The Honorable  
Ron Johnson, Chairman  
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510  

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your July 28 letter following up on numerous lines of inquiry initiated by your Committee. The Department is responding to items 1 and 2 from your letter regarding interactions by Department employees and Christopher Steele, as well as additional clarifications with your staff during the accommodation process. Please find enclosed documents related to your request.

The Department will continue to review its records for any additional documents responsive to your inquiry. In sharing such information for the limited purpose of responding to the Committee’s request, the Department is not in any way waiving any legal privileges that apply to this information. We request that you protect the enclosed documents, which contain other sensitive but unclassified information. As a result, we note that the public release of any portion of the enclosed documents is not authorized by this communication. Should you wish to disclose any sensitive documents or portions thereof, we ask that you provide the Department with a reasonable opportunity to inform the Committee of any sensitive information that should be safeguarded.

Further, with regard to the portions of the enclosed documents that are classified, under Executive Order (E.O.) 13526, the Department may not disseminate classified information outside of the Executive Branch except under conditions that ensure the information will be given protection equivalent to that afforded to such information within the Executive Branch. Classified and other sensitive information may not be publicly disclosed or handled in such a manner that might lead to public disclosure. We ask that you and your staff protect the classified information by applying standards at least as stringent as E.O.13526 on the handling of classified information. Sensitive documents must be protected from unauthorized disclosure because they contain information protected by Statute. We request that only Members (and staff with the necessary clearance and the need-to-know the information) be allowed to review the material. Staff notes based upon review of these classified materials would likewise be classified and must be treated accordingly.

We hope this information is helpful to you. Please let us know if we may be of further assistance.
Sincerely,

Jessica L. Moore
Senior Bureau Official
Bureau of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:
As Stated

Cc: The Honorable Gary Peters, Ranking Member
The Honorable  
Charles E. Grassley, Chairman  
Committee on Finance  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your July 28 letter following up on numerous lines of inquiry initiated by your Committee. The Department is responding to items 1 and 2 from your letter regarding interactions by Department employees and Christopher Steele, as well as additional clarifications with your staff during the accommodation process. Please find enclosed documents related to your request.

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We hope this information is helpful to you. Please let us know if we may be of further assistance.
Sincerely,

[Signature]

Jessica L. Moore
Senior Bureau Official
Bureau of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:
As Stated

Cc: The Honorable Ron Wyden, Ranking Member
Fascinating. Tx as ever.

P, pls send Bobby M a brief note asking him to quietly tell the PM to watch out. Tx

Toria (and Paul)

According to Orbis June 5 2014 report, provided to us today by former MI6 Russia expert Chris Steele, we have a very unhappy Gennady Timchenko. As you may already know, his DC lobbyists were at Patton Boggs. Report says Timchenko hopes to use Luxembourg relationships to reduce EU pressures on his empire.

best
1. Speaking in confidence to a trusted western interlocutor, a former Russian government official with close ties to the Kremlin and President PUTIN’s inner circle, described the impact on the leadership of current USG and EU sanctions imposed in connection with Ukraine. All were scared that EU sanctions would begin specifically to target them, in the same way that USG measures had to date, and this was restraining to some extent Russian action in (eastern) Ukraine.

2. The former Russian official knew that PUTIN associate and Gunvor Trading/Novatek oligarch Gennady TIMCHENKO had taken the sanctions imposed on him particularly badly. TIMCHENKO was angry that his careful and expensive PR campaign in the West, aiming to promote his reputation as an independent businessman and patron of the arts and various charities, had come to nothing.

3. Also, despite public posturing and statements to the contrary, TIMCHENKO both resented and feared PUTIN’s recent pivot to China as a means of counterbalancing western hostility over Ukraine/Crimea and to help avoid sanctions. TIMCHENKO believed there was a clear risk now of the Chinese leveraging deals, especially in the energy sphere, which were unfavourable to Russia (and his companies). He noted that the Chinese delegation to the recent St Petersburg Economic Forum had been unusually arrogant and bullying in its behaviour.

4. However, TIMCHENKO was more optimistic now than a few weeks ago about the extent of his pull and influence in Luxembourg, where his main holding company Volga Resources was domiciled. He thought this might help protect him from any further EU sanctions, especially if national politician Jean Claude JUNCKER were appointed new EU Commission President. TIMCHENKO knew JUNCKER and regarded him as sympathetic. He therefore was using any influence he had left in Europe to further the latter’s EU candidacy.

5th June 2014
Yes. I’m out rest of week. Monday ok?

In person whenever you are in office and can make 15-30 minutes.

With warm regards, Jonathan
Sure. I will set it up.

---

From: Winer, Jonathan
Sent: Thursday, May 8, 2014 12:55 PM
To: Nuland, Victoria J
Subject: request for very brief call or meeting re something on Russian

Toria

Something came up today that I don’t want to email about regarding Russia, which likely is only worth a moment of your time, but proper for your awareness. If you are in DC and have a minute, can we talk briefly?

Jonathan M Winer
US Department of State  HST 6250
Washington DC 20520
(202)647-9548 (office phone)

(cell phone)
From: Nuland, Victoria J
Sent: Mon, 26 Sep 2016 11:52:43 -0400
To: Winer, Jonathan
Cc: 
Subject: RE: Request 15 minutes of your time today if possible

Yes, pls find us a time

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Winer, Jonathan
Sent: Monday, September 26, 2016 7:17 AM
To: Nuland, Victoria J
Subject: Request 15 minutes of your time today if possible

It's a Russia related issue. I met my old O friend who shared some material with me that I would like you to have awareness of.

Jonathan Winer +

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.
Yes, pls find us a time

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

It's a Russia related issue. I met my old O friend who shared some material with me that I would like you to have awareness of.

Jonathan Winer
From: Nuland, Victoria J  
Sent: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 18:38:38 -0400  
To: Winer, Jonathan  
Subject: RE: Orbis Report: Sechin on how to protect Rosneft by poor-mouthing its actual condition to avoid further sanctions

Tx as ever. Fun on the competition.

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Winer, Jonathan  
Sent: Monday, August 18, 2014 2:31 PM  
To: Nuland, Victoria J; Jones, Paul W  
Subject: Orbis Report: Sechin on how to protect Rosneft by poor-mouthing its actual condition to avoid further sanctions

RUSSIA – UKRAINE CRISIS  
SECHIN/Rosneft Evolving Strategy in the Face of Western Sanctions  
15 August 2014  
Orbis Report ID: 2014/194a

SUMMARY
- SECHIN/Rosneft managing to progress some deals with Exxon-Mobil regardless of USG sanctions  
- Uncomfortable with financial over-dependency on China and keen to cap this  
- Public request to Kremlin for cheap loans a ruse to imply western sanctions on company working and therefore do not need tightening  
- Also to give RN leverage in exploiting crisis to fight zero-sum battle with Gazprom, parity of state treatment/privileges being SECHIN’s bottom line

DETAIL

1. As Russia’s stand-off with the west over Ukraine has continued, Rosneft (RN) and its politically influential President (CEO) Igor’ SECHIN have been evolving their strategy to shore up and further the interests of the company in the face of western sanctions. RN senior management were pleased that not all co-operation and new deals with American energy major Exxon-Mobil (EM) had been derailed by the deterioration of bilateral political relations with the US. Several projects had been cleared with EM of late, although any real progress in the Black Sea beyond joint geological surveying/2D-3D seismic work seemed unlikely. RN understood that this progress had been achieved despite substantive political opposition from Russia hawks in the USG, especially Under Secretary for Energy at State Department, Catherine NOVELLI.

2. On RN macro-strategy, and despite the public rhetoric to the contrary, SECHIN was concerned that the company should not become over-exposed or over-dependent on China in filling the financial and technological gap left by western sanctions. RN needed to pay down existing loans without making
additional concessions to the Chinese. SECHIN valued his relations with western partners and banks and needed to continue paying foreign shareholders substantial dividends.

3. Another evolving tactic in achieving the above objective therefore was for RN to make out that it was suffering disproportionately from western sanctions, including unfairly compared to Gazprom (yet to be sanctioned icw Ukraine) and therefore should be compensated by the Kremlin. The recent public request for a R1.5 trillion cheap loan from state reserves was both unrealistic and a ploy. SECHIN assumed he might obtain some subsidised state funding but also hoped that such appeals would convince western governments that RN was suffering the impact of sanctions and that they might turn their guns elsewhere i.e. on Gazprom if and when there were further waves of economic/financial measures taken against Russia.

4. Continuing on this theme, it was the case that SECHIN/the RN Board’s zero-sum campaign against Gazprom, and its perceived embattled CEO Aleksei MILLER, was being intensified. SECHIN was arguing in private that RN paid more tax to the Russian government than Gazprom; that it needed free access to gas transit and export pipelines (especially in Sakhalin and eastern Siberia); and more generally should be entitled to the same state benefits and privileges as its main Russian energy sector rival. SECHIN was trying to use the ‘sanctions price’ RN was paying icw Ukraine to ratchet up these arguments, in particular with President PUTIN, a trusted friend and long-time close associate who was sympathetic to them.
From: Nuland, Victoria J
Sent: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 18:58:53 -0500
To: Winer, Jonathan
Cc: 
Subject: RE: Would like to catch up on something at your convenience

Yes. I’m out rest of week. Monday ok?

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

From: Winer, Jonathan
Sent: Tuesday, November 22, 2016 12:09 PM
To: Nuland, Victoria J
Subject: Would like to catch up on something at your convenience

In person whenever you are in office and can make 15-30 minutes.

With warm regards, Jonathan

Official
UNCLASSIFIED
Of course, send me good number and time.

---

Want to talk briefly further. Some new info want you to be aware of. I'm in Boston today. Phone call ok sometime this am? Five minutes is enough.

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

They want to pursue some of the things we discussed yesterday, albeit on the system integrity side.

---

Toria,
It was a delight to speak today, notwithstanding the context. You've been a warrior on these issues, and I look forward to speaking further to preserve and wherever possible strengthen the important work you have done. I'll follow up regarding a possible working group meeting.

All the best,
Daniel

Daniel Silverberg
National Security Advisor
The Honorable Steny H. Hoyer
Democratic Whip
U.S. House of Representatives
H-148, The Capitol
Washington, DC 20515
(202) 225-3130
Good

I arrive Mon. Will also reach out to you.
Jonathan Winer +

Good. I'll reach out when I'm there Sunday. I'm worried about r's too

Yes that was be good.
Jonathan Winer +

In my face to face?

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE - PRODUCED TO HSGAC
NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
Would like to discuss this and a Russian matter.

Jonathan Winer

From: Nuland, Victoria J
Sent: Saturday, September 17, 2016 11:37 AM
To: Winer, Jonathan
Subject: Fwd: Libya Update

Your view in my q's below?

From: Nuland, Victoria J
Date: September 17, 2016 at 10:18:59 AM EDT
To: >, Cohen, Jonathan R >, >
Cc: >, Tribble, Conrad R >, >, Heffern, John A >
Subject: Re: Libya Update

V helpful tx

Im starting to hear from euros that there are 100k + migrants poised to try a water crossing to europe in coming months and we'll see them in italy.

If this is not true, exaggerated, i'd like to know true sitch. If the risk is real, is Op Sophia equipped to manage? If so, what's the plan?

If real risk and we dont have confidence in sophia, shd we be brainstorming more naval help from nato or us?

From: Cohen, Jonathan R
Date: September 16, 2016 at 7:06:44 PM EDT
To: >
Cc: Heffern, John A >, >, Nuland, Victoria J >
Subject: Re: Libya Update

Thanks - super helpful.
Toria - let us know if you want us to dig deeper.
JC

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.
Jonathan:

Below please find the latest update from Winer to the 7th floor on Libya.

In answer to your question, our top-line goal for UNGA and the Libya Ministerial there is to praise the GNA for its C-ISIL progress in Sirte (and highlight how we’ve helped) and prod the international community for help rebuilding and stabilizing the city. In contrast to the political mess in Libya at last year’s UNGA, there is now a government in Tripoli and ISIL has been pared back significantly on the ground. A top priority at UNGA will be to try to close the remaining political divisions - and corral outside players such as the UAE, Egypt, and Russia, who have been backing General Haftar against the GNA.

As for Operation Sophia – since 2015, the EUNAVFOR operation’s mission has been to identify, capture, and dispose of migrant smuggling vessels. Last month, the EU authorized Operation Sophia to take up two additional tasks: training the Libyan coastguard and navy and helping implement the UN arms embargo off the coast of Libya. The UK will be seeking a technical rollover of UNSCR 2240, renewing authorization for Sophia, which USUN has been pushing for. There was some discussion from EU operational side that they want to add “watercraft originating in countries other than Libya, in light of changing migration patterns around the Mediterranean.” This change would apparently not be welcome to the Egyptians, who are on the Security Council. Libya desk thinks we can nevertheless proceed with the technical rollover and that it will be a smooth process.
Please see a Libya update S/E Winer shared with the Seventh Floor below. We are working on updating our S Libya Ministerial AA and I will share an updated version with you for reference. Please let me know if I can help answer any additional questions.

Thanks,

SBU

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Winer, Jonathan
Sent: Tuesday, September 13, 2016 10:03 PM
To: Finer, Jonathan J; Kenna, Lisa D; Sullivan, Thomas D
Cc: Patterson, Anne W; Leaf, Barbara A; Beecroft, Robert S (Cairo); Bodde, Peter W (LEO); Sison, Michele J
Subject: Libya Update

With a week to go until UNGA, Libya is as dynamic as ever. On Friday, I came back from Tunis encouraged after various Haftar representatives presented us with the most serious proposals to date about integrating eastern and western security forces under the GNA and bringing the General into a joint command. Then, I woke up Sunday to news that Haftar’s forces had advanced on the Oil Crescent – a severe blow to prospects for the deal that we, the Emiratis, and the Egyptians have been pursuing since Vienna.

(SBU) Haftar’s Political Protégé Offers Deal: Last Wednesday in Tunis, Deputy PM Ali al-Qatrani outlined an idea for a joint military command composed of PM al-Sarraj, Haftar and Agila (to represent the East), and Deputy PMs Maiteeg (for Misrata) and Koni (for the South). Al-Qatrani is Haftar’s man on
the PC. According to Haftar’s various orders, he suspended in February his participation in the PC, let loose a sustained stream of terrible rhetoric to try to torpedo it, and then, a few weeks ago, decided to rejoin it. Some Libyans viewed al-Qatrani’s proposal as Haftar’s attempt to blow up the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) from within or a plot to go after moderate Islamists, but most members of the PC were cautiously open to discussing it. The UAE strongly supported it. I told the Emiratis, Egyptians and Libyans alike that I felt it was the most reasonable offer eastern hardliners have ever put forward and was open to the idea. Combined with commitments for HoR votes to approve a new GNA Cabinet proposal and amend the Constitutional Declaration, it could provide the “grand bargain” we need. By a wide margin, al-Qatrani had been the most unpleasant PC member to deal with, but he was on a charm offensive last week both in his meeting with me and in breaking bread with other PC members.

(SBU) Eastern, Western Officers Build Confidence: We had another positive sign in Tunis Thursday: I organized and brokered a meeting between five Haftarite military figures and five western Libyan officers, then got out of the way as they laid out a common vision of a united Libya with unified security forces. The conversation was frank (on such issues as western Libyans’ fear of Haftar), but very cordial. After they said they were not opponents but rather colleagues from the same institutional background, I scrapped the seating arrangement that had them on opposite sides of the table with me in the middle, put them next to one another and limited the US role to friendly listening, with Egyptian, Italian, and Emirati counterparts similarly quiet and supportive. It all worked, potentially setting the stage for real towards a united Libyan army.

(SBU) Oil Crescent Offensive Wipes Out Progress: Before dawn on Sunday, however, Haftar launched operations to seize four key ports in Libya’s “oil crescent”: es-Sidra, Ras Lanuf, Brega, and az-Zueitina. There were few if any casualties (because Haftar had bought off or cajoled major tribal leaders and some elements of the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG)). There was no damage to oil facilities. But the harm to prospects for building consensus around al-Qatrani’s grand bargain was enormous. While before the offensive al-Sarraj and other PC members had been ready to enter into discussions with Haftar and his representatives, al-Sarraj told me Monday the PC could not even consider it unless LNA forces withdraw from all the ports. Even if the LNA does pull out, the offensive had raised suspicions of Haftar to such a degree that al-Sarraj now doubts he could get the deal through the PC. The situation on the ground is fluid, with some assertions from the PC that Minister of Defense al-Barghati has mustered pro-GNA forces to take back two of the four ports. But the damage to the comprehensive deal Libya needs is clear.

(SBU) Haftar’s Intentions: What’s not yet clear to me is what Haftar hoped to achieve by this. Perhaps the overtures from his protégés in Tunis were serious, and Haftar thinks seizing territory and resources on the ground strengthens his hand for negotiations he truly wants to pursue. If so, I think he’s miscalculated. The conditions for the deal al-Qatrani proposed were better before Sunday than they are now. A more sinister interpretation is that the positive signals in Tunis were a trick to provide cover or divert attention as Haftar prepared for the resource grab the GNA has feared since the Spring. Al-Sarraj told me he thinks Haftar sent his officers to Tunis to test the waters for the offensive and gauge whether western military figures would react. Accurate or not, this perception of Haftar’s intentions is a reality that further complicates the already extremely difficult process of building trust and agreement between the parties.

(SBU) UAE, Egypt Must Make Next Move: Since Vienna, we’ve worked hand and glove on this very process with the UAE particularly and also with Egypt. At their urging, the Secretary acknowledged that Haftar should have a role and we supported them in good faith every step of the way as they worked on
getting him to accept a reasonable one. Emirati and Egyptian officials were in Tunis last week and approved of the efforts at reconciliation. After Haftar’s move into the oil crescent, Shaykh Tahnoun told me he was entirely surprised and very concerned by it. He committed to put pressure on Haftar to be part of the solution, not the problem. Egyptian MFA and military officials also told us they were taken unawares by the move. But I’m not convinced they fully understand the gravity. (The Egyptians are already pushing back on our call for Haftar’s forces to withdraw.) The Egyptians, in particular, need to hear a tough, unified message from all parts of the U.S. government that they work with. We’ve started sending the message from State that we will not permit Haftar to exploit any control of oil fields he has gained through this stunt or gain any other advantage. We should use Friday’s Libya DC to get the full interagency on the same page. Haftar’s actions have shown contempt for our joint effort with the Emiratis and Egyptians and damaged their interests in a stable, undivided Libya. They need to understand that the flexibility we showed on Haftar in Vienna was not an unlimited license. If he doesn’t accept a good deal (the one al-Qatrani presented last week was a reasonable starting-point), it’s time for all of us to draw a redline and move on to more responsible alternatives – perhaps Wanis Boukhamada, as the Emiratis themselves suggested in June.

(SBU) A Possible Way Forward. One way out for Haftar from the mess he has unilaterally created is for him to turn the oil terminals over to the National Oil Company, demonstrating he isn’t seeking to exploit them personally for money or to hold them hostage ahead of a deal. I have discussed that notion with a few key Libyans, including the Libyan Ambassador to the UAE, Aref Nayad. I expect to discuss it with al-Qatrani tomorrow, who first reached out to me: Haftar may be looking to do some repair work.

(SBU) Looking Ahead to UNGA: Next week in New York, the Secretary will have a chance to applaud the GNA for its success against Da’esh in Sirte, highlight our significant contribution to this, and mobilize the international community to help the GNA rebuild and stabilize a city on the verge of liberation. We’ve come a long way from a year ago, when our Libya ministerial brought a ragtag group of bickering Libyan Political Dialogue members to New York and pumped life into negotiations on the edge of collapse, enabling Bernardino Leon finally to muster enough momentum to announce Prime Minister al-Sarraj and other names for the Presidency Council. Then, we had no credible Libyan government to engage at UNGA and Libya’s divisions left the field open to Da’esh’s expansion. Now, we have a government in Tripoli – flawed though it is – to partner with and, as a result of its work and our cooperation, Da’esh’s control of territory has gone from 150 kilometers of Mediterranean coast to barely one square kilometer in downtown Sirte. At UNGA, we will, of course, have to contend with the remaining divisions that still threaten to tear Libya apart. And the Secretary’s diplomacy will, of course, be critical, especially with the UAE and Egypt, with Russia a potential problem, as it demonstrated today in New York, when it backed Egypt in making excuses for Haftar and emphasizing the need for Libya to have a strong military. Of course we concur with the latter proposition - but it can't be created by conquest, especially at the expense of the government we recognize.

Jonathan Winer +
Fascinating. Tx as ever.

P, pls send Bobby M a brief note asking him to quietly tell the PM to watch out. Tx

Toria (and Paul)

According to Orbis June 5 2014 report, provided to us today by former MI6 Russia expert Chris Steele, we have a very unhappy Gennady Timchenko. As you may already know, his DC lobbyists were at Patton Boggs. Report says Timchenko hopes to use Luxembourg relationships to reduce EU pressures on his empire.

best

RUSSIA – UKRAINE CRISIS Impact of USG Sanctions on PUTIN Associate TIMCHENKO

SUMMARY
- PUTIN’s inner circle, especially TIMCHENKO, fears prospect of EU sanctions in train of USG measures

- TIMCHENKO resents failure of his PR campaign in West and both fears and dislikes pivot to China to counterbalance sanctions. Chinese already lording new geopolitical reality over Russians

- Preparing new lobbying effort in Luxembourg where his Volga Resources holding company based. Wants sympathetic JUNCKER appointed new EU Commission President

DETAIL
1. Speaking in confidence to a trusted western interlocutor, a former Russian government official with close ties to the Kremlin and President PUTIN’s inner circle, described the impact on the leadership of current USG and EU sanctions imposed in connection with Ukraine. All were scared that EU sanctions would begin specifically to target them, in the same way that USG measures had to date, and this was restraining to some extent Russian action in (eastern) Ukraine.

2. The former Russian official knew that PUTIN associate and Gunvor Trading/Novatek oligarch Gennadiy TIMCHENKO had taken the sanctions imposed on him particularly badly. TIMCHENKO was angry that his careful and expensive PR campaign in the West, aiming to promote his reputation as an independent businessman and patron of the arts and various charities, had come to nothing.

3. Also, despite public posturing and statements to the contrary, TIMCHENKO both resented and feared PUTIN’s recent pivot to China as a means of counterbalancing western hostility over Ukraine/Crimea and to help avoid sanctions. TIMCHENKO believed there was a clear risk now of the Chinese leveraging deals, especially in the energy sphere, which were unfavourable to Russia (and his companies). He noted that the Chinese delegation to the recent St Petersburg Economic Forum had been unusually arrogant and bullying in its behaviour.

4. However, TIMCHENKO was more optimistic now than a few weeks ago about the extent of his pull and influence in Luxembourg, where his main holding company Volga Resources was domiciled. He thought this might help protect him from any further EU sanctions, especially if national politician Jean Claude JUNCKER were appointed new EU Commission President. TIMCHENKO knew JUNCKER and regarded him as sympathetic. He therefore was using any influence he had left in Europe to further the latter’s EU candidacy.

5th June 2014
We always enjoy these, so send ‘em on. Tx, J. I couldn’t get it open, btw. But your summary gives us what we need. Kislyak likes to remind us he’s Ukr-Russian.

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

---

Toria, another piece that is not in my lane but which I wished to pass on to you.

My friend Chris Steele (Orbis Intelligence, former MI-6 Russia expert), provided me the enclosed memo yesterday, describing a recent conversation his source had with Kislyak on Russian Ukraine policy. As I was provided it from a person in private sector, I am treating it as low side. To open the password protected document, password is “Tiberius”.

Gist is, verbatim from Exec Summary:

- Russian ambassador in Washington highly critical of Ukraine policy/campaign. Claims both MFA and MOD excluded from decision-making and poorly informed by Kremlin.
- Ambassador believes decision-making inner circle in Moscow now reduced to only PUTIN, SECHIN (Rosneft), ROGOZIN (deputy premier) and PATRUSHEV (ex-FSB Director now National Security Council Secretary).
- Expects SECHIN’s deputies in Rosneft, Rostekhnologia senior management and Transneft chief, TOKAREV and possibly Ukrainian oligarch AKHMETOV to be included in next wave of USG sanctions after Ukrainian presidential election on 25 May.
- Believes intervention of peacekeeping force in eastern Ukraine, spearheaded by Russians, only way to avoid wide-scale bloodshed there.

You should feel free to pass on to anyone if you think it useful.

If you’d prefer I not pass these onto you as I happen to get them (I have not asked for them, he is just sending them unilaterally), just let me know and I will shut it down.

Best

Jonathan M Winer
Sure. I will set it up.

From: Winer, Jonathan  
Sent: Thursday, May 8, 2014 12:55 PM  
To: Nuland, Victoria J  
Subject: request for very brief call or meeting re something on Russian

Toria

Something came up today that I don’t want to email about regarding Russia, which likely is only worth a moment of your time, but proper for your awareness. If you are in DC and have a minute, can we talk briefly?

Jonathan M Winer  
US Department of State  HST 6250  
Washington DC 20520  
(202)647-9548 (office phone)  
(cell phone)
From: Nuland, Victoria J  
Sent: Sat, 17 Sep 2016 14:31:24 -0400  
To: Winer, Jonathan  
Subject: Re: Libya Update

Good

From: Winer, Jonathan < >
Date: September 17, 2016 at 2:01:14 PM EDT  
To: Nuland, Victoria J < >
Subject: Re: Libya Update

I arrive Mon. Will also reach out to you.
Jonathan Winer +

From: Nuland, Victoria J
Sent: Saturday, September 17, 2016 1:58 PM
To: Winer, Jonathan
Subject: Re: Libya Update

Good. I'll reach out when im there sunday. I'm worried abt r's too

From: Winer, Jonathan < >
Date: September 17, 2016 at 1:56:05 PM EDT
To: Nuland, Victoria J < >
Subject: Re: Libya Update

Yes that was be good.
Jonathan Winer +

From: Nuland, Victoria J
Sent: Saturday, September 17, 2016 1:31 PM
To: Winer, Jonathan
Subject: Re: Libya Update

In ny face to face?

From: Winer, Jonathan < >
Date: September 17, 2016 at 12:40:00 PM EDT
To: Nuland, Victoria J < >
Subject: Re: Libya Update
Would like to discuss this and a Russian matter.
Jonathan Winer +

From: Nuland, Victoria J
Sent: Saturday, September 17, 2016 11:37 AM
To: Winer, Jonathan
Subject: Fwd: Libya Update

Your view in my q's below?

From: Nuland, Victoria J < >
Date: September 17, 2016 at 10:18:59 AM EDT
To: >, Cohen, Jonathan R < >
Cc: Tribble, Conrad R < >, Heffern, John A < >
Subject: Re: Libya Update

V helpful tx
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If real risk and we dont have confidence in sophia, shd we be brainstorming more naval help from nato or us?

From: Cohen, Jonathan R < >
Date: September 16, 2016 at 7:06:44 PM EDT
To: >
Cc: Heffern, John A < >, Nuland, Victoria J < >
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Thanks - super helpful.
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Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.
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SBU

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From: Winer, Jonathan
Sent: Tuesday, September 13, 2016 10:03 PM
To: Finer, Jonathan J; Kenna, Lisa D; Sullivan, Thomas D
Cc: Patterson, Anne W; Leaf, Barbara A; Beecroft, Robert S (Cairo); Bodde, Peter W (LEO); Sison, Michele J
Subject: Libya Update

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Jonathan Winer +
From: nulandvj
To: Winer, Jonathan
Cc: Jones, Paul W; Sloat, Amanda L
Subject: Re: Got your voicemail re Russia-Libya

Tx JW

From: Winer, Jonathan
Sent: Friday, October 3, 2014 6:21 PM
To: Nuland, Victoria J
Cc: Jones, Paul W; Sloat, Amanda L
Subject: Got your voicemail re Russia-Libya

Toria

Glad to talk to Paul or Amanda on Russia-Libya. (If we really want to innovate in the relationship, how about Russia taking some MEK?)

I am due to be in Ottawa Monday and Tuesday, can talk on mobile with them on either of those days or if it can wait, Wednesday would work. Supposed to see Amanda then on Libya-Turkey anyway.

On Libya, we have aligned all the troublesome countries as much as we can ahead of Libya SRSG Leon’s efforts to get the major factions into a negotiation mode. Where they could be most helpful, maybe, is warning warring factions that they will continue to support sanctions against troublesome persons in Libya and indeed would lead efforts to do so, because peace is that important. Or taking some role in discouraging arms sales. (That’s complicated, actually).

Anyway, glad to brain-storm.

Jonathan M Winer
Special Coordinator for Libya
US Department of State HST 6250
Washington DC 20520
(202)647-9548 (office phone)
(202) [protected] (cell phone)
Subject: For what it's worth, latest report from Orbis: "Initial Kremlin reaction to POROSHENKO's election negative"

Really interesting, tx

SBU
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I note last line: “Finally the advisor said that what the Russian elite really feared was having their access to Great Britain curtailed by UK visa bans, especially those whose children were being educated there.”

Project RAGLAN
Russia – Ukraine Crisis: Initial Negative Kremlin Reaction to POROSHENKO’s Election
29 May 2014
Report ID: 2014/113
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

2

SUMMARY
--- Initial Kremlin reaction to POROSHENKO’s election negative. New Ukrainian president’s early rhetoric viewed as uncompromising. Fear in Kremlin of bilateral “permanent conflict.”
--- Russian economy now suffering impact of crisis, especially military-industrial sector cut-off from key capacity in Ukraine. Export earnings likely to be hit as result.
--- Crimea regarded as economic “black hole”, subsidizing which could be more costly than Sochi Olympics.
--- Kremlin also concerned at unfolding of corrupt relationship with former regime will lead to problems in managing demands for extradition of YANUKOVYCH and others to Ukraine.
--- Russian leadership divided over impact of western sanctions but fear of them being extended has forced PUTIN to step back. KUDRIN and ABRAMOVICH urging moderation, Head of PA IVANOV leading hardline camp

DETAIL
1. Speaking in confidence in late May 2014, an advisor to Russian deputy premier ROGOZIN, a key player in the current Ukraine ‘campaign’, outlined initial reactions in the Kremlin to Petro POROSHENKO’s election as Ukrainian president on 25 May. The advisor said that the Russian leadership had been very disappointed by POROSHENKO’s initial position and rhetoric on the current crisis. They feared that if POROSHENKO followed through on his declared intentions never to recognize Russian control of Crimea and keep Ukraine as a unitary state, then it was possible there would be a “permanent conflict” between the two countries.

2. The ROGOZIN advisor reported that the impact of the Ukraine crisis on the Russian economy already was significant. The military-industrial sector, for which ROGOZIN had formal responsibility, was being especially hard hit. This was because the arms trade embargo on Russia being enforced by Kiev meant the supply chain of key components produced in Ukrainian plants had been cut. This was a particularly acute problem with missile navigation systems and night vision systems built and assembled by Russian industry. This likely would cause lost export orders for Russian industry and hamper the government’s ability to upgrade its own armed forces.

3. The ROGOZIN advisor complained that the Russian leadership had been making up their policy towards Ukraine in a haphazard manner as they went along. President PUTIN had dominated policy making to an unusual degree and “all decisions were taken (by him) emotionally”. PUTIN was reluctant to take advice from anyone else which meant Russia had been “absolutely unprepared” for what had transpired in Ukraine. It had been a mistake to annex Crimea which in the advisor’s view was an economic “black hole”. It was populated by “bandits and pensioners” and the subsidies committed, circa 1.5 trillion Roubles, were greater already than the (astronomically expensive) Sochi Winter Olympics.

4. Continuing on this theme, the ROGOZIN advisor said that a growing concern in the Kremlin was that an elected, and therefore legitimate new president, POROSHENKO would expose the corrupt nature of Moscow’s relationship with the former regime and demand the extradition of ex-leader YANUKOVYCH and his associates. This would be “very uncomfortable and unpleasant” for PUTIN to manage.

5. Whilst personally sceptical over the impact of western sanctions on the Russian economy, ROGOZIN’s advisor admitted that threats made recently by President OBAMA and Chancellor MERKEL in Washington to tighten these measures and reduce Russian energy business with Europe had had an impact on PUTIN. The recent China energy deal required huge capital investment to succeed and even then, only comprised 20% of the gas Russia currently exported to the EU.

6. Within the Kremlin itself, the advisor reported that former Finance Minister KUDRIN and oligarch Roman ABRAMOVICH were the leading moderates and had taken their arguments to PUTIN directly. KUDRIN had told PUTIN recently that he thought the impact of sanctions on Russia would be at least $200 billion. Contrary to media opinion, National Security Council Secretary PATRUSHEV was ill and had not played a key role in the crisis of late. Rather, the leading hard liner was Head of Presidential Administration, Sergei IVANOV who was “crude and primitive” and spoke of Ukrainians as if they were animals.

7. Finally the advisor said that what the Russian elite really feared was having their access to Great Britain curtailed by UK visa bans, especially those whose children were being educated there.

Orbis Business Intelligence Limited
29th May 2014
Your view in my q's below?

From: Nuland, Victoria J <>
Date: September 17, 2016 at 10:18:59 AM EDT
To: >, Cohen, Jonathan R < >
Cc: >, Tribble, Conrad R < >, Heffern, John A < >
Subject: Re: Libya Update

V helpful tx
Im starting to hear from euros that there are 100k + migrants poised to try a water crossing to europe in coming months and we'll see them in italy.
If this is not true, exaggerated, i'd like to know true sitch. If the risk is real, is Op Sophia equipped to manage? If so, whats the plan?
If real risk and we dont have confidence in sophia, shd we be brainstorming more naval help from nato or us?

From: Cohen, Jonathan R <>
Date: September 16, 2016 at 7:06:44 PM EDT
To: >
Cc: Heffern, John A < >, Nuland, Victoria J < >
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Jonathan Winer
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I scrapped the seating arrangement that had them on opposite sides of the table with me in the middle, put them next to one another and limited the US role to friendly listening, with Egyptian, Italian, and Emirati counterparts similarly quiet and supportive. It all worked, potentially setting the stage for real towards a united Libyan army.

(SBU) **Oil Crescent Offensive Wipes Out Progress:** Before dawn on Sunday, however, Haftar launched operations to seize four key ports in Libya’s “oil crescent”: es-Sidra, Ras Lanuf, Brega, and az-Zueitina. There were few if any casualties (because Haftar had bought off or cajoled major tribal leaders and some elements of the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG)). There was no damage to oil facilities. But the harm to prospects for building consensus around al-Qatrani’s grand bargain was enormous. While before the offensive al-Sarraj and other PC members had been ready to enter into discussions with Haftar and his representatives, al-Sarraj told me Monday the PC could not even consider it unless LNA forces withdraw from all the ports. Even if the LNA does pull out, the offensive had raised suspicions of Haftar to such a degree that al-Sarraj now doubts he could get the deal through the PC. The situation on the ground is fluid, with some assertions from the PC that Minister of Defense al-Barghati has mustered pro-GNA forces to take back two of the four ports. But the damage to the comprehensive deal Libya needs is clear.

(SBU) **Haftar’s Intentions:** What’s not yet clear to me is what Haftar hoped to achieve by this. Perhaps the overtures from his protégés in Tunis were serious, and Haftar thinks seizing territory and resources on the ground strengthens his hand for negotiations he truly wants to pursue. If so, I think he’s miscalculated. The conditions for the deal al-Qatrani proposed were better before Sunday than they are now. A more sinister interpretation is that the positive signals in Tunis were a trick to provide cover or divert attention as Haftar prepared for the resource grab the GNA has feared since the Spring. Al-Sarraj told me he thinks Haftar sent his officers to Tunis to test the waters for the offensive and gauge whether western military figures would react. Accurate or not, this perception of Haftar’s intentions is a reality that further complicates the already extremely difficult process of building trust and agreement between the parties.

(SBU) **UAE, Egypt Must Make Next Move:** Since Vienna, we’ve worked hand and glove on this very process with the UAE particularly and also with Egypt. At their urging, the Secretary acknowledged that Haftar should have a role and we supported them in good faith every step of the way as they worked on getting him to accept a reasonable one. Emirati and Egyptian officials were in Tunis last week and approved of the efforts at reconciliation. After Haftar’s move into the oil crescent, Shaykh Tahnoun told me he was entirely surprised and very concerned by it. He committed to put pressure on Haftar to be part of the solution, not the problem. Egyptian MFA and military officials also told us they were taken unawares by the move. But I’m not convinced they fully understand the gravity. (The Egyptians are already pushing back on our call for Haftar’s forces to withdraw.) The Egyptians, in particular, need to hear a tough, unified message from all parts of the U.S. government that they work with. We’ve started sending the message from State that we will not permit Haftar to exploit any control of oil fields he has gained through this stunt or gain any other advantage. We should use Friday’s Libya DC to get the full interagency on the same page. Haftar’s actions have shown contempt for our joint effort with the Emiratis and Egyptians and damaged their interests in a stable, undivided Libya. They need to understand that the flexibility we showed on Haftar in Vienna was not an unlimited license. If he doesn’t accept a good deal (the one al-Qatrani presented last week was a reasonable starting-point), it’s time for all of us to draw a redline and move on to more responsible alternatives – perhaps Wanis Boukhamada, as the Emiratis themselves suggested in June.
(SBU) **A Possible Way Forward.** One way out for Haftar from the mess he has unilaterally created is for him to turn the oil terminals over to the National Oil Company, demonstrating he isn't seeking to exploit them personally for money or to hold them hostage ahead of a deal. I have discussed that notion with a few key Libyans, including the Libyan Ambassador to the UAE, Aref Nayad. I expect to discuss it with al-Qatrani tomorrow, who first reached out to me: Haftar may be looking to do some repair work.

(SBU) **Looking Ahead to UNGA:** Next week in New York, the Secretary will have a chance to applaud the GNA for its success against Da’esh in Sirte, highlight our significant contribution to this, and mobilize the international community to help the GNA rebuild and stabilize a city on the verge of liberation. We’ve come a long way from a year ago, when our Libya ministerial brought a ragtag group of bickering Libyan Political Dialogue members to New York and pumped life into negotiations on the edge of collapse, enabling Bernardino Leon finally to muster enough momentum to announce Prime Minister al-Sarraj and other names for the Presidency Council. Then, we had no credible Libyan government to engage at UNGA and Libya’s divisions left the field open to Da’esh’s expansion. Now, we have a government in Tripoli – flawed though it is – to partner with and, as a result of its work and our cooperation, Da’esh’s control of territory has gone from 150 kilometers of Mediterranean coast to barely one square kilometer in downtown Sirte. At UNGA, we will, of course, have to contend with the remaining divisions that still threaten to tear Libya apart. And the Secretary’s diplomacy will, of course, be critical, especially with the UAE and Egypt, with Russia a potential problem, as it demonstrated today in New York, when it backed Egypt in making excuses for Haftar and emphasizing the need for Libya to have a strong military. Of course we concur with the latter proposition - but it can't be created by conquest, especially at the expense of the government we recognize.

Jonathan Winer +
Danke!

JJP will respond high side this am on Libya PC and Toria will get you messages on Libya also once I'm in office. Best
Jonathan M. Winer

Defer to Frank on MEP, but I think we don't want to say much of anything yet, since, while the writing is on the wall, we don't have a government yet. Remain committed to two states, still assessing impact of Bibipalooza, we'll be in touch shortly...

On Syria, would just reiterate no policy change from S's blatantly misinterpreted comment about Asad on Face the Nation--still looking for ways to put more pressure on Asad, get back to talks based on Geneva principles.

Winer is your man on Libya--and Jonathan, if you were in the PC the other night, can you send me a high side readout? Thank you!

Team,
I'd be grateful for guidance/mgs on S's next steps on MEP post the Israeli elections, and any mgs on Libya and Syria for use with FedMo when I see her in Bxl on Friday (unless S expects to talk to her himself before then). Wanna make sure I'm tracking w the road team, especially.
Amanda will coordinate. Many tx, t
From: Winer, Jonathan  
Sent: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 22:39:54 -0400  
To: Jones, Paul W; Nuland, Victoria J  
Subject: Re: Factions within Russian NSC and their take on the ML17 shoot-down crisis, according to Orbis

I've told Chris Steele at Orbis I think the material is great, and I will continue to retransmit as he sends them to me. Tomorrow he leaves for Scotland with son to climb other types of summits so there may be a summer pause. Best

From: Jones, Paul W  
Sent: Tuesday, July 22, 2014 07:53 PM  
To: Nuland, Victoria J; Winer, Jonathan  
Subject: RE: Factions within Russian NSC and their take on the ML17 shoot-down crisis, according to Orbis

That’s for sure. Tx

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Nuland, Victoria J  
Sent: Tuesday, July 22, 2014 6:49 PM  
To: Winer, Jonathan; Jones, Paul W  
Subject: RE: Factions within Russian NSC and their take on the ML17 shoot-down crisis, according to Orbis

Fascinating as ever. And amazingly fast.

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Winer, Jonathan  
Sent: Tuesday, July 22, 2014 3:18 PM  
To: Nuland, Victoria J; Jones, Paul W  
Subject: Factions within Russian NSC and their take on the ML17 shoot-down crisis, according to Orbis

RUSSIA – UKRAINE CRISIS  
High-Level Read Out on Russian Security Council Meeting, 22 July 2014
22 July 2014
Report ID: 2014/162a
SUMMARY
-- Russian leadership divided in Security Council over response to latest escalation in Ukraine crisis
-- Four discernable factions; hardliners led by PATRUSHEV arguing for aggressive response up to possibly invasion of eastern Ukraine: pragmatic nationalists supported by PUTIN and IVANOV wanting a reversion to status quo ante; economic pragmatists who fear for Russian economy and own personal wealth/reputations, led by MEDVEDEV; and diplomatists under LAVROV, regarding themselves as immune to sanctions but effectively wanting a policy climb-down on Ukraine
-- No consensus reached and no prospect of one. Former intelligence chief scathing about leadership’s Ukraine handling, fearing cost of integrating Crimea and wanting to work now with west to contain Ukraine and avoid ‘Orange’ reaction scenario inside Russia itself. This was also discussed at the RNSC

DETAIL
1. Speaking in confidence to a compatriot after the Russian National Security Council meeting on 22 July 2014, three middle ranking officials/advisers with direct access to leadership participants outlined the proceedings of this event. There had been no consensus reached at the meeting on policy towards Ukraine post ML17 and four clear factions had emerged from the discussions. The most hardline of these, articulated by RNSC Secretary PATRUSHEV had argued for an aggressive response. They had no fear of western sanctions and were prepared to support even a ground invasion of eastern Ukraine. They were however a minority.

2. The second faction which was more numerous, and behind which President PUTIN had aligned himself, could be characterized as “pragmatic nationalist” wanted to try to contain the crisis, rather than escalate it. They found sanctions worrying for themselves and the Russian economy and looked to try to return to the status quo ante (ML17) by cooperating with the West up to a point (on the crash investigation etc). They wanted an easy tactical shortcut out but one which they could not immediately identify. Head of Presidential Administration Sergei IVANOV was in this camp too, and in private was seeking to blame PATRUSHEV, Igor’ SECHIN and Dmitriy ROGOZIN for the predicament Russia was in.

3. The two remaining factions within the RNSC as now constituted were the “economic pragmatists” around premier MEDVEDEV, who regarded western sanctions as a burden already, and a serious threat to the Russian economy in the short-medium term, especially if escalated. Their primary concern was to guard the country’s macro-economic stability. Finally there was a minority of “diplomatists” like Foreign Minister LAVROV who were not afraid of sanctions personally and wanted an effective climb-down over Ukraine, using ML17 as the game changer. This faction was the weakest however and the least likely to prevail.

4. Speaking in private after the event, a former Russian intelligence chief who we believe had attended the RNSC meeting, was scathing about the leadership’s handling of Ukraine. As previously, he continued to argue that even the annexation of Crimea was a mistake. Unless the RF government were able to invest more in the new province than it had in Chechnya from extra-budgetary funds, which was unlikely given the state of Russian economy and prevalence of corruption therein, then it would backfire on the Kremlin. Palpable failure and/or incompetence over eastern Ukraine likewise. The RNSC therefore had been right to discuss at length the threat of an “Orange” scenario (i.e. democratic revolution) inside Russia itself as a result of a Ukraine/Crimea policy debacle.
5. Developing his theme, the former intelligence chief said Moscow needed the West, and especially Europe, to keep the lid on Ukraine and prevent unrest there spilling over into Russia itself. Disappointingly PUTIN seemed completely unable to rise to the challenge of developing a “non-standard anti-crisis response”. Forces had been unleashed which the Kremlin was now unable to control.

Comment
All the above sources thought it significant that the first visible attempt by the Russian leadership, in the form of the RNSC meeting today, to present a united front on Ukraine policy post ML17 had clearly failed in its objective.

Orbis Business Intelligence Limited
22nd July 2014

Jonathan M Winer
US Department of State  HST 6250
Washington DC 20520
(202)647-9548 (office phone)
(cell phone)
From: Winer, Jonathan
Sent: Wed, 10 Sep 2014 16:10:48 -0400
To: Nuland, Victoria J; Jones, Paul W
Subject: RE: Orbis: POROSHENKO’S NEGOTIATING POSITION: Allow two separatist areas semi-autonomy to protect rest of country from "infection"

Good.

From: Nuland, Victoria J
Sent: Wednesday, September 10, 2014 4:11 PM
To: Winer, Jonathan; Jones, Paul W
Subject: RE: Orbis: POROSHENKO’S NEGOTIATING POSITION: Allow two separatist areas semi-autonomy to protect rest of country from "infection"

Tracks well, tx JW

From: Winer, Jonathan
Sent: Wednesday, September 10, 2014 12:06 PM
To: Nuland, Victoria J; Jones, Paul W
Subject: Orbis: POROSHENKO’S NEGOTIATING POSITION: Allow two separatist areas semi-autonomy to protect rest of country from "infection"

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
Orbis Business Intelligence Ltd. Berkeley Square House, Berkeley Square, London, W1J 6BD

RUSSIA-UKRAINE CRISIS: POROSHENKO’S NEGOTIATING POSITION ON THE FUTURE OF EASTERN UKRAINE
10 September 2014
Report ID: 2014/218b
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY
- POROSHENKO prepared to grant special autonomous status to the two regions effectively under separatist control, to avoid instability spreading to other parts of country. They would be granted their own administrative and electoral machinery on condition Kiev retain control of border with Russia
- Fighting since Minsk agreement intended to change de facto boundaries of the regions before they are frozen
- Russia continues to insist on various changes to Ukraine’s EU Association Agreement in bilateral discussions, ostensibly to avoid Russia being flooded with EU goods, but overt assertion of Russian influence over EU negotiations the more likely intention
- POROSHENKO increasingly dealing directly with representatives of Russia and West, often excluding even his closest advisers.
Further trilateral discussions expected in Brussels on 12 September.
DETAIL
1. Speaking in early September 2014, a senior Ukrainian advisor reported that President POROSHENKO’s aim was now to isolate the two regions effectively under separatist control and “prevent them from infecting the rest of the country”. The regions would be offered a special autonomous status, including their own institutions and administrative machinery. They would be allowed to run their own elections and handle their own policing. They also would be offered their own customs status separate from the rest of Ukraine and the power to develop their own ties to the (Russia led) Eurasian Customs Union, possibly including membership.

2. The government in Kiev, however, would demand in return continued control of the border with Russia and would insist the agreement withdrawing armaments and militants were observed. The fighting that had taken place since the Minsk agreement was an attempt to change the de facto boundaries before they were frozen. Crimea was currently out of the negotiating process.

3. Meanwhile the senior advisor reported that POROSHENKO continued to handle all major foreign policy initiatives on his own. He had his own channels of communication to Russia and the West. Even close advisers were often excluded from the process.

4. The advisor explained that in the bilateral discussions that had taken place, the Kremlin was continuing to insist on a large number of technical changes to Ukraine’s Association Agreement with the EU. The most important of these was higher tariff barriers, PUTIN insisting these were necessary to stop the Russian market being flooded with EU goods. The Russians also wanted changes to the procedures for certifying goods.

5. There would be further trilateral discussions on these points in Brussels on 12 September. The source believed the purpose of these demands to be political/symbolic and that Russia simply wanted to show that it had a power of veto over Ukraine’s relations with the EU.
My pleasure. When Chris Steele of Orbis comes to DC this fall, I will let you both know to provide opportunity to meet if you are free and wish to. Best
internal critics and match rhetoric with action
-- However PUTIN’s vision of ‘Novorossiya’ now growing in territorial terms and consequently difficult to achieve

DETAIL
1. Speaking in late August 2014 senior Russian leadership figures discussed the evolution of the Ukraine ‘campaign’ to date and its likely forward trajectory. The Russian leadership had made several early mistakes regarding eastern Ukraine. Accepting former Ukrainian president YANUKOVYCH’s advice, President PUTIN had assessed that there would be much greater support for a pro-Russian rebellion in places like Odessa and, especially, Kharkiv than actually materialized. According to this assessment, Kharkiv would have changed the situation fundamentally, in favour of Moscow, had not the Russian/rebel propaganda campaign there been so bungled.

2. Continuing on this theme, the senior leadership figures believed the other early obstacles to Russian political and military success were the disloyalty of Donbass oligarch AKHMETOV, whom YANUKOVYCH also promised he could deliver for them, and troublesome rebel leaders like STRELKOV who had been operating beyond the Kremlin’s control. Had AKHMETOV’s support been secured early on, Donetsk would have fallen under Moscow’s influence and been spared the fighting which now was raging there. The Donetsk premier ZAHARCHENKO was a Russian agent but this had not made much difference.

3. In terms of the current situation and moving forward, the senior leadership figures cited believed that the tide now had turned in Moscow’s favour. PUTIN and the Kremlin had full control of the rebellion, the military success of which was proving a multiplier for greater support on the ground. This was essential for PUTIN, not least in combatting internal political pressure in Russia for success in Ukraine, which had been mounting. The Kremlin needed to match rhetoric with action, the hallmark of his soviet antecedents, and guarded his “Eurasian project” very personally/carefully.

4. The challenge going forward would be realizing PUTIN’s growing vision of ‘Novorossiya’. The Russian president now believed this needed to be geographically much larger than previously assessed, in order to be at all credible and free-standing (and by implication include cities like Kharkiv). This would be very difficult to bring about with the current level of military operations.

Orbis Business Intelligence Limited
2 September 2014
Great. Here’s the whole thing then, “”(no quotes in the password itself) still works for me. Re last sentence in this piece, I am not betting on the international community agreeing to an intervention by an “armed peacekeeping force with Russians at its spearhead” either.

best

SUMMARY
-- Russian ambassador in Washington highly critical of Ukraine policy/campaign. Claims both MFA and MOD excluded from decision-making and poorly informed by Kremlin
-- Ambassador believes decision-making inner circle in Moscow now reduced to only PUTIN, SECHIN (Rosneft), ROGOZIN (deputy premier) and PATRUSHEV (ex-FSB Director now National Security Council Secretary)
-- Expects SECHIN’s deputies in Rosneft, Rostekhnologia senior management and Transneft chief, TOKAREV and possibly Ukrainian oligarch AKHMETOV to be included in next wave of USG sanctions after Ukrainian presidential election on 25 May
-- Believes intervention of peacekeeping force in eastern Ukraine, spearheaded by Russians, only way to avoid wide-scale bloodshed there

DETAIL
1. Speaking in confidence to a trusted compatriot in mid-May 2014 Russian ambassador to Washington, Sergei KISLYAK, commented on Ukraine policy-making and the campaign there to date. KISLYAK was highly critical of the way in which the Kremlin was handling the Ukraine crisis. He claimed both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministry in Moscow were effectively excluded from policy-making and poorly informed by the leadership. KISLYAK complained that it was difficult to work as a diplomat for “one leader i.e. PUTIN rather than a country”.
2. In terms of the Ukraine decision-making process in Moscow, KISLYAK contended that President PUTIN’s inner circle now had shrunk to only four people- himself, Igor’ SECHIN (Rosneft CEO), Dmitriy ROGOZIN (deputy premier) and Nikolai PATRUSHEV (former FSB director and currently Secretary of the RF National Security Council). It was for this reason, he assumed, that SECHIN and ROGOZIN, rather surprisingly given their formal positions, had been included in the second wave of USG sanctions.
3. Concerning the likely next, third wave of USG sanctions against Russia in connection with the Ukraine crisis, the ambassador understood that the targets most probably would include SECHIN’s deputies in Rosneft (though not other Board directors), senior managers and directors of manufacturing plants within the Rostekhnologia conglomerate, and possibly Transneft Chairman, Nikolai TOKAREV, the latter being an old KGB associate of PUTIN. KISLYAK also thought it possible that Ukrainian oligarch, Rinat AKHMETOV, might be threatened with or actually sanctioned by the USG if he did not distance himself from the Kremlin, with whom he was known currently to be negotiating an accommodation.
4. More generally, KISLYAK thought the only way to prevent wide scale bloodshed ensuing
in eastern Ukraine was for there to be intervention by an armed peacekeeping force, with Russians at its spearhead. He was pessimistic about the chances of this being agreed internationally.

Orbis Business Intelligence Limited

From: Nuland, Victoria J
Sent: Monday, May 19, 2014 6:20 PM
To: Winer, Jonathan
Cc: Jones, Paul W
Subject: RE: Sergei KISLYAK in private on Ukraine

We always enjoy these, so send ‘em on. Tx, J. I couldn’t get it open, btw. But your summary gives us what we need. Kislyak likes to remind us he’s Ukr-Russian.

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Winer, Jonathan
Sent: Monday, May 19, 2014 11:34 AM
To: Nuland, Victoria J
Subject: Sergei KISLYAK in private on Ukraine

Toria, another piece that is not in my lane but which I wished to pass on to you.

My friend Chris Steele (Orbis Intelligence, former MI-6 Russia expert), provided me the enclosed memo yesterday, describing a recent conversation his source had with Kislyak on Russian Ukraine policy. As I was provided it from a person in private sector, I am treating it as low side. To open the password protected document, password is “ ”.

Gist is, verbatim from Exec Summary:

- Russian ambassador in Washington highly critical of Ukraine policy/campaign. Claims both MFA and MOD excluded from decision-making and poorly informed by Kremlin.
- Ambassador believes decision-making inner circle in Moscow now reduced to only PUTIN, SECHIN (Rosneft), ROGOZIN (deputy premier) and PATRUSHEV (ex-FSB Director now National Security Council Secretary).
- Expects SECHIN’s deputies in Rosneft, Rostekhnologia senior management and Transneft chief, TOKAREV and possibly Ukrainian oligarch AKHMETOV to be included in next wave of USG sanctions after Ukrainian presidential election on 25 May.
- Believes intervention of peacekeeping force in eastern Ukraine, spearheaded by Russians, only way to avoid wide-scale bloodshed there.

You should feel free to pass on to anyone if you think it useful.

If you’d prefer I not pass these onto you as I happen to get them (I have not asked for them, he is just sending them unilaterally), just let me know and I will shut it down.
Best

Jonathan M Winer
US Department of State  HST 6250
Washington DC 20520
(202)647-9548 (office phone)
(202)647-9548 (cell phone)
Would like to discuss this and a Russian matter.

Jonathan Winer +

From: Nuland, Victoria J  
Sent: Saturday, September 17, 2016 11:37 AM  
To: Winer, Jonathan  
Subject: Fwd: Libya Update

Your view in my q's below?

From: Nuland, Victoria J  
Date: September 17, 2016 at 10:18:59 AM EDT  
To: Nuland, Victoria J  
Cc:  
Subject: Re: Libya Update

V helpful tx

I'm starting to hear from euros that there are 100k + migrants poised to try a water crossing to europe in coming months and we'll see them in Italy.

If this is not true, exaggerated, I'd like to know true sitch.  If the risk is real, is Op Sophia equipped to manage?  If so, what's the plan?

If real risk and we don't have confidence in sophia, shd we be brainstorming more naval help from nato or us?

From: Cohen, Jonathan R  
Date: September 16, 2016 at 7:06:44 PM EDT  
To:  
Cc:  
Subject: Re: Libya Update

Thanks - super helpful.

Toria - let us know if you want us to dig deeper.

JC

From: Libby, Mark W
Jonathan:

Below please find the latest update from Winer to the 7th floor on Libya.

In answer to your question, our top-line goal for UNGA and the Libya Ministerial there is to praise the GNA for its C-ISIL progress in Sirte (and highlight how we’ve helped) and prod the international community for help rebuilding and stabilizing the city. In contrast to the political mess in Libya at last year’s UNGA, there is now a government in Tripoli and ISIL has been pared back significantly on the ground. A top priority at UNGA will be to try to close the remaining political divisions - and corral outside players such as the UAE, Egypt, and Russia, who have been backing General Haftar against the GNA.

As for Operation Sophia – since 2015, the EUNAVFOR operation’s mission has been to identify, capture, and dispose of migrant smuggling vessels. Last month, the EU authorized Operation Sophia to take up two additional tasks: training the Libyan coastguard and navy and helping implement the UN arms embargo off the coast of Libya. The UK will be seeking a technical rollover of UNSCR 2240, renewing authorization for Sophia, which USUN has been pushing for. There was some discussion from EU operational side that they want to add “watercraft originating in countries other than Libya, in light of changing migration patterns around the Mediterranean.” This change would apparently not be welcome to the Egyptians, who are on the Security Council. Libya desk thinks we can nevertheless proceed with the technical rollover and that it will be a smooth process.

Director, Office of Southern European Affairs (EUR/SE)

Department of State
Please see a Libya update S/E Winer shared with the Seventh Floor below. We are working on updating our S Libya Ministerial AA and I will share an updated version with you for reference. Please let me know if I can help answer any additional questions.

Thanks,

SBU

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Winer, Jonathan
Sent: Tuesday, September 13, 2016 10:03 PM
To: Finer, Jonathan J; Kenna, Lisa D; Sullivan, Thomas D
Cc: Patterson, Anne W; Leaf, Barbara A; Beecroft, Robert S (Cairo); Bodde, Peter W (LEO); Sison, Michele J
Subject: Libya Update

With a week to go until UNGA, Libya is as dynamic as ever. On Friday, I came back from Tunis encouraged after various Haftar representatives presented us with the most serious proposals to date about integrating eastern and western security forces under the GNA and bringing the General into a joint command. Then, I woke up Sunday to news that Haftar’s forces had advanced on the Oil Crescent
– a severe blow to prospects for the deal that we, the Emiratis, and the Egyptians have been pursuing since Vienna.

(SBU) **Haftar’s Political Protégé Offers Deal:** Last Wednesday in Tunis, Deputy PM Ali al-Qatrani outlined an idea for a joint military command composed of PM al-Sarraj, Haftar and Agila (to represent the East), and Deputy PMs Maiteeg (for Misrata) and Koni (for the South). Al-Qatrani is Haftar’s man on the PC. According to Haftar’s various orders, he suspended in February his participation in the PC, let loose a sustained stream of terrible rhetoric to try to torpedo it, and then, a few weeks ago, decided to rejoin it. Some Libyans viewed al-Qatrani’s proposal as Haftar’s attempt to blow up the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) from within or a plot to go after moderate Islamists, but most members of the PC were cautiously open to discussing it. The UAE strongly supported it. I told the Emiratis, Egyptians and Libyans alike that I felt it was the most reasonable offer eastern hardliners have ever put forward and was open to the idea. Combined with commitments for HoR votes to approve a new GNA Cabinet proposal and amend the Constitutional Declaration, it could provide the “grand bargain” we need. By a wide margin, al-Qatrani had been the most unpleasant PC member to deal with, but he was on a charm offensive last week both in his meeting with me and in breaking bread with other PC members.

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Its lovely in Wellfleet. Blue eyed scallops on the tidal flats, periwinkle and oysters, just came back for breakfast and sunscreen.

Thanks, things are better today but far from solved. Hope you are have a great time.

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

Still on leave, passing this on as received.

Jonathan M. Winer

Begin forwarded message:

Dear Jon,
We have just received some new intelligence on the Russian 'aid' convoy approaching Ukraine which, although from a source whose reliability is not yet fully established, we thought we should share with you. According to this source, bilateral talks between POROSHENKO and the Kremlin over the conditions for the convoy entering Ukraine have broken down and the Russians are rerouting it through a pro-Russian rebel held border checkpoint near Lugansk.

Clearly there is now the potential for a confrontation, which we believe may have been the Kremlin's intention all along.

Best, Chris

Chris Steele
Director

Orbis Business Intelligence Limited (“Orbis”) is registered in England with registered number 07318597 and registered address Highfield House, Mayflower close, Chandlers Ford, Eastleigh, SO53 4AR.
Want to talk briefly further. Some new info want you to be aware of. I'm in Boston today. Phone call ok sometime this am? Five minutes is enough.

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

They want to pursue some of the things we discussed yesterday, albeit on the system integrity side.

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

Toria,
It was a delight to speak today, notwithstanding the context. You've been a warrior on these issues, and I look forward to speaking further to preserve and wherever possible strengthen the important work you have done. I'll follow up regarding a possible working group meeting.

All the best,
Daniel

Daniel Silverberg
National Security Advisor
The Honorable Steny H. Hoyer
Democratic Whip
U.S. House of Representatives
H-148, The Capitol
Washington, DC 20515
(202) 225-3130
Yes that was be good.

Jonathan Winer

In ny face to face?

Would like to discuss this and a Russian matter.

Your view in my q's below?

V helpful tx
Im starting to hear from euros that there are 100k + migrants poised to try a water crossing to europe in coming months and we'll see them in italy.
If this is not true, exaggerated, i'd like to know true sitch. If the risk is real, is Op Sophia equipped to manage? If so, what's the plan?
If real risk and we don't have confidence in Sophia, should we be brainstorming more naval help from NATO or us?

From: Cohen, Jonathan R <>
Date: September 16, 2016 at 7:06:44 PM EDT
To: >
Cc: Heffern, John A <>, Nuland, Victoria J <>, >
Subject: Re: Libya Update

Thanks - super helpful. Toria - let us know if you want us to dig deeper.
JC
Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

From:  
Sent: Friday, September 16, 2016 6:56 PM
To: Cohen, Jonathan R
Cc:  
Subject: FW: Libya Update

Jonathan:

Below please find the latest update from Winer to the 7th floor on Libya.

In answer to your question, our top-line goal for UNGA and the Libya Ministerial there is to praise the GNA for its C-ISIL progress in Sirte (and highlight how we've helped) and prod the international community for help rebuilding and stabilizing the city. In contrast to the political mess in Libya at last year’s UNGA, there is now a government in Tripoli and ISIL has been pared back significantly on the ground. A top priority at UNGA will be to try to close the remaining political divisions and corral outside players such as the UAE, Egypt, and Russia, who have been backing General Haftar against the GNA.

As for Operation Sophia – since 2015, the EUNAVFOR operation’s mission has been to identify, capture, and dispose of migrant smuggling vessels. Last month, the EU authorized Operation Sophia to take up two additional tasks: training the Libyan coastguard and navy and helping implement the UN arms embargo off the coast of Libya. The UK will be seeking a technical rollover of UNSCR 2240, renewing authorization for Sophia, which USUN has been pushing for. There was some discussion from EU operational side that they want to add “watercraft originating in countries other than Libya, in light of
changing migration patterns around the Mediterranean.” This change would apparently not be welcome to the Egyptians, who are on the Security Council. Libya desk thinks we can nevertheless proceed with the technical rollover and that it will be a smooth process.

From: Director, Office of Southern European Affairs (EUR/SE)
Department of State

Sent: Friday, September 16, 2016 5:51 PM
To: 
Cc: 
Subject: FW: Libya Update

Please see a Libya update S/E Winer shared with the Seventh Floor below. We are working on updating our S Libya Ministerial AA and I will share an updated version with you for reference. Please let me know if I can help answer any additional questions.

Thanks,

SBU
With a week to go until UNGA, Libya is as dynamic as ever. On Friday, I came back from Tunis encouraged after various Haftar representatives presented us with the most serious proposals to date about integrating eastern and western security forces under the GNA and bringing the General into a joint command. Then, I woke up Sunday to news that Haftar’s forces had advanced on the Oil Crescent – a severe blow to prospects for the deal that we, the Emiratis, and the Egyptians have been pursuing since Vienna.

(SBU) **Haftar’s Political Protégé Offers Deal:** Last Wednesday in Tunis, Deputy PM Ali al-Qatrani outlined an idea for a joint military command composed of PM al-Sarraj, Haftar and Agila (to represent the East), and Deputy PMs Maiteeg (for Misrata) and Koni (for the South). Al-Qatrani is Haftar’s man on the PC. According to Haftar’s various orders, he suspended in February his participation in the PC, let loose a sustained stream of terrible rhetoric to try to torpedo it, and then, a few weeks ago, decided to rejoin it. Some Libyans viewed al-Qatrani’s proposal as Haftar’s attempt to blow up the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) from within or a plot to go after moderate Islamists, but most members of the PC were cautiously open to discussing it. The UAE strongly supported it. I told the Emiratis, Egyptians and Libyans alike that I felt it was the most reasonable offer eastern hardliners have ever put forward and was open to the idea. Combined with commitments for HoR votes to approve a new GNA Cabinet proposal and amend the Constitutional Declaration, it could provide the “grand bargain” we need. By a wide margin, al-Qatrani had been the most unpleasant PC member to deal with, but he was on a charm offensive last week both in his meeting with me and in breaking bread with other PC members.

(SBU) **Eastern, Western Officers Build Confidence:** We had another positive sign in Tunis Thursday: I organized and brokered a meeting between five Haftarite military figures and five western Libyan officers, then got out of the way as they laid out a common vision of a united Libya with unified security forces. The conversation was frank (on such issues as western Libyans’ fear of Haftar), but very cordial. After they said they were not opponents but rather colleagues from the same institutional background, I scrapped the seating arrangement that had them on opposite sides of the table with me in the middle, put them next to one another and limited the US role to friendly listening, with Egyptian, Italian, and Emirati counterparts similarly quiet and supportive. It all worked, potentially setting the stage for real towards a united Libyan army.
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Jonathan Winer
Great -- I’ve told Chris Steele that I am glad to receive his reports and that they are read, and he’s advised that’s all he needs to know to keep them coming. best

Fascinating. Tx as ever.

P, pls send Bobby M a brief note asking him to quietly tell the PM to watch out. Tx

According to Orbis June 5 2014 report, provided to us today by former MI6 Russia expert Chris Steele, we have a very unhappy Gennady Timchenko. As you may already know, his DC lobbyists were at Patton Boggs. Report says Timchenko hopes to use Luxembourg relationships to reduce EU pressures on his empire.

best

RUSSIA – UKRAINE CRISIS Impact of USG Sanctions on PUTIN Associate Timchenko

SUMMARY
- PUTIN’s inner circle, especially TIMCHENKO, fears prospect of EU sanctions in train of USG measures
TIMCHENKO resents failure of his PR campaign in West and both fears and dislikes pivot to China to counterbalance sanctions. Chinese already lording new geopolitical reality over Russians

Preparing new lobbying effort in Luxembourg where his Volga Resources holding company based. Wants sympathetic JUNCKER appointed new EU Commission President

DETAIL
1. Speaking in confidence to a trusted western interlocutor, a former Russian government official with close ties to the Kremlin and President PUTIN’s inner circle, described the impact on the leadership of current USG and EU sanctions imposed in connection with Ukraine. All were scared that EU sanctions would begin specifically to target them, in the same way that USG measures had to date, and this was restraining to some extent Russian action in (eastern) Ukraine.

2. The former Russian official knew that PUTIN associate and Gunvor Trading/Novatek oligarch Gennadiy TIMCHENKO had taken the sanctions imposed on him particularly badly. TIMCHENKO was angry that his careful and expensive PR campaign in the West, aiming to promote his reputation as an independent businessman and patron of the arts and various charities, had come to nothing.

3. Also, despite public posturing and statements to the contrary, TIMCHENKO both resented and feared PUTIN’s recent pivot to China as a means of counterbalancing western hostility over Ukraine/Crimea and to help avoid sanctions. TIMCHENKO believed there was a clear risk now of the Chinese leveraging deals, especially in the energy sphere, which were unfavourable to Russia (and his companies). He noted that the Chinese delegation to the recent St Petersburg Economic Forum had been unusually arrogant and bullying in its behaviour.

4. However, TIMCHENKO was more optimistic now than a few weeks ago about the extent of his pull and influence in Luxembourg, where his main holding company Volga Resources was domiciled. He thought this might help protect him from any further EU sanctions, especially if national politician Jean Claude JUNCKER were appointed new EU Commission President. TIMCHENKO knew JUNCKER and regarded him as sympathetic. He therefore was using any influence he had left in Europe to further the latter’s EU candidacy.

5th June 2014
Want to talk briefly further. Some new info want you to be aware of. I'm in Boston today. Phone call ok sometime this am? Five minutes is enough.

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

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Official

UNCLASSIFIED

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All the best,
Daniel

Daniel Silverberg
National Security Advisor
The Honorable Steny H. Hoyer
Democratic Whip
U.S. House of Representatives
H-148, The Capitol
Washington, DC 20515
(202) 225-3130
From: Winer, Jonathan
Sent: Thu, 20 Nov 2014 09:46:40 -0500
To: Jones, Paul W; Nuland, Victoria J
Cc: 
Subject: RE: Three Orbis Reports, Also Orbis' Chris Steele is in DC Thursday Nov 20 and Friday Nov 21 - Please advise if you would like to meet him and if so when

Paul, if you are still free, does 3pm work to meet with Chris Steele? I would pick him up downstairs, get him to your office, and sit in. Will be sending you another Orbis report regardless in a few minutes, it just arrived but I haven’t had chance to open it and manicure it yet.

best

Jonathan M Winer
US Department of State  HST 6250
Washington DC 20520
(202)647-9548 (office phone)
(202)647-9548 (cell phone)

From: Jones, Paul W
Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2014 8:03 PM
To: Winer, Jonathan; Nuland, Victoria J
Subject: RE: Three Orbis Reports, Also Orbis' Chris Steele is in DC Thursday Nov 20 and Friday Nov 21 - Please advise if you would like to meet him and if so when

I’d welcome meeting him, if it is easy – if not, no problem. Tomorrow Thurs between 2:30-4:30? (Toria is traveling)

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Winer, Jonathan
Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2014 4:24 PM
To: Nuland, Victoria J; Jones, Paul W
Subject: Three Orbis Reports, Also Orbis' Chris Steele is in DC Thursday Nov 20 and Friday Nov 21 - Please advise if you would like to meet him and if so when

Toria and Paul

Three reports from Orbis. The man behind them and Orbis, Chris Steele (as previously mentioned, former MI6 Russia expert, and a trusted friend of mine) is in DC next couple of days. If you’d like to meet with him, let me know and I can put it together.
1. Ukrainian MFA to Lobby GOP Senate on Lethal Sales; RUS-UKR Both Planning for “Big War”
2. Ukraine: Government debt increasing to 64% of GDP, but default not coming.
3. Russians on Putin’s Priorities: Strengthening Price of Oil, Value of Ruble, His Own Popularity


- Driven by desire to be seen as a great power, Russia will move in due course from (overt) military intervention to stirring up domestic discontent in Ukraine, aimed at overthrow of current regime or force it into concessions. Goal to push Ukraine back to 2013 status quo of public support for Europe and privately moving back into Russian sphere.

- Only a strategy of constant pressure on Moscow would make a difference, though Russia could survive two years with the current sanctions regime.

- Ukraine surprised by recent German statements on (no new) sanctions. Pressing EU for further measures.

- NATO support ‘about half what was needed’ and currently entirely non-lethal. White House, rather than State Department or Pentagon, the sticking point in terms of defence support for Kiev. Major lobbying effort planned on new Republican senate.

- MFA more sanguine about sustainability of gas agreement and supplies across the winter than the Energy Ministry.

DETAIL

1. Senior Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs commentators noted in mid-November 2014 that Russian behaviour was motivated by a desire to be seen as a great power. For Kiev, Ukraine was the perfect excuse Russia needed for a demonstration of strength. Russian President Vladimir PUTIN, wanted to destroy Ukraine’s belief that change was possible and force the country to self-destruct.

1. The Ukrainians believed that PUTIN would move from overt military intervention to stirring up domestic discontent in order either to overthrow Ukrainian President Petro POROSHENKO, or force him to make concessions. PUTIN knew that POROSHENKO’s relationship with the electorate was weak and he wanted to stir up trouble wherever he could. The goal was to return Ukraine to the 2013 status quo of publicly moving towards Europe whilst privately shifting back towards Russia. It made no sense to imagine that a peace agreement with PUTIN was possible in these circumstances, yet there was no realistic alternative either and POROSHENKO remained in regular contact with him. As one senior Ukrainian MFA official noted, ‘Ukraine needs time to get ready for a big war’, one waged against it by Russia, rather than initiated by Ukraine. Diplomacy was designed to buy time.

2. The MFA view was that only a strategy of constant pressure on PUTIN and the Russian economy by the West would make a difference. Russia could survive for perhaps two years on its financial reserves with the current sanctions regime in place. Kiev judged that PUTIN was calculating that
both Ukraine and the West would back down before then. But Russia would follow the same trajectory as Iran. Levada polling showed that there was increased support amongst Russians for their government combined with growing dissatisfaction with the state of the country. Eventually that would lead to political discontent and a greater willingness to compromise.

3. The Ukrainian government had been surprised by recent German statements ruling out new sanctions. They were trying to explain to EU countries that the current sanctions would take time to work and that stronger sanctions were also needed. There was confidence that the current sanctions would remain in place and possibly be strengthened.

4. Meanwhile current military support from NATO countries was ‘only about half’ of what was required. The supply of non-lethal equipment was satisfactory. But there was a marked reluctance on the part of NATO members to provide lethal equipment. Commenting on the US position, the MFA judged that the problem lay in in the White House, rather than in the State Department or the Pentagon where there was more understanding for the Ukrainian position. The new Republican Senate was going to be a big focus of Ukrainian lobbying activity. There was a number of promising initiatives under discussion, but there was also a possible Presidential veto to consider. It was impossible to ‘bypass’ the White House. In terms of defence equipment, there was now more focus in Ukraine on domestic production; the requirement for defence imports related to a handful of critical technologies.

5. The MFA judged that despite the gas deal a winter supply crisis could not be entirely ruled out, although it was likely to be avoided because the Russian economic need to sell gas had increased. Gazprom for the first time had signed a trilateral contract, including the European Commission, committing to supply gas to Europe. This made it harder for them to renege on the deal. Ukraine now had very good and transparent procedures in place to challenge Russian accusations of stealing gas. The EU had all the data it required to make an informed judgment of adherence to the terms of the agreement.

Comment

The MFA view of the prospect of an energy crisis is at odds with more pessimistic views expressed by the Energy Ministry, according to analysts.

2. SUMMARY: Report ID: 2014/299a Ukraine economy shrinking due to loss of East, but default not coming

- Negative growth likely for Ukrainian economy which provides challenges for rebuilding and reform

- Sense from economists and politicians that IMF likely to continue to support Kiev government even if reform conditions unmet; Russian debt obligations a risk for Q1 2015

- KOLOMOISKY view that Kiev political class underestimating scale of problem and overestimating IMF willingness to support government

DETAIL

Growth Context
1. In mid-November a well-connected Ukrainian economist set out the context of the Ukrainian macro picture. The Ukrainian economy was set to contract by 6-9% this year and 5-10% in 2015 if the conflict continued. If peace and stability returned, then there could be 0% growth for 2015 or slightly better. FDI was already down by 51% in the year to date and would likely decrease further over the rest of the year.

2. The main challenge for the economy was the loss of industrial capacity and resources in the East. The break of the supply chain linking raw materials in the Donbass, particularly coal, and production elsewhere was particularly damaging, and could not be compensated with supplies from elsewhere as the Ukrainian port capacity to receive raw materials was insufficient. Currently the energy situation was difficult but there could be a lasting and long-term improvement for the country if this forces energy intensive industries like the chemical and metallurgical sectors to improve energy efficiency.

Government Revenue and Pressure for Reform

3. In terms of the Kiev government’s books, the Donbass had previously accounted for between 16% and 25% of industrial production but only 10% of tax revenues. The minimum difference of 6% between GDP and tax take demonstrated the level of public corruption in the region. Looking ahead there would be significant costs for the government to bear in rebuilding damaged infrastructure and providing housing and employment for half a million internally displaced persons at a time when the government needed to address the issue of reform (anti-corruption, public sector reform, deregulation, tax reform, liberalisation of the energy and banking sectors) as a priority to make the country viable. Many of the current crop of power-holders were implicated in past corruption, but public pressure would force them to reform.

Sovereign Debt and the IMF

4. There was no expectation of a sovereign debt default as things stood. Debt was only 64% of GDP and increasing, but would probably not breach 70%. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) facility was enough to service debt of this scale and there would only be a problem if the IMF withdrew support. Despite the fact that the government was currently not complying with the agreements for reform in the IMF package, there was no indication that the IMF was likely to withdraw support soon. It was a political question and the political will to support the government appeared to override the technicalities at this point.

5. In terms of banking it was rumoured that the stress-tests for Ukrainian banks had produced some very negative outcomes, although the results of these tests were unknown. Equally it was understood that the Central Bank continued to support certain private banks with daily refinancing, despite rumours that some of these funds were being used for ‘speculation’.

Political Nuance to this Base Case

6. In parallel to this senior political analysts gave a nuance to this picture. At a diplomatic and Ministry of Finance level the sense was strong that the IMF would continue to support Ukraine with the resources necessary to meet its external debt obligations to the IMF, EU and other private creditors because the risk of cutting support was greater than continuing to support the
government. The view in the Presidential administration was that the debt/GDP ration would likely rise above 70% but that the IMF would support this even if there were no reform. The looming risk for external debt was around 1st March 2015 when Russia could announce a default if Ukraine had not settled.

KOLOMOISKY View

7. Separately sources familiar with local oligarch Ihor KOLOMOISKY’s thinking suggested that the government was in denial about the problem of sovereign debt. The IMF facility of $17bn was insufficient and would need to rise to between $34bn and $50bn; in the face of this the government assumption that the IMF would just ‘give them what they want’ was naïve.


--- PUTIN primarily concerned with world oil price and own personal ratings within Russia. Banking on oil price returning to $100/barrel in near term

--- Has lost confidence in CBR Chairwoman NABIULLINA and blames her team for recent $20 billion fruitless intervention in currency market to support Rouble

--- Increasingly succumbing to pressure from hawks in regime, especially regarding Ukraine. Dissenting voices exist but collectively mute

DETAIL

1. As of early November 2014, President PUTIN was, day-to-day, focused primarily on two issues: the world oil price and his own levels of personal popularity inside Russia. According to a senior Kremlin figure who knew him well, PUTIN regarded the two issues as linked. The Russian president had been persuaded by hawkish advisors like National Security Council Secretary, Nikolai PATRUSHEV, that OPEC and other oil producing states would not let the price fall below $80/barrel, otherwise the world economy would spiral downwards.

2. Indeed PUTIN was confident that the oil price would rise in the near term back to circa $100/barrel, at which level he believed the Russian economy would re-stabilise and his own personal popularity be assured, regardless of western sanctions or the situation in Ukraine.

3. PUTIN however was concerned and angry about the recent fall in the Rouble and the cost of associated intervention by the Russian Central Bank in support of it. Although PUTIN himself had instructed CBR Chairwoman NABIULLINA and her team initially to intervene in support of the Russian currency, he now was claiming he had been badly advised by them. According to a senior CBR executive, whilst PUTIN previously had been close to and held a high opinion of NABIULLINA, this had dissipated with the loss of $20 billion of CBR intervention in the currency market. She and her team in turn now felt let down by PUTIN and relations between the Kremlin and CBR were icy.

4. As far as Ukraine itself was concerned, the senior Kremlin figure (him/herself quite nationalist in political orientation) opined that PUTIN was increasingly succumbing to those in the regime with
hawkish views. Many of these already had been hit by western sanctions and so felt they now had little to lose by pushing a hard line. How this would play into policy decisions was as yet unclear. But the Kremlin figure noted the financial price of reintegrating Crimea with Russia and expected the cost of the Ukraine campaign to mount and itself undermine further the Russian economy, regardless of sanctions. S/he contended that such dissenting views were not uncommon within the Kremlin, but few inside were prepared to voice them as yet collectively.
From: Winer, Jonathan  
Sent: Fri, 13 Jun 2014 13:00:38 -0400  
To: Nuland, Victoria J; Jones, Paul W  
Subject: Fw: For Toria Nuland To challenge sanctions, PUTIN orders both Sberbank and VEB to conduct bond issues on international financial markets.

Toria and Paul, use as you see fit same as others, best
growing crisis in Iraq. The Russian leadership was particularly scathing about former US Secretary of State Hillary CLINTON’s position on both counts i.e. her hawkish stance on Russia-Ukraine and Middle East policy legacy. They hoped these factors would work to CLINTON’s detriment in any future presidential campaign.

2. Continuing on this theme, the senior businessman said that in order to exploit the perceived opportunity, PUTIN had ordered both Sberbank and VEB to conduct bond issues on the international financial markets. Although he had stipulated these should be in Euros (rather than US dollars), at least initially, the Russian banks concerned had been instructed to follow-up expressions of interest on the part of several US financial institutions, not least for propaganda purposes.

3. Despite this growing bullishness on the part of PUTIN and others in the Russian leadership, the senior businessman reported that within the oligarch community there remained serious concerns about the anti-Russian leverage held by the USG and associated measures which might be taken by Washington against them. This was particularly true of any move to cut off Russia from the international payments systems that were controlled by the West. There was also a fear of increased disruption of key imported (equipment/component) supplies. It also was the case with Russian companies owned or closely associated with Western, and especially USG-sanctions persons.

4. Speaking separately to the same source, a former senior Russian government official also with close leadership ties reported that the main sufferer from the lack of current access to Western capital markets was the energy company Novotek. This company remained partly owned by sanctioned PEP and close PUTIN associate, Gennadiy TIMCHENKO.

Orbis BI Comment

Although we have no specific reason to doubt either the access or truthfulness of the main subsource of this report, the fact that he (the senior businessman) was speaking to a Western interlocutor means he may have been aiming to influence as well as inform. We do not judge that the same applies however to the former Russian government official also quoted, given the thrust of his/her reporting.

Orbis Business Intelligence Limited
13th June 2014
You're welcome, Toria. Please also see two other reports from today, they are both fresh and to me specially of interest.

Tx J, as ever

Some of this is overtaken by events, but still interesting. (I was on the road, so didn’t get until today). Orbis apparently can provide us documentation on phony sales of shares relating to Sogaz, let me know if you want.

RUSSIA – UKRAINE CRISIS

First Report: Growing Kremlin Frustration With Kiev And Pro-Russian Forces In Ukraine
16 October 2014
Report ID: 2014/275a
-- Kremlin and Gazprom do not expect gas trade agreement with Ukraine prior to forthcoming legislative elections
Russian leadership views continuing Ukrainian intransigence over gas debt/EU transit fees equation as bad sign
-- PUTIN eschewing advice on how to deal with Kiev and pro-Russian elements. No credible friendly Ukrainian election candidates and unresolved problems in winter supplies of energy to LPR and DPR
-- PUTIN also now turning on his erstwhile ally, ex-president YANUKOVICH

DETAIL
1. As of mid-October 2014 neither the Kremlin nor Gazprom expected there to be a bilateral gas deal reached with Kiev prior to legislative elections scheduled for 26 October. Naftogaz was demanding EU gas transit tariff payments for October from Gazprom and refusing to deduct these from the total outstanding gas debt owed to Russia. Gazprom even had offered to reduce the initial bilateral debt demand by $500 million (to $1.5 billion) in return but Kiev had rejected this too. This put both Gazprom and the Russian president in a difficult position as hardliners in Moscow were accusing PUTIN of weakness, in both downscaling military involvement in eastern Ukraine and compromising with Kiev over gas prior to the onset of winter.

2. President PUTIN was both angry and disillusioned by recent developments in and over Ukraine. Top Kremlin officials reported that he was not taking advice from associates on Ukraine elections and gas negotiations right now and was refusing to back any Russia-friendly Ukrainian politicians as candidates in the forthcoming legislatives. Meanwhile ‘Novorossiya’ was in total disarray, both politically where a “leapfrog of cadres” was underway and economically, where they had lobbied Moscow for a separate deal on gas supplies but to no avail. However, as winter drew near it was clear they could not afford to remain dependent for their energy supplies on the (physically degraded) Ukrainian grid and pipeline system.

3. As a sign of PUTIN’s growing frustration, senior Kremlin figures understood he now had turned on former Ukrainian president YANUKOVICH (now living in exile in Moscow). The Russian president blamed YANUKOVICH for the disarray and disunity among the pro-Russian forces in eastern Ukraine and had threatened to dispossess him of his assets if he were not able quickly to improve the situation, from Moscow’s standpoint, on the ground.

Second Report: POROSHENKO’s Efforts to Secure Victory in October Parliamentary Election
13 October 2014
Report ID: 2014/272a
SUMMARY
- Military alert in Kiev ahead of expected nationalist protests around 14 October anniversary;
- POROSHENKO consolidating power in own hands and installing placemen;
- Doing everything possible to secure clear victory in October elections;
- Influential businessmen now grouped around ‘United Opposition’ and ‘Strong Ukraine’ lists.

DETAIL
1. In mid October senior figures in Kiev explained that the POROSHENKO administration had put Kiev on full military alert ahead of the annual nationalist parades to commemorate the founding of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army on 14th October. The government was expecting this to be the moment when the nationalist backlash against its peace strategy split over onto the streets with organised violence and possible attacks on government buildings. Dmytro YAROSH, leader of Right Sector, had accused Ukrainian President Petro POROSHENKO of betraying the Maidan and Ukraine. His comments reflected a growing section of Ukrainian opinion that saw POROSHENKO as a Russian puppet, including right-wing elements of the self-defence militias that formed during the Maidan protests. 14th October would be
the first opportunity for these people to “put fire on the streets” in an effort to weaken the legitimacy of the government and prepare for the next phase of opposition.

2. Against that background, POROSHENKO had consolidated power to such an extent that people were beginning to talk about him as ‘the new YANUKOVYCH’. The decision to put his own son on the list for the parliamentary elections had reminded people of the nepotism they thought they had left behind. Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseny YATSENYUK was now completely sidelined within government and Deputy Prime Minister Volodymyr GROYSMAN was behaving more and more as if he had already taken over the role: this power shift could be measured by the number of foreign ambassadors queuing up to see him rather than his nominal boss. The widespread assumption was that GROYSMAN would become Prime Minister after the elections, but this was not definite. It was possible that Russian President Vladimir PUTIN would insist on someone acceptable to him in order to limit POROSHENKO’s ability to consolidate power. This would more likely be Valeriy KHOROSHKHOVSKY than Yuriy BOYKO or Serhiy TIHIPKO.

3. POROSHENKO was pulling out all the stops to ensure that he would come out on top in the parliamentary elections. One device he was using to undermine rival campaigns was the imposition of controls on financial transfers. The official policy was to restrict bank withdrawals to $200 per person each day. Unofficially the same restrictions were being applied to transfers between accounts. This was playing havoc with the campaigns of POROSHENKO’s main rivals. One traditional mechanism political parties had previously used to build local support networks had been to appoint and pay election observers and members of the electoral commission. There was an unlimited right to do this, effectively enabling parties to buy votes. After the imposition of financial controls there were already reports of Batkivshchyna and Civil Position being unable to meet financial commitments to some of their supporters. These limits were not applied to the POROSHENKO Bloc.

4. There were now two groups competing for the votes of former Party of the Regions supporters in the East and South. The first was the ‘United Opposition’ led by BOYKO and Serhiy LYOVOCHKIN. Dmytro FIRTASH was the majority shareholder in this project, making him an important potential power broker, and Rinat AKHMETOV had also lent his support, albeit from a position of weakness. By agreeing to become a junior partner to FIRTASH, AKHMETOV hoped to guarantee his survival. He had been given 30% of the places on the list in exchange for putting his organisational network at its disposal. The second group was ‘Strong Ukraine’ headed by TIHIPKO and KHOROSHKOVSKY. Although TIHIPKO had traditional links to Ihor KOLOMOISKY, it was notable that KOLOMOISKY’s people were absent from the ‘Strong Ukraine’ list.

5. KOLOMOISKY’s game plan was unknown, but the shift towards a peace settlement with PUTIN on Russian terms had left him badly exposed. There were rumours that he had fled to Israel after failing to get TIHIPKO to intercede on his behalf with PUTIN. But there were also suggestions that he might instead choose either to sponsor an alternative to POROSHENKO or push for a federal arrangement that would leave him in control of Dnepropetrovsk.

6. The sacking of former governor of Donetsk, Serhiy TARUTA, suggested that KOLOMOISKY’s mandate as governor of Dnepropetrovsk would likely also soon end. TARUTA’s replacement, Oleksander KIKHTENKO was a POROSHENKO placeman and it was likely that someone similar would replace KOLOMOISKY as POROSHENKO continued to centralize power in his own hands. TARUTA’s own future was unclear, but as a relatively independent and respected figure, it was expected that he would have a future role in Ukrainian politics in some form.

7. By contrast, Viktor MEDVEDCHUK had no stake in the parliamentary elections, having been kept off the ‘United Opposition’ list. His approach now was to influence politics by sponsoring civil society initiatives. He was known to be behind a new organisation that had been set up to campaign for autonomy in Galicia in the hope of furthering Ukraine’s fragmentation from the West.
Third Report: Kiev View of International Relations as of October 13, Ahead of Summit
Report ID: 2014/271a

- Normandy Format talks in Milan to target agreement on ceasefire, demarcation of internal boundaries and gas supply;
- Fighting in East Ukraine confined to 4 areas; Kiev side aiming to trade these for concessions from Russians in effort to reach agreement;
- Military defeat in Ilovaisk far more significant than widely understood, hence removal of Defence Minister.

DETAIL

1. In mid October senior sources in Kiev gave their view of the current balance of the Kiev government’s international relations. Promised talks between Ukrainian President Petro POROSHENKO and his Russian counterpart Vladimir PUTIN, slated to take place in Milan on 16 October, would likely follow the ‘Normandy format’ of Ukraine and Russia along with Germany and France. These talks would attempt to reach a final settlement on three interlinked issues – the ceasefire; the demarcation of internal boundaries and powers; and gas supply.

2. The fighting in the East was now confined to four specific areas, all currently held by Ukrainian forces but strategically important in determining the viability of the separatist areas as self-sustaining entities. Donetsk airport was needed to provide an air link to Russia; Debaltseve had a railway junction linking Donetsk and Luhansk; Schatsya provided 92% of Luhansk’s electricity; and Mariupol had the main cargo port supplying the Donbass region. With the exception of Mariupol, these areas were effectively encircled by separatist held areas and not defensible in the longer term. The government intended to use these areas as bargaining chips to be traded for Russian concessions elsewhere in the negotiation of a final settlement, possibly relating to gas. Kiev might, however, dig its heels in over Mariupol, over which it had more control.

3. Defence Minister Valeriy HELETEY had been sacked on 12 October as a result of the military defeat at Ilovaisk in August that tipped the scales of the conflict in Russia’s favour. The full extent of this defeat had still not become public. Officially the government had only admitted to around 300 deaths, but the real figure was thought to be much higher. Of the 4000 troops involved in the engagement only 600 escaped. With a few hundred known to have been captured, the rest were thought to have been killed.

Fourth Report: FURTHER SUCCESSFUL MOVES BY RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP-OWNED INSURANCE COMPANY SOGAZ TO EVADE USG SANCTIONS

SUMMARY

-Kremlin and Russian Central Bank continue to advise and tip-off regime-favoured Russian companies on evasion of Ukraine-related western sanctions;
-Russian insurance company Sogaz conducts another (bogus) share ownership manoeuvre in early August with this objective. Dissembles about date of operation, which actually precedes OFAC rule change on ‘aggregated ownership’, so as to disguise likely Kremlin role and intelligence from West;
-Key objective in Sogaz case is protecting family interests of sanctioned PA Head, S.IVANOV, as well as other close and sanctioned PUTIN associates, KOVALCHUK and TIMCHENKO;
-Sogaz and Russian leadership conceited about apparent success in thus avoiding latest round of US sanctions, though not complacent.

DETAIL

1. Speaking separately in confidence to a trusted compatriot in September 2014, senior executives at the Kremlin-sponsored Bank Rossiya, owned by sanctioned Russian national Yuri KOVALCHUK, and the
Central Bank of Russia (CBR) reported on the leadership’s role in advising and directing regime-related companies on evading USG and other Ukraine-related sanctions. This followed the change in OFAC’s guidance to western companies to avoid doing business with Russian enterprises owned, or partly owned, by individuals or institutions subject to Ukraine-related sanctions, but preceded the so-called ‘aggregated ownership’ ruling announced on 13 August 2014.

2. According to both sources, the Kremlin was engaged with selected Russian companies, owned by individuals close to President PUTIN and the leadership, in order to assist and direct them in evading western sanctions. This included favouring them with state intelligence not shared more widely with Russian businesses. One such case involved the leading insurance company Sogaz (subject of our earlier report 2014/160). Various, essentially bogus, share ownership operations had been conducted there to stay one step ahead of the USG and EU sanctions machines. The latest involved the sale of 16.22% of shares from the Bank Rossiya-related Abros ostensibly to a Gazprom subsidiary, Gazprom-Gazoraspredelenie, in order to circumvent the ‘aggregated ownership’ ruling (that any company majority owned by a group of, rather than a single sanctioned individual as previously could be impacted).

3. Sogaz announced that this share sale operation took place on 14 August 2014 i.e. the day after the OFAC rule change was announced. However, according to the Bank Rossiya executive, who provided documentation in support of this (available on request), the sale from Abros actually took place on 11 August, thus preceding the OFAC ruling. The CBR executive added that this manoeuvre had taken place as the result of intelligence and tipoffs from the US about the OFAC change of rules. The prioritisation of Sogaz for Kremlin support and guidance was directly related to the fact that the Head of Presidential Administration (PA) Sergei IVANOV (sanctioned already) had family commercial interests in the company. It also was significant that the interests of other sanctioned associates of PUTIN, KOVALCHUK (through Abros) and Gennadiy TIMCHENKO (via Kordeks-now 12.5%) were involved.

4. Following the publication of the latest list of Ukraine-related Russian sanctions on 12 September 2014, the Kremlin, Bank Rossiya and S. IVANOV were ecstatic that their (sham) financial operation over Sogaz ownership again had enabled the company to avoid sanctions. They also believed that it showed the USG they were at least one step ahead of its policy-making process. The senior CBR executive however reported that the Russian leadership thought the USG, and especially OFAC, often imposed such rules flexibly and arbitrarily and therefore that they would need to keep vigilant and active in supporting Sogaz and other similarly favoured entities.

Orbis Business Intelligence Limited
17 October 2014
From: Winer, Jonathan  
Sent: Tue, 1 Jul 2014 19:50:32 -0400  
To: Nuland, Victoria J  
Subject: Re: Two Pieces from Orbis on Russia-Ukraine, contrasting views from with Russian officials on consequences/effectiveness of Crimea annexation

Whatever you choose to do with it is fine, so long as Chris protected, thanks, best

From: Nuland, Victoria J  
Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2014 06:12 PM  
To: Winer, Jonathan  
Subject: RE: Two Pieces from Orbis on Russia-Ukraine, contrasting views from with Russian officials on consequences/effectiveness of Crimea annexation

I send to a v small group and take all the identifiers off the stuff first, just say: a biz person with good contacts.

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Winer, Jonathan  
Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2014 11:41 AM  
To: Nuland, Victoria J  
Subject: RE: Two Pieces from Orbis on Russia-Ukraine, contrasting views from with Russian officials on consequences/effectiveness of Crimea annexation

Great, I am just trying to be sensitive that sometimes I don’t know what I don’t know. Chris is a good friend and I do trust him. I find them fascinating snapshots too. He considers the Ivanov one to be especially sensitive; I told him we don’t leak, that would be other parts of the USG and not to worry.

Best

From: Nuland, Victoria J  
Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2014 11:38 AM  
To: Winer, Jonathan  
Subject: RE: Two Pieces from Orbis on Russia-Ukraine, contrasting views from with Russian officials on consequences/effectiveness of Crimea annexation

Love these, tx

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.
From: Winer, Jonathan  
Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2014 11:27 AM  
To: Nuland, Victoria J; Jones, Paul W  
Subject: Two Pieces from Orbis on Russia-Ukraine, contrasting views from with Russian officials on consequences/effectiveness of Crimea annexation

July 1 2014 Orbis Report

RUSSIA-UKRAINE CRISIS: HEAD OF RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS SUCCESS IN UKRAINIAN OPERATION

SUMMARY

- Head of Russian Presidential Administration, IVANOV claims Kremlin achieving its goals on and in Ukraine
- Primary Russian objective is to use eastern Ukraine crisis to deflect international attention from Crimea annexation and leave latter as fait accompli. IVANOV now bullish about achieving this
- On sanctions, IVANOV believes threat of further western measures receding and elements of international co-operation in other areas, especially ME, heralding return to “business as usual”
- Further Kremlin strategic aim is to decouple Ukraine-related issues/negotiations from each other. IVANOV thinks this is also being accomplished now

DETAIL

1. Speaking privately to a senior colleague in late June 2014, Head of Russian Presidential Administration Sergei IVANOV contended that current Kremlin strategy on Ukraine was succeeding. According to IVANOV, the key Ukraine-related objectives now were to distract international attention from the Russian annexation of Crimea; to avoid further western sanctions; and to decouple the various aspects of relations with Ukraine from each other. On all three counts IVANOV claimed recent success.

2. On the annexation of Crimea, IVANOV believed the focus on achieving pacification of eastern Ukraine, as evidenced in the recent drawing in of German and French leaders to this dialogue, was working in Russia’s favour and helping to make Crimea a fait accompli. Western powers were distracted and had stopped talking, in public at least, about the annexed province.

3. This process also had assisted the Kremlin in avoiding the imposition of further and/or escalated western sanctions on Russia in retaliation for President PUTIN’s Ukraine policy. Even further US sanctions seemed to have been avoided now. IVANOV claimed that the world had moved on and that increasing western need for Russian co-operation, especially in Iraq and Syria, meant that the situation was returning to “business as usual”. He also predicted the western powers would require further Russian assistance in their military drawdown in Afghanistan.

4. In terms of decoupling the various aspects of the bilateral conflict with Ukraine, IVANOV claimed that this was happening also beyond the Crimea annexation/pacification of eastern Ukraine cited above. Gas sales; gas transit; gas-related kickbacks and other important issues were being addressed now bilaterally by different representatives in separate fora, both officially and unofficially.
IVANOV believed President POROSHENKO was too weak to change this evolution in bilateral relations which was favourable to Russia.

BUT

RUSSIA – UKRAINE CRISIS Top Russian Intelligence Officer’s Critique of Crimea Annexation
24 June 2014

SUMMARY
- Top level former RIS officer/Kremlin insider highly critical of Russian annexation of Crimea
- Concerned by growing resources drain on RF, but also difficulty Moscow is having imposing its will and Russian political system there. Practical implementation of annexation also sluggish and unimpressive
- In addition the RIS officer is critical of political shift towards favouring bilateral relations with China over India especially as result of Ukraine crisis. Fears loss of key export market(s)

DETAIL
1. Speaking in confidence to a compatriot in late June 2014, a former top level Russian intelligence services (RIS) officer/Kremlin insider commented on President PUTIN’s decision to annex Crimea. The intelligence officer was highly critical of both the policy itself and the lack of progress achieved in its implementation to date. Firstly, Crimea was a big resources drain on the Russian Federation. This would be amplified as the local economy atrophied and was starved of direct investment, especially from abroad as the result of western sanctions.

2. The intelligence officer also highlighted a more profound problem he perceived in connection with Crimea. This was that the so-called ‘puppet regime’ there actually was proving difficult and rebellious. It was reluctant simply to accept Moscow’s diktat and the Kremlin was having difficulty imposing its own placemen and other appointees to run the province. He put this down to the fact that Crimeans had become accustomed to living in a more pluralist and democratic political system under Kiev’s tutelage over the previous generation. A bit like Hong Kong for China, he now feared that Crimea could prove a subversive influence on the stability of the wider Russian Federation.

3. In terms of the practical implementation of annexation, the officer underlined that, 3 months on, the Rouble had not been introduced effectively, state salaries and pensions were not being paid on time and the Russian government had not made any significant capital investment(s) in the province. This was all very unimpressive.

4. On the wider scene, the intelligence officer thought it was a mistake for PUTIN to have prioritized bilateral relations with China at the expense of Japan, and especially India, on account of the politics of Crimea and buffering the negative reaction to its annexation by the international community. Important Russian export markets, especially in weaponry, had been thus jeopardized and bilateral relations with New Delhi now certainly were at their lowest point for many years as a result.

***

As before, I will continue to accept these from ex-MI6 Chris Steele at Orbis (London) and send them to you until/unless you ask me to stop.
best

Jonathan M Winer
US Department of State  HST 6250
Washington DC 20520
(202)647-9548 (office phone)
[redacted] (cell phone)
From: Winer, Jonathan
Sent: Sat, 17 Sep 2016 12:39:59 -0400
To: Nuland, Victoria J
Subject: Re: Libya Update

Would like to discuss this and a Russian matter.

Jonathan Winer +

From: Nuland, Victoria J
Sent: Saturday, September 17, 2016 11:37 AM
To: Winer, Jonathan
Subject: Fwd: Libya Update

Your view in my q's below?

From: Nuland, Victoria J >
Date: September 17, 2016 at 10:18:59 AM EDT
To: >, Cohen, Jonathan R < >, Tribble, Conrad R < >, Heffern, John A < >
Cc: Nuland, Victoria J >
Subject: Re: Libya Update

V helpful tx

I'm starting to hear from euros that there are 100k + migrants poised to try a water crossing to Europe in coming months and we'll see them in Italy.

If this is not true, exaggerated, I'd like to know true sitch. If the risk is real, is Op Sophia equipped to manage? If so, what's the plan?

If real risk and we don't have confidence in sophia, shd we be brainstorming more naval help from NATO or us?

From: Cohen, Jonathan R < >
Date: September 16, 2016 at 7:06:44 PM EDT
To: >
Cc: Heffern, John A < Nuland, Victoria J >
Subject: Re: Libya Update

Thanks - super helpful.
Toria - let us know if you want us to dig deeper.
JC
Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

From: Libby, Mark W
Jonathan:

Below please find the latest update from Winer to the 7th floor on Libya.

In answer to your question, our top-line goal for UNGA and the Libya Ministerial there is to praise the GNA for its C-ISIL progress in Sirte (and highlight how we've helped) and prod the international community for help rebuilding and stabilizing the city. In contrast to the political mess in Libya at last year’s UNGA, there is now a government in Tripoli and ISIL has been pared back significantly on the ground. A top priority at UNGA will be to try to close the remaining political divisions - and corral outside players such as the UAE, Egypt, and Russia, who have been backing General Haftar against the GNA.

As for Operation Sophia – since 2015, the EUNAVFOR operation’s mission has been to identify, capture, and dispose of migrant smuggling vessels. Last month, the EU authorized Operation Sophia to take up two additional tasks: training the Libyan coastguard and navy and helping implement the UN arms embargo off the coast of Libya. The UK will be seeking a technical rollover of UNSCR 2240, renewing authorization for Sophia, which USUN has been pushing for. There was some discussion from EU operational side that they want to add “watercraft originating in countries other than Libya, in light of changing migration patterns around the Mediterranean.” This change would apparently not be welcome to the Egyptians, who are on the Security Council. Libya desk thinks we can nevertheless proceed with the technical rollover and that it will be a smooth process.
Please see a Libya update S/E Winer shared with the Seventh Floor below. We are working on updating our S Libya Ministerial AA and I will share an updated version with you for reference. Please let me know if I can help answer any additional questions.

Thanks,

SBU

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

With a week to go until UNGA, Libya is as dynamic as ever. On Friday, I came back from Tunis encouraged after various Haftar representatives presented us with the most serious proposals to date about integrating eastern and western security forces under the GNA and bringing the General into a joint command. Then, I woke up Sunday to news that Haftar’s forces had advanced on the Oil Crescent...
– a severe blow to prospects for the deal that we, the Emiratis, and the Egyptians have been pursuing since Vienna.

(SBU) **Haftar’s Political Protégé Offers Deal:** Last Wednesday in Tunis, Deputy PM Ali al-Qatrani outlined an idea for a joint military command composed of PM al-Sarraj, Haftar and Agila (to represent the East), and Deputy PMs Maiteeg (for Misrata) and Koni (for the South). Al-Qatrani is Haftar’s man on the PC. According to Haftar’s various orders, he suspended in February his participation in the PC, let loose a sustained stream of terrible rhetoric to try to torpedo it, and then, a few weeks ago, decided to rejoin it. Some Libyans viewed al-Qatrani’s proposal as Haftar’s attempt to blow up the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) from within or a plot to go after moderate Islamists, but most members of the PC were cautiously open to discussing it. The UAE strongly supported it. I told the Emiratis, Egyptians and Libyans alike that I felt it was the most reasonable offer eastern hardliners have ever put forward and was open to the idea. Combined with commitments for HoR votes to approve a new GNA Cabinet proposal and amend the Constitutional Declaration, it could provide the “grand bargain” we need. By a wide margin, al-Qatrani had been the most unpleasant PC member to deal with, but he was on a charm offensive last week both in his meeting with me and in breaking bread with other PC members.

(SBU) **Eastern, Western Officers Build Confidence:** We had another positive sign in Tunis Thursday: I organized and brokered a meeting between five Haftarite military figures and five western Libyan officers, then got out of the way as they laid out a common vision of a united Libya with unified security forces. The conversation was frank (on such issues as western Libyans’ fear of Haftar), but very cordial. After they said they were not opponents but rather colleagues from the same institutional background, I scrapped the seating arrangement that had them on opposite sides of the table with me in the middle, put them next to one another and limited the US role to friendly listening, with Egyptian, Italian, and Emirati counterparts similarly quiet and supportive. It all worked, potentially setting the stage for real towards a united Libyan army.

(SBU) **Oil Crescent Offensive Wipes Out Progress:** Before dawn on Sunday, however, Haftar launched operations to seize four key ports in Libya’s “oil crescent”: es-Sidra, Ras Lanuf, Brega, and az-Zueitina. There were few if any casualties (because Haftar had bought off or cajoled major tribal leaders and some elements of the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG)). There was no damage to oil facilities. But the harm to prospects for building consensus around al-Qatrani’s grand bargain was enormous. While before the offensive al-Sarraj and other PC members had been ready to enter into discussions with Haftar and his representatives, al-Sarraj told me Monday the PC could not even consider it unless LNA forces withdraw from all the ports. Even if the LNA does pull out, the offensive had raised suspicions of Haftar to such a degree that al-Sarraj now doubts he could get the deal through the PC. The situation on the ground is fluid, with some assertions from the PC that Minister of Defense al-Barghati has mustered pro-GNA forces to take back two of the four ports. But the damage to the comprehensive deal Libya needs is clear.

(SBU) **Haftar’s Intentions:** What’s not yet clear to me is what Haftar hoped to achieve by this. Perhaps the overtures from his protégés in Tunis were serious, and Haftar thinks seizing territory and resources on the ground strengthens his hand for negotiations he truly wants to pursue. If so, I think he’s miscalculated. The conditions for the deal al-Qatrani proposed were better before Sunday than they are now. A more sinister interpretation is that the positive signals in Tunis were a trick to provide cover or divert attention as Haftar prepared for the resource grab the GNA has feared since the Spring. Al-Sarraj told me he thinks Haftar sent his officers to Tunis to test the waters for the offensive and gauge whether western military figures would react. Accurate or not, this perception of Haftar’s intentions is a reality
that further complicates the already extremely difficult process of building trust and agreement between the parties.

(SBU) **UAE, Egypt Must Make Next Move:** Since Vienna, we’ve worked hand and glove on this very process with the UAE particularly and also with Egypt. At their urging, the Secretary acknowledged that Haftar should have a role and we supported them in good faith every step of the way as they worked on getting him to accept a reasonable one. Emirati and Egyptian officials were in Tunis last week and approved of the efforts at reconciliation. After Haftar’s move into the oil crescent, Shaykh Tahnoun told me he was entirely surprised and very concerned by it. He committed to put pressure on Haftar to be part of the solution, not the problem. Egyptian MFA and military officials also told us they were taken unawares by the move. But I’m not convinced they fully understand the gravity. (The Egyptians are already pushing back on our call for Haftar’s forces to withdraw.) The Egyptians, in particular, need to hear a tough, unified message from all parts of the U.S. government that they work with. We’ve started sending the message from State that we will not permit Haftar to exploit any control of oil fields he has gained through this stunt or gain any other advantage. We should use Friday’s Libya DC to get the full interagency on the same page. Haftar’s actions have shown contempt for our joint effort with the Emiratis and Egyptians and damaged their interests in a stable, undivided Libya. They need to understand that the flexibility we showed on Haftar in Vienna was not an unlimited license. If he doesn’t accept a good deal (the one al-Qatrani presented last week was a reasonable starting-point), it’s time for all of us to draw a redline and move on to more responsible alternatives – perhaps Wanis Boukhamada, as the Emiratis themselves suggested in June.

(SBU) **A Possible Way Forward.** One way out for Haftar from the mess he has unilaterally created is for him to turn the oil terminals over to the National Oil Company, demonstrating he isn't seeking to exploit them personally for money or to hold them hostage ahead of a deal. I have discussed that notion with a few key Libyans, including the Libyan Ambassador to the UAE, Aref Nayad. I expect to discuss it with al-Qatrani tomorrow, who first reached out to me: Haftar may be looking to do some repair work.

(SBU) **Looking Ahead to UNGA:** Next week in New York, the Secretary will have a chance to applaud the GNA for its success against Da’esh in Sirte, highlight our significant contribution to this, and mobilize the international community to help the GNA rebuild and stabilize a city on the verge of liberation. We’ve come a long way from a year ago, when our Libya ministerial brought a ragtag group of bickering Libyan Political Dialogue members to New York and pumped life into negotiations on the edge of collapse, enabling Bernardino Leon finally to muster enough momentum to announce Prime Minister al-Sarraj and other names for the Presidency Council. Then, we had no credible Libyan government to engage at UNGA and Libya’s divisions left the field open to Da’esh’s expansion. Now, we have a government in Tripoli – flawed though it is – to partner with and, as a result of its work and our cooperation, Da’esh’s control of territory has gone from 150 kilometers of Mediterranean coast to barely one square kilometer in downtown Sirte. At UNGA, we will, of course, have to contend with the remaining divisions that still threaten to tear Libya apart. And the Secretary’s diplomacy will, of course, be critical, especially with the UAE and Egypt, with Russia a potential problem, as it demonstrated today in New York, when it backed Egypt in making excuses for Haftar and emphasizing the need for Libya to have a strong military. Of course we concur with the latter proposition - but it can't be created by conquest, especially at the expense of the government we recognize.
Thanks, I’m honored to be the telegraph operator. Best

Super interesting Jonathan. Tx as always. Paul

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

And now two more Orbis reports, providing perspective from the Russian side.

The first describes how Ukraine policy has created low morale among Putin’s inner circle. The second sets forth fears of influential Russian economic players about sanctions beginning to cripple Russian economy, with worse effects feared over next six to twelve months.

RUSSIA – UKRAINE CRISIS
PUTIN’s Leadership and Position on Ukraine
21 August 2014
Report ID: 2014/202a
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY
-- PUTIN increasingly isolated in Russian leadership and taking most Ukraine-related policy decisions himself. Listening to only a few hardliners, such as increasingly powerful PA Chief, IVANOV
-- Serious divisions within inner circle emerging, with both TIMCHENKO and SECHIN clearly discontent. Kremlin angry with former in particular for giving recent media interview about crisis
-- Liberal economic pragmatists in government know situation deteriorating but afraid to
confront PUTIN. Deputy premier SHUVALOV distrusted and apparently forbidden to leave Russia.
-- PUTIN’s tactic of dividing US and EU over Ukraine torpedoed by ML17 crash. Originally wanted to spread insurgency to Kharkiv, Odessa etc but thwarted by lack of local support
-- Current dual track approach comprises continuing to supply rebels with enough arms to survive whilst simultaneously appearing to support diplomatic track. Relaying on winter hardships in Ukraine to turn tables

DETAIL
1. As the Ukraine crisis has intensified since the shooting down of ML17 in July, President PUTIN has become increasingly isolated within the Russian leadership and has taken more decisions himself. He has narrowed the group whose advice he listens to, limiting these only to people who are hawkish on Ukraine and anti-western. Among these, Head of Presidential Administration IVANOV has emerged as the key figure, advocating that Russia turns to China to fill the growing vacuum of financial and economic relations with the west. However, IVANOV had returned from a recent mission to China empty-handed in his attempts to raise new loans and renew gas talks on a new pipeline route from western Russia through Altai. This did not bode well for his approach.
2. Reliable sources have noted that other leadership figures traditionally regarded as within PUTIN’s inner circle were starting to break ranks, using the media to hint none too subtly their dissatisfaction with Ukraine policy and sanctions. These included former Gunvor International owner Gennadiy TIMCHENKO (still a large stakeholder in sanctioned private Russian gas company Novatek) and Rosneft CEO, Igor’ SECHIN (also sanctioned). Leading figures around PUTIN in the Kremlin were furious with both for effectively leaking and breaking ranks.
3. Separately, the economic liberal faction in the Russian government realised the seriousness of the crisis and sanctions for growth and development but were afraid to tackle PUTIN head on. Even former Finance Minister Aleksei KUDRIN, who was respected and trusted by PUTIN, had given up trying to persuade his former St Petersburg colleague to change course and was now “staying away”. Unsanctioned government ministers of this faction, such as deputy premiers DVORKOVICH and SHUVALOV, were regarded with increasing hostility and suspicion by those around PUTIN and it appeared that SHUVALOV had been prevented leaving the country since March (not true of KUDRIN who appears currently to be on holiday in Italy).
4. In terms of PUTIN’s approach to Ukraine itself, the Russian President’s aims of dividing the US and EU appeared to have been shattered by the downing of ML17. It was also the case that PUTIN’s wish to extend the insurgency more widely into eastern Ukraine, to encompass for example Kharkiv and Odessa, had failed due to a lack of local support among the population. Even in Donetsk and Lugansk, the ethnic Russian majority disliked the rather odious leaders of the insurgency, one reason the Kremlin had forced a number of them out prior to the resumption of negotiations with Kiev. This meant PUTIN was left with a stop-gap, two pronged approach hoping increased hardship for Ukraine with the onset of winter would strengthen his position. It comprised of supplying the rebels with enough weaponry to survive whilst appearing to support efforts to internationalize negotiations on the issue with foreign powers.
5. PUTIN however had been unprepared for the hardening of MERKEL’s line in particular and did not have any credible response to this. His long term position was beginning to look shaky. According to one source, he “was under pressure to take firmer action” and was “looking like an idiot”. He had “no policy” and although people were “unbelievably
careful about what they said” it was “enough not to say anything positive”.

Orbis Business Intelligence Limited
21 August 2014

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RUSSIA – UKRAINE CRISIS
Impact of Western Sanctions on Russian Politics and
Economy
21 August 2014
Report ID: 2014/203a
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY
-- Sanctions beginning seriously to undermine Russian economy. This is well understood by
economic liberal government ministers but they are too afraid to challenge PUTIN.
-- Credible sources reckon there could be string of defaults by year end and regime could be
“on its knees” in 6-12 months, this primarily because of no realistic alternative financing
source to support repayment of foreign corporate debt
-- Fixed exchange rates likely to be introduced by Kremlin in response. VTB judged
particularly vulnerable as result, due to its heavy involvement in derivatives market
-- ‘Crony’ oligarchs, particularly TIMCHENKO, discontented at being sanctioned.
‘Traditional’ oligarchs very worried by threat of sanctions too but remain divided and
politically weak

DETAIL
1. According to leading Russian economic players, western sanctions have begun seriously to
undermine the Russian economy. Leading government economic ministers fully
appreciated the situation but were too scared of President PUTIN, who did not, to
challenge him directly on Ukraine policy. Their assessment was that sanctions’ impact over
time would grow and that Russian banks would be the hardest hit. The cost of credit
would “soar” and printing money in response would just “stoke inflation”.
2. A top Russian oligarch claimed the full force of sanctions had yet to be felt. S/he reckoned
that by the end of the year there would be a “string” of serious corporate defaults and in 6-
12 months the regime could be “on its knees”. At the heart of the problem, it was not clear
where Russia was going to obtain the credit required to service its foreign private
corporate debts. There simply was no alternative here to engagement with the western
banking system, on which the whole credit side of the economy had been built up over
many years.
3. The likely response to this impending crisis was for the Kremlin to fix exchange rates. A
decision had been taken already that in this event, the Rouble-USD rate should be 30:1 and
the Rouble-Euro rate 40:1. This approach might stave off an immediate crisis but was
unsustainable in the longer term. In terms of specific corporate vulnerability,
VneshTorgBank (VTB) was singled out due to its heavy activities in the derivatives market.
4. Both ‘crony’ (regime insider) and ‘traditional’ (those whose wealth preceded PUTIN)
oligarchs were discontented about current Ukraine policy and the sanctions it had
provoked. Former Gunvor International owner, Gennadiy TIMCHENKO, was especially
angry with his new predicament. It represented the “collapse of his dream” to become
“international, expand and be active outside Russia”, none of which were any longer possible. Meanwhile ‘traditional’ oligarchs were worried that sanctions could be extended to them and their businesses, but remained divided among themselves and therefore politically weak. Their current approach in face of the crisis appeared to be, ‘every man for himself’.

Orbis Business Intelligence Limited
21 August 2014

Jonathan M Winer
US Department of State  HST 6250
Washington DC 20520
(202)647-9548 (office phone)
(cell phone)
You’re welcome.

Really interesting, tx

SBU
This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

I note last line: “Finally the advisor said that what the Russian elite really feared was having their access to Great Britain curtailed by UK visa bans, especially those whose children were being educated there.”

Project RAGLAN

Russia – Ukraine Crisis: Initial Negative Kremlin Reaction to POROSHENKO’s Election
29 May 2014
Report ID: 2014/113
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
2

SUMMARY
--- Initial Kremlin reaction to POROSHENKO’s election negative. New Ukrainian president’s early rhetoric viewed as uncompromising. Fear in Kremlin of bilateral “permanent conflict.”
--- Russian economy now suffering impact of crisis, especially military-industrial sector cut-off from key capacity in Ukraine. Export earnings likely to be hit as result.
Crimea regarded as economic “black hole”, subsidizing which could be more costly than Sochi Olympics.
Kremlin also concerned at unfolding of corrupt relationship with former regime will lead to problems in managing demands for extradition of YANUKOVYCH and others to Ukraine.
Russian leadership divided over impact of western sanctions but fear of them being extended has forced PUTIN to step back. KUDRIN and ABRAMOVICH urging moderation, Head of PA IVANOV leading hardline camp

DETAIL

1. Speaking in confidence in late May 2014, an advisor to Russian deputy premier ROGOZIN, a key player in the current Ukraine ‘campaign’, outlined initial reactions in the Kremlin to Petro POROSHENKO’s election as Ukrainian president on 25 May. The advisor said that the Russian leadership had been very disappointed by POROSHENKO’s initial position and rhetoric on the current crisis. They feared that if POROSHENKO followed through on his declared intentions never to recognize Russian control of Crimea and keep Ukraine as a unitary state, then it was possible there would be a “permanent conflict” between the two countries.

2. The ROGOZIN advisor reported that the impact of the Ukraine crisis on the Russian economy already was significant. The military-industrial sector, for which ROGOZIN had formal responsibility, was being especially hard hit. This was because the arms trade embargo on Russia being enforced by Kiev meant the supply chain of key components produced in Ukrainian plants had been cut. This was a particularly acute problem with missile navigation systems and night vision systems built and assembled by Russian industry. This likely would cause lost export orders for Russian industry and hamper the government’s ability to upgrade its own armed forces.

3. The ROGOZIN advisor complained that the Russian leadership had been making up their policy towards Ukraine in a haphazard manner as they went along. President PUTIN had dominated policy making to an unusual degree and “all decisions were taken (by him) emotionally”. PUTIN was reluctant to take advice from anyone else which meant Russia had been “absolutely unprepared” for what had transpired in Ukraine. It had been a mistake to annex Crimea which in the advisor’s view was an economic “black hole”. It was populated by “bandits and pensioners” and the subsidies committed, circa 1.5 trillion Roubles, were greater already than the (astronomically expensive) Sochi Winter Olympics.

4. Continuing on this theme, the ROGOZIN advisor said that a growing concern in the Kremlin was that an elected, and therefore legitimate new president, POROSHENKO would expose the corrupt nature of Moscow’s relationship with the former regime and demand the extradition of ex-leader YANUKOVYCH and his associates. This would be “very uncomfortable and unpleasant” for PUTIN to manage.

5. Whilst personally sceptical over the impact of western sanctions on the Russian economy, ROGOZIN’s advisor admitted that threats made recently by President OBAMA and Chancellor MERKEL in Washington to tighten these measures and reduce Russian energy business with Europe had an impact on PUTIN. The recent China energy deal required huge capital investment to succeed and even then, only comprised 20% of the gas Russia currently exported to the EU.

6. Within the Kremlin itself, the advisor reported that former Finance Minister KUDRIN and oligarch Roman ABRAMOVICH were the leading moderates and had taken their arguments to PUTIN directly. KUDRIN had told PUTIN recently that he thought the impact of sanctions on Russia would be at least $200 billion. Contrary to media opinion, National Security Council Secretary PATRUSHEV was ill and had not played a key role in the crisis of late. Rather, the leading hard liner was Head of Presidential Administration, Sergei IVANOV who was “crude and primitive” and spoke of Ukrainians as if they were animals.
7. Finally the advisor said that what the Russian elite really feared was having their access to Great Britain curtailed by UK visa bans, especially those whose children were being educated there.

**Orbis Business Intelligence Limited**

**29th May 2014**
Confirmed - Ukrainian sources only. Primarily one close advisor, distilling attitudes of the group around Poro who felt left out.

I understood it was Ukrainian advisors, but I will check and get back to you.

J, is it your sense that this is derived from Russian sourcing or Ukrainian or both? Any way to find out? Makes a diff in terms of how we evaluate it. Tx
--- POROSHENKO running increasingly personalized and opaque foreign policy. FM KLI MKIN the most influential advisor and pushing him towards MERKEL/Germany
--- Broader leadership skepticism however about MERKEL's agenda and her pressure on POROSHENKO to compromise with PUTIN/negotiate with pro-Russian rebels. USG currently disengaged
--- POROSHENKO maintaining informal channel to Russian leadership, to address issues relating to own business interests (in Russia). This currently being conducted by Head of PA, LOZHKIN, in person to avoid USG monitoring
--- Military situation in east more of a stalemate than Kiev admitting. Ukrainian forces probably lack means to deliver knock-out blow to insurgency. This realisation pushing POROSHENKO back towards diplomatic track

DETAIL
1. According to reliable intelligence, Ukrainian President POROSHENKO has been running an increasingly personalised and opaque foreign policy in the run-up to his expected meeting with President PUTIN in Minsk later this month. Most of his top advisors have been excluded from the preparations for this, with only Foreign Minister KLI MKIN really in the loop. KLI MKIN's previous role as ambassador to Germany had resulted in him directing POROSHENKO towards Chancellor MERKEL and Germany as the main foreign channel to be pursued. MERKEL was due in Kiev for consultations on 23 August, just prior to POROSHENKO's trip to Minsk to meet PUTIN.

2. However, contrary to KLI MKIN's approach, there was a good deal of skepticism within Ukrainian leadership circles concerning MERKEL and this 'Germanisation' of POROSHENKO's foreign policy. MERKEL was not regarded as supporting the country’s real interests and suspected of pushing POROSHENKO towards making unwarranted compromises both with Moscow and in pressuring Kiev to negotiate directly with the pro-Russian rebels in the east. By contrast, the USG was very passive in the current phase of the crisis. Previous regular contact between the Ukrainian government and Vice President BIDEN, for example, had now lapsed.

3. Meanwhile reliable sources have reported that POROSHENKO was continuing to pursue an informal back channel into the Russian leadership. This was primarily to deal with the future of his CIS business interests, especially in Russia. This dialogue was being conducted secretly in person, for the present by Head of Presidential Administration, LOZHKIN with his Russian opposite number (including recently at their meeting in Sochi), because POROSHENKO knew the USG were monitoring all such electronic communications and he wanted to avoid this. The Kremlin was also understood to have re-established dialogue with other eastern-Ukrainian oligarchs such as Rinat AKHMETOV in an apparent attempt to localise the conflict.

4. Finally, the military situation on the ground in the east was not as favourable to Kiev as Ukrainian government spokespeople had been claiming. In reality it was more of a stalemate than a rout and it seemed unlikely that the Ukrainian forces had the resources or skill to deal the sort of knock-out blow required to bring the pro-Russian insurgency rapidly to an end. POROSHENKO was conscious of this, and the oncoming winter, which were factors pushing him back towards diplomacy and the negotiating table.

Jonathan M Winer
US Department of State  HST 6250
Washington DC 20520
(202)647-9548 (office phone)
Great -- I’ve told Chris Steele that I am glad to receive his reports and that they are read, and he’s advised that’s all he needs to know to keep them coming. best

Fascinating. Tx as ever.

P, pls send Bobby M a brief note asking him to quietly tell the PM to watch out. Tx

According to Orbis June 5 2014 report, provided to us today by former MI6 Russia expert Chris Steele, we have a very unhappy Gennady Timchenko. As you may already know, his DC lobbyists were at Patton Boggs. Report says Timchenko hopes to use Luxembourg relationships to reduce EU pressures on his empire.

best
- TIMCHENKO resents failure of his PR campaign in West and both fears and dislikes pivot to China to counterbalance sanctions. Chinese already lording new geopolitical reality over Russians

- Preparing new lobbying effort in Luxembourg where his Volga Resources holding company based. Wants sympathetic JUNCKER appointed new EU Commission President

DETAIL
1. Speaking in confidence to a trusted western interlocutor, a former Russian government official with close ties to the Kremlin and President PUTIN’s inner circle, described the impact on the leadership of current USG and EU sanctions imposed in connection with Ukraine. All were scared that EU sanctions would begin specifically to target them, in the same way that USG measures had to date, and this was restraining to some extent Russian action in (eastern) Ukraine.

2. The former Russian official knew that PUTIN associate and Gunvor Trading/Novatek oligarch Gennadiy TIMCHENKO had taken the sanctions imposed on him particularly badly. TIMCHENKO was angry that his careful and expensive PR campaign in the West, aiming to promote his reputation as an independent businessman and patron of the arts and various charities, had come to nothing.

3. Also, despite public posturing and statements to the contrary, TIMCHENKO both resented and feared PUTIN’s recent pivot to China as a means of counterbalancing western hostility over Ukraine/Crimea and to help avoid sanctions. TIMCHENKO believed there was a clear risk now of the Chinese leveraging deals, especially in the energy sphere, which were unfavourable to Russia (and his companies). He noted that the Chinese delegation to the recent St Petersburg Economic Forum had been unusually arrogant and bullying in its behaviour.

4. However, TIMCHENKO was more optimistic now than a few weeks ago about the extent of his pull and influence in Luxembourg, where his main holding company Volga Resources was domiciled. He thought this might help protect him from any further EU sanctions, especially if national politician Jean Claude JUNCKER were appointed new EU Commission President. TIMCHENKO knew JUNCKER and regarded him as sympathetic. He therefore was using any influence he had left in Europe to further the latter’s EU candidacy.

5th June 2014
I arrive Mon. Will also reach out to you.

Good. I'll reach out when I'm there Sunday. I'm worried about it's too

In ny face to face?

Would like to discuss this and a Russian matter.

Your view in my q's below?
From: Nuland, Victoria J >
Date: September 17, 2016 at 10:18:59 AM EDT
To: >, Cohen, Jonathan R >
Cc: >, Tribble, Conrad R >, Heffern, John A >
Subject: Re: Libya Update

V helpful tx
Im starting to hear from euros that there are 100k + migrants poised to try a water crossing to europe in coming months and we'll see them in italy.
If this is not true, exaggerated, i'd like to know true sitch. If the risk is real, is Op Sophia equipped to manage? If so, what's the plan? 
If real risk and we don't have confidence in sophia, shd we be brainstorming more naval help from nato or us?

From: Cohen, Jonathan R >
Date: September 16, 2016 at 7:06:44 PM EDT
To: >
Cc: Heffern, John A >, Nuland, Victoria J >
Subject: Re: Libya Update

Thanks - super helpful.
Toria - let us know if you want us to dig deeper. 
JC
Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

From: >
Sent: Friday, September 16, 2016 6:56 PM
To: Cohen, Jonathan R
Cc: >
Subject: FW: Libya Update

Jonathan:

Below please find the latest update from Winer to the 7th floor on Libya.
In answer to your question, our top-line goal for UNGA and the Libya Ministerial there is to praise the GNA for its C-ISIL progress in Sirte (and highlight how we’ve helped) and prod the international community for help rebuilding and stabilizing the city. In contrast to the political mess in Libya at last year’s UNGA, there is now a government in Tripoli and ISIL has been pared back significantly on the ground. A top priority at UNGA will be to try to close the remaining political divisions - and corral outside players such as the UAE, Egypt, and Russia, who have been backing General Haftar against the GNA.

As for Operation Sophia – since 2015, the EUNAVFOR operation’s mission has been to identify, capture, and dispose of migrant smuggling vessels. Last month, the EU authorized Operation Sophia to take up two additional tasks: training the Libyan coastguard and navy and helping implement the UN arms embargo off the coast of Libya. The UK will be seeking a technical rollover of UNSCR 2240, renewing authorization for Sophia, which USUN has been pushing for. There was some discussion from EU operational side that they want to add “watercraft originating in countries other than Libya, in light of changing migration patterns around the Mediterranean.” This change would apparently not be welcome to the Egyptians, who are on the Security Council. Libya desk thinks we can nevertheless proceed with the technical rollover and that it will be a smooth process.
Thanks,

SBU

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Winer, Jonathan

Sent: Tuesday, September 13, 2016 10:03 PM

To: Finer, Jonathan J; Kenna, Lisa D; Sullivan, Thomas D

Cc: Patterson, Anne W; Leaf, Barbara A; Beecroft, Robert S (Cairo); Bodde, Peter W (LEO); Sison, Michele J

Subject: Libya Update

With a week to go until UNGA, Libya is as dynamic as ever. On Friday, I came back from Tunis encouraged after various Haftar representatives presented us with the most serious proposals to date about integrating eastern and western security forces under the GNA and bringing the General into a joint command. Then, I woke up Sunday to news that Haftar’s forces had advanced on the Oil Crescent – a severe blow to prospects for the deal that we, the Emiratis, and the Egyptians have been pursuing since Vienna.

(SBU) **Haftar’s Political Protégé Offers Deal:** Last Wednesday in Tunis, Deputy PM Ali al-Qatrani outlined an idea for a joint military command composed of PM al-Sarraj, Haftar and Agila (to represent the East), and Deputy PMs Maiteeg (for Misrata) and Koni (for the South). Al-Qatrani is Haftar’s man on the PC. According to Haftar’s various orders, he suspended in February his participation in the PC, let loose a sustained stream of terrible rhetoric to try to torpedo it, and then, a few weeks ago, decided to rejoin it. Some Libyans viewed al-Qatrani’s proposal as Haftar’s attempt to blow up the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) from within or a plot to go after moderate Islamists, but most members of the PC were cautiously open to discussing it. The UAE strongly supported it. I told the Emiratis, Egyptians and Libyans alike that I felt it was the most reasonable offer eastern hardliners have ever put forward and was open to the idea. Combined with commitments for HoR votes to approve a new GNA Cabinet proposal and amend the Constitutional Declaration, it could provide the “grand bargain” we need. By a
wide margin, al-Qatrani had been the most unpleasant PC member to deal with, but he was on a charm offensive last week both in his meeting with me and in breaking bread with other PC members.

(SBU) Eastern, Western Officers Build Confidence: We had another positive sign in Tunis Thursday: I organized and brokered a meeting between five Haftarite military figures and five western Libyan officers, then got out of the way as they laid out a common vision of a united Libya with unified security forces. The conversation was frank (on such issues as western Libyans’ fear of Haftar), but very cordial. After they said they were not opponents but rather colleagues from the same institutional background, I scrapped the seating arrangement that had them on opposite sides of the table with me in the middle, put them next to one another and limited the US role to friendly listening, with Egyptian, Italian, and Emirati counterparts similarly quiet and supportive. It all worked, potentially setting the stage for real towards a united Libyan army.

(SBU) Oil Crescent Offensive Wipes Out Progress: Before dawn on Sunday, however, Haftar launched operations to seize four key ports in Libya’s “oil crescent”: es-Sidra, Ras Lanuf, Brega, and az-Zueitina. There were few if any casualties (because Haftar had bought off or cajoled major tribal leaders and some elements of the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG)). There was no damage to oil facilities. But the harm to prospects for building consensus around al-Qatrani’s grand bargain was enormous. While before the offensive al-Sarraj and other PC members had been ready to enter into discussions with Haftar and his representatives, al-Sarraj told me Monday the PC could not even consider it unless LNA forces withdraw from all the ports. Even if the LNA does pull out, the offensive had raised suspicions of Haftar to such a degree that al-Sarraj now doubts he could get the deal through the PC. The situation on the ground is fluid, with some assertions from the PC that Minister of Defense al-Barghati has mustered pro-GNA forces to take back two of the four ports. But the damage to the comprehensive deal Libya needs is clear.

(SBU) Haftar’s Intentions: What’s not yet clear to me is what Haftar hoped to achieve by this. Perhaps the overtures from his protégés in Tunis were serious, and Haftar thinks seizing territory and resources on the ground strengthens his hand for negotiations he truly wants to pursue. If so, I think he’s miscalculated. The conditions for the deal al-Qatrani proposed were better before Sunday than they are now. A more sinister interpretation is that the positive signals in Tunis were a trick to provide cover or divert attention as Haftar prepared for the resource grab the GNA has feared since the Spring. Al-Sarraj told me he thinks Haftar sent his officers to Tunis to test the waters for the offensive and gauge whether western military figures would react. Accurate or not, this perception of Haftar’s intentions is a reality that further complicates the already extremely difficult process of building trust and agreement between the parties.

(SBU) UAE, Egypt Must Make Next Move: Since Vienna, we’ve worked hand and glove on this very process with the UAE particularly and also with Egypt. At their urging, the Secretary acknowledged that Haftar should have a role and we supported them in good faith every step of the way as they worked on getting him to accept a reasonable one. Emirati and Egyptian officials were in Tunis last week and approved of the efforts at reconciliation. After Haftar’s move into the oil crescent, Shaykh Tahnoun told me he was entirely surprised and very concerned by it. He committed to put pressure on Haftar to be part of the solution, not the problem. Egyptian MFA and military officials also told us they were taken unawares by the move. But I’m not convinced they fully understand the gravity. (The Egyptians are already pushing back on our call for Haftar’s forces to withdraw.) The Egyptians, in particular, need to hear a tough, unified message from all parts of the U.S. government that they work with. We’ve started sending the message from State that we will not permit Haftar to exploit any control of oil fields he has
gained through this stunt or gain any other advantage. We should use Friday’s Libya DC to get the full interagency on the same page. Haftar’s actions have shown contempt for our joint effort with the Emiratis and Egyptians and damaged their interests in a stable, undivided Libya. They need to understand that the flexibility we showed on Haftar in Vienna was not an unlimited license. If he doesn’t accept a good deal (the one al-Qatrani presented last week was a reasonable starting-point), it’s time for all of us to draw a redline and move on to more responsible alternatives – perhaps Wanis Boukhamada, as the Emiratis themselves suggested in June.

(SBU) **A Possible Way Forward.** One way out for Haftar from the mess he has unilaterally created is for him to turn the oil terminals over to the National Oil Company, demonstrating he isn’t seeking to exploit them personally for money or to hold them hostage ahead of a deal. I have discussed that notion with a few key Libyans, including the Libyan Ambassador to the UAE, Aref Nayad. I expect to discuss it with al-Qatrani tomorrow, who first reached out to me: Haftar may be looking to do some repair work.

(SBU) **Looking Ahead to UNGA:** Next week in New York, the Secretary will have a chance to applaud the GNA for its success against Da’esh in Sirte, highlight our significant contribution to this, and mobilize the international community to help the GNA rebuild and stabilize a city on the verge of liberation. We’ve come a long way from a year ago, when our Libya ministerial brought a ragtag group of bickering Libyan Political Dialogue members to New York and pumped life into negotiations on the edge of collapse, enabling Bernardino Leon finally to muster enough momentum to announce Prime Minister al-Sarraj and other names for the Presidency Council. Then, we had no credible Libyan government to engage at UNGA and Libya’s divisions left the field open to Da’esh’s expansion. Now, we have a government in Tripoli – flawed though it is – to partner with and, as a result of its work and our cooperation, Da’esh’s control of territory has gone from 150 kilometers of Mediterranean coast to barely one square kilometer in downtown Sirte. At UNGA, we will, of course, have to contend with the remaining divisions that still threaten to tear Libya apart. And the Secretary’s diplomacy will, of course, be critical, especially with the UAE and Egypt, with Russia a potential problem, as it demonstrated today in New York, when it backed Egypt in making excuses for Haftar and emphasizing the need for Libya to have a strong military. Of course we concur with the latter proposition - but it can’t be created by conquest, especially at the expense of the government we recognize.

Jonathan Winer +
From: Winer, Jonathan
Sent: Tue, 1 Jul 2014 11:40:41 -0400
To: Nuland, Victoria J
Subject: RE: Two Pieces from Orbis on Russia-Ukraine, contrasting views from with Russian officials on consequences/effectiveness of Crimea annexation

Great, I am just trying to be sensitive that sometimes I don’t know what I don’t know. Chris is a good friend and I do trust him. I find them fascinating snapshots too. He considers the Ivanov one to be especially sensitive; I told him we don’t leak, that would be other parts of the USG and not to worry.

Best

From: Nuland, Victoria J
Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2014 11:38 AM
To: Winer, Jonathan
Subject: RE: Two Pieces from Orbis on Russia-Ukraine, contrasting views from with Russian officials on consequences/effectiveness of Crimea annexation

Love these, tx

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Winer, Jonathan
Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2014 11:27 AM
To: Nuland, Victoria J; Jones, Paul W
Subject: Two Pieces from Orbis on Russia-Ukraine, contrasting views from with Russian officials on consequences/effectiveness of Crimea annexation

July 1 2014 Orbis Report

RUSSIA-UKRAINE CRISIS: HEAD OF RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS SUCCESS IN UKRAINIAN OPERATION

SUMMARY

- Head of Russian Presidential Administration, IVANOV claims Kremlin achieving its goals on and in Ukraine
- Primary Russian objective is to use eastern Ukraine crisis to deflect international attention from Crimea annexation and leave latter as fait accompli. IVANOV now bullish about achieving this
- On sanctions, IVANOV believes threat of further western measures receding and elements of international co-operation in other areas, especially ME, heralding return to “business as usual”
- Further Kremlin strategic aim is to decouple Ukraine-related issues/negotiations from each other. IVANOV thinks this is also being accomplished now
1. Speaking privately to a senior colleague in late June 2014, Head of Russian Presidential Administration Sergei IVANOV contended that current Kremlin strategy on Ukraine was succeeding. According to IVANOV, the key Ukraine-related objectives now were to distract international attention from the Russian annexation of Crimea; to avoid further western sanctions; and to decouple the various aspects of relations with Ukraine from each other. On all three counts IVANOV claimed recent success.

2. On the annexation of Crimea, IVANOV believed the focus on achieving pacification of eastern Ukraine, as evidenced in the recent drawing in of German and French leaders to this dialogue, was working in Russia’s favour and helping to make Crimea a fait accompli. Western powers were distracted and had stopped talking, in public at least, about the annexed province.

3. This process also had assisted the Kremlin in avoiding the imposition of further and/or escalated western sanctions on Russia in retaliation for President PUTIN’s Ukraine policy. Even further US sanctions seemed to have been avoided now. IVANOV claimed that the world had moved on and that increasing western need for Russian co-operation, especially in Iraq and Syria, meant that the situation was returning to “business as usual”. He also predicted the western powers would require further Russian assistance in their military drawdown in Afghanistan.

4. In terms of decoupling the various aspects of the bilateral conflict with Ukraine, IVANOV claimed that this was happening also beyond the Crimea annexation/pacification of eastern Ukraine cited above. Gas sales; gas transit; gas-related kickbacks and other important issues were being addressed now bilaterally by different representatives in separate fora, both officially and unofficially. IVANOV believed President POROSHENKO was too weak to change this evolution in bilateral relations which was favourable to Russia.

BUT

RUSSIA – UKRAINE CRISIS Top Russian Intelligence Officer’s Critique of Crimea Annexation
24 June 2014

SUMMARY
- Top level former RIS officer/Kremlin insider highly critical of Russian annexation of Crimea
- Concerned by growing resources drain on RF, but also difficulty Moscow is having imposing its will and Russian political system there. Practical implementation of annexation also sluggish and unimpressive
- In addition the RIS officer is critical of political shift towards favouring bilateral relations with China over India especially as result of Ukraine crisis. Fears loss of key export market(s)

DETAIL
1. Speaking in confidence to a compatriot in late June 2014, a former top level Russian intelligence services (RIS) officer/Kremlin insider commented on President PUTIN’s decision to annex Crimea. The intelligence officer was highly critical of both the policy itself and the lack of progress achieved in its implementation to date. Firstly, Crimea was a big resources drain on the Russian Federation. This would
be amplified as the local economy atrophied and was starved of direct investment, especially from abroad as the result of western sanctions.

2. The intelligence officer also highlighted a more profound problem he perceived in connection with Crimea. This was that the so-called ‘puppet regime’ there actually was proving difficult and rebellious. It was reluctant simply to accept Moscow’s diktat and the Kremlin was having difficulty imposing its own placemen and other appointees to run the province. He put this down to the fact that Crimeans had become accustomed to living in a more pluralist and democratic political system under Kiev’s tutelage over the previous generation. A bit like Hong Kong for China, he now feared that Crimea could prove a subversive influence on the stability of the wider Russian Federation.

3. In terms of the practical implementation of annexation, the officer underlined that, 3 months on, the Rouble had not been introduced effectively, state salaries and pensions were not being paid on time and the Russian government had not made any significant capital investment(s) in the province. This was all very unimpressive.

4. On the wider scene, the intelligence officer thought it was a mistake for PUTIN to have prioritized bilateral relations with China at the expense of Japan, and especially India, on account of the politics of Crimea and buffering the negative reaction to its annexation by the international community. Important Russian export markets, especially in weaponry, had been thus jeopardized and bilateral relations with New Delhi now certainly were at their lowest point for many years as a result.

***

As before, I will continue to accept these from ex-MI6 Chris Steele at Orbis (London) and send them to you until/unless you ask me to stop.

best

Jonathan M Winer
US Department of State  HST 6250
Washington DC 20520
(202)647-9548 (office phone)

(202)647-9548 (cell phone)
Per Paul communication to me, starting today, will send to you through my assistant high side when I am on the road. Have one of great interest today. Jonathan

Good stuff, JW.
We’ll work on all this. Safe home

Thanks, Jonathan.

-----Original Message-----
From: Winer, Jonathan
Sent: Thursday, December 11, 2014 1:44 AM
To: Wade, David E; Finer, Jonathan J; Patterson, Anne W; Nuland, Victoria J
Subject: Albanian PM Rama and MEK

Met with PM Rama. Gist: we will keep taking MEK in a pipeline at a comfortable level, both to replace those you and others take and maybe some more - so long as it is comfortable and digestable and doesn't blow up politically or in some other way.

I think this probably means they will be able to take a few hundred a year - but for now, not remaining 2500 at one swoop.

He appreciated call from S.

He wants some things from us which I need to discuss with Toria. Main one is her privately urging Opposition to cease trying to create a government-in-exile as if it were a second government and instead end boycott of Parliament and find way back in.

He thinks they are acting in ways that risk delegitimization of State institutions across the board and that this is dangerous for Albania.

He also wants our help acting informally as head hunters to find him potential candidates for a foreigner to act for a fixed term as cohead of their new National Bureau of Investigation. I offered to call Robert Mueller, Ray Kelly, and
INTERPOL's Ron Noble to informally see if they had any names of persons who might be interested.

There is considerable opportunity for US with PM Rama on issues well beyond MEK. On CIA torture, he's been saying that release of report shows strength of US democracy. When bad things happen, system is strong enough to expose the truth rather than to cover it up. Its evidence of the deep underlying values of country.

This man is a smart politician.

- Jonathan

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.
From: Winer, Jonathan
To: Nuland, Victoria J; Jones, Paul W
Subject: Re: Orbis Report: Ukrainian advisors to Poroshenko grouse about him tilting towards Merkel & USG ostensibly "passive"

I understood it was Ukrainian advisors, but I will check and get back to you.

From: Nuland, Victoria J
Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2014 01:45 PM
To: Winer, Jonathan; Jones, Paul W
Subject: Re: Orbis Report: Ukrainian advisors to Poroshenko grouse about him tilting towards Merkel & USG ostensibly "passive"

J, is it your sense that this is derived from Russian sourcing or Ukrainian or both? Any way to find out? Makes a diff in terms of how we evaluate it. Tx

From: Winer, Jonathan
Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2014 9:32 AM
To: Nuland, Victoria J; Jones, Paul W
Subject: Orbis Report: Ukrainian advisors to Poroshenko grouse about him tilting towards Merkel & USG ostensibly "passive"

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
Orbis Business Intelligence Ltd. Berkeley Square House, Berkeley Square, London, W1J 6BD

RUSSIA – UKRAINE CRISIS
POROSHENKO’s Position Pre-Minsk and Key
Foreign Relationships
21 August 2014
Report ID: 2014/201a

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY

--- POROSHENKO running increasingly personalized and opaque foreign policy. FM KLINCKIN the most influential advisor and pushing him towards MERKEL/Germany
--- Broader leadership skepticism however about MERKEL's agenda and her pressure on POROSHENKO to compromise with PUTIN/negotiate with pro-Russian rebels. USG currently disengaged
--- POROSHENKO maintaining informal channel to Russian leadership, to address issues relating to own business interests (in Russia). This currently being conducted by Head of PA, LOZHKIN, in person to avoid USG monitoring
--- Military situation in east more of a stalemate than Kiev admitting. Ukrainian forces probably lack means to deliver knock-out blow to insurgency. This realisation pushing POROSHENKO back towards diplomatic track
DETAIL
1. According to reliable intelligence, Ukrainian President POROSHENKO has been running an increasingly personalised and opaque foreign policy in the run-up to his expected meeting with President PUTIN in Minsk later this month. Most of his top advisors have been excluded from the preparations for this, with only Foreign Minister KLIMKIN really in the loop. KLIMKIN’s previous role as ambassador to Germany had resulted in him directing POROSHENKO towards Chancellor MERKEL and Germany as the main foreign channel to be pursued. MERKEL was due in Kiev for consultations on 23 August, just prior to POROSHENKO’s trip to Minsk to meet PUTIN.

2. However, contrary to KLIMKIN’s approach, there was a good deal of skepticism within Ukrainian leadership circles concerning MERKEL and this ‘Germanisation’ of POROSHENKO’s foreign policy. MERKEL was not regarded as supporting the country’s real interests and suspected of pushing POROSHENKO towards making unwarranted compromises both with Moscow and in pressuring Kiev to negotiate directly with the pro-Russian rebels in the east. By contrast, the USG was very passive in the current phase of the crisis. Previous regular contact between the Ukrainian government and Vice President BIDEN, for example, had now lapsed.

3. Meanwhile reliable sources have reported that POROSHENKO was continuing to pursue an informal back channel into the Russian leadership. This was primarily to deal with the future of his CIS business interests, especially in Russia. This dialogue was being conducted secretly in person, for the present by Head of Presidential Administration, LOZHKIN with his Russian opposite number (including recently at their meeting in Sochi), because POROSHENKO knew the USG were monitoring all such electronic communications and he wanted to avoid this. The Kremlin was also understood to have re-established dialogue with other eastern-Ukrainian oligarchs such as Rinat AKHMETOV in an apparent attempt to localise the conflict.

4. Finally, the military situation on the ground in the east was not as favourable to Kiev as Ukrainian government spokespeople had been claiming. In reality it was more of a stalemate than a rout and it seemed unlikely that the Ukrainian forces had the resources or skill to deal the sort of knock-out blow required to bring the pro-Russian insurgency rapidly to an end. POROSHENKO was conscious of this, and the oncoming winter, which were factors pushing him back towards diplomacy and the negotiating table.

Jonathan M Winer
US Department of State  HST 6250
Washington DC 20520
(202)647-9548 (office phone)
(cell phone)
Sure-  Happy thanks till Monday.

Yes.  I’m out rest of week.  Monday ok?

In person whenever you are in office and can make 15-30 minutes.

With warm regards, Jonathan
From: Nuland, Victoria J
To: Kavalec, Kathleen A; Winer, Jonathan
Subject: Re: I’m in London but if you have two minutes please call me asap

Assuming u r asleep now

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From: Winer, Jonathan
Date: October 31, 2016 at 6:27:08 PM EDT
To: Kavalec, Kathleen A, Nuland, Victoria J
Subject: I’m in London but if you have two minutes please call me asap

Happy to connect with either Toria or Kathy.
Jonathan Winer