’s relationship with members of your own party. Similarly, you refer to the testimony of Amos Hochstein opining about the contours of our investigation—rather than matters about which he has personal knowledge—yet leave out the part where he explained that Russia was using Hunter Biden’s business arrangements to undermine U.S. policy.4 In any reality-based worldview, these would be precisely the type of conflict-of-interest investigations our Committee should be conducting.

In fact, the only “disinformation” in our investigative record is a document that your staff used as an exhibit during a witness interview.5 Your letter belatedly defends this poor decision by casting it as a noble attempt “to expose Russian disinformation, educate the public …, and prevent[] the Committee from spreading that disinformation further.” But your staff was “expos[ing]” something that was never in our investigative record in the first place. Thanks to your staff’s efforts, a known piece of Russian disinformation is now a permanent part of the congressional record.

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3 You note that we “cited [Mr. Telizhenko] 42 times in [our] letters,” but this is both misleading (because the purpose of those letters was to understand the nature and extent of his relationship with several Democrats) and says nothing about our final report.
4 Hochstein Interview at 50 (“I shared with [Hunter Biden] that the Russians were using his name in order to sow disinformation—attempt to sow disinformation among Ukrainians.”); id. at 58-59 (testifying that he told Vice President Biden that “pro-Moscow outlets [] were trying to create some kind of rift between the U.S. and Ukraine or to undermine the U.S. efforts, and that they were using Hunter Biden’s name in those article to sow that doubt”).
5 S. Comm. on Fin. & S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs Staff Report, Hunter Biden, Burisma, and Corruption: The Impact on U.S. Government Policy and Related Concerns at 60-61 (Sept. 23, 2020) (discussing minority staff’s use of a document created by Andriy Derkach during the interview of George Kent in an attempt to impugn Chairman Grassley and myself).
The height of your hypocrisy is your selective interest in Russian disinformation. In April 2020, Senator Grassley and I published declassified information that the Clinton campaign and Democratic National Committee paid for Russian disinformation—false information invented by Russian intelligence services—and promoted it as a basis for relentlessly attacking and investigating the Trump administration. I am not aware of you making any public statements acknowledging, let alone condemning, that conduct. You also profess to oppose our investigation because it “amplified” a Russian attack on our election,” yet I am unaware of you condemning any other policy discussions or investigations that were used as the basis for Russian disinformation efforts.

Your use of the term “Russian disinformation” has been unprincipled and dangerous. You make no effort to identify and define the Russian disinformation campaign you allege, and you make no effort to explain how that campaign in any way undermines the evidence at the heart of our investigation—financial records, concerns raised by U.S. officials, and efforts by adversaries to exploit those financial arrangements to undermine U.S. policy. Instead, you have misused the term as a smear, a blunt instrument for scoring political points no matter the truth. In doing so, you are depriving the phrase of its true meaning and potentially undermining efforts to combat actual instances of disinformation. I know this because, unlike you, I have been exposing Russian disinformation efforts since 2015.

Your letter is the unfortunate culmination of the false and absurd claims about our investigation that you have been peddling for months. You may not like the politics of my

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7 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 116-290, vol. 2, at 44 (2020) (explaining that Russia’s Internet Research Agency (IRA) sought to exploit “divisive and inflammatory U.S. social issues” that “spanned the ideological and political spectrum, ranging from race, sexuality, or and gender identity, to immigration and Second Amendment right”); id. at 42 (describing IRA’s post-election efforts to “promot[e] hashtags such as ‘#Impeach 45,’ ‘#Resist,’ and ‘#GunReformNow,’” and efforts to organize “disparate political rallies,” including a “Trump is NOT my President” rally in New York).

8 During our December 16, 2020 hearing, I did state that you “were involved in a process of creating a false intelligence product that was supposedly classified … [and then] leaked to the media.” Although the letter with the attached “intelligence product” was sent by Minority Leader Schumer, Senator Warner, Speaker Pelosi, and Chairman Schiff, I did assume you or your staff were involved in the process of its creation based on your prior work with your Democratic colleagues to harm or disrupt our investigation. Specifically, my staff is aware of at least one instance when your staff shared confidential committee information with Minority Leader Schumer’s office that later was leaked to the press.

investigations, but examining conflicts of interest falls squarely within our Committee’s jurisdiction.10 No matter how loudly you yell “Russian disinformation,” these are the facts.

Sincerely,

Ron Johnson
Chairman

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10 S. Res. 70, Sec. 12(e)(1)(A), 116th Cong. (“The committee … is authorized to study or investigate … the efficiency and economy of operations of all branches of the Government including the possible existence of … conflicts of interest[.]”).
December 22, 2020

The Honorable Ron Johnson
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Mr. Chairman,

In our Wednesday, December 16th Committee hearing you made baseless accusations on the record, including calling me a liar for my efforts to hold you accountable for your extreme partisan actions that have undermined our Committee’s bipartisan traditions and our fundamental mission to help protect our homeland security. Had you made your false accusations on the Senate floor, it would have been in violation of Senate Rule XIX. Your outburst was beneath the dignity of the Senate, the Committee, and simple civil discourse. In fact, it was the culmination of the Committee’s descent, under your chairmanship, into a hotbed of dangerous, hyper-partisan, anti-democratic, and demonstrably false conspiracies that have no place in the United States Senate. Tragically, those falsehoods have extended beyond your efforts to influence the 2020 presidential election to your amplification of unsound medical information that has the potential to exacerbate the COVID-19 pandemic and your amplification of conspiracy theories that question the very validity of the election’s outcome.

To be clear, in pursuing my responsibilities as Ranking Member and as a steward of our Committee’s bipartisan reputation, I have never lied. To the contrary, every specific allegation you named in your public accusation was false or misleading. To set the record straight:

First, you claimed that I was involved in the creation of a “false intelligence product.” The accusation itself is false. Specifically, you said, “Senior Democrat leaders, including Ranking Member Peters, you know, were involved in a process of creating a false intelligence product that was supposedly classified. They leaked to the media that accused Senator Grassley, the president pro tem of the Senate and myself, of accepting and disseminating Russian disinformation from Andrii Derkach.”

You are referring to the July 13, 2020, letter with a classified annex from Democratic leaders to the FBI requesting a defensive briefing on foreign election interference efforts. As I stated during last week’s hearing, I was not involved in the creation of the letter, classified addendum, or subsequent press reports. Your characterization of the classified addendum as a “false intelligence product” is also

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1 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hearing on Examining Irregularities in the 2020 Election (Dec. 16, 2020).
inaccurate. Despite your protestations, I requested defensive briefings that would have given us clear answers about how your allegations related to a foreign attack on our election. Unfortunately, while the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Foreign Influence Task Force was willing to brief our Committee, the Central Intelligence Agency declined. Politico reported that you are “considered ‘toxic’ by some members of the intelligence community.”

Second, you also falsely claimed I “lied repeatedly in the press” that you were “spreading Russian disinformation.” To be precise, I have said that you have “advanced,” and “amplified,” a Russian attack on our election, which is unequivocally true. Your investigation was the successful culmination of a Russian attack on our election. As then-Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs Amos Hochstein testified in this very same investigation:

Q: Do you remain concerned that Vice President Biden is a target of a Russian disinformation effort?

A: Yes.

Q: Why?

A: Because I can see it on a regular basis. I think this investigation is probably the successful outcome of that effort.

Then-Ambassador to Ukraine (later President Trump’s appointed Ambassador to Greece) Geoffrey Pyatt also testified that the conspiracy theory that Hunter Biden’s position at Burisma undermined anti-corruption efforts in Ukraine was in fact rooted in a Russian disinformation effort:

Q: And the argument that Hunter Biden’s position on the board of Burisma corrupted U.S. anti-corruption efforts in Ukraine, do you include that as part of the Russian disinformation narrative?

A: Yes, of course. And it’s of a pattern with lots of other Russian disinformation. … This is a toolkit which Russia is using across Europe to undermine security and advance their perceived interests.

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5 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on Finance Interview of Amos Hochstein (Sept. 17, 2020) p.74.
6 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on Finance Interview of Geoffrey R. Pyatt (Sept. 17, 2020) p.115.
Q: Is the narrative that Vice President Biden’s actions in the Ukraine were corrupt, is that a false narrative?

A: Yes, it is. And I think you only need to look at what Secretary Pompeo said about Derkach, what Treasury said about Derkach, and their contemporaneous release of privileged telephone conversations between the Vice President and President Poroshenko by Derkach to understand what’s referred to there.  

You seem to think that because you have never spoken with Mr. Derkach, that you cannot be held accountable for amplifying his lies. This reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of how disinformation works, and the role you have played in aiding it. A key source for your investigation is Ukrainian national Andrii Telizhenko, who traffics in the same conspiracy theories as Mr. Derkach and is cited 42 times in your letters. You initially sought to authorize a subpoena from the Committee to interview Mr. Telizhenko, but retreated following bipartisan concerns over Mr. Telizhenko’s credibility and associations.

Both Mr. Derkach and Mr. Telizhenko released leaked records of alleged phone calls between former Vice President Biden and former Ukrainian President Poroshenko one day before you forced this Committee to meet in person during a devastating pandemic to vote to obtain records related to Mr. Telizhenko. Mr. Telizhenko translated Mr. Derkach’s claims from Russian to English to make his disinformation accessible to an American audience. In October 2020, the State Department reportedly revoked Mr. Telizhenko’s visa.

On September 10, 2020, the U.S. Treasury Department identified Mr. Derkach as an “active Russian agent” and sanctioned him for “false and unsubstantiated narratives concerning U.S. officials” in the 2020 election, “spurring corruption investigations in both Ukraine and the United States designed to culminate prior to election day.” Two weeks later, you released an investigative report entitled “Hunter Biden, Burisma, and Corruption.”

I have never accused you of having directly accepted material or Russian disinformation from Andrii Derkach, as you have consistently denied. However, direct contact with Mr. Derkach is not necessary to repeat his disinformation. I have only made statements that are indisputably true—your “claims that...
mirror the claims” of Mr. Derkach, relied on “suspect sources” who have “extensive ties” to Mr. Derkach, and “amplified a known Russian attack on our election.”

Finally, in our December 16th hearing, you again repeated the false claim that the minority was the only party who introduced Russian disinformation into the record – a transparent attempt to deflect from the clear record of your statements and actions that have repeatedly amplified conspiracy theories rooted in Russian disinformation. Minority staff identified the document you are referring to as disinformation, as the transcript reflects, “by introducing this into the record we are in no way endorsing it but rather trying to expose it.” This document was entered into the record, identified as disinformation at the time, and presented to an expert witness to discuss it in the context of the broader Russian disinformation efforts that have been confirmed by President Trump’s own National Counterintelligence and Security Center Director. This exhibit was entered into the record in order to expose Russian disinformation, educate the public about this complex attack on our election, and with the goal of preventing the Committee from spreading that disinformation further. Unfortunately that effort failed. You have been credulously repeating Russian disinformation for more than a year now, debasing the Committee responsible for oversight of election security by advancing a foreign attack on our democracy.

You still have a chance to drop your partisan probe, abandon this destructive behavior and return to the Committee’s bipartisan traditions. I urge you to retract your words, cease your political investigations and apologize for the harm you have done to the reputation of our Committee and the United States Senate over the past year.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Gary C. Peters
Ranking Member

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13 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on Finance Interview of George Kent (July 24, 2020) p.150.

August 26, 2020

Joseph C. Folio III
Chief Counsel
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
U.S. Senate
340 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC, 20510

Re: Request for Voluntary Interview

Dear Joe:

I write to confirm our discussions regarding the request of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and the Senate Finance Committee (collectively, the “Committees”) for a voluntary interview of my client, Antony Blinken.

At the outset, I note that Chairman Johnson has suggested that a key area of focus of the Committees’ investigation is the reasons behind the development of U.S. policy in 2015 calling for the removal of the then-Ukrainian Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin.¹ But Chairman Johnson himself answered that question more than four years ago, when he signed a February 12, 2016 bipartisan letter calling for reform of the Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office.² Indeed, Politico reported that in a press interview in October 2019, Chairman Johnson said that “[t]he whole world felt that this, that [Viktor] Shokin wasn’t doing a [good] enough job. So we were saying, ‘Hey, you’ve . . . got to rid yourself of corruption.’”³

Thus, in the context of Chairman Johnson having squarely addressed this issue years ago, it is difficult to understand why these questions are being asked again. There have also been serious concerns raised by members of both political parties that this investigation is being motivated by political purposes. Chairman Johnson stated in an interview that “[w]e had a number of my committee members that were highly concerned about how [the investigation] looks politically.”⁴ Politico also reported that there was “Republican resistance” to aspects of this

The Ranking Member of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee has also noted that “it’s alarming that in the middle of a national emergency Chairman Johnson is choosing to pursue a partisan investigation.” These concerns were exacerbated when Chairman Johnson said in an interview on August 11, 2020, referring to this investigation, that “I would think it would certainly help Donald Trump win reelection and certainly be pretty good, I would say, evidence about not voting for Vice President Biden.”

Turning to the Committees’ request of Mr. Blinken, you have represented that the time frame of the Committees’ interest as to him is his service as Deputy Secretary of State (January 9, 2015 to January 20, 2017). Further, you have said that in this time frame, the topics of interest to the Committees as it relates to Mr. Blinken are: (1) Mr. Blinken’s factual recollection of meetings he may have had with Hunter Biden; (2) Mr. Blinken’s factual recollection of meetings he may have had with Vice-President Biden or State Department officials, including Ambassadors Geoffrey R. Pyatt and Marie L. Yovanovitch, regarding Ukraine policy; and (3) the extent of Mr. Blinken’s involvement in development of U.S. policy in Ukraine, including issues relating to loan guarantees to Ukraine.

Further, you have confirmed that: (1) the universe of documents the Committees would reference during any such voluntary testimony is encompassed within the documents the State Department has provided to us; (2) the ongoing document requests from the Committees to the State Department and any other ongoing factfinding by the Committees do not necessitate a postponement of Mr. Blinken’s voluntary testimony; and (3) you do not expect the duration of the voluntary testimony will exceed four hours.

On the basis of these specific understandings, Mr. Blinken is prepared to provide voluntary testimony to the Committees on September 14 or 15, 2020. As we have discussed, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, Mr. Blinken’s testimony will need to be provided over videoconference, as he has frequent contact with elderly family members as well as his infant children. Please let me know which one of these dates are amenable to the Committees. I understand that, once we confirm a date, you will provide additional details of information you intend to discuss within the three subjects set forth above. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Very truly yours,

Jonathan C. Su
of LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

cc: Majority and Minority Staff of the Committees

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5  Id.


February 12, 2016

H.E. Petro Poroshenko  
President of Ukraine  
Presidential Administration of Ukraine  
11 Bankova Street  
Kyiv, Ukraine 01220  

Dear President Poroshenko,

As members of the U.S. Senate Ukraine Caucus and strong supporters of your government, we write to express our concern regarding the recent resignation of Minister of Economy Aivaras Abromavičius and his allegations of persistent corruption in the Ukrainian political system.

During the past year, Mr. Abromavičius and his team implemented tough but necessary economic reforms, worked to combat endemic corruption, and promoted more openness and transparency in government. He was known to many of us as a respected reformer and supporter of the Ukrainian cause. Minister Abromavičius's allegations raise concerns about the enormous challenges that remain in your efforts to reform the corrupt system you inherited.

We recognize that your governing coalition faces not only endemic corruption left from decades of mismanagement and cronyism, but also an illegal armed seizure of territory by Russia and its proxies. Tackling such obstacles to reforms amidst a war and the loss of much of southeastern Ukraine’s economic productivity is a formidable challenge -- one which we remain committed to helping you overcome.

Succeeding in these reforms will show Russian President Vladimir Putin that an independent, transparent, and democratic Ukraine can and will succeed. It also offers a stark alternative to the authoritarianism and oligarchic cronyism prevalent in Russia. As such, we respectfully ask that you address the serious concerns raised by Minister Abromavičius. We similarly urge you to press ahead with urgent reforms to the Prosecutor General's office and judiciary. The unanimous adoption by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Basic Principles and Action Plan is a good step.

We very much appreciate your leadership and commitment to reform since the Ukrainian people demonstrated their resolve on the Maidan two years ago, and we look forward to continued cooperation in the future.

Sincerely,
GOP senator says he doesn't remember signing 2016 letter urging 'reform' of Ukraine prosecutor's office

By Zack Budryk - 10/03/19 06:00 PM EDT

Sen. Ron Johnson (R-Wis.) told reporters Thursday he did not recall signing a letter urging reforms in the office of the Ukrainian prosecutor President Trump has alleged former Vice President Joe Biden improperly had ousted.

Johnson did acknowledge the letter in an interview Thursday on WIBA's "The Vicki McKenna Show," saying "The whole world, by the way, including the Ukrainian caucus, which I signed the letter, the whole world felt that..."
this that Shokin wasn't doing a [good] enough job. So we were saying hey you've ... got to rid yourself of corruption."

In the first interview, Johnson also said there was no misconduct in Trump's call on Thursday for China to investigate Biden and his son.

"If there's potential criminal activity, the President of the United States is our chief law enforcement officer. We have proper agreements with countries to investigate potential crimes so I don't think there's anything improper about doing that," he said.

Even as he endorsed investigations by both China and Ukrainian officials, Johnson denied the July 25 call between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the heart of a whistleblower complaint represented Trump pressuring Zelensky to investigate the Bidens.

"I look at that transcript and I go, it's Trump being Trump," Johnson said, according to the Journal-Sentinel.

In a statement, Andrew Bates, rapid response director for the Biden campaign, told The Hill: ""The United States, the European Union, the I.M.F., and Ukraine's leading reform figures were all pressing for Viktor Shokin to be removed from office because he was one of the biggest obstacles to fighting corruption in the entire country. This was a bipartisan goal in Congress as well."

"It is unfortunate that Senator Johnson seems to have forgotten a time when he put the country's values over his own politics, but perhaps re-reading his well-articulated words whole-heartedly agreeing with Joe Biden's push to move the anti-corruption cause in Ukraine forward will help him on his journey back to intellectual consistency," Bates added.

Updated: 9:35 p.m.
Election Interference: Majority Investigation Amplifies Russian Attack on 2020 Election.
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IV. CONCLUSION

V. APPENDIX A: TIMELINE OF CHAIRMEN JOHNSON AND GRASSLEY’S PARTISAN INVESTIGATION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Majority staff report released by Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and Senate Finance Committee Chairmen Ron Johnson and Charles Grassley amplifies discredited allegations that are part of a known Russian campaign to interfere in the 2020 election.

Existence of this campaign has been confirmed by Trump Administration officials. In August 2020, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence publicly warned that Russia is engaged in efforts, including through the use of pro-Russia Ukrainians – particularly known Russian agent Andrii Derkach – to spread claims about corruption to spur investigations into Vice President Biden. In September 2020, the Department of the Treasury sanctioned Mr. Derkach for his role in the Kremlin-directed efforts to promote the same false claims that the Majority report has alleged. The Majority’s investigation is one outcome of Mr. Derkach’s election interference efforts.

Chairman Johnson repeatedly impugned Vice President Biden in public on the basis of secret evidence he claimed to have obtained. Contrary to his public insinuations, the Chairmen’s investigation found no evidence that the former Vice President did anything wrong in his efforts to carry out official U.S foreign policy in Ukraine. This premise was advanced by the Chairmen with the explicit intention of tarnishing Vice President Biden’s reputation and his candidacy for President of the United States, even though it required the Chairmen to discount the testimony of Trump appointees and career Foreign Service officers in favor of Russian-backed conspiracy theories.

Every witness interviewed for this investigation testified that Vice President Biden did not alter United States foreign policy to benefit his son Hunter Biden, and that Hunter Biden’s presence on the board of the Ukrainian gas company Burisma had no effect on U.S. foreign policy. Every witness stated that Hunter Biden and his associates had no role in the formulation of U.S. policy, that Hunter Biden’s role did not influence U.S. foreign policy decisions, and that Vice President Biden carried out U.S. foreign policy in the interest of the United States. The investigation’s evidence, set forth in this Minority report, confirms there was no corruption, wrongdoing, or impropriety on the part of Vice President Biden.

The U.S. policy to condition a loan guarantee in part on the removal of Ukraine’s Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin was an anti-corruption measure that received strong, bipartisan support at the time, including from Chairman Johnson. Chairmen Johnson and Grassley did not raise any concerns related to Hunter Biden’s position on the board of Burisma until Vice President Biden became a top tier presidential candidate. Once Vice President Biden became the presumptive Democratic nominee, the Majority escalated their politically motivated investigation in an effort to damage his prospects as a challenger to President Trump in the 2020 presidential election.

The Chairmen relied on suspect sources – including known purveyors of Russian disinformation narratives – as the basis for their initial inquiries: primarily Ukrainian national Andrii Telizhenko and discredited American journalist John Solomon. Mr. Telizhenko – who is cited 42 times in the Chairmen’s letters – has extensive ties to Mr. Derkach. Mr. Telizhenko and Mr. Derkach
each released leaks of alleged phone calls between former Vice President Biden and former Ukrainian President Poroshenko on May 19, 2020, apparently timed to influence a Committee vote the next day. On May 20, Chairman Johnson convened a Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee vote to authorize subpoenas related to Mr. Telizhenko. Mr. Telizhenko has also aided Mr. Derkach’s claims by translating them from Russian to make his disinformation accessible to an American audience.

The Chairmen have uncovered absolutely no evidence of wrongdoing by Vice President Biden. Instead, this effort has been a partisan and unnecessary distraction from important business before both Committees as the country faces a once in a century pandemic. Since this investigation began, 200,000 Americans have perished due to COVID-19. The Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee has jurisdiction over pandemic preparedness and response. And yet, this Committee has now spent more than twice as much time on the record in this investigation than it has devoted to all of its COVID hearings, combined. At a time when the Committees should be focusing on the health, safety and economic well-being of Americans, the continued pursuit of this partisan investigation is a gross misuse of Committee time and resources.

**Key Findings:**

At the request of Ranking Members Peters and Wyden, this report sets forth for the public excerpts of over 36,000 pages of documents and all 10 interviews conducted by Committee staff. This report makes the following key findings:

**The Chairmen’s Investigation Is the Outcome of a Russian Disinformation Campaign:**
The Russian government has encouraged a disinformation campaign against former Vice President Biden. This campaign was already underway in 2015 in response to his anti-corruption efforts in Ukraine, and it gained renewed fervor because of his candidacy in the 2020 presidential election. The Chairmen’s investigation is the result of Russian attempts to influence the 2020 presidential election and benefit President Trump’s reelection by denigrating Vice President Biden and manipulating U.S. political institutions to aid in efforts to weaken U.S. democracy and national security.

**No Evidence of Wrongdoing by Vice President Biden:**
The Chairmen’s investigation, which includes more than 50 hours of transcribed interviews of 10 witnesses and the review of thousands of pages of documents from federal agencies, does not support the premise that Hunter Biden’s position on the board of Burisma created a conflict of interest that impacted United States foreign policy. Instead, the investigation has uncovered ample evidence to the contrary, which shows that Hunter Biden’s position on the board of Burisma had no effect whatsoever on United States foreign policy.

**The Chairmen’s Claims Mirror Claims of U.S.-Sanctioned Kremlin Agent – Andrii Derkach and Associate Andrii Telizhenko:**
The U.S. Treasury Department recently sanctioned “active Russian agent” Andrii Derkach, thereby exposing Russian-directed “malign influence campaigns and protecting
our upcoming elections from foreign interference.” The principal sources cited by the Chairmen, including Ukrainian national Andrii Telizhenko, have extensively promoted Derkach’s claims and are closely tied to Derkach collaborator and President Trump’s personal attorney Rudy Giuliani.

**Chairman Johnson Repeatedly Stated the Investigation’s Purpose is to Influence the 2020 Presidential Election:**
Chairman Johnson continues to explicitly, publicly state the purpose of this investigation is to “help Donald Trump win reelection” and provide “evidence about not voting for Vice President Biden.” The Office of the Director of National Intelligence recently assessed Russia’s election interference goals as one and the same – “to undermine former Vice President Biden’s candidacy” and “to boost President Trump’s candidacy.”

**No Evidence U.S.-Ukraine Policy Altered to Assist Hunter Biden:**
State Department communications and detailed, lengthy interviews with former and current officials clearly demonstrate that U.S. policy during the Obama Administration was not influenced in any manner to assist Burisma or Hunter Biden. Vice President Biden did not alter U.S. policies toward Ukraine in any way to benefit Burisma or his son. The evidence unanimously shows that the normal interagency policy process was driven solely by the national interest.

**No Evidence Vice President Biden Tried to Halt a Corruption Investigation:**
Vice President Joe Biden’s public condemnation of Ukraine’s Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin was a U.S foreign policy priority and was not, as the Majority alleges, an attempt to halt a corruption investigation into Burisma. State Department officials interviewed in this investigation explained that Shokin did not pursue corruption investigations against Burisma’s owner, effectively shielding the owner from prosecution, and that removing Shokin made an investigation into Burisma more, not less, likely. The Senate Ukraine Caucus, including Chairman Johnson himself, supported the United States policy advocating for the removal of Prosecutor General Shokin.

**No Evidence Any Official U.S. Government Action Favored Burisma:**
There is no evidence that any action of the U.S. government or any U.S. official was taken to benefit Burisma or Hunter Biden. On the contrary, emails obtained by the Committees indicate persistent, negative views among key officials and numerous complaints against the outreach of Burisma’s consulting firm Blue Star Strategies.
I. THE GOP INVESTIGATION ADVANCED RUSSIA’S ELECTION INTERFERENCE EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT TRUMP

The Chairmen’s investigation is based on conspiracy theories with roots in Russian disinformation efforts – that Ukraine and not Russia interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and that Hunter Biden’s connection with Ukrainian energy company Burisma influenced former Vice President Biden’s actions and U.S. foreign policy. These types of theories were used by Russian intelligence to obscure their interference in the 2016 election, as well as by Republicans to defend President Trump during impeachment proceedings, despite having no basis in fact.

Russian efforts to interfere in our elections continue to this day and include efforts to undermine former Vice President Biden’s candidacy. Chairmen Johnson and Grassley’s own investigation has revealed Russian attempts to discredit Vice President Biden through the Hunter Biden conspiracy theory, dating back to at least 2015. Former State Department Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs Amos Hochstein recalled in transcribed interviews before the Committees that in November 2015 Hunter Biden’s “membership on the board of Burisma had come up in the Russian propaganda machine.” Mr. Hochstein further explained in his testimony, that Russian outlets began arguing Hunter Biden had a “conflict of interest” in order to “create some kind of rift” and “undermine the U.S. efforts” in Ukraine:

A: [W]e, the government, had seen increased traffic in Russian language in pro-Moscow outlets that were trying to create some kind of rift between the U.S. and Ukraine or to undermine the U.S. efforts, and that they were using Hunter Biden's name in those articles to sow that doubt. With the Vice President traveling, we were starting to organize towards traveling, I wanted to make my boss aware of what was happening on the ground, so that he knows what the Russian effort was.

Q: Was anything raised in those articles untrue?
A: Yes.

Q: What was untrue?
A: The articles argued that the presence of Hunter Biden was a conflict of interest. They were trying to say that our government’s efforts were hypocritical. It followed a common

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1 For example, State Department emails show a series of conversations in December 2015 involving State Department officials and discussing a negative article from Prodrobnosti.biz titled, “The Ukrainian scam of the Biden Family” discussing Vice President Joe Biden and his son Hunter. A State Department official stated they were “absolutely sure” the article “originated from a Russian website” and not the Ukrainian TV channel it was sourced to.”1 Additional emails noted that officials spoke with the head programming at the Ukrainian TV channel who confirmed the article was not genuine,1 that Podrobnosti.biz was a “junk website” registered in Crimea, and the intent of the article included an attempt to “pour mud over VP and piss him off before this important visit.” Alan Purcell email to Geoffrey Pyatt – Subject Podrobnosti article December 6, 2015 (State Department Production #0004714); Alan Purcell email to Geoffrey Pyatt – Subject Podrobnosti article December 6, 2015 (State Department Production #0004714).

line of Russian propaganda, not just in Ukraine but that everything the United States does is hypocritical.⁵

Mr. Hochstein also testified that in 2015, Hunter Biden also reached out for his views on Burisma and its owner, Mykola Zlochevsky. In response, Mr. Hochstein “shared with him that the Russians were using his name in order to sow disinformation – attempt to sow disinformation among Ukrainians.”⁴

Then-Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt also stated in his interview with the Committees that the theory Hunter Biden’s position at Burisma undermined anti-corruption efforts in Ukraine was Russian disinformation:

Q: And the argument that Hunter Biden’s position on the board of Burisma corrupted U.S. anti-corruption efforts in Ukraine, do you include that as part of the Russian disinformation narrative?

A: Yes, of course. And it’s of a pattern with lots of other Russian disinformation. … This is a toolkit which Russia is using across Europe to undermine security and advance their perceived interests.⁵

Ambassador Pyatt also agreed the allegation that Vice President Biden committed corrupt acts in Ukraine was a “false narrative,” and linked this narrative directly to the release of tapes by Andrii Derkach:

Q: Is the narrative that Vice President Biden’s actions in the Ukraine were corrupt, is that a false narrative?

A: Yes, it is. And I think you only need to look at what Secretary Pompeo said about Derkach, what Treasury said about Derkach, and their contemporaneous release of privileged telephone conversations between the Vice President and President Poroshenko by Derkach to understand what’s referred to there.⁶

Russian-backed propaganda – now confirmed by Trump Administration officials – is central to the Chairmen’s claims. By publicly pursuing investigations based on these widely discredited claims, Chairmen Johnson and Grassley are using Senate Committee and taxpayer resources to reinforce the same conspiracy theories and false narratives promoted by Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin.

A. Putin and the Kremlin Support the GOP’s Ukraine Conspiracy Theories

Although Chairman Johnson repeatedly voiced support for U.S. policy in Ukraine as a member of the Senate Ukraine Caucus, his public positions changed after President Trump and his allies

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⁢ Id. p. 58.
⁴ Id. p. 49.
⁵ HSGAC-SFC Interview of Geoffrey Pyatt (Sep. 22, 2020) p. 115.
⁶ Id. pp. 117-118.
began pushing unfounded allegations that it was the government of Ukraine, not Russia, who interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. On July 20, 2017, Chairman Grassley wrote a letter to the Department of Justice (DOJ) asserting that “Ukrainian government officials tried to help Hillary Clinton and undermine Trump.” In support of this assertion, Chairman Grassley referenced a 2016 Financial Times story that the bipartisan Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded was almost certainly arranged by a Russian intelligence asset with close ties to Paul Manafort.

On September 27, 2019, Chairmen Johnson and Grassley wrote another letter to Attorney General Barr alleging Ukrainian election interference, stating:

> Ukrainian efforts, abetted by a U.S. political party, to interfere in the 2016 election should not be ignored. Such allegations of corruption deserve due scrutiny.”

On November 20, 2019, President Putin told a forum in Moscow he was pleased with the “political battles” in Washington: “Thank God no one is accusing us of interfering in the U.S. elections anymore, now they’re accusing Ukraine.” Russia had already been disseminating unfounded allegations of Ukrainian election interference for several years. On February 2, 2017, Putin stated during a news conference:

> [A]s we all know, during the presidential campaign in the United States, the Ukrainian government adopted a unilateral position in favour of one candidate. More than that, certain oligarchs, certainly with the approval of the political leadership, funded this candidate, or female candidate, to be more precise.

The U.S. Intelligence Community, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Special Counsel Robert Mueller have all concluded Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election in support of President Trump’s candidacy, while finding no credible evidence of Ukrainian election interference. The January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment found, “Putin and

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13 SSCI Russian Interference Report Vol. 5.
the Russian Government aspired to help President-elect Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to him.” The assessment also warned Russia’s aggressive interference efforts should be considered the “new normal” since Russian intelligence considered 2016 “at least a qualified success because of their perceived ability to impact public discussion.”

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence also thoroughly investigated allegations of Ukrainian election interference but found no evidence of a top-down campaign akin to the Kremlin’s efforts in 2016. The Committee’s bipartisan report concluded “during the course of the investigation, the Committee identified no reliable evidence that the Ukrainian government interfered in the 2016 U.S. election.”

U.S. intelligence and national security officials have repeatedly pushed back on the conspiracy theory that Ukraine interfered in the 2016 presidential election and warned the narrative promotes Russian interests and disinformation. Dr. Fiona Hill served as the Trump Administration’s top Russia advisor on the National Security Council. Testifying before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Dr. Hill explained the “result of all of these narratives” is “exactly what the Russian government was hoping for.”

Dr. Hill also directly implored Republican lawmakers at the impeachment hearing to stop spreading the “fictional narrative” of Ukraine conspiracy theories championed by Russia:

Some of you on this committee appear to believe that Russia and its security services did not conduct a campaign against our country and that perhaps, somehow, for some reason, Ukraine did … This is a fictional narrative that has been perpetrated and propagated by the Russian security services.

On December 9, 2019, FBI Director Christopher Wray also stated during an interview that we “have no information that indicates that Ukraine interfered with the 2016 presidential election” and that it’s “important for the American people to be thoughtful consumers of information and to think about the sources of it and to think about the support and predication for what they hear.” He added, “as far as the [2020] election itself goes, we think Russia represents the most significant threat.”

16 Id.
19 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on Impeachment Inquiry: Dr. Hill (Nov. 21, 2019).
20 Id.
21 Id.
23 Id.
As discussed in detail below, Russia is already engaged in an active effort to interfere in the 2020 U.S. Presidential election – promoting the same false allegations pertaining to Vice President Biden and his son that have been amplified by the Chairmen for the past several months.

B. GOP Allegations Originate From Sources Closely Tied to Kremlin and Promoting Russian Interests

Chairmen Johnson and Grassley’s allegations against former Vice President Biden rely primarily on sources promoting Russian interests. They have amplified information from sources with direct links to the Kremlin and who are working directly with President Trump’s close allies.

On November 6, 2019, the Chairmen sent a letter to Secretary Pompeo for documents to “better understand what actions, if any, the Obama Administration took to ensure that policy decisions relating to Ukraine and Burisma were not improperly influenced by the employment and financial interests of family members.” 24 On December 3, the Chairmen also sent a letter to Blue Star Strategies to investigate “actual or apparent conflicts of interest because of Hunter Biden’s role” and “whether Hunter Biden or his associates had any role” in formulating the Obama Administration’s Ukraine policies. 25 These allegations are based on the same corruption allegations against Vice President Biden that are promoted by foreign nationals linked to Russian disinformation efforts.

In promoting these allegations, the Chairmen have provided a successful platform for the foreign disinformation campaign of known Russian agent Andrii Derkach and two related sources: (1) Andrii Telizhenko, a former low-ranking Ukrainian embassy official against whom the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) raised national security concerns, and (2) John Solomon, the author of a series of opinion columns in The Hill that prompted an internal investigation for distortions.

1. GOP Investigation is Outcome of Derkach’s Election Interference Efforts

The Russian-backed propaganda of Ukrainian lawmaker Andrii Derkach is central to the Chairmen’s claims. Andrii Derkach is a pro-Russian member of Ukraine’s parliament who has been identified by the U.S. government as an active Russian agent. 26 Mr. Derkach attended the Dzerzhinsky Higher School of the KGB in Moscow and his father served as a KGB officer for

decades before becoming head of independent Ukraine’s intelligence service in the late 1990s. Mr. Derkach, like the Chairmen, has falsely alleged that Vice President Biden pressured then-Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko to remove then-Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin in order to protect Hunter Biden.

In an August 7, 2020 statement, William Evanina, Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), specifically cited the actions of “pro-Russia Ukrainian parliamentarian Andrii Derkach” as an example of Russian election interference efforts, stating that Mr. Derkach is “spreading claims about corruption – including through publicizing leaked phone calls – to undermine former Vice President Biden’s candidacy and the Democratic Party.”

This month, the Department of Treasury imposed sanctions on Mr. Derkach for promoting the same unfounded claims against Vice President Biden as the Majority report, noting Mr. Derkach was an “active Russian agent for over a decade.” The Treasury Department also explained Mr. Derkach’s “false and unsubstantiated narratives” have spurred corruption investigations in “the United States designed to culminate prior to election day” – including targeting “members of the U.S. government.”

From at least late 2019 through mid-2020, Derkach waged a covert influence campaign centered on cultivating false and unsubstantiated narratives concerning U.S. officials in the upcoming 2020 Presidential Election, spurring corruption investigations in both Ukraine and the United States designed to culminate prior to election day. Derkach’s unsubstantiated narratives were pushed in Western media through coverage of press conferences and other news events, including interviews and statements.

Between May and July 2020, Derkach released edited audio tapes and other unsupported information with the intent to discredit U.S. officials, and he levied unsubstantiated allegations against U.S. and international political figures. Derkach almost certainly targeted the U.S. voting populace, prominent U.S. persons, and members of the U.S. government, based on his reliance on U.S. platforms, English-language documents and videos, and pro-Russian lobbyists in the United States used to propagate his claims.

That same day, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo released his own statement on the sanctions, highlighting the fact that Mr. Derkach’s efforts were directed by the Kremlin:

Treasury designated Andrii Derkach pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13848, for his efforts to influence the 2020 U.S. presidential election. Derkach maintains close ties to

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30 Id.
Russian intelligence and sought to influence the views of American voters through a Russian-directed covert influence campaign centered on manipulating the American political process to advance Russia’s malign interests in Ukraine. This operation was designed to culminate prior to Election Day.\(^\text{31}\)

Former Special Envoy for International Energy Affairs Amos Hochstein worked closely with Vice President Biden to combat anti-corruption issues in Ukraine. In a transcribed interview before the Committees, he explained that he was “very familiar” with the allegations from the Chairmen’s investigation since he was aware of “pro-Russian forces” such as Mr. Derkach and efforts “to take fringe allegations and put them into the mainstream”:

Q: What was your reaction when you first learned about the purpose of the Chairmen's investigation?

A: Well, beyond surprise. Look, I think there had been a lot of propaganda over the previous year about so-called wrongdoings that were all made up. I was aware that Russia was trying to influence the U.S. elections. I was aware that those same efforts were working in concert with people that were close to the White House to besmirch the reputation and record of the Vice President in any way that they could. So I guess I felt regret that I was getting pulled into an investigation that I thought was, at that time seemed very familiar and resonated with everything that had been going on, and efforts of Russia and pro-Russian forces to take fringe allegations and put them into the mainstream.

Q: What do you mean when you say it was “familiar”?

A: Well, when I was in the Obama Administration I worked a lot on anti-corruption issues in Ukraine and elsewhere, and when I left the Administration I continued to do some work on that. And so I was aware of the things like with Mr. Derkach and Ukraine was doing and some other oligarchs.\(^\text{32}\)

Mr. Hochstein highlighted his concerns about “the laundering of information” from someone like Mr. Derkach, who comes from “a KGB family” and “who has no credibility in Ukraine.” He explained how Mr. Derkach’s discredited theories in Ukraine have now made their way “into the mainstream discussions of U.S. policy”:

A: And the pattern that concerns me is that it's the laundering of information when someone who has no credibility in Ukraine, let alone anywhere else, well known to be – and I had known of Mr. Derkach for a long time. I've never had the pleasure of meeting him, but he is a – comes from a long – from a KGB family and a pro-Russian Ukrainian lawmaker. The pattern that concerns me is that I don't really care what he says in Ukraine. It doesn't bother me. Nobody believes him in Ukraine.


\(^\text{32}\) HSGAC-SFC Interview of Amos Hochstein (Sep. 17, 2020) p. 61.
What bothers me is that it seems that more people in the United States believe him than people who know him in Ukraine believe him. There, he's discredited, and here, his information, sometimes in a direct leap and sometimes through a stop on the way, gets into the mainstream discussions of U.S. policy. That concerns me, and I think he is following the – I believe that he has always followed the proceedings in the United States and tried to influence that.33

Mr. Hochstein added he was “disappointed and sad” to see the same Russian propaganda allegations that “usually came from noncredible sources” instead come from the United States Senate:

A: [S]o that's what I mean when I say “familiar.” I had heard these allegations before, except that they usually came from noncredible sources. I was rather disappointed and sad to see that it was coming from more mainstream, as in the United States Senate, which I hold in great regard and great esteem.34

During his press conferences, Mr. Derkach has favorably identified Chairmen Johnson and Grassley as part of a group of those uncovering an international conspiracy of corruption spearheaded by Vice President Biden and George Soros.35 He identifies the Chairmen in his conspiratorial disinformation flowchart “DemoCorruption” as “Accusers of international corruption in the USA” while identifying himself and Andrii Telizhenko as “Accusers of international corruption in Ukraine.” Mr. Derkach has further claimed to have provided information to the Chairmen’s Committees.36 The Chairmen deny receiving information directly from Mr. Derkach.

2. Star Witness Telizhenko Has Close Ties to Derkach and Causes National Security Concerns

Andrii Telizhenko is a conservative political consultant and former employee of Blue Star Strategies (“Blue Star”), the Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s office, and the Ukrainian embassy.37 He became the Majority’s central and only witness promoting the unsubstantiated claims that Ukraine interfered in the 2016 U.S. election and that former Vice President Biden or his son unduly influenced U.S. foreign policy toward Ukraine.38 Claims made by Mr. Telizhenko, either directly to the Chairmen or to the press, were cited in letters by the Chairmen 42 times during the course of this investigation.39 Notably, this investigation has uncovered no proof of his

33 Id. pp. 75-77.
34 Id. p. 61.
36 Id.
37 Id.
allegations. Mr. Telizhenko traffics in the same debunked conspiracy theories as Andrii Derkach, including those pertaining to Vice President Biden.

Mr. Telizhenko has engaged in the same methods as Mr. Derkach to interfere in the 2020 U.S. presidential election. In an August 2020 statement, the ODNI cited Andrii Derkach’s release of “leaked phone calls” between Vice President Biden and Ukrainian President Poroshenko as an example of Russian election interference efforts. Both Mr. Derkach and Mr. Telizhenko released leaked records of alleged phone calls between former Vice President Biden and former Ukrainian President Poroshenko on the same day – specifically, the day before Chairman Johnson’s scheduled vote to subpoena records related to Mr. Telizhenko.40

Mr. Telizhenko has actively amplified Mr. Derkach’s claims in Ukrainian and American media. He has appeared on several Ukrainian television programs to discuss the leaked phone calls released by Mr. Derkach.41 Furthermore, Mr. Telizhenko provided an English-language voiceover translation for Mr. Derkach’s claims in an interview with Rudy Giuliani.42 In the Treasury Department’s September 10, 2020 statement regarding Mr. Derkach’s election interference efforts, the Department refers specifically to Mr. Derkach’s use of “English-language documents and videos” – by translating Mr. Derkach’s claims, Mr. Telizhenko has helped produce Russian disinformation for an American audience.43

Both Mr. Derkach and Mr. Telizhenko have appeared in the same media outlets promoting the same debunked conspiracy theories pertaining to Vice President Biden. For instance, as discussed below, both Mr. Derkach and Mr. Telizhenko appeared in a documentary series on One America News (OAN), a network with ties to Russian state-owned media.44 Unsurprisingly,

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41 E.g., Pravo na Vladu Interview of Andrii Telizhenko (May 21, 2020) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tlqy5tvjkX8; Chornomors’ka Teleradiokompaniya Interview of Andrii Telizhenko (June 10, 2020) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1FsRAAsKHgU; NewsOne Interview of Andrii Telizhenko (June 24, 2020) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tlqy5tvjkX8.
Mr. Derkach has identified not only Chairmen Johnson and Grassley but also Mr. Telizhenko as a fellow accuser of the “DemoCorruption” allegedly spearheaded by Vice President Biden.

During the Committees’ transcribed interview of George Kent, the State Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, he identified Mr. Telizhenko as “a liar.”

Mr. Telizhenko’s former employers at Blue Star also described him as unreliable and not credible. Chief Executive Officer Karen Tramontano said, “the information he provided was, you know, conspiratorial in nature and unfounded” and Chief Operating Officer Sally Painter noted “he makes things up and has another agenda.”

Mr. Telizhenko has links with additional corrupt and pro-Russia foreign nationals. Mr. Telizhenko reportedly worked for at least two unseemly Ukrainians. One was a politician who was stripped of his Ukrainian citizenship and investigated by Ukrainian authorities for treason after he was accused of “conspiring with Russia to commit ‘subversive acts against Ukraine,’” by advancing a pro-Russian proposal to legitimize Russia’s occupation of the Crimean peninsula. The other was an oligarch who had reportedly been a potential business partner to Donald Trump in a Moscow tower project. Mr. Telizhenko has also been accused of corruption. An editor for a Ukrainian magazine also recently accused Mr. Telizhenko of offering him a cash bribe to lobby Republican elected officials on behalf of pro-Russian media outlets in Ukraine.

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45 HSGAC-SFC Interview of George Kent (July 24, 2020) p. 85.
In July 2019, Chairman Johnson and his staff spent over five hours meeting with Mr. Telizhenko to discuss an “unsubstantiated claim that the Democratic National Committee worked with the Ukrainian government in 2016 to gather incriminating information about Paul Manafort.” Mr. Telizhenko’s actions have since raised additional security concerns with U.S. officials. He was cited by the bipartisan Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report in a discussion of efforts by Paul Manafort and a Russian intelligence asset to spread disinformation on Ukraine – two months prior to meeting with Chairman Johnson – although specific details remain classified: “For example, in late May 2019, Telizhenko claimed that the “black ledger” naming Manafort was a forgery solicited by the Obama administration.”

Subsequent to this meeting with Mr. Telizhenko, on September 27, 2019 the Chairmen wrote to Attorney General Barr to “follow up” on Chairman Grassley’s letter from over two years prior on “brazen efforts by the Democratic National Committee and Hillary Clinton campaign to use the government of Ukraine” to undermine the Trump campaign. The letter cited unsubstantiated claims by Mr. Telizhenko, and cast doubts on Ukrainian anti-corruption parliamentarian Serhiy Leshchenko and the “black ledger,” a document which detailed $12.7 million in alleged secret payments from the Party of Regions to Manafort.53 The Senate Select

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53 As summarized in Just Security, the essential veracity of the black ledger has held up over time. ‘Bank records described in an FBI search warrant, and reviewed by the Associated Press, confirmed that at least $1.2 million in payments listed in the records next to Manafort’s name were actually deposited in one of his firm’s bank accounts in Virginia…. Andrew Kramer, the New York Times foreign correspondent who first revealed the secret payments to Manafort, also reported at the time that others in Ukraine who were named in the ledger had confirmed that the records were genuine. As a BBC fact check on the ledger explained, ‘More than three years since it emerged, no one has managed to cast serious doubt on its contents.’ The Washington Post’s fact checker Glenn Kessler noted, ‘While some Republicans have suggested that the ledger was fake, Manafort’s defense lawyers did not make that argument.’” Just Security, Manafort’s Reward: Sen. Ron Johnson and the Ukraine Conspiracy Investigation: Part II (Aug. 24, 2020) https://www.justsecurity.org/72148/manafort-s-reward-sen-ron-johnson-and-the-ukraine-conspiracy-investigation-part-ii.
Committee on Intelligence report identified derogatory claims about Mr. Leshchenko and the “black ledger” to be part of Russian influence operations to undermine investigations into Russian interference.\textsuperscript{54}

On February 29, 2020, former Vice President Joe Biden decisively won the Democratic South Carolina primary, giving his campaign a decisive boost.\textsuperscript{55} The very next day, Chairman Johnson announced his intent to subpoena Mr. Telizhenko for documents and testimony, stating: “I am convinced obtaining Mr. Telizhenko’s Blue Star documents and information is an important part of this investigation.”\textsuperscript{56} In a letter of disapproval, Ranking Member Peters expressed his concern “that the United States Senate and this Committee could be used to further disinformation efforts by Russian or other actors,” and asked “for the Committee to receive defensive briefings – specifically regarding Mr. Telizhenko – from relevant intelligence community and law enforcement officials.”\textsuperscript{57}

On March 10, the FBI provided a classified briefing to staff on issues connected to the Telizhenko subpoena. The next day – an hour before the scheduled Committee vote – Chairman Johnson abruptly “postpone[ed]” the vote to subpoena Mr. Telizhenko out of “an abundance of caution.”\textsuperscript{58} Chairman Johnson acknowledged there was a “discrepancy” between the classified briefing and a previous unclassified briefing about Mr. Telizhenko.\textsuperscript{59}

The Telizhenko subpoena vote was never rescheduled and Chairman Johnson instead sought subpoenas for documents from Blue Star Strategies and testimony from its co-founders. However, according to Mr. Telizhenko he has remained in contact with Chairman Johnson’s staff in recent months answering questions over email and by phone.\textsuperscript{60}

\textbf{3. GOP Chairmen Repeatedly Cite Discredited Reporter’s Opinion Columns as Findings of Fact}

Chairmen Johnson and Grassley’s joint investigation letters rely heavily on opinion columns written by former The Hill writer John Solomon as factual evidence in support of their allegations. Mr. Solomon previously wrote “investigative” pieces, but The Hill began explicitly labeling him an “opinion contributor” in May 2018 after complaints from Mr. Solomon’s

\textsuperscript{54} SSCI Russian Interference Report Vol. 5, p. 106.
\textsuperscript{56} Letter from Chairman Johnson to HSGAC Committee Members (Mar. 1, 2020) https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2020-03-01%20RHJ%20Letter%20to%20HSGAC%20members.pdf.
\textsuperscript{57} Letter from Ranking Member Peters to Chairman Johnson (Feb. 27, 2020) https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/200227_Letter_Peters.pdf.
\textsuperscript{58} Letter from Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Ron Johnson, to Committee Members (March 11, 2020).
\textsuperscript{59} Id.
colleagues that his articles lacked context and rigor. As early as 2007, media critics have also questioned his work, noting a “history of bending the truth to his storyline” and “massaging facts to conjure phantom scandals.”

For example, on September 27, 2019, Chairmen Johnson and Grassley sent a letter relying entirely on Mr. Solomon’s opinion piece from the day prior regarding information they claimed “raises new questions” about Vice President Biden and Burisma. The letter recited the claims in Mr. Solomon’s opinion piece in detail, but presented as a credible news report with findings of fact:

A recent report described a note purporting to memorialize a meeting in Kiev between the Ukrainian Acting Prosecutor General, Yuriy Sevruk, and Burisma’s American legal team. Yuriy Sevruk was the temporary replacement for the Prosecutor General that Vice President Biden demanded be fired, Victor Shokin. … The article also reports that Ukrainian prosecutors have unsuccessfully been trying to get information to Justice Department officials since the summer of 2018, possibly including “[h]undreds of pages of never-released memos and documents… [that] conflict with Biden’s narrative” that his actions in Ukraine had nothing to do with his son’s connections to Burisma.

During his interview with the Committees, former Special Envoy for International Energy Affairs Amos Hochstein was asked about one of the Chairmen’s letters citing Mr. Solomon’s articles, and identifies Mr. Solomon as printing “information that comes from Russian forces” from “under his byline”:

Q: I'm just going to ask you about the block quote that's on page 2 of this document. It quotes Andrii Telizhenko from an article by John Solomon. Mr. Hochstein, who is John Solomon?

A: I think he is a – he is a – he's someone who publishes right-wing reports on different U.S. websites, usually – the ones that – I don't read a lot of them, but the ones that I've seen have been filled with information that comes from Russian forces.

Q: And why do you say that?

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64 Id.
A: I said only the ones that I've read regarding Ukraine have been ones where I would see things and hear things in Kyiv or coming out of Russia, and I would see them printed under his byline.\textsuperscript{65}

In 2019, Mr. Solomon published a series of opinion articles making various claims pertaining to Ukraine. On November 18, 2019, The Hill announced they would review 14 articles written by Solomon – including all of those cited by the Chairmen – after extensive criticism from State Department officials. Mr. Solomon’s work was so flawed that The Hill re-evaluated its own policies and guidelines. The Hill’s news team found Mr. Solomon used deeply unreliable and biased sources, amplifying an inaccurate narrative about the Bidens: “Solomon failed to identify important details about key Ukrainian sources, including the fact that they had been indicted or were under investigation. In other cases, the sources were his own attorneys.”\textsuperscript{66}

One source cited by Mr. Solomon was Konstantyn Kulyk, a former Ukrainian prosecutor.\textsuperscript{67} Mr. Kulyk has a long and well-known history of corruption and has appeared in several press conferences with Mr. Derkach, where the pair have spread Russian disinformation efforts intended to interfere in the 2020 U.S. presidential election.\textsuperscript{68} Mr. Solomon’s Ukrainian sources also included two former Ukrainian Prosecutor Generals Yuriy Lutsenko and Viktor Shokin – who were principal sources behind the unfounded allegations of corruption against former Vice President Biden. The Hill noted, “Like Lutsenko, Shokin’s reliability as a sources is in question.”\textsuperscript{69}

The Hill also concluded that “the central idea Solomon advanced about Ukraine and Biden was flawed in many ways and ‘disputed by officials in both Kyiv and Washington.’”\textsuperscript{70} The executive director of Ukraine’s nonprofit Anti-Corruption Action Centre specifically wrote a column to rebut one of Mr. Solomon’s articles that had falsely accused the anti-corruption organization of election interference efforts.\textsuperscript{71} WNYC referred to Mr. Solomon’s pieces as “a time-honored tradition of using American outlets to launder foreign propaganda” in “making accusations against a well-regarded anti-corruption activist.”\textsuperscript{72} State Department official Amos Hochstein also flatly asserted Mr. Solomon’s efforts – along with Andrii Derkach and Andrii Telizhenko –

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\textsuperscript{65} HSGAC-SFC Interview of Amos Hochstein (Sep. 17, 2020) p. 86.


\textsuperscript{69} Id.


were consistent with “Russian malign influence operations” in order to “undermine Vice President Biden’s candidacy and to ensure a Russian successful outcome in the U.S. election.”

4. Derkach Ally Giuliani Provided Biden Dirt to GOP Sources

Andrii Derkach has repeatedly met with President Trump’s personal attorney Rudy Giuliani and was a key source in Giuliani’s longstanding search for “Biden dirt” in Ukraine to damage former Vice President Joe Biden. The Chairmen’s primary sources – Andrii Telizhenko and John Solomon – were also in regular contact with and directly fed information from Mr. Giuliani.

In December 2019, Mr. Giuliani met with Mr. Derkach in Ukraine, where Mr. Derkach said he handed Mr. Giuliani documents on allegations related to Burisma, where Hunter Biden had previously served as a board member. Mr. Telizhenko reportedly traveled with Mr. Giuliani to Ukraine on the same trip. Earlier this year, Mr. Giuliani told the Washington Post that he knew Mr. Derkach “quite well” and had “been very helpful to me.” When asked if Mr. Derkach had provided him with materials, Mr. Giuliani responded, “Oh, my God, yeah.”

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73 HSGAC-SFC Interview of Amos Hochstein (Sep. 17, 2020) pp. 88-89.
During his December 2019 trip, Mr. Giuliani interviewed Mr. Derkach for a documentary series on OAN, a network that regularly features pro-Trump stories, obtained leaked recordings of alleged calls between Vice President Biden and Ukrainian President Poroshenko, and has repeatedly interviewed Mr. Derkach and repeated his claims. OAN also employs a journalist covering U.S. politics who is simultaneously paid by the Kremlin and writing for Sputnik – the Russian-owned news outlet that the U.S. intelligence community concluded assisted in Russia’s 2016 election interference operation.

Mr. Telizhenko has had repeated public and non-public contact with Rudy Giuliani, including multiple meetings over the past year in Mr. Giuliani’s personal office. In 2016, the former mayor flew Mr. Telizhenko to New York and interviewed him for five hours about his allegations. In November 2019, Mr. Telizhenko discussed his close relationship with Giuliani: “We’re friends now. He respects our country.” Mr. Telizhenko also traveled with Mr. Giuliani in December 2019 to participate in the OAN documentary. Mr. Giuliani indicated he was also a key source for John Solomon’s discredited Ukraine columns. In November 2019, he told the New York Times: “I really turned my stuff over to John Solomon.” Mr. Giuliani also said he encouraged Mr. Solomon to highlight information on the Bidens: “I said, ‘John, let’s make this as prominent as possible’ … ‘I’ll go on TV. You go on TV. You do columns.’”

Text messages provided by Mr. Giuliani associate Lev Parnas to Congress show Mr. Solomon in repeated contact with Mr. Giuliani. On May 7, 2019, Mr. Parnas texted, “We are at trump with Rudy and John Salomon [sic] and joe in private room.” An earlier text to Mr. Parnas also asks, “Any documents for us or are you going to keep working through Solomon?”

C. Republicans Admit Purpose of Investigation is to Attack Vice President Biden’s Candidacy for President

82 Id.
Chairman Johnson and other Republicans have acknowledged that this investigation seeks to attack former Vice President Joe Biden’s presidential candidacy and influence the 2020 presidential election in President Trump’s favor. On March 3, 2020, Vice President Biden won overwhelmingly in the Democratic primaries’ Super Tuesday elections and became the likely Democratic nominee.86

The next day, President Trump announced in an interview with Sean Hannity that an investigation portraying the Bidens as corrupt would be a central focus of his presidential campaign. He stated: “That will be a major issue in the campaign. I will bring that up all the time.”87

That same day, Chairman Johnson explained his plans to release an investigative report on Hunter Biden and Ukraine that would answer questions of a “Democratic primary voter” on Biden:

These are questions that Joe Biden has not adequately answered … [and] if I were a Democrat primary voter, I’d want these questions satisfactorily answered before I cast my final vote.88

President Trump immediately retweeted Chairman Johnson’s news: “NEW: Ron Johnson says he’ll likely release an interim report within next 1-2 months on his cmte’s Biden probe.”89

The Chairmen’s investigation targeting Hunter Biden is a transparent attempt to influence the U.S. presidential election by attempting to damage Vice President Biden. Senator Mitt Romney agreed it was “apparent on its face” that the election year Hunter Biden probe was politically motivated.90 Earlier this month, Senator Romney also stated: “It’s not the legitimate role of government, for Congress, or for taxpayer expense to be used in an effort to damage political opponents.”91

In August 2020, Chairman Johnson continued to explicitly state the intended purpose of his investigation: “I would think it would certainly help Donald Trump win reelection and certainly be pretty good, I would say, evidence about not voting for Vice President Biden.”92 He also stated on public radio that his investigation “should completely disqualify Biden from president.”93 Just last week, Chairman Johnson also declared on local radio of Joe Biden: “What

87 Id.
89 Tweet by @realdonaldtrump (Mar. 4, 2020) https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1235371634757861376
91 Associated Press, Romney says Biden probe 'not legitimate role of government' (Sep. 16, 2020)
https://apnews.com/F1de4eeb909548a1327967677799ee56d.
93 Id.
our investigations are uncovering I think will reveal that this is not somebody we should be electing president of the United States.”

D. No GOP Interest In Hunter Biden Allegations Until Impeachment and 2020 Presidential Campaign

The faulty basis of the investigation, coupled with the timing of the investigation, make it clear that it is motivated primarily to impact the November 2020 election and epitomizes its partisan nature. The Chairmen’s investigation, which sat dormant for months, regained momentum after former Vice President Joe Biden became a presidential candidate, and has since become even more active and targeted since he became the Democratic presidential nominee.

On May 12, 2014, Burisma’s announcement that Hunter Biden was joining the company’s Board of Directors was widely reported in the U.S. media. At that time, Chairman Johnson had the authority but chose not to investigate allegations of conflict of interest or possible corruption as the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation. Between January 2013 and April 2019, the Foreign Relations Committee held at least 35 hearings where corruption in Ukraine was discussed and witnesses relevant to corruption in Ukraine were questioned. Chairman Johnson never raised any concerns about Hunter Biden’s position on the board of Burisma at the 16 hearings about Ukraine that he attended after Hunter Biden’s employment by Burisma. In fact, at a June 2014 Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Ukraine, Johnson stated: “If we have to tie aid or help to make sure that anti-corruption laws are passed, I think we should do that.”

Speaking about his time as Ambassador to Ukraine, Geoffrey Pyatt told the Committees about his close relationship with Congress, and with Chairman Johnson in particular, during his time in Ukraine:

A: I can tell you I made it a habit when I was Ambassador to go up on the Hill, and I still do. Every time I'm in Washington, I offer myself up to the Foreign Relations Committee. . . . I probably had more meetings with Senator Johnson than just about any other member of the Foreign Relations Committee on the Republican side. And I'm very grateful for the support he's provided and the interest that he's shown in my work as Ambassador. And we certainly would have talked about these issues.

Q: And when you say "these issues," what are you referring to?

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96 Chairman Johnson was present at 20 of these 35 hearings and was not recorded as present at the remaining 15 hearings.
97 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, Developments in Ukraine (June 5, 2014) S. Hrg. 113-525.
A: The agenda of anti-corruption. And as I said, you know, the broad agenda as described in this briefing memo and many other places of helping the Ukrainian people to build the kind of society that they deserve.98

The lockstep timing of the Committees’ investigative steps with political and electoral events also raises concerns. In 2017, Chairman Grassley first wrote to the Department of Justice seeking information related to allegations pertaining to the Democratic National Committee, Ukraine, and the 2016 election.99 The Chairmen did not follow up on this letter until more than two years later on September 27, 2019 – just two days after the release of a phone call between President Trump and Ukrainian President Zelensky and one day after the release of a related Intelligence Community (IC) whistleblower complaint alleging wrongdoing by the President.100

The Chairmen’s first request pertaining to Hunter Biden occurred on November 6, 2019 – amidst active impeachment proceedings in the House of Representatives.101 The Chairmen proceeded to send letters during high-profile moments of the impeachment proceedings, including public hearing testimony and the day of the House Intelligence Committee’s release of its impeachment report.102 Chairmen Johnson and Grassley also requested records about Hunter Biden from the Secret Service hours after the Senate’s vote to acquit President Trump in the impeachment trial.103

Moreover, despite statements that he intends to keep “information-gathering on these matters largely outside the public spotlight,” Chairman Johnson has issued six press releases outlining in detail their efforts to pursue this investigation, along with frequent media appearances and public statements by the Chairman.104

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II. OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE REVEALS NO GOVERNMENT IMPROPRIETY IN U.S.-UKRAINE POLICY

Chairman Johnson and Chairman Grassley’s investigation purportedly seeks to “better understand what actions, if any, the Obama Administration took to ensure that policy decisions relating to Ukraine and Burisma were not improperly influenced.”\(^\text{105}\) The Majority staff investigation found no evidence of improper influence. Despite more than 36,000 pages of records and internal communications from the State Department, Treasury Department, and the National Archives and Records Administration, and 50 hours of interviews with ten witnesses, the Majority’s investigation found no evidence to support the Chairmen’s insinuations that Hunter Biden’s position on the board of Burisma unduly influenced any U.S. policy regarding Ukraine.

To the contrary, the overwhelming evidence before the Committees indicates a whole-of-government U.S.-Ukraine policy was reached through the normal interagency process involving numerous layers of career and political officials. Every relevant witness told the Committees that the actions taken by the U.S. Government regarding Ukraine were proper and that Hunter Biden’s role was not a factor in any policy decision.

The investigation found no evidence to support the Majority’s theory that former Vice President Biden supported removing Ukraine’s top prosecutor in order to stop a corruption investigation into Burisma. The investigation in fact documented the opposite to be true. Removing the scandal-ridden Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin was widely understood to be an anti-corruption reform measure and vocally supported, at the time, in the United States – including by Chairman Johnson – and across the Western geopolitical alliance.\(^\text{106}\) Removing Mr. Shokin was intended to enable the Prosecutor General’s office to crack down on corruption in Ukraine, including at Burisma.\(^\text{107}\)

A. U.S. Policy in Ukraine Was Not Influenced By and Did Not Benefit Hunter Biden

The investigation uncovered no evidence demonstrating that Hunter Biden’s role at Burisma negatively affected the United States’ Ukraine policy. To the contrary, witnesses consistently testified that policy decisions were not made to benefit Hunter Biden.

1. Former Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt Confirms Hunter Biden’s role “had zero impact” on his Ukraine Work

\(^{105}\) Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Ron Johnson and Senate Finance Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley Letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (December 3, 2019).


Then-Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt emphasized that Hunter Biden’s role on Burisma’s board “had zero impact on my work” and that “there was no time at which Hunter Biden’s employment in any way compromised my ability to do my job effectively.”\textsuperscript{108} Ambassador Pyatt confirmed “the normal policy process” was followed, not a special instruction from Vice President Biden:

Q: So this was not an instruction that came from the Vice President outside of any regular channel.

A: I never saw Vice President Biden operate in any way outside of the normal policy process.\textsuperscript{109}

Ambassador Pyatt explained that while Vice President Biden was “the leading voice” for the Administration’s Ukraine policy, he was “just one part of a large interagency policy”:

A: [T]he Vice President was the leading voice for the administration's policy as part of a large interagency team that helped to mobilize the U.S. Government in response to Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked invasion and occupation of Ukraine, the first time that that had happened in the history of the post-World War II security order in Europe. But it was a whole-of-Government effort. …

Q: So how did Vice President Biden's leading role on U.S.-Ukraine policy, how did that work with the role of Secretary of State John Kerry during that time period?

A: So we were part of a large interagency enterprise. Most U.S. foreign policy is driven at the embassy level by the country team, so I had my Deputy, my State Department colleagues, my CIA, FBI, Department of Justice, USAID. … So there was a lot of interagency process. The Vice President was a very important voice in that process, but he was just one part of a large interagency policy.\textsuperscript{110}

Ambassador Pyatt also dismissed the claim that the policy to remove Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin was to assist Hunter Biden:

Q: So was the policy advocating for the dismissal of Prosecutor General Shokin formulated by Vice President Biden in an effort to assist his son?

A: No. As I said, it was formulated by the interagency process in all of its glory.\textsuperscript{111}

2. Amos Hochstein, Former Special Envoy for International Energy Affairs, Knows “for a fact” Vice President Biden Allegations Untrue

\textsuperscript{108} HSGAC-SFC Interview of Geoffrey Pyatt (Sep. 22, 2020) p. 85, 88.
\textsuperscript{109} Id. p. 66.
\textsuperscript{110} Id. pp. 15-16.
\textsuperscript{111} Id. p. 63.
During his interview, former State Department Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs Amos Hochstein repeatedly and unequivocally emphasized he knows “for a fact” that the allegations of Hunter Biden’s position on the board of Burisma affecting U.S. policy or presenting even a potential conflict of interest were untrue – due to his deep involvement with former Vice President Biden on anti-corruption matters in Ukraine:

Q: Did a potential conflict of interest related to Hunter Biden influence Obama Administration policy decisions with respect to Ukraine and Burisma Holdings?

A: Not at all.

Q: You sound very confident in that answer. Why?

A: I was involved in one part of the U.S. policy towards Ukraine. I accompanied Vice President Biden to Ukraine. I traveled to Ukraine independently. I was in close contact with other officials from the Department of Defense, Department of State, and the White House on the formulation of U.S. policy towards Ukraine in discussion with the Secretary of State. And never was the word “Burisma” raised. The presence of Hunter Biden on the board of Burisma never factored into it.112

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A: I was working very closely with the Vice President on corruption matters in Ukraine. I was working in concert with other officials from the U.S. Government. We were never working in isolation or in a dark room. We were all discussing this on a regular basis and coordinating our efforts and strategies. So I know for a fact that these allegations are untrue.

When somebody says that the Vice President wanted to fire Shokin to support his son, I know it's not true. Now I know it because I was there. I was on that trip. I was in meetings before. I know who else was calling for the firing of Shokin. I know that it wasn't the Vice President's view alone. I know that it was called for by other international financial institutions, other governments. So the idea that firing, or calling for reforms in the Prosecutor General Office culminating in the removal of him was a coordinated, multi-stakeholder effort, and therefore the plausibility that that was somehow manipulated all for a tiny little company called Burisma that Hunter Biden was on the board of, for somebody like me that was there, I know that it's not true. … I can tell you (1) I was there, (2) it was multilateral, (3) it was an interagency, (4) it had no material effect on Burisma itself or on Mr. Zlochevsky.113

Mr. Hochstein also explained how “the biggest fear in Ukraine then and now among the oligarchs and the corruption machine was Vice President Biden and the team around him that

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112 HSGAC-SFC Interview of Amos Hochstein (Sep. 17, 2020) p. 90.
113 Id. p. 101.
He added that the conflict of interest allegation stemmed from such “maligned influencers” who “feared the anti-corruption efforts” of Vice President Biden:

[T]here is no basis in fact to suggest any conflict of interest, not even a perception, successful perception. Just maligned influencers from outside Ukraine and corrupt oligarchs who feared the anti-corruption efforts by the Vice President and several of us working under his direction.\(^\text{115}\)

3. **During his Interview, George Kent Thoroughly Discredited the Allegations against Vice President Biden, Consistent with his Previous Sworn Testimony**

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent testified that although he had concerns about Hunter Biden’s role “it was not an issue of programs and policies of the U.S. Government.”\(^\text{116}\) Mr. Kent stated Hunter Biden and his associates had no role in the formulation of U.S. policy, and any potential conflict of interest resulting from Hunter Biden’s role did not influence U.S. policy decisions. In his written opening statement, Mr. Kent discussed raising his concern of a potential “perception of a conflict of interest” but also emphasized no “U.S. official shield[ed] Burisma from scrutiny” as a result:

Later, I became aware that Hunter Biden was on the board of Burisma. Soon after that, in a briefing call with the national security staff in the Office of the Vice President, in February 2015, I raised my concern that Hunter Biden’s status as board member could create the perception of a conflict of interest. Let me be clear, however: I did not witness any efforts by any U.S. official to shield Burisma from scrutiny. In fact, I and other U.S. officials consistently advocated reconstituting a scuttled investigation of Zlochevsky, Burisma’s founder, as well as holding the corrupt prosecutors who closed the case to account.\(^\text{117}\)

Mr. Kent also testified he was aware of no evidence to suggest that Vice President Biden altered U.S. foreign policy to benefit his son:

Q: Mr. Kent, was the foreign policy that Vice President Biden pursued in Ukraine intended to advance the interests of the United States of America?

A: **It was.**

Q: Are the narratives that suggest otherwise false?

A: As I’ve testified, I know of no facts to support those claims.

\(^{114}\) *Id.* p. 91.

\(^{115}\) *Id.* pp. 159-160.

\(^{116}\) HSGAC-SFC Interview of George Kent (July 24, 2020) p. 226.

\(^{117}\) HSGAC-SFC Interview of George Kent (July 24, 2020) (Opening Statement).
Q: Did a conflict of interest influence Obama Administration policy decisions with respect to Ukraine and Burisma Holdings?

A: In my view, no.

Q: Was the foreign policy pursued by Vice President Biden in Ukraine corrupt?

A: The foreign policy that Vice President Biden helped advance was to counter corruption.

Q: Did Vice President Biden alter United States Government foreign policy concerning Ukraine to assist his son?

A: I have no evidence to suggest that, no.

Q: As you have previously testified to, did you witness any efforts by any U.S. official to shield Burisma from scrutiny?

A: As I said in my opening statement and repeated, no.\(^\text{118}\)

Mr. Kent also affirmed that removing Viktor Shokin was the official policy of the U.S. Government, not a decision made by Vice President Biden to benefit his son:

Q: So it was your view at the time that removing Shokin would advance the reform effort that the United States Government was pursuing.

A: That was the position of the United States Government.

Q: So was the policy advocating for the dismissal of Prosecutor General Shokin formulated by Vice President Biden in an effort to assist his son?

A: No.\(^\text{119}\)

Mr. Kent also agreed that Hunter Biden’s position at Burisma did not influence the decisions made by U.S. officials at the Ukrainian embassy:

Q: [Y]ou testified in the last hour that Hunter Biden's role on the board had zero impact on the decision of the Embassy, and that Hunter Biden's role was irrelevant. And you know that because you were one of the decision-makers. Correct?

A: That's correct.

Q: And you advised the Embassy on the decisions with respect to America's policy in Ukraine. You executed the decisions with respect to America's foreign policy in the

\(^{118}\) Id. pp. 69-70.

\(^{119}\) Id. p. 72.
Ukraine. You advised the Ambassador, and you worked with the Vice President's Office as well on those decisions.

A: That's correct.

Q: And again, on that basis, you know, for a fact, that Hunter Biden's role on the board had zero impact on the decisions of the Embassy.

A: To the best of my experience and knowledge that is correct.120

4. **David Wade, Former Chief of Staff to Secretary of State John Kerry, also Categorically Rejected the Allegation that Hunter Biden’s Position at Burisma Involved Corruption or Influenced U.S. Ukraine Policy**

David Wade, former Chief of Staff to Secretary of State John Kerry testified to the Committees that Hunter Biden’s role at Burisma had no influence on Obama Administration policy decisions. He further stated he “never heard the words ‘Hunter Biden’ in any discussion about Ukraine.”121

Q: Mr. Wade, from what you observed, did Hunter Biden’s role on the board of Burisma influence the Obama Administration policy decisions with respect to Ukraine and Burisma holdings?

A: I never heard the words “Hunter Biden” in any discussion about Ukraine that I was ever privy to.

Q: From what you observed, was foreign policy pursued by the State Department in Ukraine corrupt in any way?

A: No.

Q: Based upon what you observed, did the State Department alter the United States Government’s foreign policy concerning Ukraine to assist the Vice President’s son?

A: No, not even a little bit.122

5. **Catherine Novelli former Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment,Testified that She Knew of no U.S. Government Actions Taken to Benefit Hunter Biden or Burisma**

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120 *Id.* p. 132.

121 HSGAC-SFC Interview of State Department Chief of Staff David Wade (Aug. 3, 2020) p. 53.

122 *Id.*
Catherine Novelli, former Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment during the Obama Administration, testified that she knew of no U.S. Government actions taken with the intent to benefit Hunter Biden or Burisma:

Q: Did you take any actions related to U.S. policy in Ukraine intended to benefit Hunter Biden?
A: No.

Q: Are you aware of any U.S. official who took any action related to U.S. policy in Ukraine intended to benefit Hunter Biden?
A: I am – I have no awareness.

Q: Are you aware of any wrongdoing by the Obama Administration related to Hunter Biden's position on the board of Burisma?
A: I have no awareness.

Q: Ms. Novelli, was the foreign policy that Vice President Biden pursued in Ukraine intended to advance the interests of the United States of America?
A: Everybody who worked on Ukraine was trying to advance the interests of the United States of America, to my knowledge.

Q: To your knowledge, was the foreign policy pursued by the State Department in Ukraine corrupt?
A: Was the foreign policy pursued by the State Department corrupt?
Q: Correct.
A: Not to my knowledge.

Q: To your knowledge, was the foreign policy pursued by Vice President Biden in Ukraine corrupt?
A: Not to my knowledge.

Q: To your knowledge, did the State Department change foreign policy toward Ukraine in an effort to assist the Vice President's son?
A: Not to my knowledge.

Q: Did Vice President Biden change foreign policy towards Ukraine to assist his son?
A: I have no knowledge of that.\textsuperscript{123}

6. **All Other Witnesses Categorically Denied that Hunter Biden’s Presence on Burisma’s Board Had Any Impact on U.S. Policy Toward Ukraine**

Ambassador Nuland emphasized that Hunter Biden’s position at Burisma “did not impact policy at all,” that Vice President Biden was advancing U.S. interests, and that the policy pursued “would have been counter to Burisma’s interests:”

Q: In your view, did a conflict of interest related to Hunter Biden's role on the board of Burisma impact your ability to pursue an anti-corruption agenda in Ukraine?

A: It did not impact policy at all. On the contrary, the policy that we were pursuing was, if anything, counter to Burisma's interests because it had been protected by Shokin.\textsuperscript{124}

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A: I would simply say that I was proud to work with Vice President Biden on Ukraine policy and especially on trying to help the Ukrainian period root out corruption in their country. He was a warrior on these subjects, and I never saw any influence on policy as a result of Hunter Biden's board seat.

Q: Was the foreign policy that Vice President Biden pursued in Ukraine intended to advance the interests of the United States of America?

A: It was.

Q: Are narratives that suggest otherwise false?

A: I don't support narratives that suggest otherwise.

Q: Was the foreign policy pursued by Vice President Biden in Ukraine corrupt?

A: It was not, in my view. On the contrary.

Q: Did Vice President Biden alter United States Government foreign policy concerning Ukraine in order to assist Burisma or his son?

A: I never saw any evidence of that.

Q: Did you witness any efforts by any U.S. official to shield Burisma from scrutiny?

\textsuperscript{123} HSGAC-SFC Interview of Catherine Novelli (Aug. 18, 2020) pp. 52–53.

\textsuperscript{124} HSGAC-SFC Interview of Victoria Nuland (Sep. 3, 2020) p. 69.
A: No. On the contrary, the actions that we were recommending would have been counter to Burisma's interests.

Q: And, again, was the policy advocating for the dismissal of Prosecutor General Shokin formulated by Vice President Biden in an effort to assist his son?

A: It was not.\textsuperscript{125}

Ambassador Bridget Brink who was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs at the time, testified in her interview that Hunter Biden’s position on Burisma’s board “had zero impact on policy.”\textsuperscript{126} When asked if she believed Vice President Biden’s “decisions were influenced by a conflict of interest related to his son” she replied, “No.”\textsuperscript{127}

Ambassador Brink also noted “there are a lot of private citizens that serve on boards” and that a government official “may or may not give advice that that is a good or a bad thing”:

I understand the interest in corruption, and obviously, the way in which – the impetus for the question. But as a policymaker, what I would say is there are a lot of private citizens that serve on boards all over the world in places where as a government official we may or may not give advice that that is a good or a bad thing. But I would say that Hunter Biden's service on the board of Burisma had zero policy impact. We were pushing the prosecutor's office very, very hard to prosecute and investigate corruption cases, including the Burisma case, and the problem was he was not and his team was not.\textsuperscript{128}

Elisabeth Zentos, at the time a staff member on the National Security Council, repeatedly testified that Hunter Biden and Burisma were never mentioned in any deliberations or discussions related to U.S. policy toward Ukraine in which she participated:

Q: Did Hunter Biden’s position on the board of Burisma ever affect your work?

A: Not that I am aware of, no.

Q: Did it ever complicate any policy matters that you worked on?

A: Not that I’m aware of, no.

Q: Did it ever make any policies more difficult to achieve?

A: Not that I’m aware of. I don’t recall being – I don’t recall whether I was even aware that this was the case, so no.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Id.} pp. 70-71.
\textsuperscript{126} HSGAC-SFC Interview of Bridget Brink (Sep. 21, 2020) p. 47.
\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Id.} p. 65.
\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Id.} pp. 28-29.
\textsuperscript{129} HSGAC-SFC Interview of Elisabeth Zentos (July 20, 2020) p. 90.
B. Universal Support for Removal of Ukraine’s Top Prosecutor as Anti-Corruption Reform

Former Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin served as Ukraine’s top prosecutor for approximately a year from the end of February 2015 until March 2016. Although the U.S. Government initially attempted to support Mr. Shokin, his tenure in the office was marked by obvious corruption and failure to prosecute corruption cases, leading Western governments to demand he be replaced.\(^{130}\)

The U.S. Government initially devoted significant resources to helping Mr. Shokin reform the PGO to support the overarching policy goal of rooting out corruption in Ukraine. In his interview by the Committees, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs George Kent explained:

> U.S. efforts to counter corruption in Ukraine have focused on building institutional capacity so that the Ukrainian government has the ability to go after corruption and effectively investigate, prosecute, and judge alleged criminal activities using appropriate institutional mechanisms.\(^{131}\)

According to Mr. Kent, these efforts included establishing a new Internal Affairs Unit to investigate corrupt prosecutors and in the summer of 2015, the Internal Affairs Unit arrested two prosecutors for extortion and bribe-taking, in what became known as the Diamond Prosecutor Affair.\(^{132}\) Mr. Kent also stated that rather than back the U.S. supported anti-corruption investigators, “Shokin undermined their efforts and then destroyed the careers of everyone associated with the case.”\(^{133}\)

In September 2015, Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt addressed the Odessa Financial Forum, criticizing the Prosecutor General’s office for not implementing anti-corruption reforms and identified the failed cooperation of the PGO in the United Kingdom’s case against Mykola Zlochevsky.

Seeing no progress toward reform, in December 2015, Vice President Biden told Ukrainian leaders they must remove Mr. Shokin and undertake a number of additional anti-corruption measures or the U.S. would withhold $1 billion in loan guarantees.\(^{134}\) In February 2016, the International Monetary Fund also threatened to withhold funds from a bailout program unless Ukraine addressed key corruption issues.\(^{135}\)

Mr. Shokin’s actions were also roundly condemned by Ukrainian citizens, who protested in the streets.\(^{136}\) President Poroshenko protected Mr. Shokin in the matter, resulting in a steep drop in

131 HSGAC-SFC Interview of George Kent (July 24, 2020) p. 23
132 Id. p. 25
133 Id.
135 Id.
136 HSGAC-SFC Interview of George Kent (July 24, 2020) p. 25.
his popularity from 55 percent to the low 20s.137 Over 25,000 Ukrainians signed a petition calling for Mr. Shokin’s dismissal, and in March 2016 hundreds demonstrated outside the Ukrainian parliament, calling for his resignation.138 Mr. Shokin’s deputy, Vitaly Kasko resigned in February 2016, saying Mr. Shokin and his office were a “hotbed of corruption.”139 Another Shokin deputy, David Sakvarelidze, accused Mr. Shokin of maintaining ties with corrupt officials and lawmakers and repeatedly called for his firing. Mr. Sakvarelidze was later fired in March 2016, Mr. Shokin’s apparent last act before his own departure.140 Both Mr. Kasko and Mr. Sakvaridze had been anti-corruption reformers.141 On March 29, 2016, the Ukrainian parliament formally removed Mr. Shokin from his position.142

Vice President Joe Biden was not the genesis of this decision, but ultimately became the Obama Administration’s lead spokesperson for reform – pushing hard for the change. According to Mr. Kent, the policy decision to demand Mr. Shokin’s removal had the full support of embassy team. This position was developed, discussed and agreed to in the interagency review process. 143

The U.S. foreign policy to replace Viktor Shokin in Ukraine under the Obama Administration had consistent bipartisan and international support. The policy was not influenced or changed as the result of lobbying efforts pertaining to Burisma by Blue Star, and did not benefit Burisma in any manner.144 This U.S. policy – to promote anti-corruption efforts and reforms in Ukraine – was also the position of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, Ukrainian anti-corruption activists, and the European Union.145 Chairman Johnson and seven other Republican Senators publicly supported these same efforts at the time.146 Chairman Johnson even explicitly endorsed tying U.S. aid to anti-corruption reforms.147

1. Chairman Johnson Supported Reform of Prosecutor General’s Office

137 Id. pp. 25-26.
139 Id.
141 HSGAC-SFC Interview of Geoffrey Pyatt (Sep. 22, 2020) p. 49.
143 HSGAC-SFC Interview of George Kent (July 24, 2020) pp. 191-192.
144 HSGAC-SFC Interview of Catherine Novelli (Aug 18, 2020) p. 54; HSGAC-SFC Interview of George Kent (July 24, 2020) p. 260.
During much of the time of the events at issue, Senator Johnson served as the Chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committees, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation, and a member of the Senate Ukraine Caucus. During this time, he had ample occasion and opportunity to voice any concerns he had about United States’ policy in Ukraine and potential conflicts of interest. Rather than voice concerns, however, Chairman Johnson was supportive of the government’s anti-corruption efforts in Ukraine.

On February 12, 2016, Chairman Johnson signed a letter as a Member of the Senate Ukraine Caucus to the Ukrainian President urging anti-corruption reforms, specifically including in the Prosecutor General’s Office, then headed by Viktor Shokin:

Succeeding in these reforms will show Russian President Vladimir Putin that an independent, transparent, and democratic Ukraine can and will succeed. It also offers a stark alternative to the authoritarianism and oligarchic cronyism prevalent in Russia. … We similarly urge you to press ahead with urgent reforms to the Prosecutor General’s office and judiciary.”

Then-Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt recalled Chairman Johnson’s letter in his interview with the Committees, confirming the “contemporaneous understanding of support from Congress” it helped “make the case” to remove Prosecutor General Shokin:

Q: So you raised this letter on your own, if I am understanding you correctly, you were aware of it at the time. You were talking about your contemporaneous understanding of support from Congress.

A: Absolutely. I was delighted at the letter, and I don’t remember specifically what I did with it, but I’m quite confident that I would have gotten a letter like this, and I would have emailed the .pdf to the President’s Chief of Staff and said something like, “You will find this of interest. It reinforces everything we’ve been talking about for the past few weeks.

Q: So this letter helped you make the case with President Poroshenko that Prosecutor General Shokin needed to be removed?

A: Yes. As part of a broad process of urgent reforms to the Prosecutor General’s office and judiciary.  

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Three days later on February 15, Mr. Shokin submitted his letter of resignation. Chairman Johnson claimed not to remembering signing the 2016 letter when asked about his contemporaneous support. He told *The Hill*:

> I send out all kinds of oversight letters ... I don't know which 2016 oversight letter you're referring to so I will look at that and then we'll issue a press release, statement, or something – but I don't engage in hypocrisy. I'm looking at getting the truth.

Despite this claim, Chairman Johnson specifically voiced his support for the decision to oust Viktor Shokin as Ukraine’s Prosecutor General at the time. On October 3, 2019, Chairman Johnson stated on public radio that “the whole world” felt Mr. Shokin was not doing a sufficient job against corruption:

> So everybody says, the whole world, by the way – including the Ukrainian Caucus, which I signed the letter – you know, the whole world felt that this – that Shokin wasn’t doing a [good] enough job. So we were all saying, you know, hey you’ve got, you have to rid yourself of corruption.

Chairman Johnson also supported the policy of withholding U.S. financial aid in order to promote Ukrainian anti-corruption reform. At a June 2014 Senate Foreign Relation Committee hearing on Ukraine, he stated: “If we have to tie aid or help to make sure that anti-corruption laws are passed, I think we should do that.”

During her interview with the Committees, former Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland recalled that she briefed Chairman Johnson personally and that “he was a strong supporter, and a very important supporter in the Senate of overall U.S. policy towards Ukraine” and that she “was very grateful for his support at that time.”

Ambassador Nuland also confirmed Chairman Johnson specifically supported conditioning a loan guarantee to Ukraine on removing Mr. Shokin:

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152 Id.


154 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing, Developments in Ukraine (June 5, 2014) p. 40, [https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/060514_Transcript_Developments%20in%20Ukraine.pdf](https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/060514_Transcript_Developments%20in%20Ukraine.pdf). Sen. Johnson went on to support the U.S. policy of pursuing energy independence for Ukraine. “Then long-term. Again, understanding what gives Vladimir Putin power is his oil and gas monopolies. We need to break that up. So we should be taking actions today to make sure that Vladimir Putin understands that his monopoly will not be in place, not 2, 3, or 4 years from now.”

155 HSGAC-SFC Interview of Victoria Nuland (Sep. 3, 2020) p. 63.
Q: And the policy that Congress was so supportive of, by late 2015 and early 2016, that included conditioning a third loan guarantee to Ukraine on the removal of Prosecutor General Shokin. Correct?

A: I’m quite confident that the Congress was fully briefed on the conditionality at that point. I would note that there was a bipartisan letter sent to President Poroshenko in February of 2016, from members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, including both Democrats and Republicans, which Senator Johnson signed, which included a reference to more anti-corruption progress by the PGO.156

2. Western Allies and International Community Called for Shokin’s Removal

For months, the United States and other Western nations had called for the ousting of Mr. Shokin, who was widely criticized for turning a blind eye to corrupt practices and for defending the interests of a venal and entrenched elite.157 He was one of several political figures in Kyiv whom reformers and Western diplomats saw as a worrying indicator of a return to past corrupt practices, two years after a revolution that was supposed to put a stop to self-dealing by those in power.158 In March 2016, the European Union’s ambassador to Ukraine said “the decision to remove Shokin creates an opportunity to make a fresh start in the Prosecutor General's office.”159

The international community also was highly critical of Mr. Shokin. In November 2015, the Ukraine chapter of Transparency International, a global anti-corruption non-profit, announced that it “believes that Prosecutor General Shokin is personally responsible for the failure of the fight against high-ranking officials’ corruption.”160

In February 2016, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which supports Ukraine financially, threatened to delay $40 billion in aid, noting they were “concerned about Ukraine’s slow progress in improving governance and fighting corruption, and reducing the influence of vested interests in policymaking.”161 The IMF also stated progress was so slow in fighting corruption in Ukraine that “it’s hard to see how the IMF-supported program can continue.”162

156 Id. pp. 63-64.
158 Id.
Ambassador Nuland recalled that by November 2015, the consensus was “that Shokin himself was corrupt” after he failed to remove the prosecutors responsible for dismissing the case against Burisma and Mr. Shokin’s prosecutorial team was caught with diamonds. She added removing Shokin was necessary to “get significant anti-corruption reform in Ukraine” and one of “at least three conditions that were coordinated with the IMF”:

A: My view was that we had been pushing and warning along with the Europeans, along with the – International Monetary Fund, along with the World Bank for months and months and months that the PGO needed cleaning up and needed to do its job, and we were not only not making any progress there, but we had had this shocking new diamond prosecutor's case, which was taking them in the wrong direction, and that as long as Shokin was the head of the PGO, we were not going to get significant anti-corruption reform in Ukraine. And we should not be putting more U.S. tax dollars into Ukraine in that circumstance.

Q: Was it a significant decision to condition an entire $1 billion loan guarantee on the removal of one person?

A: There were other conditions for that loan guarantee at the time. I can't recall all of the conditions. I believe one of them had to do with the pension funds. There were at least three conditions that were coordinated with the IMF.

Ambassador Nuland further described how loan support from the United States, as well as the international community, and that “there were anti-corruption standards against all three loan guarantees” for Ukraine to strengthen anti-corruption efforts:

Well, we were not going to give U.S. taxpayer money to a Ukraine that was not reforming. We were not going to give taxpayer money when we were concerned that it would disappear in unclean ways. So to the extent that we were providing large-scale economic support, budget support to Ukraine, we wanted to ensure that Ukraine was staying on a reform track. So with each of the loan guarantees that we gave – there were three of them – we attached reform conditionality to the loan guarantees, and that conditionality was tightly coordinated with the International Monetary Fund's requirements, the World Bank's requirements, and the requirements of EU countries and others providing support to Ukraine.

In March 2016, Vice President Joe Biden stated that the U.S. would withhold $1 billion in loan guarantees unless Ukraine removed Mr. Shokin and implemented other anti-corruption reforms. Ultimately, on March 29, 2016, the Ukrainian parliament voted to accept Mr. Shokin’s resignation. However, the U.S. loan guarantee was not finalized for several months as

163 HSGAC-SFC Interview of Victoria Nuland (Sep 3, 2020) p. 30.
164 Id. p. 35.
165 Id. pp. 21-22.
additional conditions were finalized, including the Ukrainian parliament passing legislation aimed at tackling corruption in the judicial system.  

### 3. Shokin’s Dismissal Increased Likelihood of Burisma Corruption Investigation

Contrary to the Chairmen’s theory that Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin was removed to protect Burisma and Hunter Biden from a corruption prosecution, Mr. Shokin proactively stood in the way of holding Burisma or its owner Zlochevsky accountable. The U.S. State Department and Ukrainian anti-corruption activists believed removing former Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin would make it more – not less – likely that Ukrainian authorities would investigate allegations of corruption at Burisma. Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch and other witnesses unanimously testified to that point during the impeachment proceedings.

A leading Ukrainian anti-corruption activist and executive director of Ukraine’s Anti-Corruption Action Center agreed, telling the *Washington Post* in July 2019:

> Shokin was not investigating [Burisma]. He didn't want to investigate Burisma. … And Shokin was fired not because he wanted to do that investigation, but quite to the contrary, because he failed that investigation.”

In April 2014, Hunter Biden joined the board of Burisma. That same month, Britain’s Serious Fraud Office, an independent government agency, initiated a money-laundering investigation involving Burisma’s founder Mykola Zlochevsky. Mr. Zlochevsky had previously been Ukraine’s ecology minister under former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, who had been forced into exile in Russia. British officials froze the $23 million in Mr. Zlochevsky’s London bank accounts, but were forced to unfreeze these assets after Ukrainian prosecutors refused to provide the needed documents.

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167 Reuters, U.S. signs third $1 billion loan guarantee agreement for Ukraine (June 3, 2016) 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-usa/u-s-signs-third-1-billion-loan-guarantee-agreement-for-ukraine-idUSKCN0YP0ZU


173 *Id.*
In September 2015, then-U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt gave a speech criticizing Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office [PGO] for “undermin[ing] prosecutors working on legitimate corruption cases” including a case regarding Mykola Zlochevsky:

"[I]n the case of former Ecology Minister Mykola Zlochevsky, the U.K. authorities had seized 23 million dollars in illicit assets that belonged to the Ukrainian people. Officials at the PGO were asked by the U.K to send documents supporting the seizure. Instead they sent letters to Zlochevsky’s attorneys attesting that there was no case against him. As a result the money was freed by the U.K. court and shortly thereafter the money was moved to Cyprus."\(^1\)

At the time, Viktor Shokin served in the PGO as the Deputy Prosecutor General. In his interview with the Committees, Ambassador Pyatt explained additional context for his speech, including agreeing with the “whole-of-government policy to condition foreign aid in part on the removal of Prosecutor General Shokin”:

Q: And with respect to this policy, did you agree with it?
A: Absolutely. That’s why I gave speeches about it.

Q: So it's fair to say, to summarize, that it was a whole-of-government policy to condition foreign aid in part on the removal of Prosecutor General Shokin.

A: Yes. And I want to spend a lot of time explaining this, because I think it's important to understand that this was an evolution. So if you go back, for instance, to my Odessa speech in the fall of 2015, where I talk about these issues, I used the phrase "reform to the Office of the Prosecutor General." I didn't use the phrase, "Get rid of Shokin," because we were still hopeful, at that point, that systemic reform could be accomplished without the abrupt step of changing the Prosecutor General, with all the challenges that that would present to Poroshenko, and finding somebody who would be an appropriate successor, et cetera, and working that conformation process within the delicately balanced state of the parliamentary government in Ukraine.\(^2\)

Mr. Zlochevsky is Burisma’s majority shareholder, although the company itself is not mentioned in Pyatt’s speech. Mr. Zlochevsky was intended as just one of many examples of corruption in the Prosecutor General’s Office which Mr. Shokin led. As Ambassador Pyatt later clarified to colleagues and the press, the speech was not about Mr. Zlochevsky specifically, but “about the pervasive rot in the PGO, of which obstruction of justice in the Zlochevsky case is but one example.”\(^3\)

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\(^2\) HSGAC-SFC Interview of Geoffrey Pyatt (Sep. 22, 2020) p. 67.

Furthermore, corruption in the PGO was a longstanding issue, one that was not unique to Mr. Shokin. Ambassador Nuland also recalled Mr. Shokin’s resistance to bringing corruption cases and “significant corruption within the PGO itself at that period” before Ambassador Pyatt’s speech:

But we had not seen Shokin bring to the courts any high-profile corruption cases. We knew of significant corruption within PGO itself already at that period, in part because we had FBI and Justice Department advisors there who were concerned about it and who were working with deputies of Shokin who were trying to clean up the PGO, and they reported that he was resisting.\textsuperscript{177}

Mr. Kent also told the Committees that prior to Mr. Shokin’s tenure Mr. Kent confronted a senior official in the PGO about the Zlochevsky case, asking “how much was the bribe and who took it?”\textsuperscript{178} The PGO official stated they accepted a seven million dollar bribe related to the Zlochevsky case.\textsuperscript{179} As evidenced by the above, U.S. government officials did not take action to protect Mr. Zlochevsky from accountability – in fact, the opposite occurred.

4. Burisma Case Long Dormant During Push to Remove Shokin

Ukraine’s anti-corruption investigation agency the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, stated the Burisma investigation focused solely on activity that took place from 2010-2012, years before Hunter Biden was on the board from 2014-2018. In a statement, the Bureau noted:

Changes to the board of Burisma Limited, which are currently the object of international attention, took place only in May 2014, and therefore are not and never were the subject of (the anti-corruption bureau’s) investigation.\textsuperscript{180}

Additionally, despite claims made by President Trump’s allies, there is also no evidence of any serious investigation of Mr. Zlochevsky or Burisma at the time of the push to remove corrupt Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin.\textsuperscript{181} Mr. Shokin’s own former deputy in the Prosecutor General’s office Vitaly Kasko also explained there was no undue pressure to halt the investigation into Burisma and Mr. Zlochevsky since it was already inactive during that time:

There was no pressure from anyone from the U.S. to close cases against Zlochevsky … It was shelved by Ukrainian prosecutors in 2014 and through 2015.\textsuperscript{182}

\textsuperscript{177} HSGAC-SFC Interview of Victoria Nuland (Sep 3, 2020) p. 28.
\textsuperscript{178} HSGAC-SFC Interview of George Kent (July 24, 2020) p. 130.
\textsuperscript{179} Id.
\textsuperscript{180} Reuters, Ukraine agency says allegations against Burisma cover period before Biden joined (Sep 27, 2019) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-whistleblower-ukraine-burris/ukraine-agency-says-allegations-against-burisma-cover-period-before-biden-joined-idUSKBN1WC1LV.
In order to advance the claim that Mr. Shokin was actively investigating Mr. Zlochevsky, at points in this investigation the Majority relied on the false allegation that Mr. Shokin conducted a raid on Mykola Zlochevsky’s home in February 2016. In an April 30, 2020 letter to Secretary of State Pompeo, the Chairmen alleged, without citation, that a raid had been made on Mr. Zlochevsky’s home during Mr. Shokin’s tenure. The Chairmen implied that Vice President Biden increased his efforts to have Mr. Shokin removed because of the raid. 183 However, Mr. Mr. Shokin never conducted a raid of Mr. Zlochevsky’s home, and this was likely a reference to an event that occurred under Mr. Shokin’s predecessor.

This theory had been circulating on right-wing media and appears to have originated by John Solomon. 184 It was later repeated by Congressman Nunes during impeachment inquiry proceedings. 185 Five months before the Chairmen sent their letter Secretary Pompeo, the Washington Post debunked the claim that Mr. Shokin raided Mr. Zlochevsky’s home, noting “nothing significant appears to have happened in February 2016.” 186 The Majority staff asked Mr. Kent about this raid during his interview, and he had no recollection of the event. 187

C. Blue Star’s Government Meetings Did Not Halt Corruption Investigation, Seek to Remove Shokin, or Impact U.S. Policy Toward Burisma or Ukraine

In November 2015, Burisma hired Blue Star Strategies (“Blue Star”). 188 Blue Star is a well-established Washington, D.C.-based consulting firm co-founded by Karen Tramontano and Sally Painter, that specializes in the representation of public and private foreign entities. 189 Blue Star scheduled numerous meeting with State Department officials in Washington, DC and in Kyiv. Blue Star continued to represent Burisma during the Trump Administration. 190

On February 24, 2020, Chairman Johnson announced his intent to issue a subpoena to Blue Star, to “address the many unanswered questions about potential conflicts of interest and the extent to which representatives of Burisma – including officials at Blue Star” and cited records to allege “Blue Star sought to leverage Hunter Biden’s role as a board member of Burisma to gain access

187 HSGAC-SFC Interview of George Kent (July 24, 2020).
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. pp. 21 – 22. Burisma also hired another Washington, D.C. based consultant – David Leiter – a former Senate aide to Secretary of State John Kerry. There was no evidence that the hiring of Mr. Leiter had any impact on U.S. policy including no documentary evidence and testimony from Wade and Novelli.
to and potentially influence matters at the State Department.” There is no evidentiary support for the unfounded allegation that Blue Star successfully influenced the State Department policy to benefit Burisma or Hunter Biden. Hunter Biden played no identifiable role in hiring Blue Star nor negotiating its contract.

Not only is there no evidence to support the Chairmen’s allegations concerning Blue Star and their connections to Hunter Biden, the Chairmen’s investigation revealed communications showing State Department officials had negative perceptions of Blue Star, and discussions with Blue Star and Burisma representatives did not alter the U.S. Government’s position toward Burisma. George Kent explicitly testified that his opinion of Burisma, and more specifically its owner Mykola Zlochevsky, was not affected by Blue Star. Under Secretary Catherine Novelli also testified she took no personal action to change any U.S. policy toward Ukraine because of her meeting with Blue Star representatives. Mr. Hochstein and Ambassador Pyatt similarly testified that meeting with Blue Star had no impact on US policy.

Blue Star reached out to State Department officials and scheduled about 10 meetings between December 2015 and December 2016, some of which are highlighted below. Contrary to the Chairmen’s insinuations that these meetings represent influence-peddling using Hunter Biden, none of these meetings were obtained using Hunter Biden’s position at Burisma, changed the U.S. Government’s perception of Burisma, or changed the whole-of-government Ukraine policy.

### 1. Under Secretary Novelli and Other State Department officials Did Not Grant Blue Star a Meeting Based Upon Hunter Biden’s Membership on the Burisma Board and the Meeting Did Not Affect U.S. Policy Toward Burisma or Ukraine

On February 18, 2016, Karen Tramontano emailed Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment Catherine Novelli to request a meeting, stating “the U.S. Government has taken a position in a commercial matter regarding a Ukrainian individual and I believe the position is in error.” Under Secretary Novelli agreed to the meeting.

This meeting, which occurred on March 1, 2016, is a central element to the Chairmen’s contention that access to U.S. policy makers was swayed by Hunter Biden’s presence on the Burisma board. Key to the majority’s theory is a subsequent February 24, 2016 email, released under FOIA and published by discredited opinion writer John Solomon. The email

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192 Letter from Chairman Johnson to Ranking Member Peters (Feb. 24, 2020).
193 HSGAC-SFC Interview of State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary George P. Kent (July 24, 2020) pp. 259–260.
194 HSGAC-SFC Interview of Catherine Novelli (Aug. 18, 2020) p. 54.
195 Email from Karen Tramontano to Catherine Novelli (Feb. 18, 2016) BSS031.
196 Email from Catherine Novelli to Karen Tramontano, Michael Dodman and others (Feb. 18, 2020) STATE-2019-18-00000988.
was written by a member of Under Secretary Novelli’s staff who was doing routine background preparation for the Under Secretary’s meeting with Tramontano. In the email the staff member wrote:

Per our conversation, Karen Tramontano of Blue Star Strategies requested a meeting to discuss with U/S Novelli USG remarks alleging Burisma (Ukranian energy company) of corruption. She noted that two high profile U.S. citizens are affiliated with the company (including Hunter Biden as a board member). Tramontano would like to talk with U/S Novelli about getting a better understanding of how the U.S. came to the determination that the company is corrupt.

This email was written nearly a week after Under Secretary Novelli agreed to meet with Ms. Tramontano. When Blue Star requested the meeting on February 18, 2016, Ms. Tramontano did not identify Mr. Zlochevsky, Burisma, or Hunter Biden. According to documents, Under Secretary Novelli accepted the request minutes later, by reply e-mail, without knowing it pertained to them in anyway. Under Secretary Novelli and Ms. Tramontano each confirmed this in their Committee interviews, and Under Secretary Novelli also stated she wasn’t even aware Hunter Biden was on the Burisma board at the time she accepted the meeting.

[T]here was no mention of any people or any company or any anything when I said that I would have the meeting, and what is typical when a meeting is requested and I’ve agreed to it is that my staff then takes the ball from there and contacts whoever the appropriate people are in the State Department and says, "Under Secretary is having this meeting. We need to get talking points for her and a briefing paper." And that was typical for every meeting that I had.

Ms. Tramontano testified that the origin of information discussing the presence of Hunter Biden on the board and cited in the State Department email, was the result of outreach to Under Secretary Novelli’s staff to Blue Star in preparation for the meeting. Under Secretary Novelli’s staff asked Blue Star whether there were any U.S. interests involved in the matter Ms. Tramontano wanted to discuss. In response, Ms. Tramontano testified that she identified Hunter Biden and Devon Archer to Under Secretary Novelli’s staff, but did not discuss it any further:

A: My recollection when I was talking to her staff is I was asked a question about whether there was any U.S. content or U.S. involvement in Burisma, and I responded that
Burisma purchases its equipment from U.S. companies and that Hunter Biden and Devon Archer, both U.S. citizens, were on the board.

Q: And was there any other follow-up discussion after you mentioned that regarding those two specific facts?

A: No, not to my – not to my recollection, no.\textsuperscript{205}

Under Secretary Novelli testified that she had no knowledge of Mr. Zlochevsky, Burisma, or Hunter Biden’s role on the board prior to the meeting.\textsuperscript{206} Following the meeting, Under Secretary Novelli testified that she discussed the matter with Ambassador Pyatt. Ambassador Pyatt told her that Blue Star’s contention that the U.S. Government was improperly handling this matter was incorrect.\textsuperscript{207} Under Secretary Novelli testified that she took no further action regarding Burisma and took no action to change Ukraine policy to benefit Burisma because of Hunter Biden’s position on the board.\textsuperscript{208} Contrary to the Majority’s theory, Under Secretary Novelli’s meeting with Blue Star had no effect on U.S. policy in Ukraine, and there is no documentary evidence in the State Department records obtained by the Committees that indicate otherwise.

2. **Blue Star Representatives met with State Department Ukraine Special Envoy Amos Hochstein to Discuss the State Department’s Position on Burisma and U.S. Investment Opportunities in Ukraine’s Energy Sector**

On December 10, 2015, Karen Tramontano met with Amos Hochstein, the State Department’s Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs.\textsuperscript{209} In the Chairmen’s initial request letter seeking information about this meeting, they reference reporting from the *Washington Examiner* stating that “the purpose of the meeting was for “Blue Star Strategies [] to convince Hochstein (but [it] did not) that Burisma was on the level and did not warrant further investigation.”\textsuperscript{210} Ms. Tramontano flatly denied this characterization of the purpose of the meeting, telling the Committees the meeting was to understand the State Department’s position on Burisma, and whether the comments made by Ambassador Pyatt about Burisma reflected his personal view or the entire government’s view of Burisma.\textsuperscript{211}

Mr. Hochstein told the Committees that during his meeting with Blue Star representatives, he told them he believed Blue Star’s owner Mykola Zlochevsky: “faced real and credible

\textsuperscript{205} HSGAC-SFC Interview of Karen Tramontano (Aug. 28, 2020) p. 92.

\textsuperscript{206} HSGAC-SFC Interview of Catherine Novelli (Aug. 18, 2020) pp. 129 – 133.

\textsuperscript{207} *Id.* p. 134.

\textsuperscript{208} *Id.* pp. 136, 144.

\textsuperscript{209} Letter from Blue Star Strategies to Sen. Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Dec. 18, 2019).


accusations that I believed that it was unfortunate that he wasn't being prosecuted for them; and that I was still holding out hope that there would be a cooperation by the Ukrainian prosecutor's office to support these investigations; and I urged them to – I was happy that they were looking into it and hoped that they would produce a report that supported those allegations.”

Mr. Hochstein also told Blue Star officials he “strongly disagreed” with their conclusions on Mr. Zlochevsky and “expressed [his] disappointment”:

A: They told me that they believed that Zlochevsky was tried, prosecuted, and the charges against him were dismissed by the U.K. and, therefore, there was no reason to hold him responsible since the judicial system worked.

Q: Did you agree with that report?
A: I strongly disagreed with it.

Q: Did you let Blue Star officials know that disagreement?
A: I was very clear about my views that I disagreed –

Q: What was Blue Star's reaction to your disagreement?
A: They clearly did not agree with me, and I expressed my disappointment.213

3. On December 16, 2015, Blue Star met Ambassador Pyatt to Discuss his Negative Views of Burisma

On December 16, 2015, Karen Tramontano and Sally Painter traveled to Kyiv for a meeting with Ambassador Pyatt. At the meeting, the Blue Star representatives wished to discuss Burisma and learn more about Ambassador Pyatt’s recent negative comments about Burisma’s owner, Zlochevsky. In testimony to the Committees, Ms. Tramontano and Ms. Painter explained that their goal was to better understand whether Ambassador Pyatt’s comments were his personal views or whether they reflected the views of the entire U.S. Government.214 They further stated that Pyatt was not interested in discussing the matter and told them so in the meeting. Hunter Biden’s position on Burisma’s board was not used to obtain the meeting, and the meeting resulted in no change of U.S. policy regarding the company.215

4. Key Government Official, then Deputy Chief of Mission George Kent, had a Persistent Negative View of Blue Star and Burisma

212 HSGAC-SFC Interview of Amos Hochstein (Sep. 17, 2020) p. 124.
213 HSGAC-SFC Interview of Amos Hochstein (Sep. 17, 2020) pp. 128-129.
215 Id. p. 83; Id. p. 93.
During this investigation, the Chairmen have advanced a theory that Blue Star and their client Burisma were granted special access and preference because of Hunter Biden’s position on the board. This investigation did not substantiate that theory. Contrary to this view, key government officials held a persistent negative perception of Blue Star and Burisma. George Kent, who was then Deputy Chief of Mission, held a key role advancing U.S. anti-corruption interests in Ukraine. Mr. Kent held a negative view of Mr. Shokin and Burisma, and showed no favor to Blue Star.

For example, in August 2016, Mr. Kent forced suspension of a USAID contractor public-private partnership agreement with Burisma given Mr. Zlochevsky and Burisma’s reputation, and the moral hazard of association. There was no financial relationship between the contractor and Burisma, although Burisma was providing clean-energy related prizes totaling $7,500. When discussing the decision, a staffer for Kent underscored that Blue Star was not winning favorable treatment for Burisma, noting “Zlochevsky is working very hard to clean up and ‘westernize’ his image by hiring DC lobbyists and stacking the board with prominent people. From the rumors that we hear in the energy sector, there is no sense that Burisma has changed how it conducts its business.”

5. Blue Star Continued to Hold Meetings and Events with Trump Administration Officials

Blue Star’s contacts with government officials were in no way limited to the Obama Administration, countering the narrative they relied on Hunter Biden for access. In particular, in May 2019, Trump Energy Department Officials reached out to arrange for Deputy Assistant Tommy Joyce to speak at an energy conference in Monaco sponsored Burisma and coordinated with Blue Star. Blue Star also arranged meetings with Ambassador Kurt Volker and Department of Commerce officials, and officials at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv during the Trump Administration. In fact, the February 2019 embassy meeting resulted in Burisma being added to an Offshore Technology Conference delegation by Trump Administration officials.

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216 HSGAC-SFC Interview of George Kent (July 24, 2020) p. 21.
217 Id. p. 107.
218 Email from (redacted) to George Kent and others (Sep. 1, 2016) State-2019-18-0000490.
219 Email from Nicholas Grimes to a generic speakers email address for Energy Security Forum (May 2, 2019) Blue Star Strategies 1100–1102.
220 Email chain between Ambassador Kurt Volcker and Sally Painter (Sep. 18, 2018) Blue Star Strategies 0629–0630.
221 Email from Sally Painter to Matthew Edwards, Boris Chumak and Pero Jovlevski (Dec. 6, 2018) Blue Star Strategies 0848.
222 Email from Myroslava Myrtsalo to Vadym Pozharskyi, Sally Painter and others (Mar. 6, 2019) Blue Star Strategies 1129.
223 Id.
III. CHAIRMEN ABUSE UNVERIFIED FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS TO PRODUCE UNSUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS AND INNUENDO

The Republican Chairmen’s use of confidential Treasury documents to justify its unsubstantiated allegations and personal attacks against Vice President Biden’s family is grossly irresponsible. The information in the documents cited by the Republicans has not been verified, and we are not aware of any other Congressional committee ever releasing this sort of information in this manner.

Any credible investigation would have sought the underlying financial records at issue and spoken to the involved parties. At Chairman Johnson’s request, HSGAC authorized 46 subpoenas across four business meetings related to his current investigations, none of which sought information that could substantiate or verify the information in these documents.

The Chairmen spent a year investigating Russian-backed allegations of wrongdoing by Vice President Biden in Ukraine, only to find the allegations discredited by their own investigation. Here the Republicans made no attempt to independently investigate the transactions at issue, perhaps to avoid the embarrassment of seeing these allegations discredited as well.

Because the information in these documents is unverified, the Treasury Department requests restrictions on their use. When transmitting the documents to the Committee, Treasury officials noted “Treasury and FinCEN take seriously our obligation to safeguard sensitive personally identifiable and financial information reflected in these reports. . . . Any documents provided and information therein should not be disseminated outside the [C]ommittee or publicly disclosed without Treasury’s prior authorization.” We are not aware of any efforts by the Chairmen to honor this request by Treasury.

The manner in which many of these documents were created and then supplied to the Chairmen is also concerning and improper. Many of documents provided to the Committees note that they were generated at the request of law enforcement during President Trump’s impeachment investigation in Fall 2019. The financial institutions did not feel the transactions merited reporting at the time they occurred, but rather only did so at the request of law enforcement officials, who were apparently attempting to validate the claims being made by President Trump’s associates in their effort to distract from the behavior that resulted in the President’s impeachment. Specific details about which law enforcement personnel requested the documents were redacted.

After the documents were generated in this unusual manner, they were rushed into the hands of the Republican Chairmen by the Treasury Department. On November 15, 2019, Chairman Johnson and Chairman Grassley requested sensitive financial records related to Hunter Biden from the Treasury Department. Shortly thereafter, Ranking Member Wyden, along with Senate Banking Committee Ranking Member Sherrod Brown, wrote to FinCEN Director Kenneth Blanco, urging him to take steps to assure that FinCEN’s partnership with Congress was free of partisan influence. In particular, the Ranking Members were generally aware of similar requests by Democratic members of the House that had been pending for months, and advised FinCEN that requests should be processed in the order they were received.
Treasury and FinCEN ignored that letter and began producing documents to the Chairmen on December 12, 2019, less than one month after their initial request. This expedited response, which “jumped the line” of pending requests made by Democratic members of the House, ensured that President Trump’s Treasury Department put the newly generated financial records in the hands of Senate Republicans before the President’s impeachment trial began in January 2020.

After receiving this information in December 2019, the Republican Chairmen did nothing with it. They made no efforts to confirm or verify the underlying transactions, other than the internet news searches that fill out the Majority’s footnotes. It was not until mid-August 2020, mere weeks before the November election, that the Chairmen decided to request a small batch of additional documents in order to finalize their report they have frequently stated is intended to damage Vice President Biden’s presidential bid. Treasury again promptly replied to the Chairmen’s request. Around the same time, Ranking Member Wyden sent his own request to Treasury for documents related to the Chairmen’s active investigations. Despite having twice responded to Republican requests, Treasury declined Ranking Member Wyden’s request.

This coordination between law enforcement, Treasury, and Senate Republicans appears to have been necessary to enable the Majority to cast aspersions on the family of a presidential candidate ahead of an election. Hunter Biden’s business dealings and personal troubles are well known. Hunter Biden sat for an extensive interview with The New Yorker over a year ago, and discussed many of the business dealings and personal issues that are at core of the Chairmen’s smear efforts. The Chairmen even cite this story in their report. Stripped of tantalizing references to confidential documents, the Chairmen’s report provides little more than what is in The New Yorker and other well-worn reporting.

Rather than asking questions of witnesses or seeking additional information, the Majority makes dangerous insinuations and offers no evidence to prove their assertions. It is clear the Majority has no interest in determining facts, their goal is to twist unverified information to smear the Biden family in an effort to aid President Trump’s reelection. The Majority’s efforts are investigative malpractice and an abuse of Senate resources. The recitation of these transactions serves no legitimate legislative or oversight purposes. The Republicans released information from these documents without conducting any independent investigation to verify the transactions, abusing the records in a way that has never been done before by a Congressional committee.
IV. CONCLUSION

On September 10, 2020, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Andrii Derkach for attempting to influence the U.S. electoral process, finding:

From at least late 2019 through mid-2020, Derkach waged a covert influence campaign centered on cultivating false and unsubstantiated narratives concerning U.S. officials in the upcoming 2020 Presidential Election, spurring corruption investigations in both Ukraine and the United States designed to culminate prior to election day. Derkach’s unsubstantiated narratives were pushed in Western media through coverage of press conferences and other news events, including interviews and statements.

As the entire record before the Committees—including the testimony of Ambassador Pyatt, Ambassador Brink, Deputy Assistant Secretary Kent, Former Assistant Secretary Nuland, Special Envoy Hochstein, Former State Department Chief of Staff David Wade, Former Under Secretary Novelli, and career Foreign Service officer Zentos—makes clear, allegations of corruption by Vice President Biden in Ukraine are false and unsubstantiated. Chairman Johnson has repeatedly indicated that the investigation was designed to culminate prior to election day, and now it has.

The United States Senate should not be used to advance Russian state-backed conspiracy theories intended to interfere in our election.

Unfortunately, Chairman Johnson and Chairman Grassley have pursued widely debunked allegations against Vice President Biden and the Obama Administration as their highest investigative priority. Over the past year, the Chairmen have sent 17 letters, conducted more than 50 hours of transcribed interviews, held three in person business meetings to authorize 46 subpoenas, and issued 17 press releases to publicize their allegations.

These efforts continued—and even increased—despite the public health and economic emergency caused by the Coronavirus pandemic that has tragically claimed the lives of more than 200,000 Americans. Yet the Chairmen have devoted only a fraction of their time and the Committees’ resources to conducting oversight of the flawed pandemic response. Instead, the Chairmen insist on continuing to squander Congressional resources and abuse subpoena power on a politically motivated influence campaign during a historic health and economic crisis.

Although the Chairmen’s partisan investigation has broken Committee practices and longstanding traditions of bipartisan oversight, Ranking Member Peters and Ranking Member Wyden hope the facts laid out in this report will correct the record and return the Committees to their core missions of safeguarding our national security and vital institutions, and working on behalf of the American people.
V. **APPENDIX A: TIMELINE OF CHAIRMEN JOHNSON AND GRASSLEY’S PARTISAN INVESTIGATION**

**2014-2016: CHAIRMAN JOHNSON SUPPORTS REFORMS IN UKRAINE**

**May 12, 2014:** Hunter Biden’s position on the Board of Directors for Burisma publicly announced.

**(May 2014 – September 2019):** Chairman Johnson attends 16 Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) hearings related to Ukraine, where he never raises concerns about Hunter Biden’s position at Burisma.

**June 5, 2014:** At an SFRC hearing on Ukraine, Senator Johnson states, “If we have to tie aid or help to make sure that anti-corruption laws are passed, I think we should do that.”

**February 12, 2016:** The Senate Ukraine Caucus, including Chairman Johnson, write to Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko in support of anti-corruption reforms. The letter states, “We similarly urge you to press ahead with urgent reforms to the Prosecutor General's office and judiciary.”

**February 15, 2016:** Prosecutor General Shokin submits letter of resignation under pressure.

**March 29, 2016:** The Ukrainian Parliament votes to formally remove Prosecutor General Shokin.

**2017: CHAIRMAN GRASSLEY ASKS ABOUT BASELESS UKRAINE ELECTION INTERFERENCE THEORY**

**July 20, 2017:** Amidst the Special Counsel’s inquiry into Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, Chairman Grassley writes to the Department of Justice (DOJ) regarding the Russia-supported, baseless theory that Ukraine interfered in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.

**SEPT. 2019-FEB. 2020: AMIDST IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS, CHAIRMEN JOHNSON AND GRASSLEY INITIATE THEIR INVESTIGATION**

**September 24, 2019:** Speaker Nancy Pelosi announces the House of Representatives has opened an impeachment inquiry into President Donald Trump. Impeachment proceedings continue through February 5, 2020.

**September 25-26, 2019:** The reconstructed transcript of a July 25, 2019 phone call between President Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and of a related whistleblower complaint are publicly released, both of which pertain to impeachment proceedings.

**September 27, 2019:** Chairmen Johnson and Grassley send their first letter pertaining to Hunter Biden and Burisma to “follow up” on Grassley’s letter from over two years prior regarding the Russia-supported, baseless theory that the Ukrainian government interfered in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.
November 2019 – February 2020: Chairmen Johnson and Grassley proceed to send seven letters during high-profile moments of the impeachment proceedings, including public hearing testimony, the day of the House Intelligence Committee’s release of its impeachment report, and the day of the Senate trial vote.

February 2020–Present: Amidst Presidential Race, Chairmen Johnson and Grassley “Investigate” the Democratic Nominee for President

February 5, 2020: The Senate votes to acquit President Trump in proceedings. Hours later, Chairmen Johnson and Grassley send a letter to the Secret Service for Hunter Biden’s travel documents.

February 29, 2020: Former Vice President Joe Biden wins the South Carolina Democratic presidential primary, becoming the clear frontrunner.

March 1, 2020: Chairman Johnson notices his intent to subpoena Ukrainian national Andrii Telizhenko for documents and testimony to Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) Members.

March 4, 2020: Regarding his investigation, Chairman Johnson states, “And if I were a Democrat primary voter, I’d want these questions satisfactorily answered before I cast my final vote.”

March 10, 2020: The FBI provides HSGAC Members a classified briefing on issues related to the Telizhenko subpoena.

March 11, 2020: Chairman Johnson had planned to hold a vote in HSGAC on the Telizhenko subpoena, which he cancels following bipartisan national security concerns.

May 19, 2020: Telizhenko and Ukrainian politician Andrii Derkach release records of alleged phone calls between former Ukrainian President Poroshenko and Vice President Biden. The U.S. intelligence community has since called Derkach an “active Russian agent” and described the release of such leaked phone calls as a form of Russian election interference.

May 20, 2020: HSGAC votes on subpoena authorization for Burisma’s lobbying firm Blue Star Strategies, passing three subpoenas on a party-line vote.

June 4, 2020: HSGAC holds a vote on authorizing 36 subpoenas for the Chairman Johnson’s investigations.

July 20, 2020: Chairmen Johnson and Grassley hold their first witness interview.

August 11, 2020: Regarding his investigation, Chairman Johnson states, “I would think it would certainly help Donald Trump win reelection and certainly be pretty good, I would say, evidence about not voting for Vice President Biden.”

September 15, 2020: Regarding his investigation, Chairman Johnson again explicitly confirms his political motivations, stating, “What our investigations are uncovering I think will reveal that this is not someone we should be electing president of the United States.”

September 16, 2020: HSGAC holds a vote on 40 subpoenas for Chairman Johnson’s investigations.
**September 23, 2020:** Chairmen Johnson and Grassley release their report on Hunter Biden and Burisma.

**September 29, 2020:** First 2020 presidential debate with President Trump and Vice President Biden.