Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack


Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

U.S. Senator Gary Peters, Chair
U.S. Senator Rob Portman, Ranking Member

Committee on Rules and Administration

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Staff Report
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On January 6, 2021, the world witnessed a violent and unprecedented attack on the U.S. Capitol, the Vice President, Members of Congress, and the democratic process. Rioters, attempting to disrupt the Joint Session of Congress, broke into the Capitol building, vandalized and stole property, and ransacked offices. They attacked members of law enforcement and threatened the safety and lives of our nation’s elected leaders. Tragically, seven individuals, including three law enforcement officers, ultimately lost their lives.

Rioters were intent on disrupting the Joint Session, during which Members of Congress were scheduled to perform their constitutional obligation to count the electoral votes for President and Vice President of the United States and announce the official results of the 2020 election. Due to the heroism of United States Capitol Police ("USCP") officers, along with their federal, state, and local law enforcement partners, the rioters failed to prevent Congress from fulfilling its constitutional duty. In the early hours of January 7, the President of the Senate, Vice President Pence, announced Joseph Biden and Kamala Harris as the President-elect and Vice President-elect of the United States.

This report addresses the security, planning, and response failures of the entities directly responsible for Capitol security—USCP and the Capitol Police Board, which is comprised of the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms and the Architect of the Capitol as voting members, and the USCP Chief as a non-voting member—along with critical breakdowns involving several federal agencies, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), and Department of Defense ("DOD"). The Committees also made a series of recommendations for the Capitol Police Board, USCP, federal intelligence agencies, DOD, and other Capital region law enforcement agencies to address the intelligence and security failures.

The Committees’ investigation uncovered a number of intelligence and security failures leading up to and on January 6 that allowed for the breach of the Capitol. These breakdowns ranged from federal intelligence agencies failing to warn of a potential for violence to a lack of planning and preparation by USCP and law enforcement leadership.

The federal Intelligence Community—led by FBI and DHS—did not issue a threat assessment warning of potential violence targeting the Capitol on January 6. Law enforcement entities, including USCP, largely rely on FBI and DHS to assess and communicate homeland security threats. Throughout 2020, the FBI and DHS disseminated written documents detailing the potential for increased violent extremist activity at lawful protests and targeting of law enforcement and government facilities and personnel. Despite online calls for violence at the Capitol, neither the FBI nor DHS issued a threat assessment or intelligence bulletin warning law enforcement entities in the National Capital Region of the potential for violence. FBI and DHS officials stressed the difficulty in discerning constitutionally protected free speech versus actionable, credible threats of violence. In testimony before the Committees, officials from both
FBI and DHS acknowledged that the Intelligence Community needs to improve its handling and dissemination of threat information from social media and online message boards.

**USCP’s intelligence components failed to convey the full scope of threat information they possessed.** Although USCP mainly relies on the FBI and DHS for intelligence and threat information, USCP has three components responsible for intelligence-related activities. These components, and the materials they produce, are supposed to inform USCP’s security and operational planning. This, however, was not the case for January 6.

USCP’s lead intelligence component—the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division (“IICD”)—was aware of the potential for violence in the days and weeks ahead of January 6. It received information from a variety of sources about threats of violence focused on the Joint Session and the Capitol Complex and the large crowds expected to gather in Washington, D.C. on January 6. Yet, IICD failed to fully incorporate this information into all of its internal assessments about January 6 and the Joint Session. As a result, critical information regarding threats of violence was not shared with USCP’s own officers and other law enforcement partners.

USCP’s preparations for the Joint Session also suffered because of the decentralized nature of its intelligence components. On January 5, an employee in a separate USCP intelligence-related component received information from the FBI’s Norfolk Field Office regarding online discussions of violence directed at Congress, including that protestors were coming to Congress “prepared for war.” This report, similar to other information received by IICD, was never distributed to IICD or USCP leadership before January 6.

USCP was not adequately prepared to prevent or respond to the January 6 security threats, which contributed to the breach of the Capitol. Steven Sund, the USCP Chief on January 6, and Yogananda Pittman, who was designated as Acting Chief after Steven Sund announced his resignation on January 7, both attributed the breach of the Capitol to intelligence failures across the federal government. USCP leadership, however, also failed to prepare a department-wide operational plan for the Joint Session. Similarly, USCP leadership did not develop a comprehensive staffing plan for the Joint Session detailing, among other things, where officers would be located. USCP could not provide the Committees any documents showing where officers were located at the start of the attack and how that changed throughout the attack.

USCP leadership also failed to provide front-line officers with effective protective equipment or training. Although USCP activated seven specialty Civil Disturbance Unit (“CDU”) platoons in advance of the Joint Session, only four of those platoons were outfitted with special protective equipment, including helmets, hardened plastic armor, and shields. The many other USCP officers who fought to defend the Capitol were left to do so in their daily uniforms. Many of those front-line officers had not received training in basic civil disturbance tactics since their initial Recruit Officer Class training. While some CDU officers were issued special protective equipment, the platoons were not authorized to wear the equipment at the beginning of their shifts. Instead, USCP staged equipment on buses near the Capitol. In at least one instance, when the platoon attempted to retrieve the equipment, the bus was locked, leaving the platoon without access to this critical equipment. USCP also failed to provide equipment
training to support the CDU platoons and did not authorize CDU platoons to use all available less-than-lethal munitions, which could have enhanced officers’ ability to push back rioters.

These operational failures were exacerbated by leadership’s failure to clearly communicate during the attack. USCP leadership gathered in a command center, blocks away from the Capitol building. Two incident commanders identified as responsible for relaying information to front-line officers were forced to engage with rioters during the attack, making it difficult for them to relay information. As a result, communications were chaotic, sporadic, and, according to many front-line officers, non-existent.

Opaque processes and a lack of emergency authority delayed requests for National Guard assistance. The USCP Chief has no unilateral authority to request assistance from the National Guard; the USCP Chief must submit a request for assistance to the Capitol Police Board for approval. Steven Sund never submitted a formal request to the Capitol Police Board for National Guard support in advance of January 6. Instead, Steven Sund had informal conversations with the House Sergeant at Arms, Paul Irving, and the Senate Sergeant at Arms, Michael Stenger, regarding the potential need for National Guard support. No one ever discussed the possibility of National Guard support with the Architect of the Capitol, the third voting member of the Capitol Police Board.

The members of the Capitol Police Board who were in charge on January 6 did not appear to be fully familiar with the statutory and regulatory requirements for requesting National Guard support, which contributed to the delay in deploying the National Guard to the Capitol. In their testimony before the Committees, Paul Irving and Steven Sund offered different accounts of when Steven Sund first requested National Guard assistance during the attack. Phone records reveal a number of conversations between Steven Sund and Paul Irving on January 6. However, because there is no transcription of the conversations, there is no way for the Committees to determine when the request was made. National Guard assistance was delayed while Steven Sund attempted to contact the Capitol Police Board members and obtain the required approvals. Regardless of what time the request was made, the need to await Capitol Police Board approval during an emergency hindered the ability to request District of Columbia National Guard (“DCNG”) assistance quickly.

The intelligence failures, coupled with the Capitol Police Board’s failure to request National Guard assistance prior to January 6, meant DCNG was not activated, staged, and prepared to quickly respond to an attack on the Capitol. As the attack unfolded, DOD required time to approve the request and gather, equip, and instruct its personnel on the mission, which resulted in additional delays. Prior to January 6, USCP informed DOD officials on two separate occasions that it was not seeking DCNG assistance for the Joint Session of Congress. The D.C. government, by contrast, did request unarmed troops for traffic support, and on January 6, 154 unarmed DCNG personnel were staged at traffic control points throughout the city. As the attack unfolded, USCP and the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia (“MPD”) both pleaded with DOD officials for immediate assistance. DOD officials claimed they received a “workable” request for assistance from USCP at approximately 2:30 p.m. The request was presented to the Acting Secretary of Defense and approved at approximately 3:00 p.m. For the next ninety minutes, DOD officials ordered DCNG personnel to return to the Armory, obtain necessary gear, and prepare for deployment as leaders quickly
prepared a mission plan. Miscommunication and confusion during response preparations, demonstrated by conflicting records about who authorized deployment and at what time, contributed to the delayed deployment. DCNG began arriving at the Capitol Complex at 5:20 p.m.—nearly three hours after DOD received USCP’s request for assistance and more than four hours after the barriers at the Capitol were first breached.

The Committees’ Recommendations

Based on the findings of the investigation, the Committees identified a number of recommendations to address the intelligence and security failures leading up to and on January 6. Recommendations specific to the Capitol Complex include empowering the USCP Chief to request assistance from the DCNG in emergency situations and passing legislation to clarify the statutes governing requests for assistance from executive agencies and departments in non-emergency situations. To address the preparedness of the USCP, the Committees recommend improvements to training, equipment, intelligence collection, and operational planning.

The Committees further recommend intelligence agencies review and evaluate criteria for issuing and communicating intelligence assessments and the establishment of standing “concept of operation” scenarios and contingency plans to improve DOD and DCNG response to civil disturbance and terrorism incidents. These scenarios and plans should detail what level of DOD or DCNG assistance may be required, what equipment would be needed for responding personnel, and the plan for command-and-control during the response.

The Committees’ Investigation

Two days after the January 6 attack, the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration and Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee announced a joint bipartisan oversight investigation to examine the intelligence and security failures that led to the attack. On February 23, 2021, the Committees held the first public oversight hearing on the attack. The hearing, entitled Examining the January 6 Attack on the U.S. Capitol, featured testimony from the USCP Chief, House Sergeant at Arms, and Senate Sergeant at Arms in charge on January 6. The Committees also heard testimony from the Acting Chief of MPD. One week later, on March 3, 2021, the Committees held a second oversight hearing, which included witnesses from DOD, DCNG, FBI, and DHS.

As part of their investigation, the Committees reviewed thousands of documents. The Committees also received written statements from more than 50 USCP officers about their experiences. In addition, the Committees interviewed numerous current and former officials from USCP, Senate Sergeant at Arms, House Sergeant at Arms, Architect of the Capitol, FBI, DHS, MPD, DOD, and DCNG. Most entities cooperated with the Committees’ requests. There were notable exceptions, however: the Department of Justice and DHS have yet to fully comply with the Committees’ requests for information, the Office of the House of Representatives Sergeant at Arms did not comply with the Committees’ information requests, and a USCP Deputy Chief of Police declined to be interviewed by the Committees. The Committees will continue to pursue responses from those who have failed to fully comply. The oversight of events related to January 6, including intelligence and security failures, will continue.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings of Fact

(1) Neither the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) nor the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) issued formal intelligence bulletins about the potential for violence at the Capitol on January 6, which hindered law enforcement’s preparations for the Joint Session of Congress. The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (“I&A”) issued no intelligence products specific to January 6. Rather, it issued 15 intelligence products in 2020 related to domestic violent extremism, the last of which was issued on December 30 without any mention of the Joint Session of Congress or the Capitol. The FBI similarly did not issue any formal intelligence assessment specific to January 6; however, late on January 5, the FBI’s Norfolk Field Office circulated a Situational Information Report, which is used by field offices “to share locally-derived information that is typically operational in nature” and does not meet the same criteria as intelligence assessments. That report warned of individuals traveling to Washington, D.C. for “war” at the Capitol on January 6. In the five months since the attack, neither agency has fully complied with the Committees’ request for information on the events of January 6.

(2) Neither the FBI nor DHS deemed online posts calling for violence at the Capitol as credible. In testimony before the Committees, representatives from both agencies noted that much of the rhetoric online prior to January 6 was “First Amendment protected speech” of limited credibility and acknowledged areas for improvement in the handling and dissemination of threat information from social media and online message boards to enhance law enforcement and intelligence agencies’ abilities to counter that threat.

(3) The United States Capitol Police’s (“USCP”) Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division (“IICD”) possessed information about the potential for violence at the Capitol on January 6 but did not convey the full scope of information, which affected its preparations. Internal records and USCP officials’ testimony confirm that USCP began gathering information about events planned for January 6 in mid-December 2020. Through open source collection, tips from the public, and other sources, USCP IICD knew about social media posts calling for violence at the Capitol on January 6, including a plot to breach the Capitol, the online sharing of maps of the Capitol Complex’s tunnel systems, and other specific threats of violence. Yet, IICD did not convey the full scope of known information to USCP leadership, rank-and-file officers, or law enforcement partners.

(4) Important intelligence information received by internal USCP components was not appropriately shared among USCP’s distinct intelligence-related components. USCP has three units responsible for intelligence-related activities— IICD, the Threat Assessment Section (“TAS”), and the Intelligence Operations Section (“IOS”)—all of which are organized within USCP’s Protective Services Bureau (“PSB”). Although the three components support one another, they have different responsibilities. The decentralized nature of intelligence resources led to
vital intelligence information not being shared with senior USCP intelligence officials or USCP leadership.

(5) **IICD issued multiple intelligence reports prior to January 6 that reflected inconsistent assessments of the risk of violence at the Capitol.** IICD issued intelligence products related to expected activities on January 6, but the products were contradictory as to the threat level. For example, although a January 3 Special Event Assessment warned of the Capitol being a target of armed violence on January 6, IICD’s daily intelligence reports rated the likelihood of civil disturbance on January 6 as “remote” to “improbable.”

(6) **USCP did not prepare a department-wide operational plan or staffing plan for the Joint Session.** In advance of January 6, Steven Sund, USCP Chief of Police on January 6, believed USCP would need support to secure the Capitol perimeter in light of the large number of expected protestors at the Capitol, but he did not order the creation of a department-wide operational plan. Although the Uniformed Services Bureau and the Civil Disturbance Unit prepared component-specific plans, neither was sufficiently detailed to inform officers of their responsibilities or authorities nor did they reference warnings contained in IICD’s January 3 Special Event Assessment.

(7) **USCP’s Civil Disturbance Unit operates on an “ad hoc” basis, without sufficient training or equipment.** Of USCP’s 1,840 sworn officers, only approximately 160 are trained in advanced civil disturbance tactics and use of “hard” protective equipment. Fewer than ten are trained to use USCP’s full suite of less-than-lethal munitions. On January 6, some of the “hard” protective equipment was defective or not staged in close proximity to the officers.

(8) **USCP’s rank-and-file officers were not provided periodic training in basic civil disturbance tactics or basic protective equipment.** All officers receive basic civil disturbance training during initial Recruit Officer Class training, but there is no further training requirement after graduation. As a result, some who responded to the Capitol attack had not received training in civil disturbance tactics in years. Officers were also not uniformly provided helmets, shields, gas masks, or other crowd control equipment prior to January 6, which would have aided their response.

(9) **USCP’s Incident Command System broke down during the attack, leaving front-line officers without key information or instructions as events unfolded.** USCP did not formally designate incident commanders in advance of January 6 through a department-wide operational plan. Senior officers were directly engaged with rioters during the attack, and USCP leadership never took control of the radio system to communicate orders to front-line officers.

(10) **Capitol Police Board members in charge on January 6 did not fully understand the statutory or regulatory requirements for requesting assistance from Executive agencies and departments or declaring emergencies.** Capitol Police Board members also disagreed as to whether unanimity was required to approve a
request from USCP for assistance from the District of Columbia National Guard ("DCNG").

(11) **Steven Sund never submitted a formal request to the Capitol Police Board for an emergency declaration and DCNG assistance before January 6.** Steven Sund had informal conversations with the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms, but no request was ever provided to the full Board. In fact, no one ever informed the Architect of the Capitol, the third voting member of the Board, of a potential request for DCNG assistance.

(12) **As the attack unfolded, Steven Sund lacked the authority to request National Guard assistance unilaterally.** Under the existing statute, the USCP Chief may obtain support from law enforcement and uniformed services only after the Capitol Police Board declares an emergency. This process constrained Steven Sund’s ability to act quickly during the attack and contributed to the delay in the provision of assistance.

(13) **The Department of Defense ("DOD") confirmed with USCP on two separate occasions before January 6 that USCP was not requesting assistance from DCNG.** According to DOD records, USCP confirmed on January 3 and January 4 that it did not need DCNG assistance. Meanwhile, DOD continued to communicate with the D.C. Mayor’s office regarding its request for unarmed DCNG personnel support.

(14) **DOD’s response to January 6 was informed by criticism it received about its response to the civil unrest after the murder of George Floyd during the summer of 2020.** DOD was criticized for its heavy-handed response, particularly flying military helicopters over the protests in summer 2020. DOD officials cited lessons learned from the summer 2020 as guiding its decision-making for January 6. DOD officials believed it needed “control measures” and “rigor” before deploying DCNG personnel, including a clear deployment plan to avoid the appearance of over-militarization.

(15) **DOD imposed control measures on DCNG deployment, including requiring the Army Secretary’s approval before deploying a Quick Reaction Force (“QRF”) and doing so “only as a last resort.”** DOD set forth requirements in a pair of memoranda issued on January 4 and January 5 that allowed William Walker, DCNG Commanding General, to deploy a QRF only as a last resort and upon the express approval of a concept of operations for any use of the QRF by the Secretary of the Army, Ryan McCarthy. General William Walker testified that, absent these requirements, he would have been able to immediately deploy the QRF to support USCP. DOD officials disputed that characterization and asserted that the memoranda simply memorialized longstanding policy. Christopher Miller, the Acting Secretary of Defense on January 6, was not aware that General William Walker wanted to deploy the QRF on January 6.
As the attack unfolded, DOD officials claimed they did not have a clear request for DCNG assistance until approximately 2:30 p.m. Ryan McCarthy indicated that Muriel Bowser, the Mayor of Washington, D.C., called him around 1:34 p.m. but did not request assistance at that time. Rather, she asked whether DOD had received requests from USCP because the crowd was “getting out of control.” Steven Sund called DCNG Commanding General William Walker at 1:49 p.m. to request assistance. According to Army officials, however, the requests were not specific and clarity on the scope of the request was needed.

Inaccurate media reports stating that DOD had denied a request for DCNG support slowed DOD’s mission analysis efforts. At 2:55 p.m., a reporter tweeted that DOD “had just denied a request by D.C. officials to deploy the National Guard to the US Capitol,” despite the fact that no denial had been ordered and senior DOD officials were still analyzing the request. Christopher Miller approved DCNG mobilization at 3:04 p.m., understanding that DOD officials would then conduct “mission analysis.” Ryan McCarthy, however, spent at least half an hour fielding calls and reassuring Congressional and local leaders that DOD “was indeed coming.”

DOD spent hours “mission planning.” Christopher Miller indicated that he gave all necessary approvals for deployment at 3:04 p.m. with the understanding that Ryan McCarthy would conduct mission analysis with General William Walker. Ryan McCarthy, by contrast, felt he needed to brief and receive Christopher Miller’s approval before DCNG personnel could leave the Armory. Ryan McCarthy co-located with D.C. officials and developed a concept of operations for DCNG personnel. The plan was approved and DCNG authorized to deploy by 4:35 p.m. All DOD officials who spoke with the Committees described the time spent on mission analysis as vital to DCNG’s effectiveness. By contrast, General William Walker believed DCNG was fully equipped and ready to respond to the Capitol much earlier.

DOD officials denied mentioning or discussing the “optics” of sending DCNG personnel to the Capitol and disagreed with purported statements by an Army official that deploying DCNG to the Capitol would not be “best military advice.” As Christopher Miller told the Committees, “[t]heir best military advice is theirs. The best military advice that I take is from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, statutorily. So the best military advice that I received was, ‘Let’s go. Agree.’”

DOD and DCNG have conflicting records of when orders and authorizations were given, and no one could explain why DCNG did not deploy until after 5:00 p.m. One current DOD official acknowledged that DOD and DCNG could have “tightened up” their response time between 4:35 p.m., when DCNG was authorized to deploy, and 5:02 p.m., when Army documents reflect DCNG’s deployment. Officials attributed the delay to confusion and noted that it takes time to get personnel staged for deployment once the order is given. Concerning the conflicting records and accounts as to who needed to approve deployment orders, DOD officials cited confusion, the lack of a lead federal agency with an integrated security plan, and breakdowns in communication as to when those orders were given, and when those orders were executed.
According to DOD, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") was designated as the lead federal agency in charge of security preparations and response on January 6, but DOJ did not conduct interagency rehearsals or establish an integrated security plan. DOD officials understood DOJ was designated prior to January 6. According to Ryan McCarthy, DOJ never established a point of contact and did not effectively coordinate a response during the attack. As noted above, DOJ has not fully complied with the Committees’ requests for information.
Recommendations

CAPITOL POLICE BOARD

(1) **Empower the Chief of USCP to request assistance from the D.C. National Guard in emergency situations.** Congress should pass legislation to clarify the statutes governing requests for assistance from executive agencies and departments in non-emergency situations. Under existing statute, the Chief of USCP may request support from law enforcement and uniformed services only after the Capitol Police Board declares an emergency. This process can constrain USCP’s ability to act quickly in an emergency and delay the provision of assistance.

(2) **Document and streamline Board policies and procedures for submitting, reviewing, and approving requests from USCP to ensure coordination among all members of the Board.** Board policies and procedures should include a requirement that Board members regularly review the policies and procedures to acknowledge their understanding and ensure adherence to the processes outlined therein.

(3) **Ensure the Board is appropriately balancing the need to share information with officials with the need to protect sensitive and classified information.**

(4) **Appoint a new Chief of USCP with appropriate input from USCP officers, congressional leadership, and the committees of jurisdiction.** In addition, the new Chief should evaluate the leadership team and ensure that promotions for leadership positions in USCP are handled in a transparent manner and based on merit.

U.S. CAPITOL POLICE

(1) **Ensure USCP has sufficient civilian and sworn personnel, with appropriate training and equipment, in the roles necessary to fulfill its mission.** This includes providing all officers annual training on basic civil disturbance tactics and equipping them with ballistic helmets, gloves, and gas masks—the same equipment that the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) provides to its officers. USCP should maintain an inventory of all issued equipment and ensure that the equipment is periodically replaced. Congress should authorize sufficient funding to support the additional training and equipment requirements, as well as adequate staffing levels.

(2) **Require a department-wide operational plan for special events.** These procedures should include a bureau-specific security plan, which informs the USCP-wide operational plan. The plans should detail, at a minimum: the threat assessment for the event, staffing, deployment strategy, mission objectives, incident command system, authorized use of force, and relevant contingencies in the event of an emergency. USCP should ensure that the operational plans are informed by available intelligence and threat assessments.
(3) Establish the Civil Disturbance Unit (“CDU”) as a formal, permanent component of USCP and ensure that its dedicated officers are properly trained and equipped at all times. USCP should ensure that all members of the CDU are equipped with “hard” gear and receive annual training in advanced civil disturbance tactics and less-than-lethal munitions. USCP should also ensure that all “hard” protective equipment is properly maintained and regularly replaced.

(4) Consolidate and elevate all USCP intelligence units into an Intelligence Bureau, led by a civilian Director of Intelligence reporting to the Assistant Chief of Police for Protective and Intelligence Operations; ensure the Bureau is adequately staffed and all agents and analysts are properly trained to receive and analyze intelligence information; and develop policies to disseminate intelligence information to leadership and rank-and-file officers effectively. Currently, USCP has three separate intelligence-related entities within the Protective Services Bureau. Elevating these entities into a Bureau will increase focus on USCP’s intelligence capabilities, improve the timely sharing of relevant intelligence up the chain of command, and decrease lack of coordination within the agency and with law enforcement partners. USCP should ensure that all training given to agents and analysts is consistent with best practices of the Intelligence Community and law enforcement partners, including the determination of credibility and overall threat assessment. USCP should enhance its relationships with Intelligence Community partners, and increase the number of liaisons USCP has integrated in National Capital Region task forces, including those with the FBI and D.C. Fusion Center.

(5) Update its Incident Command System Directive to address how Incident Commanders are to communicate priorities, strategies, tactics, and threat assessment to front-line officers prior to and during an incident and ensure that the Directive is followed. USCP should also formalize the process for designating incident commanders for large events and account for contingencies should incident commanders be unable to communicate to officers, including requiring senior leaders to take over communication responsibilities.

HOUSE AND SENATE SERGEANTS AT ARMS

Develop protocols for communicating with Members of Congress, staff, and other employees during emergencies.

INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

(1) Review and evaluate handling of open-source information, such as social media, containing threats of violence.

(2) Review and evaluate criteria for issuing and communicating intelligence assessments, bulletins, and other products to consumer agencies, such as USCP.
(3) Fully comply with statutory reporting requirements to Congress on domestic terrorism data, including on the threat level and the resources dedicated to countering the threat.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE/D.C. NATIONAL GUARD

(1) Develop standing “concept of operation” scenarios and contingency plans for responding quickly to civil disturbance and terrorism incidents. These scenarios and plans should detail what level of DOD or DCNG assistance may be required, what equipment would be needed for responding personnel, and the plan for command-and-control during the response. These scenarios and plans can help reduce confusion or the necessary planning time to allow DOD to respond more quickly to unfolding emergencies. DOD and DCNG should perform tabletop and joint training exercises concerning responding to an attack on the Capitol, which includes coordinating with local law enforcement and neighboring states.

(2) Enhance communications prior to and during an event between DOD and DCNG strategic, operational, and tactical decision-makers and commanding generals. These communications should include regular updates prior to an event concerning operations and strategy, as well as regular updates on the day of an event through direct communications between the decision-makers and commanding generals, including by co-locating leaders where practicable.

(3) Practice the mobilization of National Guard members from neighboring jurisdictions to provide immediate assistance and report to command and control in the event of an emergency. Those Guard members should be trained and equipped to respond to emergencies.

(4) For special events in which a Quick Reaction Force (“QRF”) is approved, consider proximity and response time, among other factors, when deciding where to stage the QRF to ensure the ability to quickly respond to incidents at the Capitol.

(5) Clarify the approval processes and chain of command within DOD to prevent delays in the deployment of DCNG when authorized.

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND UNIFORMED SERVICES IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

(1) Ensure that Mutual Aid Agreements among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies include all partners in the National Capital Region and that those agreements are regularly reviewed and updated.
(2) Conduct joint training exercises to ensure coordination across federal, state, and local governments concerning security threats in the Washington, D.C. area for requesting, receiving, and utilizing emergency assistance. Training exercises should cover command-and-control processes during an emergency to ensure the prompt response and timely integration of personnel.

Additional USCP Inspector General Recommendations

After January 6, a number of Inspectors General announced investigations into their agencies’ preparation and response to the attack on the Capitol. The Committees support these oversight efforts. To date, the USCP Office of Inspector General has released a number of recommendations for USCP, which are summarized at Appendix A.