WRITTEN STATEMENT OF

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BEFORE

U.S. SENATE HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

ON

TRANSFORMING WARTIME CONTRACTING:
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME CONTRACTING

September 21, 2011
Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and distinguished members of the committee, I welcome this opportunity to report to you on the Department of Defense efforts to provide our contingency contracting officers with the best support possible to our deployed forces—whether they are directly supporting the warfighter, or assisting victims of a natural disaster.

I am Richard Ginman, and I am the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), where I am responsible for Department-wide contingency contracting policy and functional leadership. I am a Career Civil Servant, with more than 40 years experience in government and commercial business in the fields of contracting, acquisition, and financial management. Before returning to DPAP duties in October 2006, I held several private sector positions including Vice President of General Dynamics Maritime Information Systems and Director of Contracts for Digital System Resources. I served in the United States Navy for 30 years, retiring as a Rear Admiral, Supply Corps. In addition to three tours afloat, I served in a variety of contracting and acquisition positions that included Commander, Navy Exchange Service Command; Deputy for Acquisition and Business Management in the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research Development and Acquisition; and Deputy Commander for Contracts, Naval Sea Systems Command.

Before I get too far, I would like to take a moment to thank the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) for its support of our troops and all it did to help with their mission. I commend the Commission on the work it has done to identify problems in wartime contracting and in recommending solutions to those problems. I have read all
the Commission’s reports and believe they have identified many real and important problems. In fact, the Department agrees in principle with the Commission’s 11 DoD-specific recommendations in its final report. I have concerns about a few of the specific details within those final report recommendations; but, at the highest level, the Department is in synch with the Commission’s strategic recommendations.

I’d also like to thank the men and women who serve our great country, including our military, civilian, coalition, and industry partners. None of us could get the job done without the other, and I am continuously impressed with the cooperation between them. I am committed to providing the leadership, policies, and innovative tools needed for contracting in support of our Iraq and Afghanistan mission.

**Commission on Wartime Contracting Final Report**

You asked that I identify select recommendations within the Commission’s final report and state whether I agree with them. Of the 15 strategic recommendations, I picked a few to discuss today. I chose to feature these because they represent the range of possible outcomes: in the first case, the Department is still assessing a new recommendation; in the second case, the Department is implementing a Commission recommendation; and in the final case, the Department has concerns with a specific approach the Commission has suggested.

First, we are still in the process of fully assessing the recommendations, particularly those that did not previously appear in a prior major Commission report. Recommendation #5, to “take actions to mitigate the threat of additional waste from
unsustainability,” falls in that category. We agree with the Commission that any fraud or waste is not acceptable and are analyzing the Commission’s proposed way forward to address the challenge.

Second, as I indicated earlier, the Department agrees in principle with the Commission’s DoD-specific final report recommendations. In particular, I would like to highlight the Commission’s recommendation #2, to “develop deployable cadres for acquisition management and contractor oversight.” I support this recommendation to grow a trained, experienced, and deployable cadre, and the Department is taking steps to implement it. USD(AT&L) is working with the Military Services and Defense Agencies to support these enduring requirements for contingency operations. Thanks to Congress, the Department has 10 new General/Flag Officer billets, and the Department has filled 9 of these 10 billets.

Finally, in a couple areas the Department has concerns with details within the 11 DoD-specific recommendations. The Department raised its concerns to the Commission when these same recommendations appeared in its 2nd interim report. In these areas, we have a professional difference of opinion about the best way to proceed. For example, Recommendation #12 is to “strengthen enforcement tools,” which I support. The Department supports two Senate bills that would be beneficial. One would expand the government’s access to contractor records; the other provides the authority to void any DoD contracts if funds directly or indirectly support the enemy.

However, one of the means the Commission recommends to strengthen enforcement tools is to “facilitate the increased use of suspensions and debarment for contingency contractors by revising regulations to lower procedural barriers and require
a written rational rationale for not pursing a proposed suspension and debarment.” In the 2nd Interim Report, the Commission said this written rationale should be published in the government-wide past performance database. I believe it is inappropriate to include this information as documentary evidence to suggest unreliable performance.

The Department has increased the use of these enforcement tools; from Fiscal Year 2007 to 2011, the number of Army debarments has increased 46 percent (from 94 debarments to 178). The Department has consistently advocated the policy that Debarring and Suspension Officials need to treat each case on its own facts and circumstances. We need to preserve the discretion of our officials to determine on a case-by-case basis what makes the best sense.

DoD Support of Commission on Wartime Contracting

The Department is determined to identify, correct, and prevent contracting efforts not in consonance with U.S. objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan and wasteful of U.S. tax dollars. These areas were of specific concern to the CWC, and the Department has supported fully the Commission’s independent study by providing it with personnel, data, interviews, and insights. Some examples of the Department’s support to the Commission include:

- I served as the Department’s focal point to facilitate the Commission’s efforts, from the Commission’s outset in 2008.
- The Department detailed subject-matter experts (SMEs) to augment the CWC’s 40-member staff.
• The Department testified in 18 of CWC’s 25 hearings.

• The Department analyzed each CWC publication—including its June 2009 first interim report, February 2011 second interim report, August 2011 final report, and its five special reports—and is moving out on solutions, as appropriate.

In short, the Department has been interacting regularly with the Commission throughout its endeavors and will continue to carry the torch to ensure improvements in the way ahead for addressing contracting challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan.

**DoD Analysis of Wartime Contracting Reports**

Improving contingency contracting has top Departmental support and is benefitting from joint solutions. To begin, I will briefly discuss the DoD’s analysis of the CWC three primary reports. Together, these reports contained 82 recommendations: 35 in the first interim report, 32 in the second interim report, and 15 in the final report. The Department has analyzed each of the earlier reports, and is tracking progress for those actions deemed suitable for DoD implementation. We are still in the process of fully analyzing the final report.

**First Interim Report (June 2009).**Upon the issuance of the CWC first interim report, which contained 35 observations in 8 areas of concern, the USD(AT&L) stood up a DoD Task Force in July 2009 to analyze the Commission on Wartime Contracting First Interim Report. Establishing this task force was a clear sign of his commitment to
improvements. The composition of the task force is further testimony to senior leadership support of contingency contracting. The senior procurement executive from each Service participated on the task force, as did the directors of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA).

This joint task force inventoried and assessed an extensive array of Departmental solutions to the concerns the Wartime Commission voiced. The joint task force created a scorecard and rated the Department’s efforts. The task force identified six observations where the Department encountered major challenges, primarily in the area of resourcing of personnel for contingency contracting. The Department continues to be focused on adequate resourcing of the contingency contracting community. In fact, our contracting fill rate for the U.S. Central Command’s Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (C-JTSCC) is at 98.3 percent.


Second Interim Report (February 2011). In March 2010, USD(AT&L) created a permanent board to provide strategic leadership to the multiple stakeholders working to institutionalize Operational Contract Support (OCS). This board analyzed the Commission’s 32 recommendations in its second interim report, maintains a scorecard, and reports to senior leadership on progress. In fact, our most recent meeting was held less than a month ago, on August 23. Our analysis shows that DoD is moving forward on most of the DoD-applicable recommendations, either through direct implementation or alternative approaches to meet the Commission’s intent. Of the recommendations that
DoD deemed it could not implement, at the time the report was released, was one relating to automatic suspension and debarment because a fundamental tenet of the current system is to handle suspension and debarment on a case-by-case basis. I do note, however, that the Commission withdrew this recommendation in its final report. Others we could not implement because they were out of AT&L’s purview related to creating or elevating organizations such as creating a permanent office of inspector general for contingency operations and creating a contingency contracting directorate in the Joint Staff. As far as elevating the organizational placement of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support, USD(AT&L), Logistics and Materiel Readiness, we believe the intent has been met, as the Department determined that existing capabilities and relationships already are effective, as articulated by the USD(AT&L), Dr. Carter.

As further demonstration of the continued engagement of senior leadership in the Commission’s analysis, the USD(AT&L), Dr. Carter, appeared before the Commission on 28 March 2011 to share his views on the second interim report. He provided a preliminary assessment of the Commission’s second interim report, which was later complemented by a more detailed analysis by the permanent board he established.

**Final Report (August 2011).** The Commission’s recent final report contains 15 strategic recommendations – or 58 total recommendations, including the more detailed recommendations within the report. Our analysis shows that the great majority of these appeared in some form in the Commission’s earlier reports. For those previously published recommendations, DoD has completed a thorough analysis and continues to
track progress. For the new strategic recommendations, DoD needs to complete its analysis.

In broad terms, I agree in principle with the overarching precepts driving the Commission’s 11 DoD-specific final report recommendations. Within that umbrella, the Department may differ on specific approaches to solving the associated challenge. But rest assured that DoD is committed to making improvements.

Value of Wartime Contracting Reports

The Commission has identified many real and important problems in wartime contracting. Monitoring, assessing, and taking corrective action is a continuous process within the Department. Reports such as those published by the Commission help us to improve and better define our ongoing efforts. One area where the Commission’s work has been particularly helpful in shining a light is resourcing. The Commission’s first interim publication focused on the need for the right number and quality of people to award, manage, oversee, and closeout contracts as we drew down in Iraq and built up in Afghanistan. In reaction to the Commission’s insights, we are successfully addressing the challenge of an inadequate number of trained Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs) assigned to contractor oversight in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Department has come a long way. In 2009 when the Commission published its first interim report, the number of CORs in Afghanistan had been lagging. With constant attention, we have successfully addressed that challenge. In short, we have added hundreds of CORs to the
war zone to help oversee theater contracting. We continue to monitor these resources closely to ensure this support remains a success story.

**DOTMLP Initiatives**

*(Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, and Personnel)*

Tangible evidence of our commitment to continuous progress is found in the many accomplishments the Department has made, across the DOTMLP (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, and Personnel) spectrum. I would like to take a few moments to highlight some of those accomplishments.

**Doctrine**

Doctrine provides a common frame of reference across the military, describing how military forces contribute to campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements. This doctrine now includes operational contract support, or OCS, as a way of accomplishing military tasks. OCS is a strategic capability that must be integrated into planning and training as well as mission execution. OCS is broader than contingency contracting. OCS delivers effects using contracts and contractors to support joint force commanders during contingencies. OCS includes multiple stakeholders, including the commands that are now incorporating contracted support into their logistics support plans, the units that develop requirements documents to augment their organic capabilities, the resource management and finance personnel that allocate and disburse
funds, contracting officers that award contracts and their representatives that oversee those contracts, and the contractors that perform the contract.

The Joint Staff J-4 published Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support, on 17 October 2008 to establish doctrine for planning, conducting, and assessing operational contract support integration and contractor management functions in support of joint operations. Joint Publication 4-10 currently is being updated.

On June 20, 2011, the Army published Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 4-10, Operational Contract Support, to provide “how to” guidance to Army operational commanders and their non-acquisition officer staffs for planning, requirements preparation, and integration of OCS into combat operations. Recognizing OCS as a joint capability area, the Army has improved OCS training, developed OCS policy and doctrine, and is expanding the personnel and organizations responsible for training, planning, coordinating, and executing operational contract support.

**Organization**

The Department is improving its organizational structure to ensure it best supports OCS and contingency contracting. As mentioned earlier, on March 29, 2010, USD(AT&L) established the Operational Contract Support Functional Capability Integration Board to provide strategic leadership to the multiple stakeholders engaged in OCS. Co-chaired by Joint Staff and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support, USD(AT&L), Logistics and Materiel Readiness, and meeting quarterly, membership includes the Services, DPAP, DCMA, DCAA, Comptroller,
Personnel and Readiness, and others as required. This group monitors the Department’s progress in making improvements in the areas of concern to the Commission.

In the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility, the Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (JTSCC) re-organized, moving from being a U.S. Forces-Iraq subordinate command to joint functional command directly reporting to HQ CENTCOM in May 2010. This action recognizes that contract oversight is a combatant command responsibility; it also recognizes the importance of Afghan operations.

The Department created the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) as an enabling capability to synchronize, coordinate, and manage OCS across DoD and the Whole of Government during peacetime and contingency operations. JCASO was established at the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) in August 2009 and has been fully operational since October 2010. JCASO provides a combatant command with an initial enabling capability to establish a JTSCC, and is led by a flag officer who can potentially transition to be a future JTSCC Commander.

The Army has reorganized its contingency contracting forces to better plan, train, equip, and execute operational contract support, in response to a recommendation from the “Gansler Commission,” an independent body established by the Secretary of the Army in 2007. The Army’s Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) headquarters reached Full-Operational Capability on 8 October 2009. The ECC has six active Contracting Support Brigades (CSBs). These CSBs are geographically aligned in order to provide responsive operational contracting support to the Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) and provide the Army with greater flexibility to place contracting teams into areas to support Joint Force operations. This organizational alignment has
proven effective in assisting the ASCCs in developing and synchronizing contracting support integration plans. The ECC is scheduled to stand-up a seventh CSB in support of AFRICOM. In addition to training and equipping contingency contracting officers, the ECC has engaged the brigades deploying to Afghanistan and Iraq to provide on-site training on COR responsibilities in a contingency operation, field ordering officer training, and Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) project office training.

All the hard work to build the Army expeditionary and contingency contracting capability is paying off as demonstrated in the Army’s rapid response to support the mission in Haiti. The ECC 410th Contracting Support Brigade (CSB) was engaged with U.S. Army South and the Southern Command within hours after the earthquake and deployed contracting personnel into Haiti within 48 hours to establish a regional contracting office.

In order to leverage the power of the Army Contracting Command (ACC) enterprise in supporting global operations, the Army has established a “reach-back” contracting capability. In addition to the Expeditionary Contracting Command and Mission Installation Contracting Command, the ACC also has six major contracting centers. These contracting centers provide contracting to a wide number of customers. The real power of these contracting centers has been demonstrated in the Army’s ability to provide reach-back contracting support to contingency operations that are enduring in nature. As an example, Army Contracting Command - Rock Island (ACC-RI) established a reach-back team in early 2008 with 8 personnel executing over $800 million worth of contracts in support of our Kuwait contracting operations. As of September
2011, ACC-RI has a reach-back capability of over 100 personnel working 1350 active requirements with a total value of $30.4 billion that are in varying stages of the acquisition cycle. Having this reach-back capability reduces our in-theater footprint and the number of individuals in harm’s way. We support the Senate bill that would strengthen this reach-back resource by providing the ability to use the overseas increased micro-purchase threshold and the simplified acquisition threshold in the same manner and to the same extent as if the contract were to be awarded and performed outside the U.S.

On 8 December 2009, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology chartered the OCS and Policy Directorate. This new directorate is the proponent for operational contracting policies supporting the full spectrum of contingency operations worldwide, and will synchronize contingency contracting planning and policy across the Army and Army Staff. The OCS Policy directorate also provides liaison for and oversight of the C-JTSCC on behalf of the Army Acquisition Executive. Additionally, a concept plan is in development to staff the directorate to increase its planning and oversight capability for future operations.

**Training**

The Department has increased its training portfolio to properly prepare personnel for the reality of OCS and contingency contracting on the battlefield. The training addresses a range of audiences, from commanders to acquisition professionals to subject-matter experts performing oversight.
The Joint Staff J-7 has produced three online OCS training courses for commanders and their staffs:

- Introductory Operational Contract Support (OCS) Commander and Staff Course.
- Operational Contract Support (OCS) Flag Officer/General Officer Essentials Course.
- Introduction to Operational Contract Support Planning Course.

The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) offers seven contingency contracting courses for the acquisition community, including our contingency contracting officer course, CON234, and to date, the course is a success with great feedback. While on the topic of training, it is worth pointing out that DAU, DPAP, and the Services have already standardized our formal Contingency Contracting Officer (CCO) training, and the result is 90 to 95 percent commonality across all Services.

The Army has enhanced the training of the contracting workforce and acquisition support staff to build the skills necessary to better support the warfighter and better manage contracted support. To do this, they have added and improved multiple acquisition training courses including instruction in 16 officer and non-commissioned officer courses; incorporated contracting operations and planning into the Battle Command Training Program and Combat Training Center training; and included OCS scenarios to exercise CORs during Mission Readiness Exercises prior to deployments.

Last year, the Army Logistics University began the OCS Planning and Management Course, a two-week course which trains logistics planners at any echelon in
OCS management and oversight, requirements determination, and performance work statement writing. Currently, the demand for the course is exceeding available capacity. Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers who complete the course are awarded an additional skill identifier – 3C – which will allow the Army to better manage OCS planner assignments.

In addition to the required Defense Acquisition University training for CORs, the Army and C-JTSCC have added ethics training as an additional requirement. To better train CORs for deployment, the Army Contracting Command (ACC) has developed and implemented a COR training program provided to brigades prior to deploying, a critical step in strengthening the Army’s ability to oversee contractor performance. The Army has issued an Execution Order, referred to as an EXORD, to all commands requiring commanders to determine the number of CORs they’ll need in theater before they deploy and train enough CORs to fill those positions. The EXORD also requires COR training to be added to Soldiers’ electronic training records, requires reporting of COR training shortfalls, and requires training on the CERP.

The OCS training portfolio will continue to receive Departmental attention. In a memo dated 24 January 2011, the Secretary of Defense emphasized improvements in education and training, among other areas, as critical to how the Department will view, plan, and account for Operational Contracting Support in the future. The Joint Staff’s analysis of OCS education and training began more than a year ago with the development of OCS and Contingency Contracting core competencies, and the development of on-line distance learning courses.
To further improve OCS training, the Joint Staff (J-4), in conjunction with the National Defense University, sponsored a study to analyze the current state of OCS education and training programs and propose an institutional OCS Education and Training Program that will provide practical training content tailored to the training recipient’s role and responsibility in OCS. Due in August 2012, this study will determine the requirement for OCS education and training at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and develop methodologies that will expand the awareness of OCS across the national security enterprise.

**Materiel**

Next I would like to address some tools that the Department has developed—or is in the process of developing—to help our acquisition community do its job more effectively and efficiently.

**Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook**

Our Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook was developed to fill a gap: while deployed CCOs performing in a joint environment had Service-specific guidance, they lacked consolidated, joint guidance. The joint handbook was developed by CCOs, for CCOs. It was developed in a joint environment so all Services and Components had a say in what went into it. We also went beyond the contracting community to get feedback: auditors and lawyers helped us develop the right content. From the start, the handbook has contained tools, templates, forms, training guides and material, and
checklists. We continue to refine these, as well as add features, for each annual update to the handbook. For example, the second edition introduced critical action checklists and made the accompanying DVD more user-friendly. The third edition expanded the website capabilities, added over 100 new resources and additional material based on special interest items occurring in theater today. Over 10 thousand second edition handbooks were distributed and over 15 thousand third edition handbooks were published due to increase in demand.

Initially started as a hard copy with a DVD, the handbook has become more automated over time. Starting with the second version, the handbook and DVD information are now also available on the DPAP web site. This enables us to update content in real-time, if we find needed improvements or specific gaps in training. Having multiple platforms to access this information ensures the broadest support to CCOs.

The DVD and web site provide access to a variety of resources, so our deployed contracting offices do not have to start from scratch. Today the DVD/web site contains over 3 thousand drill-down support tools. The resources include training, specific forms they will most likely use, and samples of determinations and findings. We include a topical index to facilitate navigating the plentiful resources. We also include games, which make the learning process entertaining. This is a good tool and is being made better by feedback from CCOs who have recently returned from a deployment.
Building on a successful joint handbook for CCOs, we created a joint handbook for CORs. The DoD Contingency Contracting Officer Representative (COR) Handbook supplements official training and policy and serves as a handy pocket guide that provides CORs, who are supporting contingency operations with basic tools and knowledge. This 346-page handbook and accompanying CD provides checklists, how-to guides, form procedures, and examples. This handbook provides the basic knowledge and tools needed by CORs to effectively support contingency operations and is designed specifically to address the realities faced by CORs in operations outside the continental United States (OCONUS). The information in the handbook is extracted from numerous sources within the Defense acquisition community. Over 13 thousand handbooks were distributed in only 6 months. High demand required a reprint of another 9 thousand books that will be distributed over the next 10 months.

This unified guide strengthens the ability of CORs to provide needed contract surveillance. Another tool we are currently deploying is the DoD COR Tool (CORT), a web-based management capability for the appointment and management of CORs. It provides an automated means to access important data on CORs, including the COR name, career field, certification level, and other contact information; the COR’s supervisor contact information; and the Contracting Officer’s contact information. Beyond contact information, it identifies all training completed by the COR. The DoD CORT automates key parts of the process—it enables an electronic nomination, approval, and termination process of candidate CORs, and it provides the capability to record key
process documents online, such as status reports, trip reports, correspondence. DoD contracting personnel are provided with a web-based portal for all relevant COR actions. The CORT is being deployed within DoD and full deployment will occur by the end if fiscal year 2012.

**Other Tools**

The Department also has other tools in the pipeline, including:

- The Automated Contingency Contracting Officer After Action Report Database – a data collection and reporting tool that will help us leverage lessons learned and incorporate them into training

- The 3-in-1 Tool – a handheld device that will help us reduce cash on the battlefield

- The Contingency Acquisition Support Model – a tool to translate a combatant commander’s requirement into a procurement package that will help us with consistency

**Leadership**

The “Gansler Commission” report on Army Expeditionary Contracting, which was presented to the Secretary of the Army in October 2007, voiced a concern about the lack of military leadership in the contracting profession. One initiative that addresses this concern is the Department’s implementation of legislation Congress provided in the
Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense Authorization Act, which adds 10 military
genral/flag officer billets. Having senior leaders in military positions will be a great
help our contracting workforce, specifically in enhancing the stature of our contracting
officers, and I thank Congress for authorizing these positions.

Army contracting has four new General Officers: at the Army Materiel
Command’s Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC), Mission Installation
Contracting Command (MICC), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) National
Contracting Organization, and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition,
Logistics and Technology) (ASA(ALT)). To fill these positions, the Army has promoted
three colonels to brigadier general and one brigadier general, BG Nichols, has been
selected for promotion to major general. BG Nichols was a former Commander of the C-
JTSCC. BG Bass is currently the commander of the ECC, BG Leisenring is the
commander of the MICC, BG Harrison is serving as the Deputy Director of Contracting
in the USACE. In addition two other colonels from the Army contracting career field
have recently been selected for promotion to brigadier general. The Army promoted LTG
Bill Phillips to his current position as the Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of
the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology), following his tenure as a commander
of C-JTSCC, which is further testimony to the importance of contracting in the Army.

The Navy has three flag officers serving in contracting joint billets: Rear Admiral
(Lower Half) Ron MacLaren as the director of the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support
Office; Rear Admiral (Lower Half) Nicholas Kalathas, in the Office of the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Program Support), USD(AT&L), Logistics and Materiel
Readiness, who serves as the Commander, C-JTSCC; and Rear Admiral (Lower Half) Robert Gilbeau as the Commander of DCMA International.

For the Air Force, Major General Wendy Masiello was selected to serve as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Contracting, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Washington, D.C., replacing a civilian leader. Further, Brigadier General Casey Blake is the Senior Contracting Official-Afghanistan in the C-JTSCC.

CENTCOM has recognized the importance of contracting in the CENTCOM AOR and pushed for and received approval to fill two general officers billets, one (Rear Admiral Kalathas) is the Commander, C-JTSCC, and one (Brigadier General Blake) serves as the Senior Contracting Official in Afghanistan. Thus, with Brigadier General Blake and Rear Admiral Kalathas, for the first time the Department has two general or flag officers in key contracting positions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Personnel

People are the key to our success. The Department also is directly addressing personnel issues impacting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as discussed below.

Contingency Contracting Officers in Support of Iraq and Afghanistan

The Department has proactively managed the placement of Contingency Contracting Officers to support Iraq and Afghanistan. The C-JTSCC is currently 97.8 percent staffed overall within their Joint Manning Document and Request for Forces.
The number authorized does not include just CCOs, but also essential staff elements required to support a Headquarters and Regional Contracting Centers, such as information technology, administrative, legal, logistics, and supply personnel. Our Contingency Contracting Officers are always in high demand and many have been rotated in and out numerous times.

In 2010 we transitioned the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan to the CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (C-JTSCC). This action placed the C-JTSCC as a direct subordinate command under CENTCOM vice a command that was previously a subordinate to U.S. Forces-Iraq, although supported Afghanistan as well. Now, the C-JTSCC Commander has the latitude to reposition these high demand resources to meet operational requirements more easily. We have continually balanced the requirements for our contingency contracting officers, which are low density-high demand assets, between Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, several years ago the number of contracting officers supporting Iraq was much greater than those supporting Afghanistan. With the drawdown in Iraq and the increased contracting focus in Afghanistan, we have greatly adjusted that balance. Today, approximately 227 of the C-JTSCC’s 355 personnel are in Afghanistan, with 76 in Iraq supporting the drawdown and transition. The remainder compose the headquarters in Qatar and close out functions in the U.S. As we transition Iraq to the State Department, the C-JTSCC will reduce its size to 30 personnel or less to conduct termination functions (assuming post-2011 Iraq will not include additional Title 10 forces under a new security agreement). In June 2012 this function is expected to be completed and the C-JTSCC mission in Iraq will end altogether. As this occurs, it is our intent to reassess CCO requirements again.
**Contingency Contracting Officers**

DPAP is developing a joint standard for CCOs, which will help the commander ask for exactly what skill level person he or she needs. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) looks at education and training and years and type of experience for its three levels of contracting officer certification. What we need for CCOs is further granularity and specificity: we have to break this down to contingency education and training and contingency contracting experience. When the standard is established, the deployed contracting commander will actually be able to put a requirement in for what he or she actually needs, and the Services can respond accordingly. This approach will allow the Department collectively to use the right person and match the individual to the right job.

**Contingency Contracting Officer’s Representatives**

Just as we are dedicated to making improvements for our CCOs, so too are we committed to ensuring enhancements for our contracting officer’s representatives (or CORs) that monitor contract performance. The Section 813 Contracting Integrity Panel, which Congress required in the Fiscal Year 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, required the Department to examine efforts to eliminate areas of vulnerability that allow for fraud, waste, and abuse. Insufficient surveillance on contracts was identified a vulnerability which can lead to fraud, waste, and abuse—by both the contractor and the
government. The Section 813 Panel identified solutions to help eliminate vulnerabilities in contract surveillance. They include developing a COR standard for certification, developing a COR-specific policy, and requiring a COR’s performance to be reflected in his or her performance assessment.

The subcommittee has developed a draft DoD Instruction, or DoDI. This DoDI is significant, not only because it will standardize COR functions, but also because it will require the Defense Components to plan and budget for COR requirements.

**Workforce Growth**

On 6 April 2009, the Secretary of Defense gave direction to grow and in-source the acquisition workforce. By Fiscal Year 2015 the Army contracting civilian workforce will grow by over 1,600 new positions. This growth has been facilitated by Section 852 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, which provided short term funding to hire acquisition personnel while permanent positions are resourced. Section 852 has been utilized to hire 352 Army civilian contracting interns to date, with hundreds more planned over the next three years. Section 852 provided critical funds to help reconstitute the acquisition workforce as well as many other initiatives and I would like to thank Congress for its foresight in providing these funds.

**Conclusion**

All of the Services are working hard to translate the lessons learned regarding contingency contracting and translate them into an integrated logistics strategy that
incorporates contracted support planning, management, and oversight. As our deployed acquisition workforce continues to serve in harm’s way, we owe them the resources required to complete the tasks we have given them. DPAP, in partnership with OSD, the Services, and Components, is enhancing professional standards, tools, and training to better serve this workforce. Again, I thank you for the opportunity to report to you on just some of the many initiatives we are working to support these patriots.