TSA_HSGAC_8-21-24/5-28-25_T2_0000460

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of in telligence and Analysis 6595 Springfield Center Drive Springfield, VA 20598



FROM:

Assistant Administrator Intelligence & Analysis

TO:

Division Director

Transportation Analysis Division

Acting Division Director Vetting Analysis Division

DATE:

January 15, 2021

SUBJECT:

Use of TSA Watch Lists to Mitigate Ongoing Threats to National Security

On January 6, 2021, a number of individuals entered the U.S. Capitol Building in Washington, D.C. by force, and were followed by a larger number of individuals. These individuals unlawfully entered the Capitol with the intent of disrupting ongoing Congressional proceedings. Some of these individuals had firearms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in their possession; additional IEDs were discovered in the area near the Capitol. A number of individuals committed criminal acts of violence and destruction amidst the attack on the U.S. Capitol building. This attack led to the death of a U.S. Capitol Police Officer, a number of significant injuries to other responding law enforcement officers, and to deaths and injuries amongst the participants in the attack. Similar violent protest activity occurred in other cities across the United States on January 6, 2021. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and partnering law enforcement agencies have made dozens of arrests associated with the violence, and significant efforts remain underway to investigate this violence and prosecute perpetrators.

Further civil unrest from some of the same individuals and associates involved in the January 6, 2021 attack is expected in the coming weeks associated with the January 20, 2021 Presidential transition. Current Law Enforcement, intelligence, and open source reporting indicates that domestic violent extremists (DVEs) holding a variety of ideological motivations are planning on exploiting further planned protests to commit further acts of armed violence. In

particular, armed groups are intending to travel to Washington, DC ahead of the Presidential Inauguration and seek to replicate the tactics demonstrated on January 6th, including further potential attacks of the U.S. Capitol, and/or storming of other government facilities, including federal, state, or local buildings nationwide. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has warned of armed protests planned in all 50 state capitols from January 16 through January 20, and protests at the Capitol from January 17 through January 20, including calls for "storming" government buildings. 1,2,3

Additionally, there have been numerous incidents of disruptive passengers and unruly behavior negatively impacting aviation operations by passengers traveling to and from the National Capital Region (NCR). In the days preceding and following January 6, air carriers reported a significant number of disruptions by passengers onboard flights into and out of the NCR, including harassment of other passengers (including Members of Congress), failure to comply with crewmember instructions, as well as interference with flight crew attempting to enforce air carrier requirements to wear masks onboard the flight due to the COVID-19 pandemic. At least one individual has publicly threatened to suffocate and shoot flight attendants.

As information regarding the January 6 attack and planned future attacks have become available, it is evident that these past and threatened incidents of domestic terrorism constitute a threat to national security. Similarly, increased harassment of passengers and crew members associated with travel to the NCR on January 6, and anticipated travel surrounding the Presidential Inauguration, further indicates a threat to transportation security, and to airline and passenger safety. Accordingly, the Administrator has directed that Intelligence & Analysis use the TSA Watch Lists to deny boarding, designate persons for enhanced screening, or take other appropriate action to mitigate the threat posed by violence or threatened violence.⁴ In accordance with the Administrator's January 12, 2021 further direction, I provide the following guidance. This document memorializes how I&A applies the TSA Watch List standards approved on May 17, 2019 with respect to the criteria for placement on each TSA Watch List to the ongoing threats of violence.⁵ The below is intended to facilitate the appropriate action for persons involved in the January 6 attack, or for whom intelligence and law enforcement

¹ (U) National Cris is Coordination Center Update: Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity January 2021, 1700 12 JANUARY 2021, FBI Strategic Information Operations Center with input from ATF, DEA, DOD, DOJ, DHS, US Park Police, USMS, U//LES.

^{2 (}U//FOUO) Joint Intelligence Bulletin: Domestic Violent Extremists Emboldened in A stermath of Capitol Breach, Elevated Domestic Terrorism Threat of Violence Likely Amid Political Transitions and Beyond, 13 January 2021, FBI, DHS NCTC, U//FOUO.

³ (U//FOUO) Strategic Perspective: Executive Analytical Report: Some Domestic Violent Extremists Likely Wil React with Violence to the Presidential Transition Process, 14 January 2021, FBI, U//FOUO.

⁴ I&A began doing so on January 7, 2021.
⁵ Procedures Relating to the Transportation Security Administration Watch Lists, signed May 17, 2019 at 7-9; see also Management Directive 100, TSA Roles and Responsibilities, dated May 5, 2020 § 5.D.11, 13; Delegation of Authority for Operations Support, dated May 14, 2020 § 3.B.3-4.

WARNING This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520. No part of this record may be released to persons without a "need to know", as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. Government agencies, public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.

reporting indicates an intent to engage in or incite violent acts as described within this memorandum:

Placement on the TSA Watch List (Deny Boarding) is appropriate for:

- Individuals who unlawfully entered the U.S. Capitol building on January 6, 2021;
- Individuals found in possession of firearms, dangerous weapons, and/or zipties or similar constraints in connection with the attack on the U.S. Capitol building;
- Individuals found in possession of explosives in connection with the attack on the U.S. Capitol building;
- Individuals who have engaged in or attempted an assault on a law enforcement officer or other government personnel in connection with the attack on the U.S. Capitol building;
- Individuals who, in conjunction with ongoing civil unrest:
 - o engage in violent conduct similar to the above with respect to the U.S. Capitol building, another federal building or state capitol building; or
 - o under circumstances likely to produce such action, have expressed the intent to engage in violent conduct similar to the above;
- Individuals who, in connection with ongoing civil unrest, have threatened the life of government or security personnel, flight crew, or passengers; or
- Individuals responsible for organizing or inciting seditious conduct. Organizing or inciting seditious conduct is defined as acts intended to overthrow, put down, or destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against the Government of the United States, or to oppose by force the authority of the Government of the United States, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority of the Government of the United States.⁶

Placement on the TSA Watch List (Enhanced Screening) is appropriate for:

• Individuals suspected of traveling to the National Capital Region in conjunction with the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol and who are believed to pose an elevated risk of domestic terrorism,⁷ but for whom there is a current lack of specific information relating to unlawful entry into the U.S. Capitol, violent acts in support of the January 6, 2021 attack, or incitement of the same, and who do not otherwise the criteria for placement on the TSA Watch List (Deny Boarding).

⁶ See 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (regarding seditious conspiracy); 18 U.S.C. § 2383 (regarding rebellion or insurrection, including incitement of rebellion or insurrection); and 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (regarding advocacy of overthrowing the government by force). These statutes are serious criminal offenses that inherently touch upon a threat to national security, and guide evaluation of whether a nomination meets this standard. Incitement is not the mere oral or written advocacy of ideas or expression of belief, not involving advocacy of any actoracts of violence or the assertion of the rightness of, or right to commit, any such act or acts. See 18 U.S.C. § 2102(b).

Defined as activities that involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; which appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and which occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5).

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Placement on the TSA Watch List (Security Notification) is appropriate for:

Individuals who harass or threaten the harassment of security personnel, flight crew, or
passengers in conjunction with either the Presidential transition or requirements to wear
personal protective equipment due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

All nominations to a TSA Watch List must continue to be supported by particularized derogatory information regarding the individual to be placed on a TSA Watch List. All nominations will be evaluated under the totality of the circumstances, including available relevant derogatory and mitigating information. If information is discovered during your teams' reviews of available information that merits consideration for deviation from the above guidelines, that information must be provided along with nomination materials for consideration by the Administrator or his designee.⁸ As with all other nominations to the TSA Watch List, an individual may not be added to a TSA Watch List based solely on the individual's real or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability. Individuals shall not be added to any TSA Watch List in retaliation for engaging in activities protected by the U.S. Constitution, including First Amendment protected activities. Conduct protected by the First Amendment may be considered in conjunction with other conduct and evidence only to the extent relevant to TSA's determination as to whether an individual poses a threat warranting placement on a TSA Watch List. First Amendment protected activities shall not serve as the sole basis for placement on any TSA Watch List.

All additions, status modifications, and removals shall be memorialized via memorandum explaining the basis for the determination as soon as possible. These memoranda will formalize the ongoing analysis and legal review regarding individual nominations to a TSA Watch List.

I&A will assess the threat environment as of January 31, 2021 and determine whether modifications to this guidance are appropriate. Further, I&A will conduct a status review for all persons added pursuant to this guidance on the week of January 31, 2021, in coordination with Chief Counsel and the Privacy offices. At this time, TSA will consider up-to-date information regarding each individual placed on a TSA Watch List, the current threat environment, and threat mitigation measures undertaken by other agencies to determine if changes to the above guidance, status modifications, or removals are appropriate. I&A will also conduct encounter-based reviews upon notification of identified pending travel to consider the latest information available and determine if the case TSA Watch List status should be upgraded, downgraded, or removed as appropriate. Similarly, at the end of month thereafter, I&A will conduct a review of the cases and guidance as described above until there are no cases associated with this guidance on the TSA Watch List and/or the threat environment has changed that obviate the need for this specific guidance. Notwithstanding this scheduled review, should your teams become aware of any other information, including but not limited to intelligence, law enforcement, and open source

⁸ For example, persons for whom there is significant mitigating information to indicate the absence of a threat notwithstanding meeting the above guidelines, or for whom an investigating law enforcement agency has requested that TSA not delay or deny travel due to investigative equities, and for whom the Administrator or designee has assessed alternative threat mitigation measures to be adequate.

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information, indicating that a change in status is warranted (e.g. identification of additional derogatory information, determination that a person has been misidentified or is otherwise not associated with the January 6 attack), that information should be provided to me as soon as possible to facilitate any appropriate modifications.

Removal from the TSA Watch List is warranted when:

- The threat posed by the individual is mitigated through other measures, such as placement on the corresponding Terrorist Screening Database watchlist;
- The individual is no longer identified as connected to a threat to national security through further investigation, including coordination with partner agencies, review by I&A in conjunction with the TSA Watch List review processes, or through the DHS TRIP redress process; or
- Intelligence and law enforcement reporting no longer indicate a continuing threat to national security associated with the ongoing civil unrest.
- For persons on the TSA Watch List (Security Notification) on account of the above standard, travel without incident for three encounters, or for a period of at least one year with at least one encounter, will generally serve as evidence that an individual no longer poses a threat warranting placement on the TSA Watch List (Security Notification) unless unusual aggravating circumstances apply. These circumstances must be specifically described in TSA Watch List reviews.

TSA Chief Counsel's and Civil Rights and Liberties, Ombudsman & Traveler Engagement offices have reviewed this memorandum and have no or other objections to this guidance.

TSA_HSGAC_8-21-24/5-28-25_T2_0000465 SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

5 February 2021

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis 6595 Springfield Center Drive Springfield, VA 20598



FROM:

Assistant Administrator Intelligence & Analysis

TO:

Division Director

Transportation Analysis Division

Acting Division Director Vetting Analysis Division

DATE:

February 1, 2021

SUBJECT: Use of TSA Watch Lists to Mitigate Ongoing Threats to National Security

On January 6, 2021, a number of individuals entered the U.S. Capitol Building in Washington, D.C. by force, and were followed by a larger number of individuals. These individuals unlawfully entered the Capitol with the intent of disrupting ongoing Congressional proceedings. Some of these individuals had firearms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in their possession; additional IEDs were discovered in the area near the Capitol. A number of individuals committed criminal acts of violence and destruction amidst the attack on the U.S. Capitol building. This attack led to the death of a U.S. Capitol Police Officer, a number of significant injuries to other responding law enforcement officers, and to deaths and injuries amongst the participants in the attack. Similar violent protest activity occurred in other cities across the United States on January 6, 2021. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and partnering law enforcement agencies have made dozens of arrests associated with the violence, and significant efforts remain underway to investigate this violence and prosecute perpetrators.

Further civil unrest from some of the same individuals and associates involved in the January 6, 2021 attack has been expected in connection with the Presidential transition, including the upcoming impeachment trial in the Senate for former President Trump. Current Law Enforcement, intelligence, and open source reporting indicates that domestic violent extremists (DVEs) holding a variety of ideological motivations are planning on exploiting further planned

protests to commit further acts of armed violence. In particular, armed groups intended to travel to Washington, DC ahead of the Presidential Inauguration and seek to replicate the tactics demonstrated on January 6th, including further potential attacks of the U.S. Capitol, and/or storming of other government facilities, including federal, state, or local buildings nationwide. The Federal Bureau of Investigation warned of armed protests planned in all 50 state capitols from January 16 through January 20, and protests at the Capitol from January 17 through January 20, including calls for "storming" government buildings. 1.2.3 While the Inauguration has transpired, threats continue against members of Congress, including plots to attack Members of Congress during their travel to and from the Capitol during the impeachment trial. 4

Additionally, there have been numerous incidents of disruptive passengers and unruly behavior negatively impacting aviation operations by passengers traveling to and from the National Capital Region (NCR). In the days preceding and following January 6, air carriers reported a significant number of disruptions by passengers onboard flights into and out of the NCR, including harassment of other passengers (including Members of Congress) and failure to comply with crewmember instructions. At least one individual has publicly threatened to suffocate and shoot flight attendants.

As information regarding the January 6 attack and planned future attacks have become available, it is evident that these past and threatened incidents of domestic terrorism constitute a threat to national security. Similarly, increased harassment of passengers and crew members associated with travel to the NCR on January 6, and anticipated travel connected to the ongoing civil unrest, further indicates a threat to transportation security, and to airline and passenger safety. Accordingly, the Administrator has directed that Intelligence & Analysis use the TSA Watch Lists to deny boarding, designate persons for enhanced screening, or take other appropriate action to mitigate the threat posed by violence or threatened violence.⁵

Given these threats to the Nation's security, on January 15, 2021, I provided more specific guidance regarding how I&A would apply the TSA Watch List standards that were approved on May 17, 2019 to this new situation and in reaction to the ongoing threats of

¹ (U) National Cris is Coordination Center Update: Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity January 2021, 1700 12 JANUARY 2021, FBI Strategic Information Operations Center with input from ATF, DEA, DOD, DOJ, DHS, US Park Police, USMS, U//LES.

² (U//FOUO) Joint Intelligence Bulletin: Domestic Violent Extremists Emboldened in Aftermath of Capitol Breach, Elevated Domestic Terrorism Threat of Violence Likely Amid Political Transitions and Beyond, 13 January 2021, FBI, DHS NCTC, U//FOUO.

³ (U//FOUO) Strategic Perspective: Executive Analytical Report: Some Domestic Violent Extremists Likely Wil React with Violence to the Presidential Transition Process, 14 January 2021, FBI, U//FOUO.

⁴ (U) Donald Trump Impeachment Trial Sparks Violent Threats Against Lawmakers, 0624 25 JANUARY 2021, Newsweek, U (citing briefing provided to press).

⁵ I&A began doing soon January 7,2021.

violence.⁶ The January 15 guidance directed a review of the threat environment as of January 31, 2021 determine whether modifications to the January 15 guidance are appropriate.

As of January 31, 2021, I judge that there remains a heightened threat environment across the United States. According to a National Terrorism Advisory System bulletin issued by the Acting Secretary on January 27, 2021, the heightened threat environment will persist in the weeks following the Presidential Inauguration, as "some ideologically-motivated violent extremists with objections to the exercise of governmental authority and the presidential transition, as well as other perceived grievances fueled by false narratives, could continue to mobilize to incite or commit violence." I assess that this enduring threat of violence continues to pose a threat to transportation or national security, albeit one that is more generalized in nature in contrast with the violence at the U.S. Capitol building on January 6 and threats of violence associated with the Presidential Inauguration. Additionally, the Terrorist Screening Center has been placing persons known by TSA to have engaged in the January 6 Capitol Violence on the Terrorist Screening Database as continuing criminal investigations have yielded more information regarding these persons. Generally, these persons have been added to either the Selectee or Expanded Selectee lists absent an aggravating factor (e.g. use or possession of explosives).

Accordingly, after consultation with the TSA Senior Leadership Team, I am revising the January 15, 2021 guidance in light of current threat conditions. The standards below are intended to facilitate the placement of individuals who continue to be nominated to a TSA Watch List, and to guide the reviews of individuals placed on a TSA Watch List required by TSA Watch List procedures and the January 15 memorandum.

Placement on the TSA Watch List (Deny Boarding) is appropriate for:

- Individuals found in possession of firearms, dangerous weapons, and/or zipties or similar constraints in connection with the attack on the U.S. Capitol building;
- Individuals found in possession of explosives in connection with the attack on the U.S.
 Capitol building;
- Individuals who have engaged in or attempted an assault on a law enforcement officer or other government personnel in connection with the attack on the U.S. Capitol building;
- Individuals who, in connection with ongoing civil unrest:
 - o engage in violent conduct similar to the above with respect to the U.S. Capitol building, another federal building or state capitol building; or
 - o under circumstances likely to produce such action, have expressed the intent to engage in violent conduct similar to the above;

⁶ Procedures Relating to the Transportation Security Administration Watch Lists, signed May 17, 2019 at 7-9; see also Management Directive 100, TSA Roles and Responsibilities, dated May 5, 2020 § 5.D.11, 13; Delegation of Authority for Operations Support, dated May 14, 2020 § 3.B.3-4.

⁷ National Terrorism Advisory Bulletin, issued January 27, 2021 at 11:00 AM Eastern, available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ntas/alerts/21_0127_ntas-bulletin.pdf. This bulletin expires on or before April 30, 2021. See also United States Capitol Police Intelligence Assessment, issued January 27, 2021.

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- Individuals who, in connection with ongoing civil unrest, have threatened the life of government or security personnel, flight crew, or passengers; or
- Individuals responsible for organizing or inciting seditious conduct. Organizing or inciting seditious conduct is defined as acts intended to overthrow, put down, or destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against the Government of the United States, or to oppose by force the authority of the Government of the United States, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority of the Government of the United States.⁸

Placement on the TSA Watch List (Enhanced Screening) is appropriate for:

- Individuals who unlawfully entered the U.S. Capitol building on January 6, 2021, but
 who are not suspected of engaging in the activities warranting placement on the TSA
 Watch List (Deny Boarding) noted above;
- Individuals suspected of traveling to the National Capital Region in connection with the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol and who are believed to pose an elevated risk of domestic terrorism, but for whom there is a current lack of specific information relating to unlawful entry into the U.S. Capitol, violent acts in support of the January 6, 2021 attack, or incitement of the same, and who do not otherwise the criteria for placement on the TSA Watch List (Deny Boarding).

Placement on the TSA Watch List (Security Notification) is appropriate for:

• Individuals who harass or threaten the harassment of security personnel, flight crew, or passengers in connection with the Presidential transition;

All nominations to a TSA Watch List must continue to be supported by particularized derogatory information regarding the individual to be placed on a TSA Watch List. All nominations will be evaluated under the totality of the circumstances, including available relevant derogatory and mitigating information. If information is discovered during your teams' reviews of available information that merits consideration for deviation from the above guidelines, that information must be provided along with nomination materials for consideration

⁸ See 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (regarding seditious conspiracy); 18 U.S.C. § 2383 (regarding rebellion or insurrection, including incitement of rebellion or insurrection); and 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (regarding advocacy of overthrowing the government by force). These statutes are serious criminal offenses that inherently touch upon a threat to national security, and guide evaluation of whether a nomination meets this standard. Incitement is not the mere oral or written advocacy of ideas or expression of belief, not involving advocacy of any actor acts of violence or the assertion of the rightness of, or right to commit, any such act or acts. See 18 U.S.C. § 2102(b).

⁹ Defined as activities that involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; which appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, as sassination, or kidnapping; and which occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5).

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by the Administrator or his designee. ¹⁰ As with all other nominations to the TSA Watch List, an individual may not be added to a TSA Watch List based solely on the individual's real or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability. Individuals shall not be added to any TSA Watch List in retaliation for engaging in activities protected by the U.S. Constitution, including First Amendment protected activities. Conduct protected by the First Amendment may be considered in conjunction with other conduct and evidence only to the extent relevant to TSA's determination as to whether an individual poses a threat warranting placement on a TSA Watch List. First Amendment protected activities shall not serve as the sole basis for placement on any TSA Watch List.

All additions, status modifications, and removals shall be memorialized via memorandum explaining the basis for the determination as soon as possible. These memoranda will formalize the ongoing analysis and legal review regarding individual nominations to a TSA Watch List.

I&A will conduct monthly reviews of the cases and this guidance as described above until there are no cases associated with this guidance on the TSA Watch List and/or the threat environment has changed that obviate the need for this specific guidance. At each review, TSA will consider up-to-date information regarding each individual placed on a TSA Watch List, the current threat environment, and threat mitigation measures undertaken by other agencies to determine if changes to the above guidance, status modifications, or removals are appropriate. I&A will also conduct encounter-based reviews upon notification of identified pending travel to consider the latest information available and determine if the case TSA Watch List status should be upgraded, downgraded, or removed as appropriate. Notwithstanding this scheduled review, should your teams become aware of any other information, including but not limited to intelligence, law enforcement, and open source information, including that a change in status is warranted (e.g. identification of additional derogatory information, determination that a person has been misidentified or is otherwise not associated with the January 6 attack), that information should be provided to me as soon as possible to facilitate any appropriate modifications.

Removal from the TSA Watch List is warranted when:

- The threat posed by the individual is mitigated through other measures, such as placement within the Terrorist Screening Database;
- The individual is no longer identified as connected to a threat to national security through
 further investigation, including coordination with partner agencies, review by I&A in
 conjunction with the TSA Watch List review processes, or through the DHS TRIP redress
 process; or
- Intelligence and law enforcement reporting no longer indicate a continuing threat to national security associated with the ongoing civil unrest.

¹⁰ For example, persons for whomthere is significant mitigating information to indicate the absence of a threat notwithstanding meeting the above guidelines, or for whom an investigating law enforcement agency has requested that TSA not delay or deny travel due to investigative equities, and for whom the Administrator or designee has assessed alternative threat mitigation measures to be adequate.

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TSA_HSGAC_8-21-24/5-28-25_T2_0000470 SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

 For persons on the TSA Watch List (Security Notification) on account of the above standard, travel without incident for three encounters, or for a period of at least one year with at least one encounter, will generally serve as evidence that an individual no longer poses a threat warranting placement on the TSA Watch List (Security Notification) unless unusual aggravating circumstances apply. These circumstances must be specifically described in TSA Watch List reviews.

TSA Chief Counsel's and Civil Rights and Liberties, Ombudsman & Traveler Engagement offices have reviewed this memorandum and have no protections to this guidance.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 601 S. 12th Street Arlington, VA 20598



April 11, 2012

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Janet Napolitano

Secretary

THROUGH:

Jane Holl Lute

Deputy Secretary

John S. Pistole

FROM:

Administrator

COORDINATED WITH:

OGC, PLCY, MGMT, I&A, Office of the CT

Coordinator, CRCL, PRIV

SUBJECT:

(U//SSI) Implementation of an Intelligence-Driven,

Risk-Based Domestic Aviation Security Screening

Program (Quiet Skies).

Purpose

(U//FOUO) This memorandum (1) seeks your approval to transition the Quiet Skies pilot to a permanent intelligence-driven, risk-based domestic aviation screening program; and (2) outlines areas of agreement among DHS components.

Background

(U//SSI) Pursuant to your August 2011 approval, TSA began the Domestic Silent Partner pilot to assess TSA's ability to mitigate the risk posed by unknown violent extremists traveling on domestic passenger flights by conducting additional screening of passengers whose previous international travel matches patterns from known or suspected terrorist travel. The Quiet Skies initiative is another key component of TSA's risk-based

approach to security. Based upon the results of the Domestic Silent Partner (DSP) Concept of Operations and successful demonstration of the objectives of the Quiet Skies pilots, TSA began planning efforts for a permanent Quiet Skies program.

Discussion

(U//SSI) In early January 2012, at the direction of Deputy Secretary Lute, TSA convened the Quiet Skies Working Group (QSWG) to consider the intelligence, operational, legal, policy, and privacy implications of transitioning Quiet Skies from a pilot to a full operational program. TSA chaired the QSWG with participation from the Office of the General Counsel (OGC), the DHS Privacy Office (PRIV), the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), Policy, the Office of the Counterterrorism Coordinator (CT) and the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). The QSWG participants met six times to discuss program development and provided feedback to their respective Principals. Based on this work, the Principals have now reached consensus on: (1) the need for transparency; (2) limiting the number of encounters which result in additional screening; (3) defining Quiet Skies List name retention periods (e.g. 20 days for TSDB affiliates and 90 days for intelligence-based rules); (4) quarterly reviews of the intelligence justifications for Quiet Skies rules; (5) redress, which will include a Quiet Skies Cleared List (QSCL); (6) the use of ethnicity component in Quiet Skies rules; and (7) information sharing.

(U//SSI) <u>Quiet Skies Rules Approval Process</u> – In order to be included in Quiet Skies, a rule must be approved through the established Silent Partner approval process. In addition to the Silent Partner requirements, a rule in Quiet Skies must: (1) target a potential threat to aviation security within the Homeland, as assessed by TSA-OIA; (2) be separately recommended for inclusion in Quiet Skies by TSA-OIA; and (3) be separately approved by the Administrator for inclusion in Quiet Skies. A separate oversight review process for Quiet Skies will also be implemented.

(U//SSI) <u>Use of Ethnicity Component in Quiet Skies Rules</u> – In light of the heightened sensitivities associated with using ethnicity as a factor ("ethnic-based rule") in a domestic context, there will be an additional review process for the potential use of ethnicity as a factor in Quiet Skies rules. There will be two processes for the review, depending on the exigency of the threat.

(U//SSI) If TSA determines that exigent circumstances require implementation of a Quiet Skies rule with an ethnicity-based name selector, the TSA Administrator may direct that the rule be implemented immediately. Reviewing offices will be notified immediately of the implementation of a new rule. Should a reviewing office non-concur with the rule, the reviewing office will notify TSA within 24 hours, and TSA and the non-concuring office will seek resolution. Disagreements as to implementation of a rule shall be elevated to the Deputy Secretary, followed by the Secretary, as necessary. In non-exigent

circumstances, TSA will receive affirmative consent by each of the reviewing offices within 48 hours, prior to the issuance of the rule. Disagreement will be elevated to the Deputy Secretary, followed by the Secretary, as necessary.

(U//SSI) The DHS HQ oversight offices (CRCL, PRIV, and OGC) will review all Quiet Skies rules employing ethnicity-based name selectors when approved by the TSA Administrator. TSA will provide the supporting intelligence to the reviewing offices, including TSA-OIA's analysis of the need for the ethnicity-based name selector, specifically discussing the reasons for its use and why alternative selectors (such as a travel segment, duration of travel, or travel document country of issue) are not an effective means to mitigate a particular threat. The reviewing offices will also consider the potential negative effects on ethnic groups. If all parties are unable to reach resolution on the implementation of a specific rule, the matter will be elevated to the Deputy Secretary, followed by the Secretary, as necessary.

(U//SSI) TSA assesses the Quiet Skies program has value as an intelligence-based prescreening mechanism to mitigate risk from unknown or potential terrorists who have received enhanced (secondary) screening at their Last Point of Departure (LPD) airport prior to travel to the United States. It is flexible and scalable, allowing TSA to be more risk-based and operationally responsive to situations that potentially threaten aviation within the Homeland. Quiet Skies will further enhance DHS and TSA's risk-based security initiatives by enabling TSA to focus screening resources based on intelligence.

(U//SSI) Given the risk associated with unknown violent extremists, TSA believes Quiet Skies' implementation, as an additional layer of aviation security, will assist in mitigating threats to domestic aviation.

TSA has implemented appropriate safeguards, based on input from CRCL and PRIV, to ensure travelers are not unnecessarily or indefinitely subjected to enhanced screening. Accordingly, it is recommended you approve Quiet Skies as a layer of DHS/TSA's intelligence-driven, risk-based approach to aviation security.

(U//SSI) The attached appendixes detail the implementation plan for the Quiet Skies initiative (Appendix 1) and the OGC Legal Analysis (Appendix 2).

Recommendation

Approve Date In Disapprove Date

Modify/	Needs more discussion	/	Date
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Appendix 1

Quiet Skies Full Implementation Plan

(U//SSI) TSA will use match records from specified Silent Partner rules to build a watch list, the Quiet Skies List, and will screen travelers flying into, out of, or within the Homeland against this Quiet Skies List.¹ Two types of Silent Partner rules will be considered for inclusion²:

- (U//SSI) The Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) Affiliate rule

 3
 - (U//SSI) Individuals will be removed from the Quiet Skies List through deliberate exclusion, after three encounters or after 20 days, whichever is earliest.
- (U//SSI) Intelligence-based scenario rules identify individuals based on specific
 intelligence about a potential threat or who have traveled abroad and may be
 returning from identified higher risk areas using travel routes and tradecraft
 highlighted in current intelligence. These rules or rule packages will be
 implemented at the TSA Administrator's direction based on threat information
 indicating a specific and credible threat to aviation security within the Homeland
 from violent extremists.
 - o (U//SSI) Intelligence-based rules will populate a 90-day, rolling list.
 - (U//SSI) Individuals will be removed from the Quiet Skies List through deliberate exclusion, after three encounters, after 90 days, or after deactivation of the particular Quiet Skies rule placing them on the list, whichever is earliest.
 - (U//SSI) The intelligence supporting the Quiet Skies rules is continually evaluated and subject to quarterly reviews by DHS PRIV, CRCL and OGC. The Quiet Skies approval process is described below.
 - (U//SSI) On
 were implemented based on current intelligence information. These are
 the only intelligence-based rules currently in effect. These rules are
 currently being evaluated to assess whether the intelligence remains valid
 and current.

current Watchlisting Guidance does not permit use of these records for transportation security.

¹ (UnSSI) TSA plans to use the TSDB Affiliate Rule in the initial Quiet Skies rule set.

 ⁽U//SSI) In the event of a screening anomaly, TSA will nominate to the terrorist watch list or take appropriate action in accordance with our operating procedures and legal authorities.
 (U//SSI) TSA will modify the TSDB Affiliate Rule applied to TSA screening programs

(U//SSI) Additionally, TSA will develop and maintain additional rule packages for Quiet Skies, as necessary to mitigate emerging threats to aviation security within the Homeland. The process for the implementation of a targeting rule for the Quiet Skies program is described in detail in the Rules Approval Process section.


(U//SSI) TSA will notify DHS Office of the Counterterrorism Coordinator, Policy, I&A, OGC, CRCL and Privacy within 48 hours of the implementation of a rule or rule package(s), as well as provide the relevant threat information and underlying intelligence. In addition, all Silent Partner rules are, and will continue to be, the subject of quarterly reviews by DHS Privacy, CRCL, and OGC. A review of rules for use in Quiet Skies will be incorporated into the quarterly review standard operating procedures.

(U//SSI) TSA will review encounter data to ensure match quality and to process deliberate exclusions from the Quiet Skies List, as appropriate. In addition, TSA will monitor the departure and arrival airports for Quiet Skies encounters to ensure there is no negative impact on domestic screening and security operations.

Rule Approval & Oversight Process

(U//SSI) Since the Quiet Skies List is driven by the results from Silent Partner targeting rules, it is important to understand the process for the development of a Silent Partner rule and the program's strict oversight processes.

TSA Silent Partner Rule Approval



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 (U//SSI) All Silent Partner rules are reviewed regularly and archived when no longer supported by intelligence. The TSA Administrator approves the implementation, modification, and removal of all Silent Partner rules.

DHS Oversight of Silent Partner

(U//SSI) In addition to the implementation process described above, Silent Partner is overseen under the auspices of an oversight agreement with three DHS HQ reviewing offices: the DHS Privacy Office, the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, and the Office of the General Counsel. The purpose of the oversight agreement is to ensure that Silent Partner rules are based on current intelligence identifying specific potential threats, are deactivated when no longer necessary to address those threats, are appropriately tailored to minimize the impact upon bona fide travelers' civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy, and are in compliance with relevant legal authorities, regulations, and DHS policies.

(U//SSI) The principles of the Silent Partner oversight agreement provide that:

- (U//SSI) TSA will continually evaluate the performance of the rules and the
 intelligence supporting them. If a rule is determined to no longer be necessary
 to address a particular threat, the rule will be deactivated immediately.
- (U//SSI) The reviewing offices will review the program quarterly, focusing on changes to the rule set from the prior review and concerns raised by the reviewing offices for further discussion. TSA will provide access to the intelligence reporting supporting the rules for review.
- (U//SSI) Intelligence assessments for each rule should be updated at least annually for presentation to the reviewing offices, but may be updated sooner upon request of the reviewing offices.

Quiet Skies Rule Approval

(U//SSI) In order to be included in Quiet Skies, a rule must be approved through the established Silent Partner approval process and will be covered by the oversight provisions above. In addition to the Silent Partner requirements, a rule in Quiet Skies must:

- (U//SSI) Target a potential threat to aviation security within the Homeland, as assessed by TSA-OIA;
- (U//SSI) Be separately recommended for inclusion in Quiet Skies by TSA-OIA;
 and

 (U//SSI) Be separately approved by the Administrator for inclusion in Quiet Skies. The Administrator will not delegate the authority to approve a Quiet Skies rule below the Deputy Administrator.

(U//SSI) These additional requirements may be documented in a combined decision memorandum for a Silent Partner rule. If so, TSA will cross-file the memo with both programs.

Quiet Skies Oversight

(U//SSI) Furthermore, with respect to oversight of the Quiet Skies program⁴, TSA will:

- (U//SSI) Notify the DHS HQ reviewing offices of the implementation of all Quiet Skies rules within 48 hours of approval and provide the relevant threat information and underlying intelligence for that rule, with an exception for rules containing ethnicity-based name selectors, as described below.⁵
- (U//SSI) If TSA determines that exigent circumstances require implementation of a Quiet Skies rule with an ethnicity-based name selector, the Administrator may direct that the rule be implemented immediately. TSA will immediately notify the reviewing offices of the implementation of a Quiet Skies rule using an ethnicity-based name selector and provide the supporting intelligence. Should a reviewing office non-concur with the rule, the reviewing office will notify TSA within 24 hours, and TSA will continue to coordinate with these offices to address concerns. Disagreements as to implementation of a rule shall be be elevated to the Deputy Secretary, followed by the Secretary, as necessary. In non-exigent circumstances, as determined by the Administrator, for Quiet Skies rules with an ethnicity-based name selector, TSA will provide the supporting intelligence to the reviewing offices who will have 48 hours to concur or non-concur prior to implementation.
- (U//SSI) Continually evaluate the performance of the rules in the Quiet Skies
 program and the intelligence supporting them. If a rule is determined to no longer
 be necessary to address a particular threat, the rule will be deactivated
 immediately and individuals placed on the Quiet Skies List using the deactivated
 rule will be removed at that time.
- (U//SSI) Participate in a separate quarterly review for Quiet Skies. The purpose of the separate quarterly review is to ensure that Quiet Skies rules are based on

⁴ (U//SSI) As it relates to oversight, the reviewing offices specifically refer to DHS OGC, PRIV, and CRCL. TSA has agreed to provide notice to I&A, CT, and Policy; however, these offices do not participate in the quarterly rules review.

⁵ (U//SSI) In making such notifications to CRCL, PRIV, and OGC, TSA will alert the points of contact on

current intelligence identifying specific potential threats to aviation security within the Homeland, are deactivated when no longer necessary to address those threats, are appropriately tailored to minimize the impact upon bona fide travelers' civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy (through rule design, quality assurance and oversight, and TSA's redress efforts), and are in compliance with relevant legal authorities, regulations, and DHS policies. As with Silent Partner, TSA and the reviewing offices will execute an oversight standard operating procedure (or amend the current Silent Partner procedures) formalizing this review process.

 (U//SSI) Intelligence assessments for each rule will be updated and re-approved by the Administrator every 90 days.⁶

Outet Skies Use of Ethnicity-based Name Selectors

(U//SSI) TSA understands that the use of ethnicity-based name selectors in its rules is subject to strict scrutiny when applied inside the borders of the United States. However, their use 'may be permissible within the bounds of the Constitution,' relevant law, regulations, and DHS policies. As a result, TSA will not categorically exclude the use of ethnicity-based name selectors from Quiet Skies when intelligence justifies their use. The Department's "Commitment to Race Neutrality in Law Enforcement Activities" governs the use of ethnicity-based name selectors in this program.

 (U//SSI) TSA does not employ any Silent Partner rules which refer travelers to enhanced screening based solely on an individual's ethnicity. Ethnicity-based name selectors are always used in conjunction with other selectors.

These are based on reliable and current intelligence, and do not rely on generalized stereotypes.

(U//SSI) TSA will incorporate a more stringent review and approval process for the use of ethnicity-based name selectors, including:

 (U//SSI) TSA-OIA's analysis of the need for the ethnicity-based name selector, specifically discussing the reasons for its use and why alternative selectors

not an effective means to mitigate a particular threat;

⁶ (U/SSI) Intelligence assessments for rules containing an ethnicity-based name selector will be updated every 60 days.

⁷ (U/FOUO) For name selectors, ethnicity was determined by analyzing five years of I-94 data to distinctly identify last names, first names, dates of birth, and countries of citizenship. This data was analyzed to measure the percentage of occurrences that a specific given name or surname appears for the nationals of a country.

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(U//SSI) An internal review, including an updated intelligence assessment, and re-approval by the Administrator of the use of a rule employing an ethnicity-based name selector every 60 days.

(U//SSI) This stringent review and approval process will also incorporate review by the reviewing offices either immediately after implemention in exigent circumstances, or prior to implementation otherwise.

- (U//SSI) If TSA determines that exigent circumstances require implementation of a Quiet Skies rule that includes an ethnicity-based name selector, the Administrator may direct that the rule be implemented immediately. TSA will immediately notify the reviewing offices of the implementation of a Quiet Skies rule using an ethnicity-based name selector and provide the supporting intelligence. Should a reviewing office non-concur with the rule, the reviewing office will notify TSA within 24 hours, and TSA will continue to coordinate with these offices to address any concerns. Disagreements as to implementation of a rule shall be be elevated to the Deputy Secretary, followed by the Secretary, as necessary.
- (U//SSI) In non-exigent circumstances, as determined by the Administrator, TSA will provide the supporting intelligence to the reviewing offices, who will have 48 hours to concur or non-concur prior to implementation of the rule. TSA will coordinate with these offices to address any concerns, and disagreements shall be elevated to the Deputy Secretary and/or Secretary, as necessary, prior to implementation of the rule.

Secure Flight Settings

(U//SSI) In the Final Operating Capability (FOC) for Quiet Skies, Secure Flight will provide automated match processing and reporting. Specific characteristics of the Secure Flight process include:

- (U/SSI) The Quiet Skies watchlist is built from rule feedback received by Secure Flight
- (U//SSI) For name matching, the match threshold will be set at 99 percent. 11

⁽U. SSI) In making such notifications to CRCL, PRIV, and OGC, TSA will alert the points of contact on

⁽U//SSI) Quiet Skies FOC is scheduled to be implemented in mid-April 2012.

^{10 (}U//SSI) An individual is added to the Quiet Skies List as a result of their initial Silent Partner rule hit. Day 1 on the Quiet Skies List is the day that information is received from Secure Flight.

11 (U. SSI)

 (U//SSI) The DOB match threshold will be 100 percent (exact DOB match), allowing for inversion of month and day.

 (U//SSI) For passport number of country of issuance matching, the match threshold will be set at 100 percent.



- (U//SSI) Quiet Skies will match against domestic, international inbound and international outbound flights.¹³ It will not match against international to international flights, to include overflights, received by Secure Flight.
- (U//SSI) Quiet Skies will not match against the Cleared List managed by the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP).¹⁴
- (U//SSI) Passengers who match a Quiet Skies record will automatically receive a Selectee Boarding Pass Printing Result (BPPR). Secure Flight will not inhibit boarding passes or perform identity verification.¹⁵
- (U//SSI) Secure Flight will provide a daily report of individuals who matched the Quiet Skies List to the TSA Office of Intelligence and Analysis for quality assurance, oversight, and redress purposes.

(U//SSI) TSA plans to implement Quiet Skies in such a way that many of the above parameters are configurable, to include:

- (U//SSI) Automatic list record deletion timeframe, unique for each rule.
- (U//SSI) Random exclusion from receiving SSSS BPPR (see Random Exclusion section below).
- (U//SSI) Cleared List Matching (ability to clear Quiet Skies List matches if they
 are an exact match to the Cleared List managed by DHS TRIP). Note, at launch,
 Quiet Skies matches will not be matched against the Cleared List.
- (U//SSI) Quiet Skies Cleared List (ability to clear Quiet Skies List matches if they
 are an exact match to the QSCL, detailed in the Redress section below).

These issues result in a significantly higher number of questionable matches.

^{12 (}U. SSI) Through the Quiet Skies pilot.

⁽U/SSI) An individual on the Quiet Skies List may be selected for enhanced screening on an International Inbound flight if subsequent international travel does not result in matching to a Silent Partner rule.

rule.

14 (U/'SSI) The Cleared List refers to a list maintained by DHS TRIP of persons who have been cleared. for purposes of TSA screening only, against the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB).

for purposes of TSA screening only, against the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB).

15 (U//SSI) The Boarding Pass Printing Result (BPPR) is a message sent by Secure Flight to the air carrier. It can contain four possible message responses: Cleared, Inhibited, Selectee, or Known. It is not TSA's intent to inhibit boarding passes for Quiet Skies which would require the air carrier to make a resolution call to Secure Flight.

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- (U//SSI) Flight Type (Domestic, International Inbound, International Outbound, and International to International (includes Overflights)).
- (U//SSI) Match Threshold (i.e. 99 percent and exact date of birth (DOB)).

Operating Procedures Minimizing Impacts on Travelers

(U//SSI) TSA is committed to managing Quiet Skies in such a way to ensure that the impact upon travelers is minimized. Throughout the different phases of the Quiet Skies pilot, TSA has developed processes aimed at preserving the privacy, civil rights and civil liberties of travelers. These include:

- (U//SSI) Deliberate Exclusion: Thorough reviews of encounter data are conducted to ensure that inclusion on the Quiet Skies List was appropriate; and
 - (U//SSI) Throughout the Quiet Skies pilot, the majority of deliberate exclusions have been for (1) individuals associated with a TSDB subject whose investigation was subsequently closed or (2) individuals whose travel TSA assessed would not warrant further scrutiny.
- (U//SSI) Encounter-Based Exclusions: Automatic removal of a Quiet Skies List record after it has triggered three (3) encounters resulting in enhanced screening.
- (U//SSI) Automatic removal of an individual after a defined period of time, depending on the rule applied. Individuals added via the TSDB Affiliate rule will be purged from the list after 20 days. Individuals added via intelligence-based rules will be purged from the list after 90 days. All Quiet Skies rules will be reviewed quarterly.

(U//SSI) TSA will employ all three types of exclusions in Quiet Skies.

(U//SSI) TSA will exempt individuals from additional screening if it appears the individual is unnecessarily being subjected to repetitious enhanced screening due to repeatedly matching rules.

Deliberate & Encounter-Based Exclusions

(U//SSI) TSA will monitor the Quiet Skies encounter data and review the encounters to determine the nature of the rule hit, and whether there is data warranting exclusion from the Quiet Skies List. As TSA does not consider it feasible to develop an algorithm to exclude individuals from the list prior to their first screening encounter, this analysis will be conducted after an individual's first Quiet Skies encounter. TSA expects this review will take place within seven days of the initial match. Individuals will be removed prior to their third encounter if they match

receive	and will not match against such as publicly available hotel information. ISA does not screening records. 16
•	(U//SSI) TSA will leverage specified U.S. Government information to make such a determination;
	On a limited basis, TSA may use open source information to resolve ambiguities pertaining to matches for telephone listings. Other fields may be approved on a case-by-case basis with the oversight offices.


(U//SSI) Individuals will be automatically excluded from the Quiet Skies List after their third encounter resulting in enhanced screening, a process that TSA has successfully developed and validated as part of the Quiet Skies pilot. Should TSA identify an individual with greater than three encounters, a deliberate exclusion will be immediately processed.

Random Exclusion

(U//SSI) TSA has developed a capability to randomly exclude individuals on the Quiet Skies List from receiving a Selectee Boarding Pass Printing Result (BPPR) at a configurable percentage rate. Instead, these passengers will receive a Cleared BPPR. When an individual is a Quiet Skies match but is randomly excluded, their encounter information is removed from the selectee population. The retention schedule for the excluded passenger data reflects passengers who did not match any Secure Flight watch list. These excluded records are purged from Secure Flight within seven days of the passenger's completion of travel, vice the established retention time-frame for automatic Quiet Skies List matches of seven years.

(U//SSI) For example, with random exclusion set at 50 percent, then approximately half of the passengers matching a Quiet Skies record will receive a Cleared BPPR. An individual could travel three times and not be randomly excluded at all. Conversely, an individual could travel five times and be excluded twice. Regardless, in either scenario, the individual will be removed following the third encounter resulting in referral to enhanced screening.

(U//SSI) Random exclusion is consistent with TSA's unpredictable screening operations and will conserve resources at the screening checkpoint should the operational impact of employing Quiet Skies rules become problematic. While both TSA and DHS I&A recognize the effectiveness of random exclusion in a number of screening programs, for



Quiet Skies, we believe that limiting the random exclusion may increase the effectiveness of deterrence. Therefore, at implementation, TSA will set the random exclusion percentage at zero percent.

Redress

(U//SSI) The DHS TRIP will likely receive redress requests from travelers who have received additional screening under Quiet Skies. In addition to the actions noted above, TSA is committed to incorporating DHS TRIP into the overall redress process. Based on the results of the Quiet Skies pilots, the proposed use of an exact DOB match and high match threshold will likely result in a very low rate of misidentification; however, TSA will incorporate new functionality in future TSA-OIA releases to properly address redress issues associated with misidentifications. When this functionality is implemented, DHS TRIP will review redress applicants to determine whether or not they are identity matches to the Quiet Skies List. In cases in which DHS TRIP cannot make an identity match determination, DHS TRIP will forward these cases to TSA-OIA for further analysis and adjudication.

(U//SSI) TSA will also create a Quiet Skies Cleared List (QSCL) intended to minimize impacts on travelers, to ensure an individual will not remain on the list indefinitely, and to enhance privacy, civil rights and civil liberties protection in the Quiet Skies program. TSA will add individuals to the QSCL regardless of whether they file a Traveler Inquiry with DHS TRIP.¹⁸

- (U//SSI) The QSCL will include several data elements, such as (1) the traveler's full name, (2) DOB, and (3) the rule ID.
- (U//SSI) TSA will add a traveler to the QSCL after three encounters resulting in
 enhanced screening or when the name retention period for the rule has expired (20
 days for the affiliate rule and 90 days for intelligence-based rules), whichever
 comes first.
- (U//SSI) Individuals on the QSCL will be cleared for a period of 18 months.
 During this time period, an individual would not be referred for enhanced
 screening due to matching against the same Quiet Skies rule. After that 18-month
 period, travelers who hit a Silent Partner rule that is an active Quiet Skies rule will
 again be placed on the Quiet Skies List, and become eligible for the QSCL again
 as described above.

¹⁸ (U//SSI) Since the automated QSCL functionality will be developed and incorporated into future technical releases of Secure Flight, TSA will continue to utilize a temporary process to develop, maintain and use the QSCL and perform manual removals for persons meeting the qualifications. Any changes to this temporary process prior to implementing an automated process will be coordinated with CRCL and PRIV

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- (U//SSI) TSA will also maintain the ability to manually add travelers to the QSCL
 in order to reduce impacts on individuals who repeatedly hit rules in situations
 warranting permanent removal. TSA will leverage specified U.S. Government
 information to make such a determination;
- (U//SSI) Since the automated QSCL functionality will be developed and
 incorporated into future technical releases of Secure Flight, TSA will develop a
 temporary process to develop, maintain and use the QSCL upon implementation
 of the Quiet Skies program. This manual QSCL will be used to perform manual
 exclusions for individuals being subjected to repetitious enhanced screening due
 to repeatedly matching rules. Any changes to this temporary process prior to
 implementing an automated process will be coordinated with CRCL and PRIV.

Data Sharing

(U//SSI) TSA will not share the Quiet Skies List and match results with external agencies unless there is a checkpoint screening anomaly encountered that triggers ordinary incident response processes. In the event a screening anomaly is noted for an individual on the Quiet Skies List, TSA may, on a case-by-case basis, share derogatory information relating to the individual with the appropriate parties via a watchlisting nomination package

Separately, TSA may share specific Quiet Skies results with DHS and components, on a limited basis, to facilitate oversight, and for litigation or redress purposes, as applicable.

(U//SSI) The Quiet Skies List will only be used to conduct Quiet Skies List matching by Secure Flight and will not be used by other TSA vetting programs.

Data Retention

(U//SSI) Data related to Quiet Skies will be managed in three separate records areas. Secure Flight maintains several distinct categories of records subject to retention:

- (U//SSI) The watch list database includes the active records against which Secure Flight screens. and Quiet Skies Lists.
 - o (U/SSI)
 - O (U//SSI) Quiet Skies List entries on individuals selected for enhanced screening by the TSDB Affiliate rule under Quiet Skies will be deleted from the Secure Flight watch list database after the traveler's third encounter resulting in additional screening or when they expire at the end of the rule's specified name retention period, whichever occurs first.

- O (U//SSI) Quiet Skies List entries on individuals selected for enhanced screening by intelligence-based rules under Quiet Skies will be deleted from the Secure Flight watch list database after the travelers' third encounter resulting in additional screening or when they expire at the end of the rule's specified name retention period, whichever occurs first.
- O (U//SSI) Quiet Skies List entries will be deleted for any rule that is deactivated as a result of TSA or the Intelligence Community indicating that the particular threat to aviation within the Homeland is no longer valid or has been successfully disrupted, whichever is earlier.
- (U//SSI) Secure Flight also maintains information on individuals matched to watch lists. For the Quiet Skies List, this information includes the identifying information of the passenger, the identifying information of the Quiet Skies List record(s) of the potential match, the itinerary information, and administrative information. Match data will be retained pursuant to the existing Secure Flight records retention schedule—match data retention for Quiet Skies will be seven years. Match information has limited access and will only be used for the purpose of redress, or as necessary for litigation. If an individual is randomly excluded for a particular trip, Secure Flight will treat that record as a non-match and only retain the data for up to seven days.

(U//SSI) TSA-OIA will generate and maintain daily copies of both the Quiet Skies List and any Quiet Skies encounter records to manage the program and conduct redress analysis and facilitate oversight by DHS. TSA-OIA will maintain the Quiet Skies List records for no longer than two years in order to address legal or redress questions which may arise from an individual's referral.

(U//SSI) Incident Information: If an individual selected by Quiet Skies is involved in a screening or security incident meeting the threshold for reporting incident data will be retained pursuant to TSA's incident management and enforcement record retention requirements.



OFFICE of INTELLIGENCE and ANALYSIS

INTELLIGENCE IN FOCUS

17 JANUARY 2021

IA-48865-21

PUBLIC SAFETY & SECURITY

(U) Threats to Civil Aviation Surrounding Presidential Transition

(U//FOUO) We assess that airports and aviation personnel, especially in the National Capital Region (NCR), are at risk of potential escalatory acts of violence due to the heightened threat environment surrounding the presidential inauguration. Elected officials encountered during travel, airline and airport personnel, and law enforcement probably are the most likely potential targets of harassment that could escalate to violence at or near airports or onboard aircraft. While we have not identified any specific, credible information indicating that individuals explicitly intend to target aviation or aviation-associated personnel, recent disruptions at airports and onboard flights demonstrate the potential for isolated, opportunistic acts of violence.

- (U) Several flights into and out of the NCR in the days prior to and following the violent breach of the Capitol Building experienced individuals becoming verbally and physically abusive toward flight crew and other passengers, according to a representative of a flight crew professional organization and media reports.
- (U) Between 6-11 January 2021, several passengers in airport terminals and onboard
 aircraft angrily confronted two US Senators and a member of the US House of
 Representatives by yelling at and taunting them, according to media reports. Members of
 Congress have consequently expressed concern for their personal safety while traveling,
 leading the US Capitol Police and Sergeant-at-Arms to announce additional security
 measures for Members traveling through airports.
- (U) Flight crews responsible for enforcing airline mask-wearing policies remain at risk of potential conflict with noncompliant or disruptive passengers. While this has been an issue throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, multiple videos of passengers being removed from flights, allegedly for noncompliance with mask policies, have garnered significant attention on social media in the days following the Capitol breach. This could further exacerbate the already heightened threat environment, increasing the risk to flight crew members forced to mediate in combustible situations.
- (U) Law enforcement has already made at least one high-profile arrest of a prominent
 militia extremist at an airport, on a charge of unlawful activity connected to the Capitol
 breach. Additional encounters with law enforcement have the risk of becoming violent,
 especially if the detainee or bystanders perceive the law enforcement action as unjust.

(U) Prepared by the Counterterrorism Mission Center. Coordinated within the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (CBP, CWMD, ICE, TSA, USCG). For questions, contact DHS-SPS-RFI@hq.dhs.gov

(U//FOUO) Misinformation Regarding No Fly List Could Further Exacerbate Tensions

(U//FOUO) The US Government maintains a host of security measures for airline travelers who pose or may pose a threat to civil aviation or national security, including preventing an individual from boarding an aircraft, requiring enhanced screening, and alerting security personnel that an individual is expected at an airport.

(U//FOUO) Political figures and aviation insiders have increasingly called for individuals found to have participated in the Capitol breach to be placed on "the No Fly list." Video clips circulated online of passengers being removed from flights for mask noncompliance have sometimes been inaccurately labeled as passengers being denied boarding due to placement on such a list. Industry figures have also raised the possibility of airlines sharing information amongst themselves about unruly passengers to create a temporary list of banned individuals separate from government watchlists.

(U//FOUO) Misinformation and misperceptions about aviation security measures, their application, and the reasons for offboarding of passengers—which can occur for a variety of reasons—may contribute to already heightened tensions among noncompliant or confrontational individuals at airport facilities who could blame the denial of their ability to travel on perceived government overreach with the "No Fly list."

(W/FOUO) We assess that grievances associated with the presidential transition could continue to drive potential violent actors to travel to the NCR or other locations requiring air travel, including tollowing Inauguration Day on 20 January. Aviation facilities and companies as well as public officials and law enforcement agencies reportedly are preparing responses to mitigate potential violent disruptions.

- (U//FOUO) A significant number of individuals arrested at the events of 6 January traveled from outside of the NCR area, prompting concern that individuals will continue to travel to the NCR to foment violence. At least two members of Congress have asked for the FAA to take action to limit the opportunity of air travel for those seeking to come to the NCR to further violence and unrest.
- (U) Aviation facilities and companies are also implementing new policies and changes to
 address the threat of future unrest. According to media reports, at least one airline has
 increased staffing at NCR airports, and is halting liquor sales onboard flights to and from
 those airports. Multiple airlines have also announced new policies prohibiting guns in
 checked baggage on flights to the NCR until after the inauguration.
- (U) Officials at one NCR airport told media that they would have an increased law
 enforcement presence in the aftermath of the violent breach at the Capitol. TSA is also
 increasing the presence of law enforcement and other security personnel at airports and
 onboard aircraft. Additionally, TSA has increased security around surface transportation
 nodes throughout the NCR.

(U//FOUO) Potential Risk to Surface Transportation

(UI/FOUO) Civil disturbances and possible related violence at or near airport locations runs the possibility of spilling over to other local transportation modes such as metros, buses, and trains that aviation passengers use to arrive at and depart from airports. Airline travelers who are perceived to pose or do pose a threat and are prevented from traveling by air may decide to travel via other transportation modes. Once at their destination city, they are likely to rely on surface transportation to reach event locations. Surface transportation could be at risk due solely to its proximity to other events; on 6 January, for example, a truck parked near the entrance to a Metro station in Washington, DC was found to contain rifles and shotguns, a great deal of ammunition, and other unspecified material, according to press reports.

Source, Reference, ar	Source, Reference, and Dissemination Information		
Source Summary Statement	(U//FOUO) We have medium confidence in our assessment that the heightened threat environment has the potential to spark disruptions to aviation operations in the NCR. Our assessment is informed by open source reporting and past incidents of aviation disruptions. Additional reporting indicating specific and credible threats to the aviation industry would likely cause us to increase our confidence in our assessment.		
	(U/FOUO) We have high confidence in our assessment that elected officials, flight crews, and law enforcement are the most likely targets of violence at aviation facilities. Our assessment is based on open source reporting identifying these individuals as the main targets of past disruptive incidents at aviation facilities. Our confidence in this assessment might decrease if we receive additional reporting indicating other targets of violence at airports or on flights.		
Definitions	(U)FOUO) Militia Extremists: Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence directed at federal, state, or local government officials or infrastructure in response to their belief that the government deliberately is stripping Americans of their freedoms and is attempting to establish a totalitarian regime. These individuals consequently oppose many federal and state authorities' laws and regulations, (particularly those related to firearms ownership), and often belong to armed paramilitary groups. They often conduct paramilitary training designed to violently resist perceived government oppression or to violently overthrow the US Government.		
Reporting Suspicious Activity	(U) To report suspicious activity, law enforcement, Fire-EMS, private security personnel, and emergency managers should follow established protocols; all other personnel should call 911 or contact local law enforcement. Suspicious activity reports (SARs) will be forwarded to the appropriate fusion center and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force for further action. For more information on the Nationwide SAR Initiative, visit http://nsi.ncirc.gov/resources.aspx.		
Dissemination	(U) Federal, state, local, tribal, territorial authorities, and private sector partners.		
Warning Notices & Handling Caveats	(U) Warning: This document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO). It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need to know without prior approval of an authorized DHS official. State and local homeland security officials may share this document with authorized critical infrastructure and key resource personnel and private sector security officials without further approval from DHS.		
,	(I) All US person information has been minimized. Should you require US person information on weekends or after normal weekday hours during exigent and time sensitive circumstances, contact the Current and Emerging Threat Watch Office BHQ.DHS.GOV. For all other inquiries, please contact the Homeland Security Single Point of Service, Request for Information Office at Bhq.dhs.gov.		



TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT/FEDERAL AIR MARSHAL SERVICE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION COORDINATION SECTION



Information Bulletin - Quiet Skies Selectees

March 15, 2018

Effective Tuesday, March 13, 2018, OLE/FAMS will initiate Special Mission Coverage (SMC) on flights carrying Quiet Skies Selectees.

TSA's Quiet Skies Program

The purpose of the Quiet Skies Program is to mitigate the threat to commercial aviation posed by unknown or partially known terrorists; and to identify and provide enhanced screening to higher risk travelers before they board aircraft based on analysis of terrorist travel trends, tradecraft and associations.

Through the Quiet Skies Program, TSA's office of Intelligence and Analysis designates potentially higher risk travelers for enhanced screening and security measures because they engaged in travel fitting intelligence driven, risk-based passenger targeting rules. Quiet Skies rules are triggered when individuals enter the United States from foreign locations.

- TSA I&A currently employs Quiet Skies rules to screen passengers.
- Quiet Skies rules change based on current intelligence.
- Quiet Skies rules target specific travel patterns or affiliations, for example:
 - Rules may target individuals who have spent a certain amount of time in one or more specific countries; or
 - Rules may target individuals whose reservation information includes email addresses or phone numbers associated to watch listed terrorism suspects.
- Quiet Skies Selectees receive enhanced screening at security checkpoints.
- Individuals who meet the requirements for addition to the Quiet Skies list remain on the Quiet
 Skies list for up to 90 days or 3 encounters, whichever comes first, after entering the United States.
- TSA currently sees 40 50 Quiet Skies Selectees on domestic carriers nationwide each day.

Special Mission Coverage

Quiet Skies Selectees are different from traditional SMC subjects because they are not under investigation by any agency and are not in the Terrorist Screening Data Base (TSDB). However, SMC operations on Quiet Skies Selectees will be conducted in the same manner; with two exceptions:

- 1. Briefings to SMC teams will not include traditional "derogatory" information. However, if available, teams will be briefed on which Quiet Skies rules the passenger triggered.
- 2. SMC AARs on Quiet Skies Selectees will not be shared with partner agencies unless significant derogatory information is documented by the FAM team.

Requirements for submission of the SMC AAR for Quiet Skies Selectees remain the same.

HEAVEL	
From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:	Monday, June 28, 2021 1:56 PM TSA OIA Watchlist Program RE: Memorialization to Remove 1/6 Subjects
That is correct.	
Assistant Administrator Intelligence & Analysis, Ts (office) (mobile) (24/7 Wate	
From: Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 9:41 To: Cc: TSA OIA Watchlist Program Subject: Memorialization to Remo	>
Ma'am,	
This email is to memorialize your v	verbal guidance to remove all of the 1/6 US Capitol subjects.
As of this email all subjects have b	een removed.
This does not include the one subj	ect who made a verbal threat to flight attendants.
V/R Watch Listing Analyst Threat Mitigation & Network Targ Intelligence Warning Branch Tra Transportation Security Admini HQ Watch Listing Cell After Hours Assistance: HQ Watch Phone F-mail:	nsportation Analysis Division stration

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION 184 HSGAC 8-24-26/5-28-25 T2 0000472

	TSA_H3GAC_8-21-24/5-28-25_T2_000047
From: Sent: To: Subject: Attachments:	Tuesday, December 20, 2022 3:37 PM FW: TSA-I&A ESNR-3943-22; (AIRPORTS: IAH-JFK) AIRLINE: 86 ESNR-3943-22
Close hold.	
Suboptimal situation;	but I don't anticipate any issues if everyone just does what they are supposed to

do. Let me know if there are any questions or concerns.

Thx,

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From:

©tsa.dhs.gov>

Date: Tuesday, Dec 20, 2022 at 13:32

To

©tsa.dhs.gov>

©tsa.dhs.gov>

©tsa.dhs.gov>, ICS-SAC

Hello Sir,

As per our conversation, attached is the ESNR travel itinerary, who is the wife of a HOU FAM. She has been covered in the past. This time she is traveling with her husband, who has the ability to fly while armed, which would require de-confliction prior to take-off. The FAM is listed as a ABR, rules based selectee for screening, due to association of traveling on the same itinerary as a KST. FAM is aware of the situation and the SMC Team will be brief on his awareness. TSC will submit a Special Handling Request (SHR) to prevent him from being secondary screened at the gate. I have contacted HOU SAC (FO of FAM) and WFO SAC (FO of team covering flight). Please let me know if you need any further from me.

Thanks,

Supervisory Air Marshal in Charge (Acting)
DHS TSA Federal Air Marshal Service
Information Coordination Section
Counter Terrorism Unit

#: IALVING: This recent custains Seasitive Security Information that is necrosited under 40 CFR, parts 15 and 1500. No pure of ritic record unity to defended the parameter of the a reason to move, on defined to 40 CFR, parts 15 and 1500, near private the vertice permission of the Administration of Transportation. Visuationized release many result to a left penalty or other action. For U.S. paverament agrandes, public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION TSA_HSGAC_8-21-24/5-28-25_T2_0000474

@tsa.dhs.gov

Information contained in Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) Email or other documents from the FAMS is Law Enforcement Sensitive and intended for Official Use Only. No portion of any document can be released to the media, the general public, or sent over non-secure internet servers. Release of any FAMS document, correspondence, or law enforcement sensitive material could adversely affect our mission or jeopardize investigative activities.

EXPANDED SELECTEE NOTIFICATION REPORT (ESNR) Type: Domestic PRELIMINARY DO NOT CARRY OUT ADDITIONAL OPERATIONS OTHER THAN THOSE REQUIRED BY THE SOP UNLESS DIRECTED BY TSA HO A. SUBJECT IDENTIFYING INFORMATION 1. Given Name: 5. TPN: 6 TSCID 2 Surname 7. Category Code 3. Gender: Fernale 8. Travel Identification Document: (Type: Issued by/Number) None Available: ____/___ 4. Date of Birth 9. Travel Document Verified at Check-in: **B. FLIGHT INFORMATION** Departure Air Carrier Departure Date/Time (Local Time Zone) Arrival Date/Time SF Non-Leg Overflight Airport Airport PRL/PNR Code / Flt # (Local Time Zone) Covered Code Code B6/1882 IAH 12/22/2022 17:01 JFK 12/22/2022 21:30 2 3 1 4 5 UPDATE: Itinerary Change Summary: Flight Type: Commercial Military General Aviation Source: SF Airline Carrier Gov. Agency APIS/PNR Data C. SUBJECT ENCOUNTER STATUS & RESOLUTION ACTIONS Airline directed to process as Selectee Watchlist Exclusion Checked-in. did not travel ☐ Flew Without Prior Notification Offloaded Per CBP Request Canceled No Show Inconclusive Match Negative Match Removed from Watch List Other: D. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 1. Other watchlisted individuals on the flight(s): YES NO Other watchlisted individuals on the same PRL(s)/PNR: YES 2. Co-Travelers and Watchlist DOB ABR Selectee: ABR Boarding Pass Status: 3. Additional Comments: Prelim ESNR. Pax has NOT checked in at this time E. REPORT REFERENCE INFORMATION 1. Report Reference #: ESNR-3943-22 2. Report Date:Time: 12/19/2022 / 6:35 PM ET 3. Prepared by 4. Approved by: National Transportation Vetting Center. Watch Manager, Commercial Tel SARING THIS RECORD CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY RECORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER ## C F & PARTS 15 AND 1520. NO PART OF THIS RECORD MAY HE DISCLOSED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, "AS DETRODON ## ART 15 AND 1520 DISCLOSED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW," AS DETRODON ## ART 15 AND 1520 DISCLOSED THE SECURITY OF BOOLD AND SECURITY. CHAUTHORIZED DISCLOSED MAY BE SECURITY OF COURSE AND 1520 DISCLOSED MAY BE SECURITY

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION HSGAC_8-21-24/5-28-25_12_0000476

From:	
Sent:	Monday, August 15, 2022 1:30 PM
To:	
Cc:	AND DESCRIPTION OF THE PARTY OF
Subject:	RE: HOU Selectee Passenger 16AUG2022

Please note: For operational and administrative reasons, it is important that this subject's information (including Selectee flight information) <u>not</u> be distributed to any HOU FO personnel outside of this group (individuals on the To and Cc line). Barring exigent circumstances, all related SMC missions will be assigned to other field offices.

These details are close-hold and should be handled accordingly.

Please give me a call if you have any concerns.



Gentlemen,

FYSA, here is the unclassified information for the Domestic Inbound Selectee passenger scheduled to travel on Tuesday. Use the current national password to open the document. Let me know if you have any questions.



WARNING: This communication, along with any attachments, is covered by Federal and State law governing electronic communication and may contain confidential and legally privileged information. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, use or copying of this message is strictly prohibited. If you have received this in error, please reply immediately to the sender and delete this message.

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION HSGAC_8-21-24/5-28-25_T2_0000477

From:

Sent:

Wednesday, January 18, 2023 5:05 PM

To:

Subject:

Timeline (HOU SMC Matter)

Attachments:

Timeline Re HOU FAM SMC Matter.docx

AA -

Good day. Ref today's conversation, please see attached timeline of events and advise if any additional information is needed at this time.

Thank you,

SAC Houston

mobile



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

Note: Employee is a FAM assigned to the Houston Field Office (HOU) and currently works in the HOU Operations section.

- On 7/14/2021, the employee received a standard SMC email notification via the shared HOU SMC router, which
 was sent from the LE FAMS Information Coordination Section (ICS) indicating the assignment of a SMC. The
 employee opened the document and noticed that his spouse was the subject of the SMC. The employee
 immediately reported the issue to his supervisor and HOU leadership.
 - HOU leadership notified LE FAMS Headquarters, including OCC, ICS and Field Leadership.
 - o FAMS ICS contacted HOU and indicated that they had spoken with the originating agency (FBI) as well as the case agent assigned to the investigation. The FBI indicated that the SMC subject is reportedly connected to the events at the United States Capital Building on 06JAN2021. FAMS ICS discussed the situation with the case agent and how the subject of the case had a spouse who was a FAM with potential access to SMC notifications due to his position working in HOU Operations. The FBI indicated to ICS that this was not an issue for their investigation and that only the spouse was under investigation.
 - Due to the sensitive nature of the issue, HOU leadership requested that ICS compartmentalize the information and to not include HOU on any SMC activities related to the situation.
 - O HOU leadership met with the employee to gain some additional insight into the situation and to advise the employee to have no involvement with any official investigative activities related to the situation and to not discuss the matter with his spouse. Employee also indicated that he had no involvement in the situation and furthermore did not travel with the spouse to Washington, DC during the time in question.
- On 8/8/2022, a HOU FAM Team was assigned to SMC #22-58096 and in the after action report the FAM team included the following statement, "FAM team spoke to the husband, a co-worker (Houston Field Office FAM) of SMC subject... . He advised subject was going to visit family in New York."
 - Because it was unknown why, where, when and how the FAM Team communicated with the husband (FAM) of the SMC subject regarding this special mission assignment, HOU management submitted an Incident Tracking Report (ITR) regarding the issue to the Incident Activity Coordination and Trends (IACT) section. IACT in turn submitted the incident via their e-mail routers to TSA INV, PERSEC, and PR for review.
 - LE FAMS SLT advised ICS to ensure all future SMC assignments involving this subject do not get assigned to HOU.
 - On 9/1/2022, the ITR was closed, no further action.
- On 12/20/22, the employee notified HOU management that he would be traveling on 12/22/22 (IAH-JFK) armed
 with his spouse to New York to visit family. Additionally, on that date, HOU management discussed the issue
 with ICS and FLT leadership and ICS indicated that they would discuss with TSA leadership. The following day, ICS
 indicated that the employee would be receiving a waiver because they are traveling on the same PNR as the
 SMC subject.



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

Law Enforcement Information Coordination Section (LEICS) SPECIAL MISSION COVERAGE NOTIFICATION

THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE LE/FAMS

SMC 21-27274

SMC Date:	7/15/2021	SMC Requestor:	Secure Flight	
LEICS FAM:		Contact #:		
	DINT OF CONTACT	FAM TEAM	STAFF# CONTACT	Γ#
LEICS TSOC:		(TL)	District of the latest of the	No.
MOC:	of colleges	(A) (A) (A) (A)		77 790
Field Office:				
Ava (sing)				
	JECT INFORMATION	SUE	UECT PICTURE	
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First Name:	AN ACCOUNT			
Middle Name:				
DOB:	MENTS SELECTION			
Height/Weight:	UNK/UNK	100		
Eyes/Hair:	100 K-005-0			
Watch List Status:		2	新发展更强制的	
POB:	NEW YORK (US)			
Identifier:	AND REAL PROPERTY.	Sec. 1		
Additional Subject Information:				
	Co-Tra	velers Identified on PNR		
no known co trave		velers Identified on PNR		

Flight	Departure Airport	Date	Time	Arrival Airport	Date	Time
UA 1073	FLL	07/15/2021	1545	IAH	07/15/2021	1722

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

SMC AFTER ACTION REPORT (Enhanced)

Co-travelers/Associates Co-travelers/Associates Describe any apparent co-travelers or any apparent associates with whom the SMC subject spoke before, during or ofter the flight. Note all available details, including time and location of the interactions, physical descriptions, seat numbers, etc. Name [if known] Description of Contact/Association Additional Descriptors/Details Electronic Devices Describe any electronic devices (type, brand, etc.) the subject was seen using. Enhanced After Action Report Narrative thing Significant to Report		am Leager:	THE CHARLES
Describe any apparent co-travelers or any apparent associates with whom the SMC subject spoke before, during or after it flight. Note all available details, including time and location of the interactions, physical descriptions, seat numbers, etc. Name (if known) Description of Contact/Association Additional Descriptors/Details Electronic Devices Describe any electronic devices (type, brand, etc.) the subject was seen using. Enhanced After Action Report Narrative	Approvin	g Supervisor:	Line physical and
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Describe any electronic devices (type, brand, etc.) the subject was seen using. Enhanced After Action Report Narrative	Name (if known)	Description of Contact/Association	
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SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service


Special Mission Coverage After Action Report Instructions

- The completed report should be submitted to the appropriate field office supervisor for review and submission to LEICS
 - AARs are due to LEICS within 5 days of the completion of the SMC
 - If the AAR is returned to you for correction or additional information the revised report is due to LEICS within 3 days of notification
 - After reviewing and approving the AAR, supervisors should upload the AAR to
 / in WORD
 format (DO NOT PASSWORD PROTECT), using the original naming convention under which
 you received the SMC document (i.e. SMC 15-xxxxx)
- AARs document the behaviors and activities of SMC subjects and those who interact with them in the transportation domain
 - Write the AAR in a timeline format documenting what was observed before, during, and after the mission
 - Include all details of co-travelers, electronic devices, activities, as well as pre and post-flight information observed/obtained.
- This report could become a discoverable document in a criminal investigation which you will use to testify in a court of law
- · Contact the SMC Coordinator if you have any questions regarding the AAR

Significant Information

- Although FAMs on SMCs are not typically tasked to conduct extensive observations, minor details
 FAMs observe could be valuable to transportation security. The following are examples of potentially
 useful details to include in an AAR:
 - o Unknown Subjects (UNSUBs) possibly travelling with the SMC subject
 - Note as many descriptors of the UNSUBs and their seat numbers if possible
 - Note the times and locations of the UNSUB relative to CCTV
 - Individuals with whom the subject has extended conversation
 - Any possible <u>counter-surveillance</u> or <u>surveillance detection/disruption techniques</u>, or other significant behavior by the SMC subject or UNSUBs
 - Any of the subject's activities observed during the SMC
 - o Details of electronic devices the subject and co-traveler use or possess, including:
 - Type of cell phone (BlackBerry, iPhone, unknown Smartphone, etc.)
 - Type of electronic (laptop, tablet, eReader, Kindle) and (brand name, operating system)
- If unsure whether or not a detail regarding the SMC is significant, include it in the AAR

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

Law Enforcement Information Coordination Section (LEICS) SPECIAL MISSION COVERAGE NOTIFICATION

THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE LE/FAMS

SMC 21-27327

SMC Date:	7/17/2021	SMC Requestor:	Secure	ure Flight	
LEICS FAM.	建物的 1988	Contact #:			
	POINT OF CONTACT	FAM TEAM	STAFF#	CONTACT#	
LEICS TSOC:	k or Profesions	(TL)		The state of the state of	
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				-	
en	BJECT INFORMATION	4115			
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First Name:	BOOK STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE			2.52	
Middle Name:		11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1			
DOB:	-			10	
Height/Weight:	UNK/UNK			450	
Eyes/Hair:	SING SIN				
Watch List Status:	Barrier Street				
POB:	NEW YORK (US)			100	
Identifier:	Residence of the second	100		2 20	
Additional Subject Information:					
	Co-Tra	velers identified on PNR			
NONE LISTED					

Flight	Departure Airport	Date	Time	Arrival Airport	Date	Time
UA 1420	FLL	07/17/2021	1715	HAI	07/17/2021	1917

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

SMC AFTER ACTION REPORT (Enhanced)

SMCT	eam Leader:		多 100 14 6 H 16 M 16 M
Approvi	ng Supervisor:		
		th whom the	s SMC subject spoke before, during or after the ons, physical descriptions, seat numbers, etc.
Name (if known)	Description of Contact/Associ		Additional Descriptors/Details
	Electronic D	evices	
De	escribe any electronic devices (type, bran	d, etc.) the s	subject was seen using.
	Enhanced After Action	Report N	larrative
she had stroke, and the of body.	- "	limp and	ubject was walking with a disability like a loss of muscle on her whole left side ding plane
16:59 EST; Subject sitti			
19:00 EST; Plane lande	d at IAH without incident (C 44).		
19:05 EST; Subject exit	ed plane, observation was termin	ated due	to connecting flight time.
End of report.			

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

Special Mission Coverage After Action Report Instructions

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 - AARs are due to LEICS within 5 days of the completion of the SMC
 - If the AAR is returned to you for correction or additional information the revised report is due to LEICS within 3 days of notification
 - After reviewing and approving the AAR, supervisors should upload the AAR to

format (DO NOT PASSWORD PROTECT), using the original naming convention under which you received the SMC document (i.e. SMC 15-xxxxx)

- AARs document the behaviors and activities of SMC subjects and those who interact with them in the transportation domain
 - Write the AAR in a timeline format documenting what was observed before, during, and after the
 mission
 - Include all details of co-travelers, electronic devices, activities, as well as pre and post-flight information observed/obtained.
- This report could become a discoverable document in a criminal investigation which you will use to testify in a court of law
- Contact the SMC Coordinator if you have any questions regarding the AAR

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 - Note as many descriptors of the UNSUBs and their seat numbers if possible
 - Note the times and locations of the UNSUB relative to CCTV
 - Individuals with whom the subject has extended conversation
 - Any possible <u>counter-surveillance</u> or <u>surveillance detection/disruption techniques</u>, or other significant behavior by the SMC subject or UNSUBs
 - o Any of the subject's activities observed during the SMC
 - Details of electronic devices the subject and co-traveler use or possess, including:
 - Type of cell phone (BlackBerry, iPhone, unknown Smartphone, etc.)
 - Type of electronic (laptop, tablet, eReader, Kindle) and (brand name, operating system)
- If unsure whether or not a detail regarding the SMC is significant, include it in the AAR

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

Law Enforcement Information Coordination Section (LEICS) SPECIAL MISSION COVERAGE NOTIFICATION

THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE LE/FAMS

SMC 22-16181

SMC Date:	12/23/2021	SMC Requestor:	Secure Flight	
LEICS FAM:	A RESIDE	Contact #:		tak o
	POINT OF CONTACT	FAM TEAM	STAFF#	CONTACT #
LEICS TSOC:	TOWN OF CONTACT	(TL)	J. Francisco	CONTACT
MOC:	Principal Company			CANAL TRANSPORT
Field Office:	FIGURE STATE OF THE PARTY OF TH		1000	Edd Street
	SUBJECT INFORMATION	SUE	SJECT PICTURE	
Last Name:		10 55 7		
First Name:				100
Middle Name:				
DOB:	Control of			
Height/Weight:	UNK/UNK			100
Eyes/Hair:				100
Watch List State	us:			600
POB:	NEW YORK (US)			
Identifier:				
Additional Subj Information:	act			
	Co-Ti	ravelers Identified on PNR		

Flight	Departure Airport	Date	Time	Arrival Airport	Date	Time
B6 1882	IAH	12/23/2021	1714	JFK	12/23/2021	2129

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

SMC AFTER ACTION REPORT (Enhanced)

SMCT	eam Leader:	14 法被 有某事的
Approvi	ng Supervisor:	H KONTE
	Co-travelers/Associate travelers or any apparent associates with whom the details, including time and location of the interaction	e SMC subject spoke before, during or after the
Name (if known)	Description of Contact/Association	Additional Descriptors/Details
D	Electronic Devices escribe any electronic devices (type, brand, etc.) the	subject was seen using.
	Enhanced After Action Report I	
nother and younger fe	Report - Subject traveling with family.One emale that seemed to be her picious to report during this mission assign 't	
ee anything suspiciou		

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

Special Mission Coverage After Action Report Instructions

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 - Type of electronic (laptop, tablet, eReader, Kindle) and (brand name, operating system)
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SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

Law Enforcement Information Coordination Section (LEICS) SPECIAL MISSION COVERAGE NOTIFICATION

THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE LE/FAMS

SMC 22-16775

SMC Date:	12/27/2021	SMC Requestor:	Secure Flight .		
LEICS FAM:	Mission	Contact #:			
	OINT OF CONTACT	FAM TEAM	STAFF#	CONTACT#	
LEICS TSOC:	La La Calabration	(TL)	31000	10 (23 (45.4) (45.4) (46.4)	
MOC:	No. of America		1		
Field Office:			1007	Name and Address of the Owner, where	
SHIP THE PARTY OF					
SUF	LECT INFORMATION	ctu	IFET BICTURE		
Last Name:	The second secon	SU	JECT PICTURE	Land of the land	
First Name:				NAME OF THE OWNER, WHEN THE PARTY OF THE PAR	
Middle Name:	-			300	
DOB:	Name and Address of the Owner, when the Owner, which t				
Height/Weight:	UNK/UNK				
Eyes/Hair:				- 107	
Watch List Status:	No. of Concession, Name of			100	
POB:	NEW YORK (US)				
identifier:	A separate Colomb				
Additional Subject Information:					
	Co-Trav	elers Identified on PNR			
1: 1: 2: 2: 2: 2: 2: 2: 2: 2: 2: 2: 2: 2: 2:	(RLBTGX),) - ABR Selectee			

Flight	Departure Airport	Date	Time	Arrival Airport	Date	Time
B6 1881	JFK	12/27/2021	1310	IAH	12/27/2021	1604
_						1

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

SMC AFTER ACTION REPORT (Enhanced)

SMCTe		
Approvin	g Supervisor: .	
Describe any apparent ca- flight. Note all available	Co-travelers travelers or any apparent associates details, including time and location	Associates with whom the SMC subject spoke before, during or after the of the interactions, physical descriptions, seat numbers, etc.
Name (if known)	Description of Contact/Asse	
		Transfer Descriptors Descriptors
Des	Electronic scribe any electronic devices (type, b	Devices rand, etc.) the subject was seen using.
	Enhanced After Action	on Report Narrative
All times are approxima		
TT40 E21- LWINI 169W ST	the airport and ready for mis	sion.
		board the flight. The subject closely '2" in height, 140 lbs wearing a #88 Dallas d a blue backpack.
1615 CST - FAM Team a	nd subject deplane.	
1625 CST - w	aits for a female co-traveler t	o deplane (UNSUB 1).
1630 CST - a	nd UNSUB 1 meet up with Cau	ıcasian male (UNSUB 2) in baggage claim.
UNSUB 1 - approximate waist, white purse.	ly early 30s in age, purple shir	t, black sweatpants, black sweatshirt tied around
UNSUB 2 - approximate	ly late 50's in age, navy blue c	ollared shirt, blue jeans, gray beard.
1645 CST - FAM Team o	bserves subject and co-travel	ers grab two gray roller bags from carousel.
1650 CST - Subject and	o-travelers got on subway tra	am and departed scene.

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

*The subject did not sit in originally assigned seat 1D; she switched seats at the gate and sat in 6C.
END OF REPORT.



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

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SMC Report v 20190312

Secure Flight

Sensitive Security Information



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

Law Enforcement Information Coordination Section (LEICS) SPECIAL MISSION COVERAGE NOTIFICATION

THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE LE/FAMS

SMC Date:

8/8/2022

SMC 22-58096

SMC Requestor:

LEICS FAM:		Contact #:				
Take Park	POINT OF CONTACT	FAM TEAM	STAFF#	CONTACT#		
LEICS TSOC:	1500 A 16000	(TL)	401285	Market Service		
MOC:				Market Part Alberta		
Field Office:	Philipping					
	SUBJECT INFORMATION	SU	RIFCT PICTURE	Section 1995		
Last Name:	TO SHOW					
Last Name:						

SUB.	IECT INFORMATION	SUBJECT PICTURE
Last Name:		
First Name:		
Middle Name:		
DOB:		
Height/Weight:		
Eyes/Hair:	Section 1	
Watch List Status:	The latest and the la	在是是一位在1000年
POB:	NY - NEW YORK	
identifier:	Action to the second second	
Additional Subject Information:		建设建设工程

Flight	Departure Airport	Date	Time	Arrival Airport	Date	Time
WN 2880	HAI	08/08/2022	0630	BNA	08/08/2022	0820

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

SMC AFTER ACTION REPORT (Enhanced)

Approvi		
	ng Supervisor:	
	Co-travelers/Associate -travelers or any apparent associates with whom the details, including time and location of the interact	ne SMC subject spake before, during or after the
Name (if known)	Description of Contact/Association	Additional Descriptors/Details
De	Electronic Devices escribe any electronic devices (type, brand, etc.) the	subject was seen using.
	Enhanced After Action Report	Narrative
leparture.	H, gate A3E for Southwest flight 2880 to E	NA. Flight was delayed till 7:40
95:50 Subject was first kirt. subject looked like pho 17:22 Subject boarded	any suspicious activity prior or during the	rt, white long sleeve sweater and pink

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

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SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

Law Enforcement Information Coordination Section (LEICS) SPECIAL MISSION COVERAGE NOTIFICATION

THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE LE/FAMS

SMC 22-58097

OF CONTACT	Contact #:	Secure	
OF CONTACT	FAM TEAM		
OF COM INC			CONTRACTA
		STAFF#	CONTACT#
	(14)		Particular Selection
	ACCUPATION NAMED IN	-	
11150150			The Real Property lies
INFORMATION	SUI	JECT PICTURE	
TIG SE	(E) (C) (C) (C) (C) (C) (C) (C) (C) (C) (C		F 12 7 5 11
(Harliston)			Way 5 B
			Markan
Ha mini			
44.5			A STATE
Mark and a second			A SECOND
N/4xidadi			123
Y - NEW YORK			
2010年100年	230,230 33		
			- CAN TO -
	C100 13		Contract to the
			DESIGNATION OF
			INFORMATION SUBJECT PICTURE

Flight	Departure Airport	Date	Time	Arrival Airport	Date	Time
WN 3001	BNA	08/08/2022	1100	ISP	08/08/2022	1413
-						

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

SMC AFTER ACTION REPORT (Enhanced)

SMCT	eam Leader:		26-16-16-1
Approvi	ng Supe rvisor:		
Describe any apparent co flight. Note all available Name (if known)	Co-travelers travelers or any apparent associates e details, including time and location Description of Contact/Ass	with whom the of the interacti	s e SMC subject spake before, during or after the ions, physical descriptions, seat numbers, etc. Additional Descriptors/Details
De	Electronic scribe any electronic devices (type, b		subject was seen using.
ALCUA III	Enhanced After Action	on Report N	Narrative Narrative
1043 FAM team and su 1110 Wheels up.		l in 2C.	shirt, pink skirt and a black backpack.

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

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SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

Law Enforcement Information Coordination Section (LEICS) SPECIAL MISSION COVERAGE NOTIFICATION

THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE LE/FAMS

SMC 22-60331

SMC Date:	2	8/16/2022		SI	SMC Requestor:		ure Flight
LEICS FAM:	22 2			C	Contact #:		
(SELECTION OF THE PERSON OF TH	PC	OINT OF CON	TACT	11/257	FAM TEAM	STAFF	# CONTACT#
LEICS TSOC:		MISS HOLE		(1	L)		
MOC:					ALIGN THE STATE OF		NAME AND DESCRIPTION OF THE PERSON OF THE PE
Field Office:		SALES PROPERTY.			ALL SERVICES		
	770						
	SUB	JECT INFORM	MOTTON		WATER PRINT	SUBJECT PICTL	IRF
Last Name:	500	The state of the s			190	The state of the s	
First Name:					100		15 TO 15
Middle Nam					1		
DOB:					100		STATE OF THE PARTY
Height/Weig	ght:						12 march 12
Eyes/Hair:		CONTRACTOR OF			2013		
Watch List S	itatus:				50.00		
POB:		NY - NEW	YORK		(A)		200
Identifier:	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	100000000000000000000000000000000000000			1000		98.55 (A)
Additional S					353		1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Information	l:						- Water
					100	AND HEAD IN	did was
			Co-Trave	elers ident	ified on PNR		
						,	
Flight	Departu	ure Airport	Date	Time	Arrival Airport	Date	Time
WN 2001		ICD	08/16/2022	1450	RWI	08/16/202	22 1554

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

SMC AFTER ACTION REPORT (Enhanced)

SMC Team Leader:

Approvi	ng Supervisor:	STATE OF THE STATE
Describe any apparent co	Co-travelers/As	ssociates h whom the SMC subject spake before, during ar after the
flight. Note all available	details, including time and location of th	e interactions, physical descriptions, seat numbers, etc.
Name (if known)	Description of Contact/Associa	
	The description	
De	Electronic De scribe any electronic devices (type, brand	
	The man	george and seen was seen using.
	Enhanced After Action I	Report Narrative
down over a pink shirt, slung across her chest. 13:07 EST, e 13:21 EST, e 13:26 EST, e 13:31 EST, e	and a white hat. was She appeared to have a slight liminters the security checkpoint. bserved at CNBC news store on the rrives at gate area and sits between akes a short phone call.	ne secure side of the terminal. en gates A6 and A7.
packpack unattended v	eaves the gate area and goes to the while she uses the restroom. eturns to her seat and bag.	ne restroom.
agent, gets		heck in. While FAM is talking to the gate walks up to gate A7, looks at FAM is talking to anyone.
14:25 EST,s	its in seat 2F.	at gate A7, with the pre-board group.
16:11 EST, Section earnd other terminals.	xits the aircraft at gate B15 and p	did not leave her seat during the flight. roceeds to walk towards the central food court f gate A9 gate B15 as we exit the aircraft and is heard

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

saying "I have the subject and I am following," into his radio as passes him. He then proceeds to follow her through the airport.
16:22 EST, stops at a martini bar at the beginning of terminal A and orders a drink. 16:32 EST, The FAM team covering the next leg, from CHI, takes control of
Comments/ additional information: none
End of Report

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

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SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

Law Enforcement Information Coordination Section (LEICS) SPECIAL MISSION COVERAGE NOTIFICATION

THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE LE/FAMS

SMC 22-60332

SMC Date:	8/16/2022	SMC Requestor:	Secure	Flight	
LEICS FAM:	10 200 200	Contact #:		EUGSTER	
P	OINT OF CONTACT	FAM TEAM	STAFF#	CONTACT #	
LEICS TSOC:	45 day 1000	(TL)	35	Part of Charles	
MOC:	and the second	ECCLES A SECTION	222	Service Mo	
Field Office:					
SUE	JECT INFORMATION	SUE	JECT PICTURE	6.00	
Last Name:		E 600 500	El Salate	D-NSF	
First Name:	THE RESERVE OF THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN 1				
Middle Name:				138	
DOB:	31 PS 2001				
Height/Weight:	The state of the s				
Eyes/Hair:	Transaction (Control of Control o			(200	
Watch List Status:					
POB:	NY - NEW YORK	18.00		AGE.	
Identifier:	Epidelitor this start			233	
Additional Subject Information:					
	Co-Tra	velers identified on PNR			
Not Listed					

Co-Travelers identified on PNR				
Not Listed				

Flight	Departure Airport	Date	Time	Arrival Airport	Date	Time
WN 1520	NAL	08/16/2022	1955	HOU	08/16/2022	2115

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

SMC AFTER ACTION REPORT (Enhanced)

SMCT	eam Leader:					
Approvi	ng Supervisor:					
	Co-travelers/Associate travelers or any apparent associates with whom the	e SMC subject spoke before, during or after the				
Name (if known)	flight. Note all available details, including time and location of the interactions, physical descriptions, seat number Name (if known) Description of Contact/Association Additional Descriptors/Descriptions					
	Electronic Devices					
De	escribe any electronic devices (type, brand, etc.) the	subject was seen using.				
	Enhanced After Action Report	Narrative				
An individual that mate	N1520 at 1947 and boarded a plane that the chart is the c	me (~87) of through travelers.				

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service


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SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

Law Enforcement Information Coordination Section (LEICS) SPECIAL MISSION COVERAGE NOTIFICATION

THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE LE/FAMS

SMC 22-60333

SMC Date:	8/16/2022	SMC Requestor:	Secure	Flight
LEICS FAM:	The second second	Contact #:	LO PERM	
	OUT OF COLUMN		I amage u	
	OINT OF CONTACT	FAM TEAM	STAFF#	CONTACT #
LEICS TSOC:	ISIN BIN	(TL)		
MOC:	1000			Tild the same
Field Office:	See M. A. Serian Berlin	4000	- 1 H.S.	STORY OF THE PARTY OF
AUSTRATUS				
CIII	BJECT INFORMATION	CIN	DIECT DICTUDE	
Last Name:	ALC: INFORMATION	30	BJECT PICTURE	
First Name:	PROPERTY.			1
Middle Name:	- Marianesia			-1.00
DOB:				
Height/Weight:	The same of the sa			
Eyes/Hair:				
Watch List Status:				
POB:	NY - NEW YORK			
ldentifier:				
Additional Subject Information:				
	Co-Tra	veiers identified on PNR		

Flight	Departure Airport	Date	Time	Arrival Airport	Date	Time
WN 1520	BWI	08/16/2022	1755	JAN	08/16/2022	1920
		1				

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

SMC AFTER ACTION REPORT (Enhanced)

SMC Team Leader:

Approvi	ng Supervisor:	ESPERANT								
Co-travelers/Associates Describe any opporent co-travelers or any apparent associates with whom the SMC subject spoke before, during or after the flight. Note all available details, including time and location of the interactions, physical descriptions, seat numbers, etc.										
Name (if known)	Description of Contact/Association	Additional Descriptors/Details								
De	Electronic Devices Describe any electronic devices (type, brand, etc.) the subject was seen using.									
	Enhanced After Action Report	Narrative								
ALL TIMES ARE APPROXIMATE AND IN CENTRAL DAYLIGHT TIME (CDT). 1620: FAM Team at airport ready for mission.										
Value of the second of the sec	1631: Eyes on Subject at the Martini Bar just in front of Terminal A. was wearing a white baseball cap, white long-sleeved top, pink undershirt, khaki crop									
light colored sne in her	light colored sneakers, and had a small grey purse slung around her shoulder.									
possession a pink iPhone and a black backpack. 1645: Left Martini Bar.										
1704: took a seat at the gate.										
1725: boarded aircraft.										
1909: Wheels down.										
1922: exited aircraft.										
Nothing unusual to rep	oort. SMC Complete.									

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

Special Mission Coverage After Action Report Instructions

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 - Type of electronic (laptop, tablet, eReader, Kindle) and (brand name, operating system)
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SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

Law Enforcement Information Coordination Section (LEICS) SPECIAL MISSION COVERAGE NOTIFICATION

THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE LE/FAMS

SMC 23-12626

POINT OF CONTACT LEKS TSOC: MOC: Field Office: SUBJECT INFORMATION SUBJECT PICTURE Last Name: First Name: Middle Name: DOB: Height/Weight: Eyes/Hair: Watch List Status: POB: NY - NEW YORK Identifier: Additional Subject	ght	SMC Requestor: Secure Flight		12/22/2022	SMC Date:
LEKS TSOC: MOC: Field Office: SUBJECT INFORMATION SUBJECT PICTURE Last Name: First Name: Middle Name: DOB: Height/Weight: Eyes/Hair: Watch List Status: POB: NY - NEW YORK Identifier: Additional Subject Information:					LEICS FAM:
LERCS TSOC: MOC: Field Office: SUBJECT INFORMATION SUBJECT PICTURE Last Name: First Name: Middle Name: DOB: Height/Weight: Eyes/Hair: Watch List Status: POB: NY - NEW YORK Identifier: Additional Subject Information:					
MOC: Field Office: SUBJECT INFORMATION SUBJECT PICTURE Last Name: First Name: Middle Name: DOB: Height/Weight: Eyes/Hair: Watch List Status: POB: NY - NEW YORK Identifier: Additional Subject Information:	CONTACT#	STAFF#	FAM TEAM	DINT OF CONTACT	
SUBJECT INFORMATION SUBJECT PICTURE Last Name: First Name: Middle Name: DOB: Height/Weight: Eyes/Hair: Watch List Status: POB: Additional Subject Information:		10	(TL)	本本教子 企业	LEICS TSOC:
SUBJECT INFORMATION Last Name: First Name: Middle Name: DOB: Height/Weight: Eyes/Hair: Watch List Status: POB: Additional Subject Information:	ALE STATISTICS	THE SECOND			
Last Name: First Name: Middle Name: DOB: Height/Weight: Eyes/Hair: Watch List Status: POB: Additional Subject Information:	Marie Walter	He la	THE STREET	A A CONTRACTOR	Field Office:
Last Name: First Name: Middle Name: DOB: Height/Weight: Eyes/Hair: Watch List Status: POB: Additional Subject Information:	-				
Last Name: First Name: Middle Name: DOB: Height/Weight: Eyes/Hair: Watch List Status: POB: Additional Subject Information:				TET WEADALLTION	CUR
First Name: Middle Name: DOB: Height/Weight: Eyes/Hair: Watch List Status: POB: NY - NEW YORK Identifier: Additional Subject Information:		CT PICTURE	SUBJ	ECT INFORMATION	
Middle Name: DOB: Height/Weight: Eyes/Hair: Watch List Status: POB: NY - NEW YORK Identifier: Additional Subject Information:	120		0.00		
DOB: Height/Weight: Eyes/Hair: Watch List Status: POB: Identifier: Additional Subject Information:				Chicago Santa	
Height/Weight: Eyes/Hair: Watch List Status: POB: NY - NEW YORK Identifier: Additional Subject Information:	1255			<u> </u>	100000000000000000000000000000000000000
Eyes/Hair: Watch List Status: POB: NY - NEW YORK Identifier: Additional Subject Information:					
Watch List Status: POB: NY - NEW YORK Identifier: Additional Subject Information:	ASSE			A LA	
POB: NY - NEW YORK Identifier: Additional Subject Information:	25/0				
Identifier: Additional Subject Information:	A to			AND AIRSA VARA	
Additional Subject Information:				NY - NEW YORK	
Information:					
Co-Travelers Identified on PNR					
Co-Travelers Identified on PNR		\$ 4 1 1 A L			
			entified on PNR	Co-Travel	
1: ABR Selectee			electee	- Al	1:
2: ABR Selectee			- ABR Selectee	CONTRACTOR (CONTRACTOR), EXCEPTION	2: 2 2 2 2

Flight	Departure Airport	Date	Time	Arrival Airport	Date	Time
B6 1882	HAI	12/22/2022	1701	JFK	12/22/2022	2311
			-			
				1		

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

SMC AFTER ACTION REPORT (Enhanced)

SMC Team Leader:								
Approving Supervisor:								
Co-travelers/Associates Describe any apparent co-travelers or any apparent associates with whom the SMC subject spoke before, during or after the flight. Note all available details, including time and location of the interactions, physical descriptions, seat numbers, etc.								
Name (if known)	Description of Contact/Ass		Additional Descriptors/Details					
De	Electronic scribe any electronic devices (type, b		ubject was seen using.					
	Enhanced After Action	on Report N	larrative					
AAR								
All times are approximate and in the Central Time zone.								
1615 - Off Duty LEO) and daughter.								
was wearing a grey sweater, black pants, tan boots, and carrying a black backpack.								
1645 - FAM discreetly briefed Off Duty LEO with the FAM teams seat assignments.								
1800 - was seated in 6D.								
1945 - was observed playing a game on her iPhone.								
2005 - was observed conversing with a female passenger in 6C.								
2130 - purchased two snack boxes and watched television.								
2315 - Family deplaned and exited the terminal.								
End of Report								

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

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Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

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SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

Law Enforcement Information Coordination Section (LEICS) SPECIAL MISSION COVERAGE NOTIFICATION

THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE LE/FAMS

SMC 23-14566

SMC Date:	1/1/2023	SMC Requestor:	Secure	Flight
LEICS FAM:		Contact #:	STORY ME	
	POINT OF CONTACT	FAM TEAM	STAFF#	CONTACT#
LEICS TSOC:		(TL)		
MOC:	Sec. 12. (1980)		217	- Challeger to the
Field Office:				
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S	UBJECT INFORMATION	SUE	JECT PICTURE	
Last Name:	CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY OF THE			
First Name:		1100		32-A-16
Middle Name:				
DOB:	TO SHOW			1456
Height/Weight:	lbs	100		28 Fab
Eyes/Hair:	of State Only			思麗
Watch List Status		美子為		
POB:	NY - NEW YORK (USA)	200		100
Identifier:	SSM Cover			
Additional Subject Information:	t			
	Co-Travel	ers identified on PNR		-
None listed	30 11440			

Flight	Departure Airport	Date	Time	Arrival Airport	Date	Time
B6 1881	JFK	01/01/2023	1340	IAH	01/01/2023	1650

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

SMC AFTER ACTION REPORT (Enhanced)

SMCT	eam Leader:	2·1 2·1 2·1 2·1 2·1 2·1 2·1
Approvir	ng Supervisor:	经济的 经 普勒特
Describe any apparent co- flight. Note all available	Co-travelers/Associat travelers or any apparent associates with whom a details, including time and location of the intera	the SMC subject spoke before, during or after the
Name (if known)	Description of Contact/Association	Additional Descriptors/Details
De	Electronic Devices scribe any electronic devices (type, brand, etc.) th	e subject was seen using.
	Enhanced After Action Report	Narrative
SMC 23-14566		
all times below are ap	proximate	
1151EST, ch	ecked in for flight B6 1881	
1310EST, bo	arded flight at Gate 4 in Terminal 5	
1312EST, to	ok seat in seat 2B with co-traveler (UNK)	l) who sat in seat 2A
1313EST, ex	pressed frustration with UNK1 that her b	pag was searched multiple times
1316EST an	d UNK1 took selfie with	one
1325EST, rec	eived phone call and expressed frustrat	ion with TSA
1338EST, Aircraft is 'wh	eels-up'	
1400EST, go go off gate	t up and went into galley to ask flight at	tendant how much longer until we pull

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1401EST, UNK1 used lavatory
1402EST, sat down in her seat
1406EST, UNK1 sat down in her seat
1408EST, ate a sandwich
1432EST, purchased headphones for herself and UNK1
1535EST, and UNK1 used their respective phones to scroll through news
1612EST, UNK1 opened up settings on iPhone and top of screen showed iPhone'
1632EST used the lavatory
1637EST, exited lavatory
1638EST helped UNK1 out of seat to use lavatory
1639EST, went to back of plane
1642EST, returned to seat
1643EST, UNK1 exited lavatory and returned to seat
1743EST, aircraft is 'wheels-down'
1751EST, and UNK1 exited aircraft
1752EST, UNK1 sat in wheelchair for assistance
1753EST, exited jetway toward baggage claim
1756EST, and UNK1 meet with a male outside of security (UNK2)
1800EST, UNK1 and UNK2 waited for luggage at carousel 4
1821EST, retrieved a Love Pink black small back and a large gray bag from carousel 4
1828EST, UNK1 and UNK2 are only ones left in baggage claim area

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unable to take subjects transportation due to issues with luggage

description:

- met description given
- white nail polish
- walks with a limp

Clothing:

- navy blue Vineyard Vines long-sleeve T-shirt
- black Lululemon leggings
- navy blue Dallas Cowboys ball cap
- brown Ugg boots
- plaid patterned coat

Jewelry:

- silver ring on right ring finger
- diamond ring on left ring finger

Items:

- glasses (wearing)
- white iPhone 14 with pink case
- pink neck pillow
- black backpack
- sunglasses
- purse decorated with white fur

UNK1 description:

- gender: female
- age: 60-70 years old
- height: 5'4-5'6
- hair: gray, shoulder-length
- purple nail polish
- tattoos: green-colored (roughly the size of a quarter) (left wrist)

Jewelry:

- gold crucifix necklace
- diamond band on right ring finger
- bracelet (white pearls) (right wrist)

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

- bracelet (purple pearls) (right wrist)

Clothing:

- pink sweatshirt
- blue jeans

Items:

- iPhone
- glasses (wearing)
- brown purse
- digital wrist watch (pink band)
- walking cane

UNK2 description:

- gender: male
- age: 45-50 years old
- height: 6'0-6'2
- weight: 260-280lbs
- facial hair: light-colored goatee

Clothing:


- blue short-sleeved U.S. Marines shirt
- green cargo pants
- green boots

Items:

- cell phone

End of Report

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

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Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

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SMC 23-31529

SMC Date:	4/20/2023	SMC Requestor:	SMC Requestor: Secure 1		
LEKS FAM:	以 多数数数量	Contact #:	- 635	13 60 60 60	
PC	DINT OF CONTACT	FAM TEAM	STAFF#	CONTACT#	
LEICS TSOC:		(TL)			
MOC.		STATE OF THE PARTY.	146	CALL VI SAID	
Field Office:		SHIP A BASIN	E A ST	Mark of the Sanda	
SUR	JECT INFORMATION	SUI	SJECT PICTURE		
Last Name:				GOVERN THE RESERVE OF THE PERSON OF THE PERS	
First Name:		100		N-2015	
Middle Name:	1			435	
DOB:	and the country			100	
Height/Weight:	lbs			1700	
Eyes/Hair:	10000000			7.39	
Watch List Status:					
POB:	NY - NEW YORK (USA)			45.10	
Identifier:	AND THE REAL PROPERTY.			1000	
Additional Subject Information:					
	Co-Travel	ers Identified on PNR			
none listed					

Departure Airport	Date	Time	Arrival Airport	Date	Time
!AH	04/20/2023	1838	FLL	04/20/2023	2213

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

SMC AFTER ACTION REPORT (Enhanced)

SMC Team Leader:

Approvii	ng Supervisor:	
	Co-travelers/Associate travelers or any apparent associates with whom to details, including time and location of the interact	the SMC subject spoke before, during or after the
Name (if known)	Description of Contact/Association	Additional Descriptors/Details
De	Electronic Devices escribe any electronic devices (type, brand, etc.) the	e subject was seen using.
	Enhanced After Action Report	Narrative
	e any contact with the Subject. NGRADED to a TYPE- U SMC due to the si	ubject canceling the itinerary per NTVC.
End of Statement		

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

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Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

Law Enforcement Information Coordination Section (LEICS) SPECIAL MISSION COVERAGE NOTIFICATION

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SMC 23-32023

SMC Date:	4/20/2023		SMC Requestor: Secure		Flight		
LEICS FAM:	To the same of the same		Conta	Contact #:			
	OINT OF CONTACT		15563	FAM TEAM	STAFF #	CONTACT#	
LEICS TSOC:			(TL)		I THE REAL PROPERTY.		
MOC:				7.55	4375		
Field Office:	Total Supplied			Edwick Russ	272	pilline land a selection	
	_						
SUI	BJECT INFORMATIO	N	THE CHAP	SL	BJECT PICTURE	E AND COLOR	
Last Name:				15.76		4.5	
First Name:				2.34			
Middle Name:							
DOB:	Spiroth south			1000			
Height/Weight:	lbs			888			
Eyes/Hair:				SEC. (1)			
Watch List Status:	Market Mark			36.5			
POB:	NY - NEW YORK	(USA)					
Identifier:	AND SHIP OF THE PERSON			96574			
Additional Subject Information:							
		Co-Travel	ers Identifie	on PNR			
none indicated							

Flight	Departure Airport	Date	Time ·	Arrival Airport	Date	Time
UA 0693	IAH	04/20/2023	1704	FLL	04/20/2023	2035
					-=	

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

SMC AFTER ACTION REPORT (Enhanced)

SMC Team Leader:

Approvi	ng Supervisor:	PER BUTTER
	Co-travelers/Associate	·s
	-travelers or any apparent associates with whom the details, including time and location of the interact	
Name (if known)	Description of Contact/Association	Additional Descriptors/Details

Electronic Devices

Describe any electronic devices (type, brand, etc.) the subject was seen using.

	Enhanced After Action Report Narrative
4/20/23 *All tin	nes below are approximations.*
	team at airport and ready for mission at IAH airport.
1608 CST: FAM:	observe to the same of the gate area for flight UA693.
A description of	is as follows: White sweater, short purple skirt. Black backpack. Net basket
1613 CST:	approaches gate agent to check on her standby status.
1620 CST:	is observed using an iPhone in a pink case.
1624 CST:	is observed talking to other passengers in the gate area.
1638 CST:	approaches gate agent to check on her standby status.
1643 CST:	joins boarding line.
1646 CST:	approaches gate agent to check on her standby status.
1700 CST:	gets secondary screening from TSA.
1704 CST:	boards flight UA693 and sits in 36B
1720 CST: Flight	t UA693 is Wheels up with FAM team and subject on board.
1720CST- 2037	
conversation w	
was	she knows that FAMs follow her on all her flights. She knows that on her previous flight it
	writer has the knowe that the cocondary expanies at the sate was because of her the
	owing her. She knows that the secondary screening at the gate was because of her. She
also	annual to the in an all Calastas list At ma times was the suremethal to the sure
with a	exactly why she is on the Selectee list. At no time was she aware that she was conversing
member of the	FAM team. She voluntarily provided all the above information without knowing she was

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

talking
to a FAM and without any solicitation from the FAM.
FAM also observed her deleting messages and pictures off of her iPhone.
2037 EST: Flight UA693 is Wheels Down.
2050 EST: deplanes flight UA693.
2052 EST: enters the bathroom.
2055 EST: exits and continues towards baggage claim.
2058 EST: picked up a green roller bag from the baggage carousel.
2100 EST: went outside and waited on the curbside for her ride. She was talking on the
phone the
entire time.
2110 EST: is picked up by a White Female, blond hair, gray leggings, blank tank top. She was
driving a
Black Toyota Santa Fe, Florida License plate
End of Report.



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Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

Law Enforcement Information Coordination Section (LEICS) SPECIAL MISSION COVERAGE NOTIFICATION

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SMC 23-32366

SMC Date:	4/25/202	3	SMC Requestor:	Secure	Flight
LEICS FAM:			Contact #:	THE NAME OF THE PARTY OF	the facilities
				CTAFF #	CONTACT
	POINT OF CO	VITACT	FAM TEAM	STAFF#	CONTACT
LEICS TSOC:	美国的		(TL)	1000	
MOC:	起始を対する		Next I a little of colors	33(24)	AND THE
Field Office:	the stall live		Description of the last of the	(3)10	466
SI	JBJECT INFORI	MATION	SUF	RIFCT PICTURE	
Last Name:	quirise (and				
First Name:					S 100
Middle Name:			2000		
DOB:	20000000				
Height/Weight:	AND SOM	lbs			O 1788
Eyes/Hair:	and the last				
Watch List Status					
POB:	NY NEW	YORK (USA)			
Identifier:	Southern V		10000		
Additional Subject Information:	t				
		Co-Trave	lers Identified on PNR		
NONE					

04/25/2023	1306
	
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SMC Report v 20190312




Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

SMC AFTER ACTION REPORT (Enhanced)

SMCT	eam Leader:	3453 CA 107 AN
Approvi	ng Supervisor:	
		isociates h whom the SMC subject spoke before, during or after the ne interactions, physical descriptions, seat numbers, etc.
Name (if known)	Description of Contact/Associa	ation Additional Descriptors/Details
De	Electronic De escribe any electronic devices (type, brand	
	Enhanced After Action F	Report Narrative
1120 EST Subject ident	oarded flight at different times to tified on plane seated in 7D. Subjection iPhone) on left wrist.	gain positive ID of Subject. ct was texting using a pink iPhone while AirPods
1400 PST FAM Team fo TL ended mission.	ollowed Subject to carousel 5 at iA	AH baggage claim. Subject entered elevator. FAM

SMC Report v 20190312



Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

Special Mission Coverage After Action Report Instructions

- The completed report should be submitted to the appropriate field office supervisor for review and submission to LEICS
 - AARs are due to LEICS within 5 days of the completion of the SMC
 - If the AAR is returned to you for correction or additional information the revised report is due to LEICS within 3 days of notification
 - After reviewing and approving the AAR, supervisors should upload the AAR to
 / in WORD
 format (DO NOT PASSWORD PROTECT), using the original naming convention under which
 you received the SMC document (i.e. SMC 15-xxxxx)
- AARs document the behaviors and activities of SMC subjects and those who interact with them in the transportation domain
 - Write the AAR in a timeline format documenting what was observed before, during, and after the mission
 - Include all details of co-travelers, electronic devices, activities, as well as pre and post-flight information observed/obtained.
- This report could become a discoverable document in a criminal investigation which you will use to testify in a court of law
- Contact the SMC Coordinator if you have any questions regarding the AAR

Significant Information

- Although FAMs on SMCs are not typically tasked to conduct extensive observations, minor details
 FAMs observe could be valuable to transportation security. The following are examples of potentially
 useful details to include in an AAR:
 - Unknown Subjects (UNSUBs) possibly travelling with the SMC subject
 - Note as many descriptors of the UNSUBs and their seat numbers if possible
 - Note the times and locations of the UNSUB relative to CCTV
 - Individuals with whom the subject has extended conversation
 - Any possible <u>counter-surveillance</u> or <u>surveillance detection/disruption techniques</u>, or other significant behavior by the SMC subject or UNSUBs
 - o Any of the subject's activities observed during the SMC
 - o Details of electronic devices the subject and co-traveler use or possess, including:
 - Type of cell phone (BlackBerry, iPhone, unknown Smartphone, etc.)
 - Type of electronic (laptop, tablet, eReader, Kindle) and (brand name, operating system)
- If unsure whether or not a detail regarding the SMC is significant, include it in the AAR

SMC Report v 20190312

Silent Partner / Quiet Skies Passenger Overview

Passenger: Ms. Tulsi Gabbard

Matched to: Silent Partner, Quiet Skies

Travel Dates: July 23, 2024 (Silent Partner), July 25, 2024 (Quiet Skies), July 26, 2024 (Quiet Skies),

August 2, 2024 (Quiet Skies)

Date Moved to Cleared List: August 02, 2024

Intelligence and Analysis Selectee Coordination Report Details

Distribution:

Purpose: Ensure that the passengers who are designated for enhanced screening receive appropriate screening by TSA Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) when the passengers are processed through the checkpoint.

Scope: The Intelligence and Analysis Selectee Coordination Report details travel records for the next 36 hours from the time of report generation.

Summary: The air carrier submits passenger travel record data for vetting to DHS. The Intelligence and Analysis Selectee Coordination Report details numerous passenger records, each of which correspond with a passenger who has matched to a Quiet Skies rule or been randomly selected for additional screening.

Each line of the report represents limited travel record information needed to facilitate screening at the airport specified in the record.

A passenger remains in Quiet Skies for three encounters or up to 90 days, whichever comes first, and is then automatically removed from Quiet Skies and moved to the Cleared List.

Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) Selectee Coordination Report Excerpt*

Passenger: Ms. Tulsi Gabbard

Excerpt Source Report Generation and Distribution Date: July 24, 2024

Number of Pertaining Travel Records in Source Report: Three (3)

Travel Record 1: Details a travel reservation on July 25, 2024. Mirrored in reports from July 24, 2024 - July 25, 2024.

Travel Record 2: Details a travel reservation on July 25, 2024. Mirrored in reports from July 24, 2024 - July 25, 2024.

Travel Record 3: Details a travel reservation on July 25, 2024. Mirrored in reports from July 24, 2024 - July 25, 2024.

* The enclosed excerpt has been marked as Sensitive Security Information and Privacy Act-protected information, as appropriate, for the information contained within.

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BYRNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CPR parts 15 and 1520. No part of this record may be disclosed to persons vitiout a "need to know", as defined in 49 CPR parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the Administrators of Transportation. Unauthorized permission of the Administrators of Transportation. Unauthorized release may twent in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public disclosure is governmed by 3 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.

Silent Partner / Quiet Skies Passenger Overview

Passenger: Ms. Tulsi Gabbard

Matched to: Silent Partner, Quiet Skies

Travel Dates: July 23, 2024 (Silent Partner), July 25, 2024 (Quiet Skies), July 26, 2024 (Quiet Skies),

August 2, 2024 (Quiet Skies)

Date Moved to Cleared List: August 02, 2024

Silent Partner / Quiet Skies Watchlist Complete Report Details

Distribution: Sent daily to TSA Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)

Purpose: Monitor and analyze the Quiet Skies and Silent Partner populations and the current impact of the rules on the traveling public.

Scope: The Watchlist Complete Reports for Silent Partner / Quiet Skies detail the first travel record for a passenger until the passenger have met the criteria to be moved to the Cleared List.

Summary: The air carrier submits passenger travel record data for vetting to DHS. The Watchlist Complete Reports for Silent Partner / Quiet Skies detail travel records of the first time a passenger matched to a Silent Partner or Quiet Skies rule.

Each line of the reports represents the travel record combined with the rule ID(s) and any changes in record status.

A passenger remains in Quiet Skies for three encounters or up to 90 days, whichever comes first, and is then automatically removed from Quiet Skies and moved to the Cleared List.

Silent Partner / Quiet Skies Watchlist Complete Report Excerpts*

Passenger: Ms. Tulsi Gabbard

Excerpt Source Report Generation and Distribution Date: July 24, 2024

Number of Pertaining Travel Records in Source Report: Three (3)

Travel Record 1: Details a travel reservation on July 23, 2024 for rule ID Mirrored in reports from July 21, 2024 - August 03, 2024.

Travel Record 2: Details a travel reservation on July 23, 2024 for rule ID Mirrored in reports from July 21, 2024 - August 03, 2024.

* The enclosed excerpt has been marked as Sensitive Security Information and Privacy Act-protected information, as appropriate, for the information contained within.

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Silent Partner / Quiet Skies Passenger Overview

Passenger: Ms. Tulsi Gabbard

Matched to: Silent Partner, Quiet Skies

Travel Dates: July 23, 2024 (Silent Partner), July 25, 2024 (Quiet Skies), July 26, 2024 (Quiet Skies),

August 2, 2024 (Quiet Skies)

Date Moved to Cleared List: August 02, 2024

Silent Partner / Quiet Skies Matches Report Details

Distribution: Sent daily to TSA Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)

Purpose: Enables system audits to ensure that passengers who are selected for Silent Partner or Quiet Skies enhanced screening match to the rule criteria and are moved to the Cleared List when they have met the applicable removal requirements.

Scope: The Quiet Skies / Silent Partner Matches Report details travel records for the three (3) days prior to report generation, the day of report generation, and the two days following report generation.

Summary: The air carrier submits passenger travel record data for vetting to DHS. The Quiet Skies / Silent Partner Matches Report details numerous passenger records, each of which correspond with a passenger who has matched to a Silent Partner / Quiet Skies rule.

Each line of the report represents a travel record combined with the rule ID(s) and limited travel data from when the passenger's data first matched to the Silent Partner rule.

A passenger remains in Quiet Skies for three encounters or up to 90 days, whichever comes first, and is then automatically removed from Quiet Skies and moved to the Cleared List.

Quiet Skies / Silent Partner Matches Report Excerpt*

Passenger: Ms. Tulsi Gabbard

Excerpt Source Report Generation and Distribution Date: July 24, 2024

Number of Pertaining Travel Records in Source Report: Four (4)

Travel Record 1: Details a travel reservation on July 25, 2024. Mirrored in reports from July 23, 2024 - July 28, 2024 for rule ID

Travel Record 2: Details a travel reservation on July 23, 2024. Mirrored in reports from July 23, 2024 - July 25, 2024 for rule ID

Travel Record 3: Details a travel reservation on July 25, 2024. Mirrored in reports from July 23, 2024 - July 28, 2024 for rule ID

Travel Record 4: Details a travel reservation on July 23, 2024. Mirrored in reports from July 23, 2024 - July 25, 2024 for rule ID

* The enclosed excerpt has been marked as Sensitive Security Information and Privacy Act-protected information, as appropriate, for the information contained within.

Silent Partner / Quiet Skies Passenger Overview

Passenger: Ms. Tulsi Gabbard

Matched to: Silent Partner, Quiet Skies

Travel Dates: July 23, 2024 (Silent Partner), July 25, 2024 (Quiet Skies), July 26, 2024 (Quiet Skies),

August 2, 2024 (Quiet Skies)

Date Moved to Cleared List: August 02, 2024

Daily Quiet Skies / Silent Partner Federal Air Marshal Special Mission Coverage Report Details

Distribution:

Purpose: Assist with FAMS SMC planning.

Scope: The Daily Quiet Skies / Silent Partner Federal Air Marshal Special Mission Coverage Report details travel records for the day of report generation, and the two (2) days following report generation.

Summary: The air carrier submits passenger travel record data for vetting to DHS. The Daily Quiet Skies / Silent Partner Federal Air Marshal (FAM) Special Mission Coverage (SMC) Report details numerous passenger records, each of which correspond with a passenger who has matched to a Silent Partner / Quiet Skies rule.

Each line of the report represents a travel record combined with the rule ID(s) the passenger matched to.

A passenger remains in Quiet Skies for three encounters or up to 90 days, whichever comes first, and is then automatically removed from Quiet Skies and moved to the Cleared List.

<u>Daily Quiet Skies / Silent Partner Federal Air Marshal (FAM) Special Mission Coverage Report Excerpt*</u>

Passenger: Ms. Tulsi Gabbard

Excerpt Source Report Generation and Distribution Date: July 23, 2024

Number of Pertaining Travel Records in Source Report: Three (3)

Travel Record 1: Details a travel reservation on July 23, 2024. Mirrored in reports from July 23, 2024 - July 23, 2024 for rule IDs

Travel Record 2: Details a travel reservation on July 23, 2024. Mirrored in reports from July 23, 2024 - July 23, 2024 for rule IDs

Travel Record 3: Details a travel reservation on July 25, 2024. Mirrored in reports from July 23, 2024 - July 25, 2024 for rule IDs

* The enclosed excerpt has been marked as Sensitive Security Information and Privacy Act-protected information, as appropriate, for the information contained within.

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Silent Partner / Quiet Skies Passenger Overview

Passenger: Ms. Tulsi Gabbard

Matched to: Silent Partner, Quiet Skies

Travel Dates: July 23, 2024 (Silent Partner), July 25, 2024 (Quiet Skies), July 26, 2024 (Quiet Skies),

August 2, 2024 (Quiet Skies)

Date Moved to Cleared List: August 02, 2024

Quiet Skies / Silent Partner Cleared List Report Details

Distribution:

Purpose: Enables system audits to ensure that passengers are properly exempted from applicable rule groups and are removed from the Cleared List when they have met the applicable removal criteria.

Scope: The Quiet Skies / Silent Partner Cleared List Report details travel records for the two (2) days prior to report generation, the day of report generation, and the two days following report generation.

Summary: The air carrier submits passenger travel record data for vetting to DHS. The Quiet Skies / Silent Partner Cleared List Report details numerous passenger records that matched to a corresponding passenger on the Silent Partner / Quiet Skies Cleared List.

Each line of the report represents a travel record combined with corresponding Cleared List information. The Cleared List information contains the rule ID(s) the passenger previously matched to and limited travel data from when the passenger's data first matched to the rule.

A passenger remains in Quiet Skies for three encounters or up to 90 days, whichever comes first, and is then automatically removed from Quiet Skies and moved to the Cleared List. Passengers on the Cleared List are exempt from the rule(s) they previously matched to until they meet the 18-month criteria to be removed from the Cleared List.

Quiet Skies / Silent Partner Cleared List Report Excerpt

Passenger: Ms. Tulsi Gabbard

Excerpt Source Report Generation and Distribution Date: August 03, 2024

Number of Pertaining Travel Records in Source Report: Two (2)

Travel Record 1: Details travel on August 05, 2024. Mirrored in reports from August 03, 2024 - August 7, 2024 for rule ID

Travel Record 2: Details travel on August 05, 2024. Mirrored in reports from August 03, 2024 - August 7, 2024 for rule ID

* The enclosed excerpt has been marked as Sensitive Security Information and Privacy Act-protected information, as appropriate, for the information contained within.

From: To: Cabbard

Subject: Date:

Tuesday, October 8, 2024 1:06:00 PM

Good Morning Sir,

On 7/22, while working in the TSOC, FAM recognized Tulsi Gabbard's name on the Quiet Skies list. She notified me and asked for guidance on whether Gabbard should be covered under a Quiet Skies mission. I first verified that she was a "former" congresswoman and then asked to verify the specific Quite Skies rule hit. She confirmed the specific "affiliate" rule hit and did not see any potential errors/inadvertent hits listed in Upax. I told to send the Quiet Skies mission for staffing. I confirmed the decision with ASAC who was also in the Freedom Center on 7/22.

Just let me know if you need anything further.

Supervisory Federal Air Marshal Federal Air Marshal Service – ICS

I am doing a QS with Tulsi Gabbard as the subject. why the heck is she a QS subject? SMH	
18 should have VIP instead of QS. The VIPs get added to flights. There should be a QS subject on the flight as well	5 subject on the flight as well
It just has her. Should i change it?	
It's in Staffing requested if you want to take a look when you log in	
Yeahlet me take a look. I just parked and should be on in a few	ed and should be on in a few
07/22.1224 she left congress so she probably is the QS since she's not Vip anymore	
I'm calling the yellow line	67/22 13 11 thank you
No problem	
01772 so Gabbard is an affiliate w/ a TSDB watch list subject, and since she's no longer in Congress that is probably why she bit for	0722 1319 is probably why she hit for
The fulle. Yeah I talked with about it and that's the condusion we came to as well	07.22.1319

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520. No part of this record may be disclosed to persons without a "need to know", as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the Administration of the Administration of the Secretary of Trensportation Security Administration or the Secretary of Trensportation or the Secretary of Trensportation Security Administration or the Secretary of Trensportation or the Secretary of

TSA HSGAC 8-21-24 T1 0000259 00 sitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520. No part of this record may be disclosed to persons know, as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Administration or the Secretary of Transportation. Security Administration or the Secretary of Transportation. Administration or the Secretary of Transportation. Administration or the Secretary of Transportation. Assert may result in civil penelty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520. Yeah. Let me take a look, I just parked and should be on in a few thank you I found who she's the affiliate with remind me and I can show you where to look, if you didnit find it already cool cool so Gabbard is an affiliate w/ a TSDB watch list subject, and since she's no longer in Congress that is probably why she hit for SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION about it and that's the conclusion we came to as well she left congress so she probably is the QS since she's not Vip anymore It's in Staffing requested if you want to take a look when you log in I didn't look, On UPAX songewhere I assume Shared I'm calling the yellow line ð Yeah I talked with No problem

SHAFTER SECURITY DESCRIPTION

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SMC #

AAR Narrative Notes:

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Federal Air Marshal Service Information Coordination Section

Special Mission Coverage After-Action Summary

SMC Date/Time: 07/28/2024



SRN Number:		XXIR Number:
Carrier: WN		Flight #: 3350
Status: Wheels Down		Seat Assignment:
Departure Airport: BNA		Departure Date/Time: 07/29/2024 14:50:00
Arrival Airport: AUS		Arrival DeterTime: 97/26/2024 17:00:00
Last Name: GABBARO	First Name: TULSI	Micicle Name:
LISE MAINE: GMODMAD	Fractopies (OLS)	mid data years,
Gender: FEMALE	DOB:	
TPN Number:	TSA SID:	TSC ID:
AAR Info		
Was subject's appearance different from information pro Notes:	vided?: Unanswered	Was subject observed with and/or using electronics? Unanawered Notes.
Did the subject display counter surveillance techniques of surroundings?: Unanswered Notes:	or seem abnormally aware	Team able to observe curbside?: Unanswered Notes
Did you receive any information from the ATLAS team or about any incidents in the airport involving your subject?: Notes		Unknown subject interaction? (other than listed co-travelers): Unanswered Notes
AAR Summary		

TSA_HSGAC_8-21-24_T1_0000280



AAR Narrative Notes: NSTR

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Federal Air Marshal Service Information Coordination Section

Special Mission Coverage After-Action Summary

SMC Date/Time: 08/02/2024



SNC			
SRN Number:		XNR Number:	
Carrier: DL		Flight #: 2259	
Status: Wheels Down		Seat Assignment:	
Departure Airport: AUS		Departure Date/Time: 08/02/2024 08:20:00	
Arrival Airport: MCO		Arrival Date/Time: 08/02/2024 11:58:00	
		W. P. V.	
Last Name: GABBARD	First Name: TULSI	Middle Name:	
Gender: FEMALE	DOB		
TPN Number:	TSA SID:	TSC ID:	
AAR Info			
Was subject's appearance different from information pr Notes:	ovided?: No	Was subject observed with and/or using electronics?: Yes Notes. 2 iPhones, 1 Laptop	
Did the subject display counter surveillance techniques of surroundings?; No Notes:	or seem abnormally aware	Team able to observe curbside?: No Notes	
Did you receive any information from the ATLAS team o about any incidents in the airport involving your subject Notes	r other authorities (le TSOC) ?: No	Unknown subject interaction? (other than listed co-traveler Notes	s): No
AAR Summary			

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520. No part of this record may be disclosed to persons without a need to know, as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration without a need to know, as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission. For U.S. government agencies, public disclosure is governed by 5 or the Secretary of Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.

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TSA_HSGAC_8-21-24_T1_0000281



AAR Summary

AAR Narrative Notes: Nothing significant to pass on.

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Federal Air Marshal Service Information Coordination Section

Special Mission Coverage After-Action Summery

SMC: Oxfortime: 08/03/2024



SMC *		
SRN Number:		XNR Number:
Carrier: DL		Flight #: 2470
Status: Wheels Down		Seat Assignment:
Departure Airport: ATL		Departure Date/Time: 08/03/2024 08:10:00
Arrival Airport: TUL		Arrival Date/Time: 08/03/2024 09:09 00
Last Name: GABBARD	First Name: TULSI	Middle Name:
Gender: FEMALE	008	
TPN Number:	TSA SID:	TSC ID:
AAR Info		
Was subject's appearance different from information provinces.	vided?: No	Was subject observed with and/or using electronics?: No Notes
Did the subject display counter surveillance techniques of surroundings?: No Notes:	or seem abnormally aware	Team able to observe curbside?: No Notes
Did you receive any information from the ATLAS team or or about any incidents in the airport involving your subject?:	other authorities (ie TSOC) No	Unknown subject interaction? (other than fisted co-travelers): No Notes

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520. No part of this record may be disclosed to persons without a need to know, as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration without a need to know, as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

TSA_HSGAC_8-21-24_T1_0000282



AAR Narrative Notes: Nothing significant to report.

Federal Air Marshal Service Information Coordination Section

Special Mission Coverage After-Action Summary



SMC #		SMC Deta/Time: 08/03/2024
SPIN Number:		XNR Number:
Carrier: DL		Flight #: 1548
Status: Wheels Down		Seat Assignment:
Departure Airport: MCO		Departure Date/Time: 08/03/2024 05 30:00
Arrival Airport: ATL		Arrivel Date/Time: 08/03/2024 06.58 00
Last Name: GABBARD	First Name: TULSI	Middle Name:
Gender: FEMALE	DOB	
TPN Number:	TSA SID:	TSC ID:
AAR Info		
Was subject's appearance different from information pro Notes.	vided?: No	Was subject observed with and/or using stectronics?: No Notes:
Did the subject display counter surveillance techniques of surroundings?: No Notes.	or seem abnormally awere	Team able to observe curbside?: No Notes:
Did you receive any information from the ATLAS team or about any incidents in the airport involving your subject?: Notes.	other authorities (ie TSOC) No	Unknown subject interaction? (other than listed co-travelers): No Notes:
AAR Summary		

FOUO // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE A_HSGAC_8-21-24_T1_00000335

Monda, August 3 I know where to find the QS rule hix number in UPAX, but is there a place to see how exactly the QS is affiliated to the watch used subject? (example listed them on an ESTA application)? 3.5372FV Let me ask around, I'm unsure. 1.5.2.28.79 co lected all the classified derog on the watch stad affiliate, just trying to learn how this traveler is precisely affiliated I have to run out to my car. Feel free to message me here I'm kpoking into if, are are unsure and none of us are still at not to ask I'm gonna had # 3 cund # " upax to see what I can find 1.534174 5,5 3.40 PM web eoc shows these two for her as rule hits Affiliates Rule (Inbound) TSDB Affliates Rule (Inbound) her prit is connected to a TSDB potential TSDB affinate here we go




propably connected to this

##AENLYG; This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR parts 15 and 1510. No part of this record any iss disclosed to persons without a "need to know", as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1510, except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration of the Transportation. Proc U.S. percusated approximate particles, paths disclosure is proteined by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.

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her email is affiliated as well as PNR



FOUO // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE A_HSGAC_8-21-24_T1_00000337





3 5 4 30 24

and gabbard have had multiple pru s connected since 07/17/2024

nitiooks like because on that she went onto a QS list because of the PNR connection



from that original onr itinerary from

can call to explain too



January 27, 2021 11:00AM ET

SUMMARY

The Acting Secretary of Homeland Security has issued a National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) Bulletin due to a heightened threat environment across the United States, which DHS believes will persist in the weeks following the successful Presidential Inauguration. Information suggests that some ideologically-motivated violent extremists with objections to the exercise of governmental authority and the presidential transition, as well as other perceived grievances fueled by false narratives, could continue to mobilize to incite or commit violence.

DURATION

This Bulletin will expire on or before April 30, 2021 at 1:00 PM ET

DETAILS

- Throughout 2020, Domestic Violent Extremists (DVEs) targeted individuals with opposing views
 engaged in First Amendment-protected, non-violent protest activity. DVEs motivated by a range
 of issues, including anger over COVID-19 restrictions, the 2020 election results, and police use
 of force have plotted and on occasion carried out attacks against government facilities.
- Long-standing racial and ethnic tension—including opposition to immigration—has driven DVE attacks, including a 2019 shooting in El Paso, Texas that killed 23 people.
- DHS is concerned these same drivers to violence will remain through early 2021 and some DVEs may be emboldened by the January 6, 2021 breach of the U.S. Capitol Building in Washington, D.C. to target elected officials and government facilities.
- DHS remains concerned that Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs) inspired by foreign terrorist groups, who committed three attacks targeting government officials in 2020, remain a threat.
- Threats of violence against critical infrastructure, including the electric, telecommunications and healthcare sectors, increased in 2020 with violent extremists citing misinformation and conspiracy theories about COVID-19 for their actions.
- DHS, as well as other Federal agencies and law enforcement partners will continue to take precautions to protect people and infrastructure across the United States.
- DHS remains committed to preventing violence and threats meant to intímidate or coerce specific populations on the basis of their religion, race, ethnicity, identity or political views.
- DHS encourages state, local, tribal, and territorial homeland security partners to continue prioritizing physical security measures, particularly around government facilities, to protect people and critical infrastructure.

TYPES OF ADVISORIES

Bulletin

Describes current developments or general trends regarding threats of terrorism.

Elevated Alert

Warns of a credible terrorism threat against the United States

Imminent Alert

Warns of a credible, specific and impending terrorism threat against the United States.

HOW YOU CAN HELP

- We ask the public to report <u>suspicious</u> activity and threats of violence, including online activity, to local law enforcement, <u>FBI Field Offices</u>, or their local <u>Fusion Center</u>.
- Your choice can make a difference.
 Choose non-violent ways to make your voice heard and support friends and family in doing the same.
- Communities are strongest when they are not divided: Strengthen your community by standing together against violence.

BE PREPARED

- Avoiding large crowds, including protests, is safest due to ongoing pandemic conditions. However, if taking part in protests do so peacefully, safely, and wear masks.
- Be responsible for your personal safety.
 Make note of your surroundings and security personnel. Carry emergency contact as well as medical and other needs information with you.
- Connect, Plan, Train, and Report to prepare businesses & employees.

STAY INFORMED

- Local, state and federal agencies will provide specific information about emerging threats as additional information is identified. The public is encouraged to listen to local law enforcement and public safety officials.
- Last year, DHS released a <u>Homeland</u>
 <u>Threat Assessment</u> to the public
 examining the threat environment through
 2021.
- The <u>DHS Lexicon on terrorism</u> includes terminology for DVEs and HVEs.

If You See Something, Say Something . | For more information, visit www.dhs.gov/seesay.

www.twitter.com/dhagov

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