

[REDACTED] (DO) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (DO) (FB [REDACTED]@fbi.sgov.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, October 4, 2017 12:05 PM
To: [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (DO) (FBI)
Subject: My notes re: first day - [REDACTED]
Attachments: 2017091 [REDACTED] STEELE_London_Debriefing_Part_B_Draft.docx

Classification: [REDACTED]
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
=====

[REDACTED]

See what you think. Add/clarify anything please.

[REDACTED] – for your review as well.

Out of abundance of caution – though we need to determine one way or another how we’re handling classification – I’m classifying this em [REDACTED].

Best,

[REDACTED]
Supervisory Intelligence Analyst

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=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

Declassified by FBI-C58W88B61
on 10/16/2020
This redacted version only

-- preliminaries with both business partners

█ very concerned about the loose business ends

-- Still pretty upset, as we spent time and effort getting material to you

-- We had a contract of some sort with █ – Orbis had a contract; maybe it was put together with just CS as the face of it [we indicated that we two were not involved; not privy to how any initial contract was set up]

-- Apologies for going to the press, but we found ourselves “riding two horses” as the election season went on, and eventually [after Comey’s reopening of the HRC investigation] we had to pick “one horse” and we chose the business “horse” vs. the “FBI” horse – hence, we followed what our client wanted and spoke to the press

-- This was a combination of “your fault” and “our fault”

-- They were confused about FBI and SCO, wanted to make sure that they were talking to SCO; we ensured them that their information would be going straight to Mueller

-- Ensured them that only a small group of people knew that we were meeting and talking, including Mueller

█ made the point that, in his former career, he “knew Mueller”

-- They were certainly frustrated by the inclusion of their reporting in the ICA annex. I explained that the ICA (which included the annex) was based on POTUS Obama’s USIC-wide call for information on Russian influence and 2016 election. Their reporting, as it was provided to the FBI, was part of the overall material that fit with that call for information. They felt that they should have had advance warning that their information was going in the ICA. They said that the use of their information, and the subsequent public leak of the annex, put CS’ name out there and had a “massive impact on our lives.” They wanted to know how the U █
█ worked this out – i.e. wa █ told that this information was going in the ICA? █ NOTE: They brought up the inclusion of their material in the ICA annex multiple times – almost to the point that it felt like fishing for information about how the ICA was constructed. In the end, I made the point that I wasn’t going to get into how the ICA was put together, how the annex came about, etc.]

-- They had strong statements about POTUS Trump – registered Trump as their ‘main opponent’ and registered fear about how Trump negatively impacted the historical UK-US alliance and special relationship.

-- Talked about what Bruce Ohr’s connections with them during the run-up to the election; they gave material to Ohr and pushed Ohr to do something about it; Ohr explained DOJ policy re: hands-off prior to elections; then the Comey announcement happened and their client felt like the gloves had come off

-- Talked about p-sub and how p-sub’s information had been used in earlier reports given to FBI; same p-sub was used for earlier reports

-- Said that Glen Simpson, Fusion GPS, was aware that he was sharing reports/information with FBI

-- Wasn’t sure who to go t █ to give these reports in the end; h █
█
█
█
█
█

-- p-sub me [REDACTED]; p-sub shared photo with C [REDACTED]
-- CS tried to have p-sub tape a meeting btwee [REDACTED] p-sub; unsuccessful
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] who originally provided hotel info re: T to p-sub; p-sub followed up with 3 people; they have the names of three people re: f/u

[REDACTED]

-- never heard of Page or Cohen before this, or Papadopoulos
-- had heard of Manafort, which got the whole thing started
-- hear [REDACTED]; more below

-- knew p-sub's background, current positions of sub-sources, consistent reporting through multiple projects → vetting/validating himself
-- confirming through other source reporting

-- Orbis ha [REDACTED]
-- biggest was the p-sub network
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

--p-sub issue
-- feels like it's about tim [REDACTED] engages with special counsel
-- s/w p-sub last night; he's "coming along" with the idea of talking with sc, but not there yet
-- CS very concerned to protect p-sub
-- very special story, esp ho [REDACTED] came to work for Orbis

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] – would have to b [REDACTED] for access; or possibly
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
-- traine [REDACTED] u [REDACTED] a prolific asset
-- motivation [REDACTED]
-- uses prio [REDACTED]; reporting has become better over time
-- anything happen t [REDACTED] while collecting?

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
-- CS felt this was good sign – things haven't gone smoothly all the time
-- p-sub too [REDACTED] trips for election-related reports
-- CS said they destroyed materials for legal reasons; working from memory on some of this
[REDACTED]

-- Would debrief after these trips [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

-- p-sub use [REDACTED] and other ways to communicat [REDACTED]
-- tried to get audio of p-sub and one [REDACTED] subsources; successfully got audio of convo between p-sub
an [REDACTED] subsource re: Cohen meeting in Prague
-- don't have that audio in its original form; has to be careful re: legal issues here
-- have audio and transcription of audio
-- may have opportunity to get more on this b/c this particular subsource [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]; p-sub is having dialogue wit [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

-- this particular source provided information on Ivanov and Prague
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] provided details on Prague
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] provided info on Prague and Ivanov
-- another source provided information on cyber
-- talked about how the FSB was able to turn an individual who had been caught money
laundering and get them to work cyber for FSB; main source commented about how this is the
way that the FSB typically operates

-- asked in reference to the fact that some of the reporting discusse [REDACTED] matter [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

-- what does p-sub tell other people about wha [REDACTED] doing, and wh [REDACTED] asking questions?
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

-- with respect to the election-related material, it didn't take much to collect early-on because the whole
thing was an "open secret" in Moscow; people would start talking in bars, and p-sub could easily elicit;
later, as time went on, sources started shutting down and it became harder to get information

-- p-sub has sub-source [REDACTED]

-- p-sub traveled [REDACTED]

-- p-sub has contact [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

-- for the election-related stuff, p-sub [REDACTED]

-- for the election-related material

-- Orbis' initial interest was a litigation-related issue – involving potential litigation with Paul Manafort; started around May 2016

-- Manafort had “disappeared” for multiple year [REDACTED]; appeared to be hiding from creditors

-- Manafort owed money – 100M to oligarchs and more money to Russians

-- Fusion GPS had a different client for whom it was already doing research on Manafort

-- Around June, met with Fusion GPS and they decided to start swapping notes

-- Soon thereafter, the decision was made to have Fusion GPS hire Orbis on the election-related stuff (“take [Orbis] on for the bigger issue”)

-- In June, Orbis took its own crack at it

-- This wasn't the only political sensitive investigation that Orbis was working

-- Orbis was handling an English FA matter, regarding a competitor for the bid process; and [one that he was hesitant in sharing, caveat re: very sensitive], they were involved in doing work regarding the election campaign for th [REDACTED] – a client wanted them to work up material on possible voting intentions

[REDACTED] Orbis got reporting from p-sub and another source

[REDACTED], got a debrief [from other source?] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

-- P-sub did a bit of wo [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

-- Talked about different p-su [REDACTED];

-- Carter Page – the reporting stemmed from Page's speech in Moscow in July. The reporting p-sub was able to get re: Page's meeting with Sechin and Page's meeting with Divyekin all came from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

-- Peskov's office – this reportin stem [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

-- Talked in more detail regarding his decision to talk to media
-- After Comey's letter reopening HRC case, Fusion GPS felt like gloves had come off
-- Mentioned how there had been discussion earlier with Bruce Ohr about "getting this info out" but Ohr talked about DOJ policy about not taking actions prior to elections
-- Fusion GPS put pressure on Orbis to talk to Mother Jones
-- The interview was supposed to be off-the-record, but then he altered that and said it was a combination of "off" and "on" record; in the end, he said that he shouldn't have given the interview
-- With the breakdown that the interview then caused with FBI, they had no way of getting this information into the hands of people that they believed needed it; after that, that's when they decided to go the McCain/Kramer route, which, in the end, he believes is how BuzzFeed got the material, and why now, given the BuzzFeed publication, he has the legal problems he has now

-- About Bruce Ohr

-- Bruce knows that we're in touch right now; he knows about this meeting that we're having
-- We talked about how he used Bruce to reach out to try and get us in contact; also reaching out to Bruce and Glen Simpson about p-sub
-- This led to additional discussion about p-sub meeting with Special Counsel
-- He only wants this to happen if p-sub agrees
-- He believes that p-sub is "coming around" but that it needs to be carefully handled

[REDACTED]
)-- This also led to a discussion about what p-sub is currently doing for Orbis
[REDACTED] has been doing a bit of work for us recently"
[REDACTED] has been reaching out to some of the same sources
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] mentioned with this the issue of Russian money being used for Brexit, and later referenced two individuals with respect to Russian influence and Brexi [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

-- What kind of tradecraft does p-sub use whe [REDACTED] collecting information for you?
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] takes very few written notes
[REDACTED] is very thorough when it comes to prepari [REDACTED] to be debriefe [REDACTED] takes some time before being debriefed to ge [REDACTED] thoughts and recollections together
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] used this approach before – specifically reference [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] has a very good memory
-- Onl [REDACTED] in the Orbis office have interacted with p-su [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

- He had substantive debriefings with p-sub
- P-sub had been working on multiple project [redacted]

-- "close enough...would have been told tha [redacted] been interviewed" [Need to talk t [redacted]

[redacted] that p-sub has been involved with the dossier?

- Ye [redacted] th [redacted] involved
- Remember that p-sub went to grou [redacted]
[redacted], indicated that he was worried about [redacted].
- He doesn't know when the last tim [redacted]

[redacted].

-- Discussion of p-sub validation/control issues

- money transfer
[redacted] behavior is that of someone who is scared
[redacted] wouldn't be talking about coming to talk to SCO if there was a problem
- Not, in his opinion, exhibiting signs/behavior of someone who is under control
- Can't guarantee that p-sub's sub-source aren't under control
- Hasn't been easy to get info – had to dig
- Not sure wh [redacted] would still be hanging around – even in country – [redacted] was under foreign control

[redacted]-related p-sub report from late 2016

- This is a p-sub report that I didn't provide to FBI; not sure if you have it
- Have to start by talking about earlier Orbis reporting from 3 years back – circa 2014
- Orbis working on a hydro-carbon project for a client.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

- This report may have been shared with David Kramer – he sent it to Glen Simpson with the idea of having it shared.

-- [REDACTED]

-- Have any journalists approached p-sub [REDACTED]

-- Do p-sub's sub-sources know that their information was used in the dossier? Some have tried to talk to p-sub cryptically about the reports [REDACTED]. He believes that p-sub's subsources have an idea that their information was used.

-- Discussion about th [REDACTED]

-- Nevertheless, he takes this situation seriously; gives him pause – reminds him of another, recent situatio [REDACTED]

-- On this note, 3-4 months ago, there was a shooting in the restroom of the Moscow restaurant (Cosmos/Kosmos). The shooting was in broad daylight. Kostya Myaski [Myanskiy?] (sp) was the victim [REDACTED]. The incident occurred in the May 2017 time frame.

-- Discussion about Orbis Business security procedures/situation post-dossier

- They had a situation arise where someone tried to spoof/impersonate the outside contractor who does Orbis' IT security. There was an attempt to change the password for their internal system, which was detected, and IT security contractor was contacted to determine if it was legitimate.
- If successful, this could have exposed clients, but not sensitive reporting, as that is kept off-line
- Have you had any situations, post-dossier, where you thought you were being offered dangles? Operational games [REDACTED] and the offer of tapes for money. We'll talk more about that later, but the existence of tapes have been played

out of proportion – just the fact that the Russian government has leverage on POTUS is a problem. It will be difficult to know if a tape has been doctored. There is a concern, post-dossier publicity, that any situation involving the provision of tapes can be a dangle or a controlled operation [REDACTED], but we'll talk about that tomorrow. Also, there are some dark web aspects to this – he wanted to know who is handling/analyzing dark web issues for the FBI?
-- Orbis is involved in some Kazakh-related and Cyprus-related business work, and some of the material obviously falls within the remit of Special Counsel. This brings up the issue of how we're going to go forward from here, how much support can be expected going forward.

From: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 10:10 AM
To: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Lates STEELE -- [REDACTED]

SentinelCaseId: NON-RECORD

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

=====
They do. They were highlighted when he received them by someone on the McCain side of things presumably.

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 8:08 AM
To: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Lates STEELE -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

=====
D said they had highlighting on them?

From: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 6:27 AM
To: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Lates STEELE -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

=====
I should add that none of them are new and all of them are duplicative of reports on your chart below...

J

From: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 6:25 AM
To: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Lates STEELE -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
=====

I have an envelope o STEELE reports that the D received from John McCain as well that can be added to the chart below. [REDACTED], swing by this morning and I'll give them to you to put into the file...

Thanks,

J

From [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 4:19 PM
To [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CV) (FBI) [REDACTED] (NY) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CG) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED], [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Lates STEELE -- [REDACTED]




Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
=====

Following up on the new information on the thumb drive – please see this tracking matrix which is also saved on the share drive:

Report Number	Report Dated	Simpson file date *	CROSSFIRE received	STEELE to FBI	Corn to Baker	Simpson to Ohr	Comm
80	6/20/2016	11/1/2016 ?	9/19/2016				It appears file mod
86	7/26/2016	7/28/2016	12/12/2016				Obtained from Si
94	7/19/2016	7/19/2016	9/19/2016				

95	Not dated	7/28/2016	9/19/2016				Simpson thumb (7/28/2016)
97*	7/30/2016	7/30/2016	10/26/2016				Obtained from C
100	8/5/2016	8/5/2016	9/19/2016				
101	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016				
102	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016				
105	8/22/2016	8/22/2016	10/26/2016				Obtained from C
111	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016				Obtained from C
112*	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016				Obtained from C
113	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	12/12/2016				Obtained from Si
130	10/12/2016		10/19/2016				
132	10/13/2016		10/19/2016				
134	10/18/2016	10/18/2016	10/19/2016				
135	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	10/19/2016				
136	10/20/2016	10/20/2016	10/21/2016				
137	10/14/2016		10/24/2016				
139	10/27/2016		10/28/2016				
Winer	10/19/2016		10/19/2016				
Intel Snippet	11/29/2016	11/29/2016	12/12/2016				Obtained from Si

-  Indicates FBI did not receive from STEELE
-  FBI received from STEELE
-  FBI receive STEELE report from another source

Simpson file date * = the date indicated on the Simpson thumb drive file directory as "date modified"
 97* and 112* - prior to receiving the Simpson version, the FBI only had redacted versions provided to Corn.

From [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 2:04 PM
To [redacted] (CV) (FBI) [redacted] (NY) (FBI) [redacted] (CG) (FBI) [redacted], [redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted], [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Lates STEELE -- [redacted]

Classification: [redacted]

[redacted]
 [redacted]
 [redacted]

=====

Folks,

As many of you know we obtained a USB drive from Glenn Simpson via a DOJ colleague. We are handling as evidence and a working copy is in the share drive – where we have historically kept STEELE reporting, the folder labeled [REDACTED] Reporting, sub folder Simpson 121216. A cursory look at the files appears they are indeed STEELE reports. Please review and let's discuss tomorrow morning.

In addition, we will resume 0900 meetings every Wednesday until we no longer need to meet. Let's start up again tomorrow.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

SS [REDACTED]

Washington Field Office

[REDACTED] @ic.fbi.gov (NIPR) - (Unavail during work hours)

[REDACTED] @fbi.sgov.gov (SIPR)

[REDACTED] @fbi.ic.gov (SCION)

[REDACTED] Cell - (Unavail during work hours)

[REDACTED] Desk

[REDACTED] STE

[REDACTED] NSTS - ((call desk first))

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

STEELE report tracking Matrix

Report Number	Report Dated	Simpson file date *	CROSSFIRE received	STEELE to FBI	Corn to Baker	Simpson to Ohr	McCain to Comey	Buzzfeed Published	Comment
80	6/20/2016	11/1/2016 ?	9/19/2016				12/9/2016		It appears file modified on 11/1/16
86	7/26/2016	7/28/2016	12/12/2016						Obtained from Simpson via Ohr
94	7/19/2016	7/19/2016	9/19/2016						
95	Not dated	7/28/2016	9/19/2016						Simpson thumb drive indicates 7/28/16
97*	7/30/2016	7/30/2016	10/26/2016						Obtained from Corn via Baker
100	8/5/2016	8/5/2016	9/19/2016						
101	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016						
102	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016						
105	8/22/2016	8/22/2016	10/26/2016						Obtained from Corn via Baker
111	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016						Obtained from Corn via Baker
112*	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016						Obtained from Corn via Baker
113	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	12/12/2016						Obtained from Simpson via Ohr
130	10/12/2016		10/19/2016						
132	10/13/2016		10/19/2016						
134	10/18/2016	10/18/2016	10/19/2016						
135	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	10/19/2016						
136	10/20/2016	10/20/2016	10/21/2016						
137	10/14/2016		10/24/2016						
139	10/27/2016		10/28/2016						
Winer	10/19/2016		10/19/2016						
Intel Snippet	11/29/2016	11/29/2016	12/12/2016						Obtained from Simpson via Ohr
166	12/13/2016								

 Indicates FBI did not receive from  STEELE

 FBI received from  STEELE

 FBI received  STEELE report from another source

Simpson file date * = the date indicated on the Simpson thumb drive file directory as "date modified" 97* and 112* - prior to receiving the Simpson version, the FBI only had redacted versions provided to Corn.

From: [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2016 7:35 AM
To: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Lates STEELE -- [REDACTED]

SentinelCaseId: NON-RECORD

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

=====



17_29112016 - 36_ [REDACTED] .. 24_ComplntRep...
Intel Snippet....

I have not seen the ne [REDACTED]. Pete had copies of tw [REDACTED] on Monday, read them to Joe and to me, but kept them.

-

From: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2016 6:18 AM
To: [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Lates STEELE -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

=====

Can you please help me out this morning and get me copies of the three ne STEELE reports (86, 113, and the intel snippet). Electronic on email is fine.

I also need to see any of the ne [REDACTED] that came in. Nobody seems to know where they are and I assume that means they ended up with you guys (hopefully). Any ideas who might have them?

Thanks,

J


From [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 2:52 PM
To [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CV) (FBI) [REDACTED] (NY) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CG) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED], [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Lates **STEELE** -- [REDACTED]


Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Please see latest to include a column regarding what the Director received from Senator McCain. A pattern also appears to be forming as some reports were only provided to the FBI... or we just haven't received from outside parties...unclear. See 132, 137, 139 and Winer.

Report Number	Report Dated	Simpson file date *	CROSSFIRE received	STEELE to FBI	Corn to Baker	Simpson to Ohr	McCain to Comey	Cor
80	6/20/2016	11/1/2016 ?	9/19/2016	Green	Green	Green	12/9/2016	It appears file m
86	7/26/2016	7/28/2016	12/12/2016	Red	Red	Green		Obtained from
94	7/19/2016	7/19/2016	9/19/2016	Green	Green	Green		
95	Not dated	7/28/2016	9/19/2016	Green	Green	Green		Simpson thurr 7/
97*	7/30/2016	7/30/2016	10/26/2016	Red	Red	Green		Obtained from
100	8/5/2016	8/5/2016	9/19/2016	Green	Red	Green		
101	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016	Green	Red	Green		
102	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016	Green	Red	Green		
105	8/22/2016	8/22/2016	10/26/2016	Red	Red	Green		Obtained from
111	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016	Red	Red	Green		Obtained from
112*	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016	Red	Red	Green		Obtained from
113	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	12/12/2016	Red	Red	Green		Obtained from
130	10/12/2016		10/19/2016	Green	Red	Red		
132	10/13/2016		10/19/2016	Green	Red	Red		
134	10/18/2016	10/18/2016	10/19/2016	Green	Green	Green		
135	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	Green	Red	Green		
136	10/20/2016	10/20/2016	10/21/2016	Green	Green	Green		
137	10/14/2016		10/24/2016	Green	Red	Red		
139	10/27/2016		10/28/2016	Green	Red	Red		
Winer	10/19/2016		10/19/2016	Green	Red	Red		
Intel Snippet	11/29/2016	11/29/2016	12/12/2016	Red	Red	Green	Red	Obtained from

 Indicates FBI did not receive from **STEELE**

 FBI received from **STEELE**

 FBI receive **STEELE** report from another source





































Simpson file date * = the date indicated on the Simpson thumb drive file directory as "date modified"
97* and 112* - prior to receiving the Simpson version, the FBI only had redacted versions provided to Corn.

From [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 4:19 PM
To [redacted] (WF) (FBI) [redacted] (CV) (FBI) [redacted] M. (NY) (FBI) [redacted]
(CG) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted],
[redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (WF) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (CD)
(FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted],
[redacted] (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Lates **STEELE** -- [redacted]


Classification: [redacted]


[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

Following up on the new information on the thumb drive – please see this tracking matrix which is also saved on the share drive:

Report Number	Report Dated	Simpson file date *	CROSSFIRE received	STEELE to FBI	Corn to Baker	Simpson to Ohr	Comm
80	6/20/2016	11/1/2016 ?	9/19/2016				It appears file mod
86	7/26/2016	7/28/2016	12/12/2016				Obtained from Si
94	7/19/2016	7/19/2016	9/19/2016				
95	Not dated	7/28/2016	9/19/2016				Simpson thumb c 7/28/
97*	7/30/2016	7/30/2016	10/26/2016				Obtained from C
100	8/5/2016	8/5/2016	9/19/2016				
101	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016				
102	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016				
105	8/22/2016	8/22/2016	10/26/2016				Obtained from C
111	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016				Obtained from C
112*	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016				Obtained from C
113	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	12/12/2016				Obtained from Si

130	10/12/2016		10/19/2016				
132	10/13/2016		10/19/2016				
134	10/18/2016	10/18/2016	10/19/2016				
135	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	10/19/2016				
136	10/20/2016	10/20/2016	10/21/2016				
137	10/14/2016		10/24/2016				
139	10/27/2016		10/28/2016				
Winer	10/19/2016		10/19/2016				
Intel Snippet	11/29/2016	11/29/2016	12/12/2016				Obtained from Si

 Indicates FBI did not receive from **STEELE**

 FBI received from **STEELE**

 FBI receive **STEELE** report from another source

Simpson file date * = the date indicated on the Simpson thumb drive file directory as "date modified"
 97* and 112* - prior to receiving the Simpson version, the FBI only had redacted versions provided to Corn.

From [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 2:04 PM
To [redacted] (CV) (FBI) [redacted] (NY) (FBI) [redacted] (CG) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted], [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Lates **STEELE** -- [redacted]

Classification: [redacted]

[redacted]
 [redacted]
 [redacted]

Folks,

As many of you know we obtained a USB drive from Glenn Simpson via a DOJ colleague. We are handling as evidence and a working copy is in the share drive – where we have historically kept **STEELE** reporting, the folder labeled– Rome Reporting, sub folder Simpson 121216. A cursory look at the files appears they are indeed **STEELE** reports. Please review and lets discuss tomorrow morning.

In addition, we will resume 0900 meetings every Wednesday until we no longer need to meet. Lets start up again tomorrow.

Thanks,

[Redacted]

SS [Redacted]

Washington Field Office

[Redacted] [@ic.fbi.gov](mailto:[Redacted]@ic.fbi.gov) (NIPR) - (Unavail during work hours)

[Redacted] [@fbi.sgov.gov](mailto:[Redacted]@fbi.sgov.gov) (SIPR)

[Redacted] [@fbi.ic.gov](mailto:[Redacted]@fbi.ic.gov) (SCION)

[Redacted] Cell - (Unavail during work hours)

[Redacted] Desk

[Redacted] STE

[Redacted] NSTS - ((call desk first))

=====
Classification: [Redacted]

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Classification: [Redacted]

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Classification: [Redacted]

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Classification: [Redacted]

=====
Classification: [Redacted]

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COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/113

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION- REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE TRUMP'S PRIOR ACTIVITIES IN ST PETERSBURG

Summary

- Two knowledgeable St Petersburg sources claim Republican candidate TRUMP has paid bribes and engaged in sexual activities there but key witnesses silenced and evidence hard to obtain
- Both believe Azeri business associate of TRUMP, Araz AGALAROV will know the details

Detail

1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in September 2016, two well-placed sources based in St Petersburg, one in the political/business elite and the other involved in the local services and tourist industry, commented on Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP's prior activities in the city.
2. Both knew TRUMP had visited St Petersburg on several occasions in the past and had been interested in doing business deals there involving real estate. The local business/political elite figure reported that TRUMP had paid bribes there to further his interests but very discreetly and only through affiliated companies, making it very hard to prove. The local services industry source reported that TRUMP had participated in sex parties in the city too, but that all direct witnesses to this recently had been "silenced" i.e. bribed or coerced to disappear.
3. The two St Petersburg figures cited believed an Azeri business figure, Araz AGALAROV (with offices in Baku and London) had been closely involved with TRUMP in Russia and would know most of the details of what the Republican presidential candidate had got up to there.

14 September 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/086

RUSSIA/CYBER CRIME: A SYNOPSIS OF RUSSIAN STATE SPONSORED AND OTHER CYBER OFFENSIVE (CRIMINAL) OPERATIONS

Summary

- Russia has extensive programme of state-sponsored offensive cyber operations. External targets include foreign governments and big corporations, especially banks. FSB leads on cyber within Russian apparatus. Limited success in attacking top foreign targets like G7 governments, security services and IFIs but much more on second tier ones through IT back doors, using corporate and other visitors to Russia
- FSB often uses coercion and blackmail to recruit most capable cyber operatives in Russia into its state-sponsored programmes. Heavy use also, both wittingly and unwittingly, of CIS emigres working in western corporations and ethnic Russians employed by neighbouring governments e.g. Latvia
- Example cited of successful Russian cyber operation targeting senior Western business visitor. Provided back door into important Western institutions.
- Example given of US citizen of Russian origin approached by FSB and offered incentive of “investment” in his business when visiting Moscow.
- Problems however for Russian authorities themselves in countering local hackers and cyber criminals, operating outside state control. Central Bank claims there were over 20 serious attacks on correspondent accounts held by CBR in 2015, comprising Roubles several billion in fraud
- Some details given of leading non-state Russian cyber criminal groups

Details

1. Speaking in June 2016, a number of Russian figures with a detailed knowledge of national cyber crime, both state-sponsored and otherwise, outlined the current situation in this area. A former senior intelligence officer divided Russian state-sponsored offensive cyber operations into four categories (in order of priority):- targeting foreign, especially

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE

western governments; penetrating leading foreign business corporations, especially banks; domestic monitoring of the elite; and attacking political opponents both at home and abroad. The former intelligence officer reported that the Federal Security Service (FSB) was the lead organization within the Russian state apparatus for cyber operations.

2. In terms of the success of Russian offensive cyber operations to date, a senior government figure reported that there had been only limited success in penetrating the “first tier” foreign targets. These comprised western (especially G7 and NATO) governments, security and intelligence services and central banks, and the IFIs. To compensate for this shortfall, massive effort had been invested, with much greater success, in attacking the “secondary targets”, particularly western private banks and the governments of smaller states allied to the West. S/he mentioned Latvia in this regard. Hundreds of agents, either consciously cooperating with the FSB or whose personal and professional IT systems had been unwittingly compromised, were recruited. Many were people who had ethnic and family ties to Russia and/or had been incentivized financially to cooperate. Such people often would receive monetary inducements or contractual favours from the Russian state or its agents in return. This had created difficulties for parts of the Russian state apparatus in obliging/indulging them e.g. the Central Bank of Russia knowingly having to cover up for such agents’ money laundering operations through the Russian financial system.
3. In terms of the FSB’s recruitment of capable cyber operatives to carry out its, ideally deniable, offensive cyber operations, a Russian IT specialist with direct knowledge reported in June 2016 that this was often done using coercion and blackmail. In terms of ‘foreign’ agents, the FSB was approaching US citizens of Russian (Jewish) origin on business trips to Russia. In one case a US citizen of Russian ethnicity had been visiting Moscow to attract investors in his new information technology program. The FSB clearly knew this and had offered to provide seed capital to this person in return for them being able to access and modify his IP, with a view to targeting priority foreign targets by planting a Trojan virus in the software. The US visitor was told this was common practice. The FSB also had implied significant operational success as a result of installing cheap Russian IT games containing their own malware unwittingly by targets on their PCs and other platforms.
4. In a more advanced and successful FSB operation, an IT operator inside a leading Russian SOE, who previously had been employed on conventional (defensive) IT work there, had been under instruction for the last year to conduct an offensive cyber operation against a foreign director of the company. Although the latter was apparently an infrequent visitor to Russia, the FSB now successfully had penetrated his personal IT and through this had managed to access various important institutions in the West through the back door.

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE

5. In terms of other technical IT platforms, an FSB cyber operative flagged up the 'Telegram' enciphered commercial system as having been of especial concern and therefore heavily targeted by the FSB, not least because it was used frequently by Russian internal political activists and oppositionists. His/her understanding was that the FSB now successfully had cracked this communications software and therefore it was no longer secure to use.

6. The senior Russian government figure cited above also reported that non-state sponsored cyber crime was becoming an increasing problem inside Russia for the government and authorities there. The Central Bank of Russia claimed that in 2015 alone there had been more than 20 attempts at serious cyber embezzlement of money from corresponding accounts held there, comprising several billions Roubles. More generally, s/he understood there were circa 15 major organised crime groups in the country involved in cyber crime, all of which continued to operate largely outside state and FSB control. These included the so-called 'Anunak', 'Buktrap' and 'Metel' organisations.

26 July 2015

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE

From: [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2016 8:20 AM
To: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Lates STEELE -- [REDACTED]

SentinelCaseId: NON-RECORD

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

=====
[Use this version](#)



16_29112016 -
Intel Snippet.do...

From [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2016 7:35 AM
To: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Lates STEELE -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

=====
<< File: 17_29112016 - Intel Snippet.docx >> << File: 3 [REDACTED],RussianCyberReport,July2016.pdf >> << File:
24_ComplntRepo [REDACTED],BS3,Sept2016.pdf >>

I have not seen the ne [REDACTED]. Pete had copies of tw [REDACTED] on Monday, read them t [REDACTED] and to me, but kept them.

[REDACTED]

From: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2016 6:18 AM
To [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Lates STEELE -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Can you please help me out this morning and get me copies of the three ne STEELE reports (86, 113, and the intel snippet). Electronic on email is fine.

I also need to see any of the ne [REDACTED] that came in. Nobody seems to know where they are and I assume that means they ended up with you guys (hopefully). Any ideas who might have them?

Thanks,

J

From [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 2:52 PM
To [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CV) (FBI) [REDACTED] (NY) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CG) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Lates STEELE -- [REDACTED]


Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Please see latest to include a column regarding what the Director received from Senator McCain. A pattern also appears to be forming as some reports were only provided to the FBI... or we just haven't received from outside parties...unclear. See 132, 137, 139 and Winer.

Report Number	Report Dated	Simpson file date *	CROSSFIRE received	STEELE to FBI	Corn to Baker	Simpson to Ohr	McCain to Comey	Cor
80	6/20/2016	11/1/2016 ?	9/19/2016				12/9/2016	It appears file m
86	7/26/2016	7/28/2016	12/12/2016					Obtained from
94	7/19/2016	7/19/2016	9/19/2016					
95	Not dated	7/28/2016	9/19/2016					Simpson thur 7/:
97*	7/30/2016	7/30/2016	10/26/2016					Obtained from
100	8/5/2016	8/5/2016	9/19/2016					

101	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016					
102	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016					
105	8/22/2016	8/22/2016	10/26/2016					Obtained from
111	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016					Obtained from
112*	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016					Obtained from
113	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	12/12/2016					Obtained from
130	10/12/2016		10/19/2016					
132	10/13/2016		10/19/2016					
134	10/18/2016	10/18/2016	10/19/2016					
135	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	10/19/2016					
136	10/20/2016	10/20/2016	10/21/2016					
137	10/14/2016		10/24/2016					
139	10/27/2016		10/28/2016					
Winer	10/19/2016		10/19/2016					
Intel Snippet	11/29/2016	11/29/2016	12/12/2016					Obtained from

 Indicates FBI did not receive from **STEELE**

 FBI received from **STEELE**

 FBI receive **STEELE** report from another source

Simpson file date * = the date indicated on the Simpson thumb drive file directory as "date modified"
 97* and 112* - prior to receiving the Simpson version, the FBI only had redacted versions provided to Corn.

From [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 4:19 PM
To [redacted] (WF) (FBI) [redacted] (CV) (FBI) [redacted] (NY) (FBI) [redacted] (CG) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (WF) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Lates **STEELE** -- [redacted]




Classification: [redacted]

[redacted]
 [redacted]
 [redacted]

=====

Following up on the new information on the thumb drive – please see this tracking matrix which is also saved on the share drive:

Report Number	Report Dated	Simpson file date *	CROSSFIRE received	STEELE to FBI	Corn to Baker	Simpson to Ohr	Comm
80	6/20/2016	11/1/2016 ?	9/19/2016				It appears file mod
86	7/26/2016	7/28/2016	12/12/2016				Obtained from Si
94	7/19/2016	7/19/2016	9/19/2016				
95	Not dated	7/28/2016	9/19/2016				Simpson thumb (7/28/)
97*	7/30/2016	7/30/2016	10/26/2016				Obtained from C
100	8/5/2016	8/5/2016	9/19/2016				
101	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016				
102	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016				
105	8/22/2016	8/22/2016	10/26/2016				Obtained from C
111	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016				Obtained from C
112*	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016				Obtained from C
113	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	12/12/2016				Obtained from Si
130	10/12/2016		10/19/2016				
132	10/13/2016		10/19/2016				
134	10/18/2016	10/18/2016	10/19/2016				
135	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	10/19/2016				
136	10/20/2016	10/20/2016	10/21/2016				
137	10/14/2016		10/24/2016				
139	10/27/2016		10/28/2016				
Winer	10/19/2016		10/19/2016				
Intel Snippet	11/29/2016	11/29/2016	12/12/2016				Obtained from Si

-  Indicates FBI did not receive from STEELE
-  FBI received from STEELE
-  FBI receive STEELE report from another source

Simpson file date * = the date indicated on the Simpson thumb drive file directory as "date modified"
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From [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 2:04 PM
To [redacted] (CV) (FBI) [redacted] (NY) (FBI) [redacted] (CG) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI) [redacted] D. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted], [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Lates STEELE -- [redacted]

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Folks,

As many of you know we obtained a USB drive from Glenn Simpson via a DOJ colleague. We are handling as evidence and a working copy is in the share drive – where we have historically kept STEELE reporting, the folder labeled [REDACTED] Reporting, sub folder Simpson 121216. A cursory look at the files appears they are indeed STEELE reports. Please review and let's discuss tomorrow morning.

In addition, we will resume 0900 meetings every Wednesday until we no longer need to meet. Let's start up again tomorrow.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

SS [REDACTED]
Washington Field Office

[REDACTED] [@ic.fbi.gov](mailto:[REDACTED]@ic.fbi.gov) (NIPR) - (Unavail during work hours)

[REDACTED] [@fbi.sgov.gov](mailto:[REDACTED]@fbi.sgov.gov) (SIPR)

[REDACTED] [@fbi.ic.gov](mailto:[REDACTED]@fbi.ic.gov) (SCION)

[REDACTED] Cell - (Unavail during work hours)

[REDACTED] Desk

[REDACTED] STE

[REDACTED] NSTS - ((call desk first))

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

Please pass the following - received today - to David Kramer.

BEGINS

Speaking on November 29 2016, a senior official working at the Russian MFA reported that a rumour is currently circulating there that US President-elect TRUMP's delay in appointing a new Secretary of State is the result of an intervention by President PUTIN/the Kremlin. The latter reportedly have asked that TRUMP appoint a Russia-friendly figure to this position, who was prepared to move quickly on lifting Ukraine-related sanctions and cooperation ("security") in Syria.

The source assumes the Kremlin's reported intervention was in response to the possibility that Mitt ROMNEY, viewed as hostile to Russia, might be appointed Secretary of State.

ENDS

[REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED]@fbi.sgov.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 2:05 PM
To: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (CD) (FB [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Late STEELE - [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Thanks! I will take a look toda [REDACTED].

Intelligence Analyst

De [REDACTED] | Secu [REDACTED] | Ce [REDACTED]

Fro [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: [REDACTED] ember 13, 2016 2:
T [REDACTED] (CV) (FB [REDACTED] (NY) (FBI [REDACTED] (CG) (FB [REDACTED] (CD) (FB [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI);
[REDACTED] (WF) (FB [REDACTED] (CD) (FB [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Lates STEELE -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Folks,

As many of you know we obtained a USB drive from Glenn Simpson via a DOJ colleague. We are handling as evidence and a working copy is in the share drive – where we have historically kep STEELE reporting, the folder labeled [REDACTED] Reporting, sub folder Simpson 121216. A cursory look at the files appears they are indee STEELE reports. Please review and lets discuss tomorrow morning.

In addition, we will resume 0900 meetings every Wednesday until we no longer need to meet. Lets start up again tomorrow.

Thanks,

S

[Redacted]

Washington Field Office

[Redacted] [@ic.fbi.gov](mailto:[Redacted]@ic.fbi.gov) (NIPR) - (Unavail during work hours)

jpiotka@fbi.sgov.gov (SIPR)

[Redacted] [@fbi.ic.gov](mailto:[Redacted]@fbi.ic.gov) (SCION)

[Redacted] Cell - (Unavail during work hours)

[Redacted] Desk

[Redacted] STE

[Redacted] NSTS - ((call desk first))

=====
Classification: [Redacted]

=====
Classification: [Redacted]

[REDACTED] (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2016 8:16 AM
To: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FB [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Cc: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: R [REDACTED] - ??? - [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

[REDACTED] will have more background, but I got this from Bruce Ohr on Monday following his breakfast on Saturday with Simpson:

[REDACTED] The New York Times story from October 3, 2016, that downplayed the connection between Alfa Bank servers and the Trump campaign was incorrect. There was communication and it wasn't spam. Mikhail Fridman lied in the written statement that he gave to the New York Times and Washington Post. Fridman claimed he never met Trump, however there are pictures to the contrary.

I'll get wi [REDACTED] and check the story to see relevance to us.

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Se [REDACTED] v. December 14, 2016 6:34 PM
T [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Cc: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: FW [REDACTED] - ??? -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

From: LAYCOCK, STEPHEN C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 06, 2016 1:34 PM
To: BOONE, JENNIFER C. (CD) (FBI [REDACTED] (CD) (FB [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE [REDACTED] - ??? -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

We can check but sounds like an oligarch.

From: BOONE, JENNIFER C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, December 05, 2016 5:47 PM
DOJ-HSGAC20200728-000325

OCK, STEPHEN C. (CD) (FB [redacted] CD) (FB [redacted] CD) (FBI [redacted])
(CD) (FBI)

Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)

Subject: FW [redacted] - ??? -- [redacted]

Classification: [redacted]
=====

Folks –

See below. Anyone?

Thanks.

Jen

From: PAARMANN, C. B. (OIO) (FBI)

Sent: Monday, December 05, 2016 5:37 PM

To: LYONS, KEVIN P. (CID) (FBI) [redacted]@fbi.sgov.gov>; BOONE, J [redacted] (FB [redacted]@fbi.sgov.gov>

Cc: MARKER, MAXWELL D. (CID) (FBI) [redacted]@fbi.sgov.gov [redacted] (CID) (FBI)

[redacted]@fbi.sgov.gov>

Subjec [redacted] - ??? - [redacted]

Classification: [redacted]
=====

Kevin / Jennifer - BLUF [redacted]. Apparently, captioned individual (who according to Open Source is supposedl [redacted] wealthiest guy in Russia) is maki [redacted] [redacted] I figure that a guy with that much money from Russia may very well be a target of yours. Any interest in this guy?

C. Bryan Paarmann

Deputy Assistant Director

International Operations Division, FBI

([redacted]
(ce [redacted]

(unclas [redacted] ic.fbi.gov

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Classification: [redacted]
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Classification: [redacted]
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Classification: [redacted]
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Classification: [redacted]
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Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 20, 2016 4:15 PM
To: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Fusion GPS thumb drive - [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Got it – we'll take a look no [REDACTED]

Fro [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)
Sen December 20
T [REDACTED] (WF) (FB [REDACTED] CV) (FB [REDACTED] (NY) (FBI [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (CD) (FBI [REDACTED] (CD) (FB [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI [REDACTED] (CD)
(FBI)
FA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FB [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FB [REDACTED]
OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Fusion GPS thumb drive -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

I just uploaded to our share drive the documents and files that Bruce Ohr's wife (through Bruce) voluntarily provided to the FBI this morning. They are reports/work she completed for Fusion GPS/ Glenn Simpson (similar to the one she gave us on Manafort last week). They are under the Fusion GPS file on the share drive. Please review (there are approx 85 docs...) and once we have a grasp of whats on there I can submit to the appropriate case files.

S [REDACTED]
Washington Field Office
[\[REDACTED\]@ic.fbi.gov](mailto:[REDACTED]@ic.fbi.gov) (NIPR) - (Unavail during work hours)
[\[REDACTED\]@fbi.sgov.gov](mailto:[REDACTED]@fbi.sgov.gov) (SIPR)
[\[REDACTED\]@fbi.ic.gov](mailto:[REDACTED]@fbi.ic.gov) (SCION)
Cell - (Unavail during work hours)
Desk
STE
NSTS - ((call desk first))

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]