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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6250

February 25, 2026

Michelle Anderson
Assistant Inspector General for Audit
Social Security Administration
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21235

Dear Assistant Inspector General for Audit Anderson:

I write to request that you initiate a comprehensive investigation of Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) activities at the Social Security Administration (SSA) following concerning disclosures made by multiple whistleblowers, and by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in *AFSCME v. SSA*.¹

Through a recent DOJ filing in federal court, SSA now admits that it has identified actions by the SSA DOGE Team that were likely inconsistent with SSA policy, were non-compliant with the March 20, 2025 temporary restraining order (TRO), and may have violated multiple laws. According to a recent DOJ filing in *AFSCME v. SSA*, SSA determined that prior to the TRO, a member of the SSA DOGE Team sent sensitive SSA data to Steve Davis, a DOGE colleague at the Department of Labor (DOL), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). SSA, while unable to access this file and verify its contents, believes it contained personally identifiable information (PII) derived from SSA systems for approximately 1,100 people. The court filing also states that SSA uncovered communications between SSA's DOGE Team and a private partisan political advocacy group seeking to compare SSA data against state voter rolls to find evidence of voter fraud and to overturn election results in certain states. Further, a DOGE Team member signed and executed a "Voter Data Agreement" with this advocacy group that was not reviewed or approved by the proper SSA authorities.

A recent HSGAC minority report also described SSA whistleblower disclosures alleging that DOGE-affiliated employees at the agency were granted permission to upload personal data on all Americans, including Social Security numbers (SSNs), to a cloud environment without any verified security controls or standard agency visibility into their use of that data.² An internal SSA risk assessment of this DOGE-initiated project determined that the likelihood of a data breach with "catastrophic adverse effect" is between 35 and 65 percent.³ I also write to request that you address these allegations publicly and comprehensively, and that you provide documentation to show that SSA is in compliance with applicable privacy and data security laws to ensure the American public's data is secure.

The DOJ filing makes these allegations all the more alarming. The management of sensitive agency data in compliance with federal laws, agency guidance, and other guardrails is critically important, both to

¹ *American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Social Security Administration*, No. 1:25-cv-00596, (D. Md. April 17, 2025) (notice by Social Security Administration of corrections to the record).

² Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Minority Report, *Unchecked and Unaccountable: How DOGE Jeopardizes Americans' Data Without Regard for Law and Congress* (Sept. 2025).

³ *Id.*

safeguard vital programs like Social Security and Medicare and to protect the American public from identity theft and breaches of their most sensitive personal information. At a minimum, the DOJ filing suggests that SSA failed to adequately oversee DOGE activities, which potentially compromised sensitive personal data—precisely what the HSGAC Minority report and whistleblowers warned against. At worst, SSA was complicit in the apparent Hatch Act and Privacy Act violations and lied to Congressional investigators.

As the official performing the functions and duties of the SSA Inspector General, you have a responsibility to investigate potential security violations involving sensitive agency data that may threaten the administration of agency programs. I have serious concerns about your oversight work, given that you have so far failed to initiate meaningful oversight of the current administration this year, and that a request from Sen. Peters to meet with you has so far gone unanswered. Given the gravity of the allegations regarding DOGE activities at SSA, I request that you formally launch an investigation to verify that SSA is in compliance with applicable privacy and data security laws and to ensure that the American public's data is secure. Without a thorough, independent investigation, I may never know whether SSA data was manipulated, leaked, or stolen because of the opaque nature of DOGE operations. **It is your job to investigate and ensure this critical data is safe.**

I request that you initiate this review with attention to the following questions:

1. Have the DOGE-affiliated individuals employed by or detailed to SSA since January 20, 2025, complied with SSA security policies, SSA data protection and privacy policies, SSA internal oversight requirements, and applicable laws, including those relevant to privacy, data security, cybersecurity, ethics?
2. Did SSA senior officials conduct adequate oversight of DOGE-affiliated individuals employed by or detailed to SSA, including ensuring that they only had access to data for which they had a need to know, had proper training, and accessed data only as appropriate?
3. What information or data, if any, was shared outside of SSA pursuant to the "Voter Data Agreement" that an SSA DOGE Team member signed and executed with an outside political advocacy group in March 2025?
4. What information or data was shared outside of SSA in the March 3, 2025, email from the SSA DOGE Team to Steve Davis, a DOGE-affiliated colleague at DOL, and DHS? What was the purpose of this data sharing?
5. What information or data did DOGE-affiliated employees or detailees share outside of SSA using third-party servers such as Cloudflare?
6. Why did SSA initiate a review of DOGE activities at the agency in November 2025 and what were the findings of that review? How was this review internally managed and conducted?
7. Did the approval and implementation of the NUMIDENT cloud environment project pursuant to John Solley's request on June 10, 2025, violate any federal laws, regulations, or agency policies or procedures?
 - a. What is the operational need the agency provided for the initiation of this project? Is it related to the sharing of information with DHS or any other government agency?
 - b. What factors must the agency consider in weighing the operational need against privacy and security risk? Did the agency appropriately weigh those factors in this case?
 - c. Has sensitive SSA data been manipulated, leaked, inappropriately shared, or stolen as a result of this NUMIDENT cloud environment project?
 - d. Was any other SSA data added to the cloud environment project and, if so, were there any additional violations of federal laws, regulations, or agency policies or procedures?
 - e. Is the data in the cloud environment being used by other government agencies?
8. Did SSA produce Privacy Impact Assessments, updates to its System of Records, and all other documentation as required by law before initiating the transfer of NUMIDENT data for the project initiated by John Solley on June 10, 2025?

Thank you for your attention to this letter, and I look forward to your prompt response.

Sincerely,



Gary C. Peters

United States Senator
Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs