

REDACTION KEY

- A. CLASSIFIED FBI INFORMATION RE-REVIEWED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.
- C-1. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT PENDING ONGOING CONSULTATION.
- C-2. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THAT GOVERNMENT'S DIRECTION FOLLOWING CONSULTATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.
- D. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE IS REQUIRED. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION IS OBTAINED WILL BE RELEASED.
- F. ADMINISTRATIVELY DESIGNATED FBI FILE AND/OR SERIAL NUMBERS OR HANDLING INFORMATION.
- G. SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION WITHHELD PURSUANT TO THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIVILEGE.
- J-1. SECTION 102A(i)(1) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED BY THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1).
- J-2. INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE BY THE BANK SECRECY ACT (BSA) AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE BSA. SEE 31 C.F.R. § 5311 ET SEQ; 31 C.F.R. CHAPTER X.
- J-3. INFORMATION DETERMINED BY ANOTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY TO BE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f).
- O-1. INFORMATION WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT.
- P. INFORMATION RESTRICTED FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974. SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE PRODUCED IN MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.) PURSUANT TO THE PRIVACY ACT PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED IN THAT CASE.
- P-1. INFORMATION SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, DATES OF BIRTH, AND OTHER SENSITIVE PERSONAL INFORMATION.
- S. NAMES AND OTHER PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL.

NOTE: Classification markings (classification banners and portion markings) are redacted without a code throughout the release.



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: [redacted] Albayoumi / GIP Cooptee

Date: 06/14/2017

From: WASHINGTON FIELD
[redacted] (G)

Contact: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
PENTBOMB HANNAWI, AHMED, AL MAJOR
CASE (MC) 182 [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] To file.

[redacted] (G)

Full Investigation Initiated: [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Details:

[redacted] On [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) reported the following information:

[redacted] In the late 1990's and up to September 11, 2001, Omar Albayoumi was paid a monthly stipend as a cooptee of the Saudi General Intelligence Presidency (GIP) via

[redacted]

PRODUCED TO PS NOT FOR EXTERNAL DISSEMINATION

Title: [REDACTED] Albayoumi / GIP Cooptee
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 06/14/2017

then Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan Alsaud. The information
Albayoumi obtained on persons of interest in the Saudi community in Los Angeles
and San Diego and other issues, which met certain GIP intelligence
requirements, would be forwarded to Bandar. Bandar would then inform the GIP of
items of interest to the GIP for further investigation/vetting or follow up

[REDACTED] Omar Albayoumi was a source of investigative interest following the 9/11 attacks for his support of 9/11 hijackers while living in California. Allegations of Albayoumi's involvement with Saudi intelligence were not confirmed at the time of the 9/11 Commission Report. The above information confirms these allegations. Albayoumi, at the time he was operating in California, was presumably employed with the civil aviation authority.

[REDACTED] For identification purposes a review of visas identified Albayoumi as follows:

Omar A M Al Bayoumi

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (O-1)

NFI was provided on this application. Writer could not locate prior visas.

[REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED]
Title: [REDACTED] Albayoumi / GIP Cooptee
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 06/14/2017

Emad Omar A Albayoumi (Emad Albayoumi)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Employer: General Authority of Civil Aviation

Email: [REDACTED]

Telephone: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

POC: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Supporting documentation provided the following information:

Father: [REDACTED] (J-3)

Mother: [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Title: [REDACTED] Albayoumi / GIP Cooptee
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 06/14/2017

Spouse: [REDACTED] (J-3)

Home Address: [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] Daughter requested [REDACTED] (J-3)

Bayan Omar Albayoumi (Bayan Albayoumi)

DOB ; [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Email: [REDACTED] (J-3)

Telephone: [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Husband: [REDACTED] (J-3)

Email: [REDACTED] (J-3)

Telephone: [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Title: [REDACTED] Albayoumi / GIP Cooptee
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 06/14/2017

Telephone: [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] Husband is identified as follows:

[REDACTED] (J-3)

DOB: [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Email: [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] CLEAR noted a telephone number of 615-720-2615

[REDACTED] Saudi student roster of Saudi scholarship participants noted [REDACTED] (J-3) email address of eng.sohil.bakri@hotmail.com and address of 1415 Destiny Drive, Murfreesboro, TN.

[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Albayoumi / GIP Cooptee
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 06/14/2017

[REDACTED] Another individual identified within the support network of the 9/11 hijackers was Fahad Althumairy ([REDACTED] (J-3)) DOB: [REDACTED] (J-3) Passport: [REDACTED] (J-3). Althumairy's son [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3):

[REDACTED] (J-3)

DOB: [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Employer: [REDACTED] (J-3)

Email: [REDACTED] (J-3)

Telephone: [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Father: [REDACTED] (J-3) DOB: [REDACTED] (J-3)

Mother: [REDACTED] (J-3) DOB: [REDACTED] (J-3)

PRODUCED TO PSI NOT FOR EXTERNAL DISSEMINATION

[REDACTED]

Multiple Subjects:

OPERATION ENCORE
(F)

Field Office POCs:

Fahad al-Thumairy
(F)


Omar al-Bayoumi
(F)

Musaed al-Jarrah
(F)

Iyad al-Rababah
(F)

Ahmed al-Zahrani
(F)

Firas al-Bayoumi
(F)



(G)

(S)

Headquarters POCs

(S)

Operation Encore Update (as of 20 March 2014):

- 19 March 2014 – Interview of Ardra Doherty, Iyad Al-Rababah’s ex-fiancee, at her place of employment, Home Depot, in Paramus, NJ. Doherty advised that she has been in contact with Al-Rababah, currently in Jordan, as recently as one month ago, and maintains regular contact with him by telephone. Doherty agreed to a future interview to provide additional details on her relationship with Al-Rababah, her knowledge of Al-Rababah’s former roommate Daoud Chehazeh, and Al-Rababah’s current living situation in Jordan.
- 17 March 2014 – Fox News provided internet link to a 28 minute interview of Daoud Chehazeh in Paterson, NJ in September 2011. Interview will be reviewed (D), (P)
- 06 March 2014 - Case team meeting with FBI Newark regarding Encore subject Daoud Chehazeh. Several leads pertaining to (D), (P) were discussed to include, Chehazeh’s relatives in PA, Ardra Doherty, the former fiancée of Chehazeh’s ex-roommate Iyad Al-Rababah, and linguist Susan Larabee.
- 28 February 2014 – SVTC with San Diego case team re Encore background regarding significance of San Diego subject Mohdar Abdullah, and San Diego based connections to Encore.
- 26 February 2014 - Case strategy meeting with SDNY AUSA (S)
(D), (P)

- [REDACTED]
- **24 January 2014 – Case strategy meeting with SDNY AUSA** (S) (D) [REDACTED]
(D) [REDACTED]
 - 19-20 December 2013 – [REDACTED] (G), FBI LA, FBI WFO interview Mohdar Abdullah (F) [REDACTED]
(F) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED]
 - December 2013 – SDNY advised that defense counsel [REDACTED] (D), (P) [REDACTED]
(D), (P) [REDACTED]
 - 05 November 2013 – [REDACTED] (G) advised they would seek to arrange an interview with Al-Mansoori
at the US Embassy in [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED]
 - 14 October 2013 – [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
 - October 2013 – [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
 - 19 August 2013 [REDACTED] (C-1) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
 - 13 August 2013 – SDNY advised that [REDACTED] (P), (D) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (P), (D) [REDACTED]
 - 09 July 2013 - [REDACTED] (P), (D) [REDACTED]
 - May/June 2013 - Coordination with USAO SDNY regarding [REDACTED] (P), (D) [REDACTED]
 - 13 May 2013 – SDNY advised that Daoud Chehazeh is represented by counsel and that discussions are
under way for a proffer of Chehazeh at SDNY in June 2013.
 - 1 May 2013 - [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED]
 - 18 April 2013 FBI Newark agrees to turn over [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (Daoud Chehazeh) to New York for
investigation under Operation Encore.
 - 11 April 2013 SDNY confirmed positive contact made with a defense attorney [REDACTED] (D), (P) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (D), (P) [REDACTED]
 - 08 April 2013 - [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] reporting provided by Al-Rababah.
 - 05 April 2013 - [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED]
reporting and background of Al-Rababah.
 - 20 March 2013 meeting with SDNY, was held regarding investigative approach on Daoud Chehazeh.
DHS's appeal of the U.S. Immigration judge's order granting asylum to Chehazeh was issued a final denial.
 - March 2013 - [REDACTED] (D) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (D) [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- February 2013 - [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) to conduct an interview of Mohamed Al-Mansoori [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
 - 25 January 2013 - Encore Case team met with SDNY AUSA [REDACTED] (S) SDNY AUSA [REDACTED] (S) and DOJ main attorney [REDACTED] (S) During the meeting, SDNY and DOJ were advised of case developments.
 - 30 November 2012 - [REDACTED] (C-2) (C-2)
 - [REDACTED] 24 September 2012 - Meeting with AUSA [REDACTED] (S) and DOJ attorney [REDACTED] (S) at NYO Chelsea. At the request of [REDACTED] (G) AUSA [REDACTED] (S) will explore potential charges for Mohdar Abdullah, including providing material support to the 9/11 hijackers, as well as lesser crimes, which investigators could present at a future interview with Abdullah [REDACTED] (G)
 - [REDACTED] 10 September 2012 - [REDACTED] (G) has assisted Legat Copenhagen in providing information to [REDACTED] (C-2) [REDACTED] (C-2) advised on 10 September 2012 that [REDACTED] (C-2) Upon resolution of the claim and its likely rejection, [REDACTED] (G) will coordinate with SDNY [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
 - [REDACTED] Muna Hagi Ismail, her mother Fowzia Abdi, father Aiderous Hagi Karama Nur, and mother's sister Khadra Mohamed Abdi, were sentenced on 24 September, 2012, in the Southern District of California to five years' probation and a \$2,500 fine, each. The Office of Immigration Litigation is preparing civil denaturalization cases against Fowzia and Nur, [REDACTED] (G) including Muna. Upon successful denaturalization, Fowzia, Nur, [REDACTED] (G) will be served with Notice to Appear (NTAs) and placed in immigration removal proceedings. This sentencing stems from guilty pleas from the defendants on January 15, 2012 in San Diego, CA for naturalization fraud charges.
 - [REDACTED] Osama Mustafa was arrested in Tampa, Florida on 15 May 2012 for Treasury Check Fraud by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. Mustafa was the owner of the Texaco gas station in San Diego at which Mohdar Abdullah and 9/11 hijacker Nawaf al Hazmi were both employed, along with additional people of interest to Operation Encore. On 17 September 2012, Mustafa was proffered in Tampa, Florida. During the proffer, Mustafa echoed previous statement he had made, denying any knowledge of the hijackers' terrorist affiliation and providing no additional details of use to investigators. Mustafa seemed optimistic about the charges he was facing. [REDACTED] (G) investigators anticipate future proffer sessions with Mustafa on the Operation Encore-related national security issues. During the week of 28 September 2012, Mustafa and his son proffered a second time. There was no National Security related information disclosed during the second proffer.
 - [REDACTED] In August 2012 [REDACTED] (G) sent a lead to JTTF Los Angeles seeking confirmation of two possible current addresses for Smail Mana, an Algerian individual who was known to have extremist views, and was identified as having met with Omar al Bayoumi in private on the same day as Bayoumi's alleged "chance" first meeting with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar. FBI Los Angeles confirmed Mana's current residence. [REDACTED] (G) is planning to approach Mana for an interview of his role aiding Bayoumi in facilitating the hijacker's arrival and settlement in California, for which Mana has never provided adequate explanation. [REDACTED] (G) will conduct the interview with [REDACTED] (G) should it be necessary to serve on Mana to obtain a statement.

- [REDACTED] Fathi Aidarus, [REDACTED] (F) an individual who, similarly to Mohdar Abdullah, facilitated the day-to-day life of 9/11 hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar during their time in San Diego, has been identified by FBI San Diego as living in Canada. Aidarus is reported to be very concerned about his presence on U.S. no-fly lists [REDACTED] (G), in conjunction with the San Diego office, will address seeking an interview of Aidarus.
- [REDACTED] In June, 2012, NYO investigators, along with AUSA [REDACTED] (S) and HQ analysts, traveled to London, UK, to exploit evidence seized in 2001 in New Scotland Yard's searches of Omar al Bayoumi's residences and offices. Working directly with SO15 section of Scotland Yard, the document exploitation team reviewed materials and New Scotland Yard's procedures for searches/evidence collection, discussed the potential for use in trial, and returned to the United States with copies of hundreds of pages of documentation with potential probative value. [REDACTED] (G) is undertaking the translation of these documents, to determine relevancy. To date, documents detailing the visits of Mutaib al Sudairy [REDACTED] (F) and Adel al Sadhan [REDACTED] (F) as well as directions indicating that Bayoumi was very familiar with trips from the Saudi Consulate in L.A. to the King Fahad Mosque, have been uncovered. Both documents provide evidence contradicting direct claims Bayoumi has previously made to FBI investigators, particularly about his actions on the day he allegedly randomly met the 9/11 hijackers, and highlight gaps in Bayoumi's story that undermine his claims of innocence.
- [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Details on Mohdar Abdullah and his connection to Operation ENCORE:

[REDACTED] The FBI is seeking to indict Mohdar Abdullah (Mohdar) in the Southern District of New York (SDNY) for providing material support to 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, pursuant to USC 18 section 2339B. Mohdar is the subject of San Diego's full field investigation, [REDACTED] (F) and currently resides in Sweden. The immediate goal of Operation ENCORE is to [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] Mohdar played a key role facilitating the daily lives and assisting future Flight 77 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. Shortly after February 4, 2000, al-Bayoumi tasked Mohdar to assist al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. Mohdar was also a family friend and associate of Anwar Aulaqi and they may spent time together with the hijackers. After September 11, 2001 Mohdar was investigated by the FBI for assisting the hijackers. On September 19, 2001 he was arrested by FBI San Diego on charges of immigration fraud for his claim of being a Somali asylee (Mohdar is Yemeni). Mohdar pled guilty to the immigration charges and was deported to Yemen in 2004.

[REDACTED] While Mohdar was detained in an immigration facility he bragged to two fellow inmates that he assisted the hijackers. The FBI and the SDNY have debriefed these individuals. Both are cooperative, but there is some prosecutorial concern about their value as witnesses.

[REDACTED]

(C-2)

[REDACTED]

In a January, 2012 meeting with FBI NYO,

(C-2)

[REDACTED] The FBI has also provided [REDACTED] with relevant derogatory information on Mohdar via a DIDO, including details of Mohdar's false U.S. asylum claim.

Recent investigation revealed strong indications that prior to September 11, 2001 Mohdar confided details of his conversations with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar to a young woman named Muna Hagi Ismail (Muna). Like Mohdar, Muna and her family are Yemeni, although they claimed to be Somali refugees. They have now gained U.S. citizenship.

On January 5, 2012, Muna, her parents and her aunt were arrested and charged with immigration fraud in San Diego. The post-arrest debriefings of Muna provided additional evidence of Mohdar's guilt. However, Muna continues to conceal additional information concerning Mohdar's involvement with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, as well as the role that Muna's family played in assisting Mohdar. The impending possibility of criminal and civil penalties facing Muna's entire family may motivate her to cooperate more fully with the FBI. Muna and her family are scheduled to next appear in court on February 21, 2012 for pre-trial motions.

Synopsis of Operation ENCORE:

Operation ENCORE is an investigation into individuals known to have provided substantial assistance to 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar during their time in California, prior to the attacks. Operation ENCORE main subjects include Fahad al-Thumairy, Omar Ahmed al-Bayoumi, and Musaed al-Jarrah. These subjects provided (or directed others to provide) the hijackers with assistance in daily activities, including procuring living quarters, financial assistance, and assistance in obtaining flight lessons and driver's licenses. Operation ENCORE seeks to prove these subjects provided such assistance with the knowledge that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were here to commit an act of terrorism.

Fahad al-Thumairy was the Imam at the King Fahad Mosque near Los Angeles, California when al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar first arrived in the United States. Al-Thumairy immediately assigned an individual to take care of them during their time in the Los Angeles area.

Omar al-Bayoumi was living in San Diego on a student visa, despite not attending classes, and receiving a salary from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for job duties he never performed. Shortly after arriving in Los Angeles, the two hijackers had an allegedly accidental meeting with al-Bayoumi, who claims to have been in Los Angeles on personal business. At this meeting, al-Bayoumi advised the hijackers to relocate to San Diego, which they did. Once in San Diego, al-Bayoumi assisted the hijackers with a place to live, opening a bank account, and also assigned two individuals to care for them, one of whom was Mohdar Abdullah.

██████████ Telephone numbers assigned to the Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE) in Washington, D.C., where Musaed al-Jarrah was the director of the Islamic Affairs Department, had significant telephonic contact with al-Thumairy and al-Bayoumi while the hijackers were in the Los Angeles and San Diego areas. There is evidence that al-Jarrah had possible links to al Qaeda and tasked al-Thumairy and al-Bayoumi with assisting the hijackers.

PRODUCED TO PSI NOT FOR EXTERNAL DISSEMINATION



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Electronic Communication

Title: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
Connections to the Attacks of September 11,
2001

Date: 07/23/2021

From: [REDACTED] (G)
Contact: [REDACTED] (S)

Approved By: [REDACTED] (S)

Drafted By: [REDACTED] (S)

Case ID #: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
PENTTBOMB [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] PENTTBOMB (A), (G), (J-1) MAJOR
CASE (MC) 182 [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)



PRODUCED TO PSI NOT FOR EXTERNAL DISSEMINATION

[REDACTED]
Title: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] Connections to the
Attacks of September 11, 2001
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 07/23/2021

[REDACTED]
(F)

Synopsis: [REDACTED] To file. To provide summary and historical information
for subsequent agents of [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED]
(G)

Administrative Notes: [REDACTED] Attached to this EC is a document summarizing
the connections between the 9/11 investigation and elements affiliated
with the Saudi Arabian government in the U.S.
This replaces Serial [REDACTED] (F) which was intended as a draft for review but
was serialized. Serial [REDACTED] (F) will be removed at a later date.

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. [REDACTED] Saudi 9/11 Connections

Details:

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this communication is to consolidate information related to the involvement of personnel and entities controlled by the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) and its affiliates within the United States with the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11 Attacks / PENTTBOMB). Such an analysis is deemed essential for future case agents of this program to understand the origin of the investigation. Due to the purpose noted, this document only discusses entities that are part of or closely tied to the Saudi Arabian government. Other aspects of the 9/11/2001 investigation are only noted if related to this purpose. This report should not be considered an intelligence assessment and is not intended as such.

Title: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] Connections to the
Attacks of September 11, 2001
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 07/23/2021

An additional purpose of this communication is to document investigations and supporting documentation regarding the Saudi(Wahhabi)/Salafi/militant network that was created, funded, directed and supported by the KSA and its affiliated organizations and diplomatic personnel within the U.S. As Saudi government officials and intelligence officers were directly operating and supporting the entities involved with this network, their involvement with the activities of these organizations/individuals would logically be supposed to have the knowledge or concurrence of the KSA government. This knowledge and/or concurrence by the SAG is related to the 9/11 investigation not only be the direct involvement of some personnel but also via the creation of a larger network for such activities.

In addition, the below analysis will update information available on the ties of some of these entities to Saudi Arabian intelligence services. Much of the publically known information regarding the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks was documented in the 9/11 Commission Report which was published in 2004. Thus much available information from subsequent and ongoing investigations was not noted in the Commission's Report. In addition, the classified "28 pages" was subsequently de-classified and investigations since 2004 shed additional light on the information that was contained within these 28 pages which were created in 2004 as part of the original Commission Report.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] there was located within the EKSA the offices of the Islamic Affairs Department and the office of Dawa (or Propagation). Investigation of the 9/11 hijackers and their support networks identified significant connections to these offices either directly or via the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles. As such, a primary portion of this communication will focus on these offices and connections to the 9/11 hijackers. In addition, the SAG/EKSA was also involved with the funding and creation of a multitude of Islamic organizations, offices, imams and other religious figures within the US – many of which were involved with militant ideology. Several of these were known to be tied directly to Prince Bandar and/or were involved with the collection of information on US based Islamic entities. As the propagation of militant ideology would naturally provide justification for those who were in the hijacker's support network – these organizations will also be listed below (below is not an all-inclusive list as this would be too large.)

Administration:

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] was originally formed as [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] in 2002 as a result of the PENTTBOMB investigation identifying connections between the 9/11 hijackers, their support network and individuals associated with the SAG. As is well known, 15 of the deceased 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia with a possible 20th - Mohammed Alqahtani - subsequently captured in Afghanistan and confined at Guantanamo Bay after unsuccessfully attempting to enter the US. At the time of creation of [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] there was [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] a few investigations of some Saudi Arabian

Title: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Connections to the
Attacks of September 11, 2001
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 07/23/2021

government personnel and organizations had been previously established. [REDACTED] (G) was quickly transferred to the new [REDACTED] (G) and changed to [REDACTED] (G) and then subsequently [REDACTED] (G). During a portion of this time the squad's FBIHQ oversight was within the [REDACTED] (G) and much of the squad investigative efforts were focused on Saudi Arabian charities in the [REDACTED] (G) AOR as well as individual subjects with established or alleged AQ or militant connections. After approximately ten years in [REDACTED] (G) the program was again transferred to [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) before returning to [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G).

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) of Saudi Arabian entities before and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under the [REDACTED] (F) classification. Later this designation was changed to [REDACTED] (F) (A), (G), (J-1) investigations prior to and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under [REDACTED] (F) and [REDACTED] (F). These were later combined under [REDACTED] (F) and then [REDACTED] (F) classifications. For the most part, serials noted within this document utilize the case caption of the relevant time period.

[REDACTED] As the purpose of this document is to highlight and encapsulate the connections between the Saudi Arabian establishments and government entities in the U.S. with the 9/11 hijacker support network writer is not investigating or re-investigating the 9/11 investigation. This is particularly relevant due to a lack of resources and analytical assistance. As such, writer has located relevant serials and have copied that information directly within this communication. **The language, spelling, source symbol numbers, grammar, formatting and emphasis of the original serials is retained.**

[REDACTED] As the original language of the referenced serials is retained, a note on how sources were referenced is necessary. During the 9/11/2001 time period, Letter Head Memorandums (LHMs) were necessary for dissemination to DOJ. The LHMs removed the standard source number [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) replaced by a non-standard [REDACTED] (G) designation that was created entirely by the writing agent. Thus research is necessary in order to locate and identify the original source. During this time period, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)