SEARCH AND SEIZURE
OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES AT THE BORDER*
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I. INTRODUCTION

Border searches of electronic devices are on the rise. In 2015, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) examined 8,503 devices. The number more than doubled the following year before soaring in 2017 to more than 30,000 searches.1 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), in turn, reported the search of 4,444 cellphone and 320 other electronic devices in 2015.2 In 2016, ICE eclipsed these numbers, searching 23,000 electronic devices.3

Three legal arguments support the examination of travelers’ digital data. First, conducted with an eye towards national security, border searches are a concomitant of

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3 Id.
sovereignty and firmly within Article I and Article II powers.\(^4\) Second, case law and statutory provisions recognize an exception to the warrant requirement and broad powers of search at the border. Further, Congress’s power to set the contours stems from the Commerce Clause.\(^5\) Third, as an empirical matter, the actual number of searches taking place is a drop in the sea of international travelers: in 2017, CBP searched fewer than 1/100th of 1% of all travelers (0.007 percent).\(^6\) Weighed against the significant governmental interests at stake (e.g., stopping terrorism, catching individuals involved in human trafficking and child pornography, and preventing individuals involved in international crime from entering the United States), a balancing test favors broad authorities.

Arguments mounted against the government center on the nature of the information that can be obtained. While the law focuses on material goods, such as containers or suitcases,\(^7\) electronic devices contain enormous amounts of information about individuals’ private lives. It includes not just data related to the actual crossing, but details that stretch years into the past and generate insight into individuals’ relationships, thoughts, and beliefs. As Chief Justice Roberts recognized in *Riley v. California*, mobile devices contain “the privacies of life.”\(^8\) In an increasingly globalized world, allowing broad collection powers at the borders allows for an end-run around important Fourth Amendment protections. Beyond this, there are significant implications for citizens’ First Amendment rights of association and religion; 5th Amendment due process rights and privilege against self-incrimination; and 6th Amendment right to counsel.

The issue of electronic border search is complicated by parallel incursions by agencies into cloud data, which occurs in one of two ways: by using the device to access information held on the cloud, or by requiring travelers to provide identifiers or handles, or account login credentials (such as usernames and passwords) to access social media. This issue appears to have first presented in December 2016 when CBP started asking

\(^4\) See, e.g., CBP Jan. Directive, *supra* note 1, at para. 4 (“The plenary authority of the Federal Government to conduct searches and inspections of persons and merchandise crossing our nation’s borders is well-established and extensive; control of the border is a fundamental principle of sovereignty,” citing United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153 (2004) in support: “[T]he United States, as sovereign, has the inherent authority to protect, and a paramount interest in protecting its territorial integrity.”) See also United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620 (1977) (stating, “[t]he border-search exception is grounded in the recognized right of the sovereign to control, subject to substantive limitations imposed by the Constitution, who and what may enter the country.”); id. at 616 (“That searches made at the border, pursuant to the long-standing right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border, should, by now, require no extended demonstration.”); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (“Since the founding of our Republic, Congress has granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this country.”); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 472–73 (1979) (“The authority of the United States to search the baggage of arriving international travelers is based on its inherent sovereign authority to protect its territorial integrity. By reason of that authority, it is entitled to require that whoever seeks entry must establish the right to enter and to bring into the country whatever he may carry.”).

\(^5\) See, e.g., United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973) (observing, “searches of persons and packages at the national borders rest on different considerations...from domestic regulations. The Constitution gives Congress broad, comprehensive powers’ [t]o regulate commerce with foreign Nations.’ Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3. Historically, such broad powers have been necessary to prevent smuggling and to prevent prohibited articles from entry.”)


\(^8\) Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
non-U.S. persons entering the country under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) to disclose their social media identifiers.9

Initially, the program was to be entirely voluntary. With only the provider/platform and social media identifier provided, the government stated that it would only consider publicly-available information. In January 2017, however, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) filed complaints with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, alleging that U.S. citizens were being directed to disclose not just their passwords to their phones, but also their social media login information.10 Media reported that officials were considering new policies to expand CBP scrutiny of cloud content. In February 2017, newly-appointed DHS Secretary John Kelly told a Congressional Committee that the agency might adopt a provision requiring login information from all foreign visa applicants, with the failure to comply resulting in denial of entry. Starting in May 2017, login information became required in cases tied to national security. Less than a year later, in March 2018, the U.S. Department of State submitted a formal proposal to the Office of Management and Budget, requiring that almost all visa applicants list all social media identities used over the previous five years, all telephone numbers, all email addresses, all international travel, all prior immigration violations, and whether specified family members have been involved in terrorist activity.11 The rule change would allow the government to vet and identify about 14.7 million people per year, searching any social media platforms associated with the individual.12

The Executive Branch is divided in how it addresses border search of electronic devices. In January 2018, CBP issued updated guidelines, superseding the previous directive of August 2009.13 The new document explicitly excluded information held on the cloud from its search provisions.14 It distinguished between basic and advanced searches (the latter involves connecting external equipment “to an electronic device not merely to gain access…but to review, copy, and/or analyze its contents.”15 Officers must meet a standard of reasonable suspicion or instances “in which there is a national security concern.”16 The equivalent 2009 ICE directive has not been updated since the last review

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9 Under the VWP, foreign citizens can visit the U.S. for up to 90 days without a visa, if they have been cleared by the Electronic System for Travel Authorization.
13 CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 1.
14 Id. at para 5.1.2 (“The border search will include an examination of only the information that is resident upon the device and accessible through the device’s operating system or through other software, tools, or applications. Officers may not intentionally use the device to access information that is solely stored remotely. To avoid retrieving or accessing information stored remotely and not otherwise present on the device, Officers will either request that the traveler disable connectivity to any network (e.g., by placing the device in airplane mode), or, where warranted...Officers will themselves disable network connectivity.”)
15 Id. at para 5.1.4.
16 Id.
in 2012.\textsuperscript{17} Like its CBP counterpart, the directive applies to any item containing electronic or digital information.\textsuperscript{18} But unlike its counterpart, it authorizes ICE Special Agents to “search, detain, seize, retain, and share electronic devices, or information contained therein, with or without individualized suspicion.”\textsuperscript{19} Agents are not required to perform the search in the presence of the owner.\textsuperscript{20} Consent is not necessary.\textsuperscript{21} In addition, “At any point during a border search, electronic devices, or copies of information therefrom, may be detained for further review either on-site at the place of detention or at an off-site location.”\textsuperscript{22} Searches can take place up to 30 days after the information is seized, with continuations subject to supervisory approval every 15 days thereafter.\textsuperscript{23}

The disjunction we are seeing between CBP and ICE reflect two (historical) streams of border search authorities: customs and immigration.\textsuperscript{24} Their objects differ. The first stems from efforts to prevent commercial goods from avoiding duties. The second focuses on individuals: i.e., who should (or should not) be admitted to the country. In the post-9/11 environment, a third, novel approach has steadily entered the legal discussion, seeking to use weaker Fourth Amendment protections at the borders as a way to combat all criminal activity. Thus far, the courts have provided a backstop, rejecting some of the more egregious cases to come forward. The lack of legislation is of particular concern, as it leaves citizens’ privacy at the mercy of each agency’s regulatory regime. The more recent cases of \textit{Riley v. California} and \textit{Carpenter v. United States} herald an evolving Supreme Court doctrine that is cognizant of the greater Fourth Amendment issues at stake in digital information. Further First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Sixth Amendment concerns present.

II. BORDER SEARCH AUTHORITIES RELATED TO CUSTOMS

Historically, the Executive Branch has had a wide latitude to conduct searches at the border without first establishing probable cause and obtaining a warrant.\textsuperscript{25} That breadth derives in part from the evolution of customs law. During the early colonial period,
England considered customs in the context of commercial regulation—an opportunity to ensure dominance in shipping and trade. Over time, and particularly following the Seven Years’ War during which England developed substantial debt, the approach shifted to using customs authorities as a way of generating revenue. Officials obtained broad powers to interdict “uncustomed,” or illegal materials. Following the American Revolution, the latter emphasis survived, laying the groundwork for today’s CBP authorities. This history matters, as it demonstrates both the purposes of customs searches (i.e., to interdict uncustomed materials and so generate revenue), as well as the special protections afforded the home, even where customs issues arise. Both aspects of customs searches serve as a limit on the border search exception.

A. Commercial Regulation versus Revenue Generation

The American colonies provided England with an opportunity to strengthen its global mercantile dominance. From 1621 until 1756, the colonial power thus focused on how to structure its laws to control trade. As early as 1621, the Privy Council recognized the gains at stake, arguing that “the Commodities brought from” the colony of Virginia ought to be “appropriated unto his Majesties subjects” instead of being “communicated to forraine countries.” Accordingly, the council adopted an ordinance requiring that “all Tobacco and other commodities” from Virginia “not be carried into any forra ine partes until the same have beene first landed here and his Majesties Customes paid therefore.”

In the first Navigation Act of 1651, Parliament went on to require that any materials to or from the Americas be carried on English ships. The aim was to prevent European powers from trading with the colonies. Following the Stuart Restoration, in 1660 Parliament passed the second Navigation Act, re-entrenching the rule that colonial trade only be carried out on English vessels: they had to be English-owned, operated by an English master, and carry a crew of which three quarters must be English. The statute did not entirely prevent foreign imports into the colonies—it merely required that they be shipped under English flag. Three years later, Parliament addressed this oversight via the third Navigation Act, requiring that any European commodities bound for the colonies first be taken to England, unloaded, and duties paid, prior to their return to North America. The preamble to the statute underscored the importance of strengthening the connections between England and the colonies, “keeping them in a firmer dependence upon” the Crown, and ensuring that English shipping benefitted. The goal was to establish a monopoly over colonial trade.

The early navigation statutes reflected a fundamentally flawed assumption: namely, that most or all colonial trade involved overseas commerce. In the absence of regulation, intra-colonial trade (not subject to customs duties) began to flourish, with commodities eventually making their way to Europe “to the great Hurt and Diminution of” H.M. Customs and trade. Parliament closed this gap in the Navigation Act of 1673,
requiring that a bond be paid on enumerated items where the ship travelled between plantations. But the enforcement devices were weak. They also differed from those in place in England. In the late 17th century, customs agents could search “any ship, house, or place soever” in London to search for prohibited goods. The Treasurer could provide a warrant to the customs commissioners to examine trunks and boxes held at the Custom House in Southampton. There was no equivalent in the new world.

In the 18th Century, Britain tried to tighten its hold, assuming greater powers to search for, and to seize, contraband. Lord Grenville, the First Lord of the Treasury, and Chancellor of the Exchequer, famously considered the colonies to be best source of the revenues needed, charging the colonies with a failure to offset the costs of their own defense. Towards this end, he repeatedly argued in Westminster for more stringent customs enforcement in North America. Many agreed, so when the Molasses Act expired, Parliament passed a measure that emphasized both mercantilism and revenue generation. The preamble to the American Revenue Act of 1764 (a.k.a. the Sugar Act) explained, “[I]t is expedient that new provisions and regulations should be established for improving the revenue of this kingdom, and for extending and securing the navigation and commerce between Great Britain and your Majesty’s dominions in America.” This statute, along with the Currency Act of 1764 (in which Britain assumed control of the colonial system of currency), laid the groundwork for the revolt that followed the introduction of the Stamp Act of 1765.

B. Contraband in the Early American Republic

Following independence, English mercantile ambitions fell away, but, like England following the Seven Years’ War, the United States needed to raise revenue to pay for the recent war. This required efficient enforcement mechanisms. Thus, from the earliest days of the Republic, customs inspectors could board vessels to search for contraband without first obtaining a warrant. To find the same items within a dwelling house, building, or...
other place, customs officers first had to obtain a warrant based upon “cause to suspect.”41

In 1789, the same year that Congress passed the Bill of Rights to the states for ratification, it enacted statutes setting duties, establishing international ports of entry, requiring vessels to report their contents, and providing for inspectors to board vessels to examine whether the stated goods comported with the items on board.42 Under the Act of July 31, 1789, officials could board any vessel, “in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed; and therein to search for, seize, and secure any such goods, wares or merchandise.”43 Where suspecting that such materials be concealed in a “dwelling house, store, building, or other place,” they could apply to a justice of the peace for a warrant to conduct a search for the goods, “and if any shall be found, to seize and secure the same for trial.”44

These statutes were followed by statutes in 1790, 1793, and 1799, which underscored the importance of the enforcement of duties.45 So we find, contemporaneous with the drafting and adoption of the Fourth Amendment, the First, Second, and Fourth Congresses signaling that there was no need to obtain a warrant for goods subject to forfeiture when held in a ship or vessel; however, when held in a warehouse, building, or dwelling, a warrant was required.

Congress continued to follow this line in the Act of July 18, 1866.46 That statute made it lawful for any customs officer “to go on board of any vessel, as well without as within his district, and to inspect, search, and examine the same, and any person, trunk, or envelope on board, and to this end, to hail and stop such vessel if under way, and to use all necessary force to compel compliance.”47 Where it appeared “that any breach or violation of the laws of the United States [had] been committed” whereby “such vessel,

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42 An Act for laying a Duty on Goods, Wares, and Merchandizes imported into the United States, Act of July 4, 1789, §§ 1, 3, 4, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24, 24-27 (1789) (setting duties); An Act to regulate the Collection of the Duties imposed by law on the tonnage of ships or vessels, and on goods, wares and merchandises imported into the United States, Act of July 31, 1789, § 1, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, 29 (1789) (establishing districts, ports, and officers); §2 (establishing ports for non-U.S. vessels); id. §4 (requiring master or commander of every ship or vessel to provide “a true manifest of the cargo on board such ship or vessel”); id. §5 (empowering inspection of the vessels “to examine whether the goods imported are conformable to the entries thereof.”); id. §10 (requiring that the master or commander of the vessel provide the manifest to the inspector with “a true account of the loading which such ship or vessel had on board at the port from which she last sailed, and at the time of her sailing, or at any time since, the packages, marks and numbers, and noting thereon to what port in the United States such ship or vessel is bound, and the name or names of the person or persons to whom the goods are consigned, or in cases where the goods are shipped to order, the names of the shippers.”); id. §12 (prohibiting any goods, wares, or merchandise from being unladen or delivered from any ship or vessel at night or without a permit from the collector); An Act for Registering and Clearing Vessels, Regulating the Coasting Trade, and for other purposes, Sept. 1, 1789, § 3, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 55, 55-56 (1789) (empowering the surveyor to measure every vessel to ascertain its tonnage); An Act to suspend part of an Act, intitled ‘An Act to regulate the collection of the Duties imposed by Law on the Tonnage of Ships or Vessels, and on Goods, Wares, and Merchandises, imported into the United States,’ Sept. 16, 1789, §3, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 69, 69-70 (1789) (setting duties on certain foreign goods).
43 Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 24, 36, 1 Stat. 29, 43, 47. (1789) (current version codified at 19 U.S.C §§ 482, 1582).
44 id.
45 Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, §§ 48–51, 1 Stat. 145, 170 (1790); Act of February 18, 1793, ch. 8, §27, 1 Stat. 305, 315 (1793); Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, §§ 68–71, 1 Stat. 627, 677, 678 (1799). See also Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537 (noting that Congress has always provided the Executive with plenary power to search and seize at the border, absent probable cause or a warrant to regulate duties/prevent introduction of contraband). See also An Act further to regulate the entry of merchandise imported into the United States from any adjacent territory, Mar. 2, 1821, ch. 14, 3 Stat. 616.
46 An Act further to prevent Smuggling and for other Purposes, Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, 14 Stat. 178.
47 id. § 2.
or the goods, wares, and merchandise, or any part thereof, on board of or imported by such vessel, is or are liable to forfeiture,” then the customs officer had the authority to seize the items. The statute also empowered officers to “arrest any person engaged in such breach or violation” and to pursue and arrest anyone who tried to escape. The officers could stop, search, and examine “any vehicle, beast, or person on which or whom he or they shall suspect there are goods, wares, or merchandise which are subject to duty or shall have been introduced into the United States in any matter contrary to law.” The statute reflected the importance of securing things to demonstrate the illegal movement of uncustomed goods—namely, the vehicle, beast, “goods, wares, merchandize, and all other appurtenances, including trunks, envelopes, covers, and all means of concealment, and all the equipage, trappings, or other appurtenances of such beast.”

C. Contemporary Search Authorities at Border Crossings

In 1930, the (ill-fated) Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act significantly increased tariffs on agricultural and industrial goods. Eight years later, an amendment to the act also provided for special inspection, examination, and search authorities. As subsequently amended, the law now reads:

Whenever a vessel from a foreign port or place or from a port or place in any Territory or possession of the United States arrives at a port or place in the United States or the Virgin Islands, whether directly or via another port or place in the United States or the Virgin Islands, the appropriate customs officer for such port or place of arrival may, under such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe and for the purpose of assuring compliance with any law, regulation, or instruction which the Secretary of the Treasury or the Customs Service is authorized to enforce, cause inspection, examination, and search to be made of the persons, baggage, and merchandise discharged or unladen from such vessel, whether or not any or all such persons, baggage, or merchandise has previously been inspected, examined, or searched by officers of the customs.

The law empowers customs officers, at any time, to board any vessel or vehicle,

within a customs-enforcement area established under the Anti-Smuggling Act [19 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.], or at any other authorized place, without as well as within his district, and examine the manifest and other documents and papers and examine, inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any

48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. § 3.
51 Id.
54 19 U.S.C. § 1467. See also 19 U.S.C. § 1496 (“The appropriate customs officer may cause an examination to be made of the baggage of any person arriving in the United States in order to ascertain what articles are contained therein and whether subject to duty, free of duty, or prohibited notwithstanding a declaration and entry therefor has been made.”); 19 U.S.C. § 1499 (providing for entry examination of imported merchandise).
person, trunk, package, or cargo on board, and to this end may hail and stop such vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary force to compel compliance.\footnote{19 U.S.C. § 1581(a).
}
The Secretary of the Treasury may issue regulations for searching persons and baggage.\footnote{19 U.S.C. § 1582. Implementing regulations can be found at 19 C.F.R. §§ 23.1, 23.5, 23.11.}

Further, “he is authorized to employ female inspectors for the examination and search of persons of their own sex; and all persons coming into the United States from foreign countries shall be liable to detention and search by authorized officers or agents of the Government under such regulations.”\footnote{\textit{Id.} See Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 582, 46 Stat. 590, 748.}
The border exception applies both to ingress and egress to and from the United States.\footnote{United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290 (4th Cir. 1995).}

The level of suspicion required to search travelers for illegal goods as they cross the border increases as the search becomes more intrusive. Courts, for instance, do not require particularized suspicion for the contents of a traveler’s briefcase, luggage, purse, or pockets.\footnote{See, e.g., United States v. Tsai, 282 F.3d 690, 696 (9th Cir. 2002); Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967). But note that suspicion cannot be based merely on ancestry as a basis for detention and questioning. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).}

Nor is it required for documents contained within containers in such items.\footnote{See United States v. Grayson, 597 F.2d 1225, 1228–29 (9th Cir.1979).}

Pictures, films and other graphic materials do not earn any higher level of protection.\footnote{United States v. Thirty–Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971).}

A pat-down warrants “minimal suspicion.”\footnote{See also United States v. Romero, 71 F. Supp.2d 1021 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (pat-down of traveler did not meet the minimal suspicion standard).}

In contrast, the search of a travelers’ undergarments and strip searches require “real suspicion.”\footnote{Des Jardins, 747 F.2d at 509; United States v. Couch, 688 F.2d 599, 604 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1970).}
The only context thus far recognized by the Supreme Court as requiring individualized suspicion is related to the intimate physical search of a woman believed to be smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal.\footnote{United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).}

In the 1985 case \textit{United States v. Montoya de Hernandez}, customs officials suspected that a woman had swallowed balloons containing drugs.\footnote{\textit{Id.}} The Supreme Court determined that reasonable suspicion was required to detain the individual until the drugs had passed.\footnote{\textit{Id.}} This decision followed on a series of lower court cases rejecting mere suspicion for intrusive body searches, requiring a “clear indication” or “plain suggestion” of criminal activity.\footnote{See, e.g., United States v. Vance, 62 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding “real suspicion” was present when Mr. Vance, traveling from Hawaii to Guam, underwent a pat-down search). In that case, a customs officer observed that the traveler was glassy-eyed, disoriented, and had trouble answering questions. A pat-down revealed two pairs of underwear and a bulge at the traveler’s crotch. When directed to drop his underwear, two packs of methamphetamine fell out.}
Vehicles are subject to a much less rigorous standard than searches of the person. In *United States v. Flores-Montano*, for instance, reasonable suspicion was considered sufficient for removing a gas tank to search for contraband. The Supreme Court, however, has held open the possibility “that some searches of *property* are so destructive as to require” particularized suspicion.

D. Mail Search

Customs officers, by statute, have the authority to stop and to search domestic mail headed outside the United States, as well as foreign mail transiting the United States. The law is specifically tied to six areas: exportation or importation of monetary instruments; material related to obscenity or child pornography; controlled substances; nuclear materials covered by the Export Administration Act; defense articles and services; and emergency matters that fall within the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, such as foreign exchange, transfers of credit or payments, or the import or export of currency or securities. Mail that has not been sealed against inspection, and to which the sender or addressee has consented a search, can be examined. Mail weighing more than 16 ounces that has been sealed against inspection can only be opened and searched by a customs officer where there is reasonable grounds to suspect that it contains monetary instruments, a weapon of mass destruction, or material related to one of the six categories listed above. The law explicitly forbids reading any correspondence contained in mail sealed against inspection absent consent by the sender or addressee, or a search warrant obtained consistent with rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Customs officers do not have the authority to open and inspect mail weighing 16 ounces or less.

A different provision in the code, whose origins stem from 19th century statutes, deals specifically with opening trunks or envelopes. The standard it sets is “reasonable cause.” The statutory language reads:

> Any of the officers or persons authorized to board or search vessels may search any trunk or envelope, wherever found, in which he may have a reasonable cause to suspect there is merchandise which was imported contrary to law.

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68 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004). In this case, the Ninth Circuit had taken the term “routine” from United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, created a balancing test, and applied it to vehicle searches. The Supreme Court objected, determining that searches of vehicles were subject to a much less rigorous standard than searches of the person. The 9th circuit went on in United States v. Chaudhry, 424 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005) to find the distinction between “routine” and “non-routine” inapplicable to searches of property.

69 Flores-Montano at 155–56, 124 S. Ct. 1582 (holding that complete disassembly and reassembly of a car gas tank did not require particularized suspicion.)


74 50 U.S.C. §§ App. 2401 et seq.


76 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1702 et seq.


78 Id. § 1583(c)(1).

79 Id. § 1583(c)(2).

80 Id. § 1583(d).

81 Id. § 482 (re-codified Rev. Stat. §3061, which derived from the Act of July 18, 1866, ch. § 3, 14 Stat. 178, 178.)
The Supreme Court has noted that the “reasonable cause to suspect” test presents “a less stringent requirement than that of ‘probable cause’ imposed by the Fourth Amendment as a requirement for the issuance of warrants.”83 The Court has upheld this test as applied to border searches as constitutional.84

E. Special Protections Afforded the Home

As the Supreme Court noted in 1977, "[A] port of entry is not a traveler's home."85 For the latter, as a matter of law, for centuries special protections have applied. From the time of Coke’s Institutes (and, arguably, Magna Carta) forward, outside of a fleeing felon or the hue and cry, common law forbade access to the home absent a warrant.86 The need for such a document pushed on what, precisely would satisfy the requirement. As the Crown made increasing use of general warrants, treatise writers and jurists roundly condemned the practice as unreasonable—i.e., against the Reason of the common law.87 Only particular warrants, issued by a magistrate, naming the individual, establishing probable cause for a specific crime, and supported by oath or affirmation, met the standard.88 The U.S. founders incorporated this common law rule into the Bill of Rights:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.89

It is important here to remember the mere evidence rule, which similarly continued the common law tradition and did not fall out of favor in the United States until 1967, just a few months prior to Katz v. United States.90 This rule made it clear that even with a particularized warrant, there were certain things that the government could not obtain because it interfered with the privacies of life. The court thus drew a distinction between the fruits and instrumentalities of crime, on the one hand, and other types of materials. In Boyd v. United States, Justice Bradley explained for the Court,

The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the payment thereof, are totally different things from a search for and seizure of a man's private books and papers for the purpose of obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as evidence against him. The two things differ *toto coelo*. In the one case, the government is entitled to the possession of the property; in the other it is not.91

This distinction reflects in the customs law tradition:

82 Id. § 482.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 618 (1980 (quoting United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971)).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 U.S. CONST. amend IV.
The seizure of stolen goods is authorized by the common law; and the seizure of goods forfeited for a breach of the revenue laws, or concealed to avoid the duties payable on them, has been authorized by English statutes for at least two centuries past; and the like seizures have been authorized by our own revenue acts from the commencement of the government. The first statute passed by Congress to regulate the collection of duties, the Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29, 43, contains provisions to this effect. As this act was passed by the same Congress which proposed for adoption the original amendments to the Constitution, it is clear that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as ‘unreasonable,’ and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the amendment…So, also, the laws which provide for the search and seizure of articles and things which it is unlawful for a person to have in his possession for the purpose of issue or disposition, such as counterfeit coin, lottery tickets, implements of gambling, etc., are not within this category. Many other things of this character might be enumerated.92

In other words, Congress (and the Courts) drew a clear distinction between a store or dwelling house, or other structure for which a proper warrant was required, and the search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile, where it was not practicable to obtain a warrant because the vehicle could be quickly moved. Thus, under the Act of March 3, 1815, it was not only lawful to board and search vessels within the customs’ officers’ districts and those adjoining, but also to stop and search any vehicle, beast, or person for whom there was probable cause to believe unlawful goods had unlawfully been brought into the United States.93 The Court, and the government, considered it a valid exercise of constitutional power.94 To the extent that a question of distance from the border arose, in the 19th century, the Attorney general drew the line at three miles.95

In this way, the border exception bore a striking resemblance to the fleeing felon exception: it was only in the process of hot pursuit of goods illegally brought into the country that broader powers applied. But limits applied:

It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search. Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which

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92 Id. at 623-24 (internal citations omitted).
93 Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 94, 3 Stat. 231, 232. For total or partial renewals of the statute, see Act of Apr. 27, 1816, ch. 110, 3 Stat. 315; Act of Feb. 28, 1865, ch. 67, 13 Stat. 441; Act of July 18, 1866, c. 201, 14 Stat. 178; section 3061 of the Revised Statutes.
94 Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215 (1883). See also United States v. One Black Horse, 129 F. 167 (D. Me. 1904). Similar provisions applied to Indian agents who, suspecting the introduction of alcohol, could cause the boats, stores, packages, wagons, sleds, and places of deposit of such person to be searched and seized. Rev. Stat. § 2140 (1873). This power arose from an 1822 statute, which allowed for traders’ goods to be searched/seized on basis of suspicion of alcohol (Act of May 6, 1822, ch. 58, 3 Stat. 682), as well as the Act of June 30, 1834, § 20, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729, 732. The Supreme Court recognized the Statute of 1822 as sufficient for search and seizure in American Fur Co. v. United States, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 358. All statutes cited and discussed in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
95 Section 174 of Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 429, 30 Stat. 1254, 1280. The Attorney General, construing the Act, wrote, ‘If your agents reasonably suspect that a violation of law has occurred, in my opinion they have power to search any vessel within the three-mile limit according to the practice of customs officers when acting under section 3059 of the Revised Statutes [Comp. St. § 5761], and to seize such vessels.’ 26 Op. Atys. Gen. 243. Cited and quoted in Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
may be lawfully brought in. But those lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official, authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.\textsuperscript{96}

In \textit{Carroll v. United States}, the Court noted the necessity of establishing probable cause of a felony for a search that occurred away from the border. The border was only relevant insofar as it helped to establish probable cause.\textsuperscript{97}

Reflecting these traditions, the current state of play, as both a statutory and a doctrinal matter, is that customs searches of homes require a warrant, issued by a third party federal judge or magistrate, and supported by probable cause that merchandise has been illegally brought into the United States, or that the goods in question are subject to forfeiture.\textsuperscript{98} The search of vehicles or vessels, however, is not limited to the time and place of actual international crossings.\textsuperscript{99}

F. Extended Border Search and the Functional Equivalent

For searches away from ports of entry, courts look at whether such actions can be upheld as “extended border searches” as well as whether they take place at the “functional equivalent” of the border.\textsuperscript{100} Airports, for instance, are considered the functional equivalent of the border.\textsuperscript{101} The validity of such searches depends upon a variety of factors, suggesting a totality of circumstances test. As with searches at the actual border, the Fourth Amendment standard of “reasonableness” still applies; however, mere suspicion is sufficient.\textsuperscript{102}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[96] \textit{Carroll}, 267 U.S. at 153-54.
\item[97] Id., at 160.
\item[98] 19 U.S.C. § 1595.
\item[99] Id. § 482: “(a) Any of the officers or persons authorized to board or search vessels may stop, search, and examine, as well without as within their respective districts, any vehicle, beast, or person, on which or whom he or they shall suspect there is merchandise which is subject to duty, or shall have been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in possession or charge, or by, in, or upon such vehicle or beast, or otherwise, and to search any trunk or envelope, wherever found, in which he may have a reasonable cause to suspect there is merchandise which was imported contrary to law; and if any such officer or other person so authorized shall find any merchandise on or about any such vehicle, beast, or person, or in any such trunk or envelope, which he shall have reasonable cause to believe is subject to duty, or to have been unlawfully introduced into the United States, whether by the person in possession or charge, or by, in, or upon such vehicle, beast, or otherwise, he shall seize and secure the same for trial. (b) Any officer or employee of the United States conducting a search of a person pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall not be held liable for any civil damages as a result of such search if the officer or employee performed the search in good faith and used reasonable means while effectuating such search.” This section dates back to Act of March 3, 1815, ch. 94, 3 Stat, 231, 232; Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, 14 Stat. 178.
\item[100] United States v. Carter, 760 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1985); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979) (Search of individual arriving in Commonwealth of Puerto Rico from the United States not satisfied because no functional equivalent to international border of the United States)
\item[101] Almeida–Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (“For ... example, a search of the passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis airport after a non-stop flight from Mexico City would clearly be the functional equivalent of a border search.”).
\item[102] Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1966) (citing Cervantes v. United States, 263 F.2d 800, 803, n. 5 (9th Cir. 1959); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154, (1925); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623, (1886); Hammond v. United States, 356 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1966); King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir. 1965); Jones v. United States, 326 F.2d 124, 130 (9th Cir. 1964, Dunaway, J., concurring); Denton v. United States, 310 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1962); Mansfield v. United States, 308 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1962); Plazola v. United States, 291 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1961); Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1961); Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960); Landau v. United States Attorney, 82
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
In cases of continuous surveillance of vehicles transiting the border, the lower courts have upheld searches 20 miles from the border that occur 15 hours after entry. On the other hand, for roving searches, the Supreme Court has held that a warrantless search, 25 miles north of the border, on an East-West Highway located at all points at least 20 miles from border, absent probable cause and reasonable suspicion, was invalid. There is no border exception outside the actual border or its functional equivalent.

G. Restrictions on Customs Searches: Who and Why

The Courts have held that an “officer of the customs” includes customs officers, inspectors, investigators, and mail entry aids, certain Immigration and Naturalization Service officials (e.g., border patrol agents), and Coast guard officers. It has also included a doctor aiding a customs search. The right to undertake border searches does not extend to the FBI or to law enforcement when acting for general law enforcement purposes. Thus, in the 1979 case of United States v. Vidal Soto-Soto, the 9th Circuit considered the FBI’s warrantless search of a Chevrolet pickup truck at the border to determine whether it had been stolen. The agent’s sole basis for stopping the truck was due to the make and model of the vehicle. The Court looked to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Delaware v. Prouse, in which it had required articulable and
reasonable suspicion that a motorist was unlicensed or an automobile not registered, to
retain a vehicle and request the registration papers. 109

The reason for the broader authority granted to customs officers than to ordinary law
enforcement is because the basic purpose behind a border search is to obtain things
illegally brought into the country. As the 9th circuit noted, “Validity for this distinction is
found in the fact that the primordial purpose of a search by customs officers is not to
apprehend persons, but to seize contraband property unlawfully imported or brought into
the United States.” 110 The Court observed, “The authorization of section 581 (19 USC
§1581) is to ascertain whether there are any dutiable articles concealed in the vessel; it is
to not to discover acts of criminality. If by chance contraband merchandise or dutiable
articles are discovered, then the Coast Guard officer must arrest any person connected
with the smuggling of such merchandise.” 111 The purpose is “to effectuate the provisions
of the navigation and tariff laws and to protect the revenue of the United States,
Congress, by section 581 of the Tariff Act 1930.” 112 The purpose of customs law is not to
deter criminal activity writ large. 113

III. BORDER SEARCH AUTHORITIES RELATED TO IMMIGRATION

Immigration law has a considerably different history and appears in a different area of the
code. This history sheds light on the differences between CBP and ICE in terms of their
regulations. It is also a doctrine fraught with contradictions.

On the one hand, more than a century ago the plenary power doctrine emerged,
rejecting any constitutional challenge to Congress’s initial immigration laws. 114 In Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, the Court stated that although the Constitution did not
explicitly address immigration, Congress had the general power to pass a statute
amending prior Treaties and excluding Chinese citizens. 115 Justice Field, writing for the
Court, said, “The question whether our government is justified in disregarding its
engagements with another nation is not one for the determination of courts.” 116 The
decision fell to the political branches, rendering any judicial “reflection upon
[Congress’s] motives, or the motives of any of its members,” immaterial. 117

That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative
department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not
think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an
incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could
not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of another
power. 118

F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1933).
111 Atlantic. Olson, 68 at 9.
112 Id. at 10.
113 But note that seizure may rest on a violation of criminal law. See Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501
(1927); Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. 342 (1842); Awalt v. United States, 47 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1931).
114 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). See also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law
After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.
116 Id. at 602.
117 Id. (citing Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855), aff’d, 67 U.S. 481 (1862)).
118 Id. at 603-604.
Such authority was part of the foreign affairs power of any country, found in the interstices of Article I(8) and Article II.119

Over time, however, the rule that the executive branch and Congress have absolute authority over immigration decisions has eroded.120 Thus, while entry without the appropriate status may be unlawful, the Supreme Court has held that a child’s immigration status cannot impact their access to public elementary and secondary education.121 Professor Hiroshi Motomura has argued that the gap between the Court and the dissent in that case stems from disparate views of immigration outside legal constraints: namely, a contribution to the economy and society, versus “egregious lawbreaking.”122 Further complicating the debate is the role of states and cities, as well as how (and whether) to integrate unlawful immigrants—including and up to providing a path to formal citizenship.123

Questions of individual rights have gained ground. U.S. citizens, and individuals with a substantial connection to the United States, benefit from the protections of the Fourth Amendment.124 Non-U.S. persons, however, have no such rights. Immigration officials thus have much broader authorities as to aliens. As a matter of statutory law,

Any officer or employee of the Service authorized under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General shall have power without warrant—

(1) to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United States;
(2) to arrest any alien who in his presence or view is entering or attempting to enter the United States in violation of any law or regulation made in pursuance of law regulating the admission, exclusion, expulsion, or removal of aliens, or to arrest any alien in the United States, if he has reason to believe that the alien so arrested is in the United States in violation of any such law or regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest, but the alien arrested shall be taken without unnecessary delay for examination before an officer of the Service having authority to examine aliens as to their right to enter or remain in the United States;
(3) within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States, to board and search for aliens any vessel within the territorial waters of the United States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle, and within a distance of twenty-five miles from any such external boundary to have access to private lands, but not dwellings, for the purpose of patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States;

119 Id. at 604. (“The powers to declare war, make treaties, suppress insurrection, repel invasion, regulate foreign commerce, secure republican governments to the states, and admit subjects of other nations to citizenship, are all sovereign powers, restricted in their exercise only by the constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations”).
120 See id. at 549 (“Immigration law, as it has developed over the past one hundred years under the domination of the plenary power doctrine, represents an aberrational form of the typical relationship between statutory interpretation and constitutional law. The aberrant quality is attributable to the prolonged nature of the contradiction between these two sets of “constitutional” norms in immigration law. The constitutional norms that courts use when they directly decide constitutional issues in immigration cases are not the same constitutional norms that inform interpretation of immigration statutes. To serve the latter function, many courts have relied on what I call “phantom constitutional norms,” which are not indigenous to immigration law but come from mainstream public law instead. The result has been to undermine the plenary power doctrine through statutory interpretation.”) (internal citations omitted)
123 Id.
(4) to make arrests for felonies which have been committed and which are
cognizable under any law of the United States regulating the admission,
exclusion, expulsion, or removal of aliens, if he has reason to believe that the
person so arrested is guilty of such felony and if there is likelihood of the person
escaping before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest, but the person arrested
shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the nearest available officer
empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the
United States; and

(5) to make arrests [for any offense against the United States or felony] if the
officer or employee is performing duties relating to the enforcement of the
immigration laws at the time of the arrest and if there is a likelihood of the person
escaping before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.\textsuperscript{125}

The law recognizes the protected status of the home, requiring either consent or a
properly-executed warrant to enter onto farm land or any agricultural operation to
interrogate individuals as to their right to be in the United States.\textsuperscript{126} As for “reasonable
distance,” lower courts have held that this provision, which allows the Attorney General
to ascertain how far from the border probable cause and a warrant is not required, is not
unconstitutional because it does not insert a neutral magistrate into the review process.\textsuperscript{127}

In terms of searches at the border itself,

Any officer or employee of the [immigration] service authorized and designated
under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General, whether individually or as
one of a class, shall have power to conduct a search, without warrant, of the
person, and of the personal effects in the possession of any person seeking
admission to the United States, concerning whom such officer or employee may
have reasonable cause to suspect that grounds exist for denial of admission to the
United States under this chapter which would be disclosed by such search.\textsuperscript{128}

The standard is thus one of “reasonable cause.” Congress, to date, has not made any
special exceptions for the personal effects that may be searched, with the result that, as
noted in the introduction, guidance on electronic devices has been left to the agencies
themselves.

IV. BORDER SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES

There are increasing calls in the public to exempt electronic devices from the border
search exception. The argument put forward is that these devices contain a tremendous
amount of private information. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
rejected the argument based either on the grounds that the search was routine and did not
require reasonable suspicion (pursuant to the border search exception), or that it was
conducted with reasonable suspicion. However, three courts determined that forensic
examination requires a higher standard than exists in the ordinary border search
exception. Following \textit{Riley}, \textit{Jones}, and \textit{Carpenter}, moreover, there is every reason to

\textsuperscript{125} 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357(a).
\textsuperscript{126} 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357(c).
\textsuperscript{127} United States v. King, 485 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1973), rev’d on other grounds, Bowen v. United States,
422 U.S. 916 (1975).
\textsuperscript{128} 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357(c).
believe that the Fourth Amendment places a limit on the search of electronic devices, at least as to U.S. persons and individuals who have a substantial connection to the United States.

A. Not Subject to Reasonable Suspicion

Although the Supreme Court in \textit{Flores-Montano} left open the possibility, under certain circumstances, of requiring reasonable suspicion for particular property searches at the border, some courts have considered the search of electronic devices to fall within the ordinary border search exception. In \textit{United States v. Arnold}, for instance, a traveler arrived at LAX after a nearly twenty-hour flight from the Philippines. When he went to clear customs, CBP pulled him aside for secondary questioning, inspected his luggage, and found a laptop, a separate hard drive, a USB stick, and six disks. Agents directed Mr. Arnold to turn on his computer. On the desktop, there were folders labeled “Kodak Pictures” and “Kodak Memories.” When agents opened the folders, they found naked women. CBP called in DHS and ICE, who, believing the pictures to include children, detained and questioned him. They seized his computer and the storage devices and, a fortnight later, obtained a warrant. DOJ charged Michael Arnold with transporting child pornography.

At least one other published lower court published opinion has reached a similar conclusion.\footnote{See, e.g., United States v. McAuley, 563 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (A name check on a driver crossing at Del Rio, Texas Port of entry from Mexico showed that the individual was the subject of an investigation concerning child pornography).}
B. Supported by Reasonable Suspicion

Two categories of cases have found the search of electronic devices to be supported by reasonable suspicion: those premised on criminal investigations and records, and those based on the presence of illegal substances. In United States v. Hassanshahi, for example, a 2014 case from Washington, D.C., a traveler’s laptop was seized during an international border stop at a U.S. airport. An inquiry into the traveler’s identity revealed a federal investigation into the defendant’s participation in a conspiracy to build a computer production facility in Iran in violation of U.S. trade embargoes. The court in that case considered agents to have established reasonable suspicion sufficient to support a forensic examination of the laptop. Similarly, in United States v. Saboonchi, the traveler’s name came up in connection with two different export violation investigations. The government had information that the defendant had purchased two cyclone separators which had then been shipped overseas to an entity linked to a company in Iran. The court determined that the forensic search of the defendant’s smart phone and flash drive had been supported by reasonable suspicion. Pari passu, in Cotterman, border agents had reasonable suspicion for their initial search based on the fact that the defendant had a prior conviction for child molestation, frequently traveled to a country associated with sex tourism, and carried password-protected files. A handful of lower courts have found the presence of illegal substances during the search to be sufficient for the examination of electronic devices.

C. Special Protections Extended to Forensic Investigations

One of the most prominent cases on the forensic investigation of electronic devices at the border comes from the Ninth Circuit. In United States v. Cotterman, agents entered a traveler’s name into the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) which revealed a 15-year old child sexual molestation charge. Agents referred the defendant and his wife for secondary questioning, ordering them to leave their car and belongings behind. A search of the vehicle yielded two laptop computers with password-protected files. The defendant offered to assist agents in accessing the information, but the agent declined because of concern that the defendant would use the opportunity to sabotage the investigation in New York involving child pornography. The defendant was referred to secondary inspection where, two hours later, ICE began to question him about his computer equipment, including a zip drive and two external hard drives as well as a laptop that had been observed in vehicle. He consented to the search and provided them with the password, whereupon they found child pornography on the device. The court rules the search constitutional. See also United States v. Hampe, Crim. No. 07-3-B-W, 2007 WL 1192365 (D. Me. Apr. 18, 2007). The court in this case held that the search of a laptop was a routine search and no reasonable suspicion was required, but it then concluded that the particular facts of the case gave rise to reasonable suspicion that child pornography was involved.

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139 See, e.g., United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 267 F. Supp. 3d 911 (W.D. Tex. 2016) (mobile phone searched with reasonable suspicion at Mexican border after agents found methamphetamine in the traveler’s suitcase); United States v. Mendez, 240 F. Supp. 3d 1005 (D. Ariz. 2017) (mobile phone search at border after finding drugs in the car considered to have been conducted with reasonable suspicion); United States v. Cano, 222 F. Supp. 3d 876 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (agents, finding 16 kg of cocaine in the spare tire of the defendant’s truck had reasonable suspicion to download mobile phone data on grounds that it had been used as an instrumentality of the crime); United States v. Ramos, 190 F. Supp. 3d 992 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (agents found methamphetamine in the car and questioned defendant who said he been in cell phone communication with person to whom he was reporting; court determined that DHS manual search of phone and examination of incoming calls, text messages, and the call log was reasonable); United States v. Caballero, 178 F. Supp. 3d 1008 (S. D. Cal. 2016) (CBP found illegal drugs in defendant’s car and searched the defendant’s mobile phone which had photos of large sums of money; the court said reasonable, particularized suspicion present).
files. Agents seized the computers and transported them to Tucson, 150 miles away, for forensic evaluation. After three days, seventy-five images of child pornography had been found. The court determined that border searches were limited in time and distance: agents needed to have reasonable suspicion that the subject was involved in criminal activity. Mere suspicion was not enough.\textsuperscript{140} The court recognized the unique nature of the type of information contained in electronic devices:

The amount of private information carried by international travelers was traditionally circumscribed by the size of the traveler's luggage or automobile. This is no longer the case. Electronic devices are capable of storing warehouses full of information.* * *Laptop computers, iPads and the like are simultaneously offices and personal diaries. They contain the most intimate details of our lives: financial records, confidential business documents, medical records and private emails.* * *Electronic devices often retain sensitive and confidential information far beyond the point of erasure, notably in the form of browsing histories and records of deleted files. This quality makes it impractical, if not impossible, for individuals to make meaningful decisions regarding what digital content to expose to the scrutiny that accompanies international travel.\textsuperscript{141}

A second case from the District Court in Maryland held that the border search of any computer or electronic device should be considered non-routine and require reasonable suspicion.\textsuperscript{142} The court’s argument was that, while the government has legitimate concerns about child pornography, it does not justify unfettered crime-fighting searches or an unregulated assault on citizens’ private information—which is what is involved in forensic examination of a hard drive. The court took a different approach than the Ninth Circuit in \textit{Cotterman}: in the former, the court determined that the forensic search of a computer that had been imaged was as invasive of the defendant’s privacy as a strip search. In \textit{Saboonchi}, the Maryland court took issue with the Ninth Circuit’s failure to provide guidelines for what constituted a “forensic” search. The court distinguished between routine and non-routine border searches and tried to construct a test for determining when a conventional computer search becomes a forensic investigation:

A conventional search at the border of a computer or device may include a Customs officer booting it up and operating it to review its contents, and seemingly, also would allow (but is not necessarily limited to) reviewing a computer's directory tree or using its search functions to seek out and view the contents of specific files or file types. . . . And, just as a luggage lock does not render the contents of a suitcase immune from search, a password protected file is not unsearchable on that basis alone.\textsuperscript{143}

In contrast, “[i]n a forensic search of electronic storage, a bitstream copy is created and then is searched by an expert using highly specialized analytical software—often over the course of several days, weeks, or months—to locate specific files or file types, recover hidden, deleted, or encrypted data, and analyze the structure of files and of a drive.”\textsuperscript{144} The court provided three explanations for why forensic searches should be considered sui

\textsuperscript{140} United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (requiring reasonable suspicion for forensic examination of the laptop).
\textsuperscript{141} 709 F.3d at 964-65.
\textsuperscript{143} Id. at 560-61.
\textsuperscript{144} Id. at 561.
generis: first, it creates a copy and uses specialized software to analyze the computer’s contents; second, it provides access to deleted material; third, it provides insight into an individual’s actions away from the border which would not otherwise be discoverable.\textsuperscript{145}

The First Circuit, in evaluating other kinds of searches, offered the following non-exhaustive list of factors may be relevant when determining whether a search can be characterized as routine:

(i) whether the search results in the exposure of intimate body parts or requires the suspect to disrobe; (ii) whether physical contact between Customs officials and the suspect occurs during the search; (iii) whether force is used to effect the search; (iv) whether the type of search exposes the suspect to pain or danger; (v) the overall manner in which the search is conducted; and (vi) whether the suspect's reasonable expectations of privacy, if any, are abrogated by the search.\textsuperscript{146}

D. Riley v. California: Stronger Constitutional Protections for Mobile Devices

The above cases pre-dated Riley v. California,\textsuperscript{147} in which the Supreme Court “made it clear that the breadth and volume of data stored on computers and other smart devices make today's technology different in ways that have serious implications for the Fourth Amendment analysis.”\textsuperscript{148} One of the first border search cases to incorporate and apply Riley was United States v. Kim, in which the court determined that the question of electronic searches was settled neither by the border exception nor by application of what was meant by “forensic.” Instead, it considered the extent to which the search “intrudes upon an individual's privacy, and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”\textsuperscript{149} The court noted:

while the courts in Ickes, Cotterman, and Saboonchi had little in the way of Supreme Court precedent to guide their way, the Supreme Court has since issued its opinion in Riley v. California. And in Riley, the Court made it clear that the breadth and volume of data stored on computers and other smart devices make today’s technology different in ways that have serious implications for the Fourth Amendment analysis.\textsuperscript{150}

Riley dealt with the search of a mobile phone incident to arrest. In that case, the Court underscored the distinction between electronic devices and physical items. “Modern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicate by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”\textsuperscript{151} Even the term was misleading, as “many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone.”\textsuperscript{152} A key distinguishing feature is the “immense storage capacity” of such devices: “Most people cannot lug around every piece of mail they have received for the past several months, every picture they have taken, or every book or

\textsuperscript{145} Id. at 563. See also Gretchen C.F. Shappert, The Border Search Doctrine: Warrantless Searches of Electronic Devices After Riley v. California, U.S. ATTY'S BULL., Nov. 2014, at 10.
\textsuperscript{146} United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512 (1st Cir. 1988) (footnotes omitted).
\textsuperscript{147} Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
\textsuperscript{149} Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
\textsuperscript{150} Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 54.
\textsuperscript{151} Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488-89.
\textsuperscript{152} Id. at 2489.
Mobile phones can store “millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos.” The sheer capacity of mobile devices has numerous implications for privacy:

First, a cell phone collects in one place many distinct types of information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video—that reveal much more in combination than any isolated record. Second, a cell phone’s capacity allows even just one type of information to convey far more than previously possible. The sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the same cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet. Third, the data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the phone, or even earlier. A person might carry in his pocket a slip of paper reminding him to call Mr. Jones; he would not carry a record of all his communications with Mr. Jones for the past several months, as would routinely be kept on a phone.

More than 90% of American adults own and carry cell phones, keeping “on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate.” The type of information that could be gleaned, moreover, different in important respects from what could be uncovered from the search of a physical item. Medical records, location information, relationship details, political beliefs, religious convictions—all of this, more than could be ascertained even from a search of an individual’s home, can be gleaned. Beyond this, mobile phones provide a gateway to the cloud. The court in Riley was utterly unsatisfied with the solution the government proposed here: namely, “to disconnect a phone from the network before searching the device.” (This is precisely what CBP is doing in regard to search of electronic devices at the border).

In Kim, as aforementioned, the court applied Riley and determined, under a totality of circumstances test, that the imaging and search of a laptop, for an unlimited period and without any limits on the scope of the analysis, invaded the traveler’s privacy to such an extent that it was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court noted: “given the vast storage capacity of even the most basic laptops, and the capacity of computers to retain metadata and even deleted material, one cannot treat an electronic storage device like a handbag simply because you can put things in it and then carry it onto a plane.”

The Kim case is notable not just for its application of Riley, but because it involved a conscious decision by investigators to wait until a suspect left the United States before using the border exception to search his laptop and thereby obtain detailed information about his activities. The court ultimately rejected agents’ instrumentalist approach—i.e., using the border search exception to obtain information to which they otherwise would not be entitled.

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153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id., at 2489.
156 Id., at 2490.
157 Id., at 2490-91.
158 Id. at 2491.
159 Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 56.
160 Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
161 Id. at 38-39.
162 Id. at 45 (citing Hassanshahi, 75 F.Supp.3d at 120-21).
E. Impact of Carpenter v. United States

As with Riley, the Court’s recent decision in Carpenter v. United States has significant implications for how to think about potential Fourth Amendment limits on electronic border searches. In Carpenter, the Court decided not to extend third party doctrine from United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland to cell site location information (CSLI). In United States v. Jones, five justices (the so-called “shadow majority”) had adopted the view that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements. The Carpenter court built on Jones, underscoring the sensitivity of the information that could be gleaned from location data. It highlighted a number of factors that suggested a higher privacy incursion: accuracy; retroactive application; length of time (implicating the amount of information); the revealing nature of the information; the nature of the information obtained; and the ease with which it could be obtained.

These elements are all present in the border search of electronic devices, suggesting a higher intrusion into travelers’ privacy than is present with the simple search of a traveler’s baggage or pockets. To the extent that electronic devices contain a record of the traveler’s physical movements, warrantless search runs directly contrary to the holding in Carpenter.

F. The Problem of Digitization

The two streams of authorities, customs and immigration, both deal with the transportation of physical objects: articles and people. Before concluding, it is worth noting that digitization presents two particular challenges for these regimes.

First, for customs, what happens when the illicit materials being sought are digital, and not physical? In the past, if an object was carried into the country, then the inspection regime would uncover it at the border. But what happens if the illicit material can merely be uploaded onto the cloud, to be accessed once someone enters the United States? If a traveler in Thailand, for instance, uploads child pornography onto the cloud, should there be a way to use the traveler’s movement to uncover the material? Or what if the material in question consists of documents, such as plans for a nuclear reactor or technology designs which have been forbidden by the export regime. Should a traveler be able to upload this material to the cloud, only to pull it down elsewhere? In the past, the material would have either have been mailed through the post, or carried by hand. Should there be a way to foreclose a digital end-run around the customs regime?

There are at least three possible responses to this argument. Foremost, it is important to note that part of the reason this issue even presents is because of the post-War expansion of the customs mail search regime to include not just uncustomed items, but also child pornography, weapons of mass destruction, emergency matters under the IEEPA, and the like. The historical purpose of the customs regime was not to uncover illegal activity generally. The purpose of customs searches was to identify the illegal transportation of contraband or undeclared items. To the extent that a border search exception, derived from sovereignty applies, it is specifically with this end in mind.

In addition, in light of the expansion of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) post-9/11 and the infamous demise of the wall, such matters may be relegated more appropriately to the surveillance realm. That is, to the extent that matters, such as drawings of a nuclear reactor being provided to third countries, implicate foreign affairs,
surveillance would appropriately fall within FISA. Even where the investigation may be primarily criminal in nature, such surveillance still comes within FISA’s ambit.

Further, to the extent that electronic searches reveal information that would otherwise be held in the home, then allowing such searches forces the historic protections afforded to the home, even in customs matters, to drop away. Email has replaced letter correspondence, electronic calendars now take the place of planners, and the contacts list now serves as a telephone book. The border exception, applied to electronic devices, threatens to swallow the protections which, for centuries, have limited customs searches. This is true not just for the type of data at stake, but actual views of the home. Consider, for instance, the Blink Home Monitor. An application can be downloaded to smartphones and tablets, providing homeowners with real-time coverage of what is happening inside their houses. 167

The second challenge presents for immigration. Here, part of the reason behind subjecting non-citizens to searches prior to entering the United States has to do with ascertaining (a) whether they are who they say they are, and (b) what sorts of individuals are being admitted to the country. Surely, the type of information present in travelers’ electronic devices is relevant to such a determination. By not taking into account social media, or the full range of an individual’s background, moreover, U.S. security may be harmed. Notwithstanding PPD-28 and its extension to non-citizens of privacy rights, as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in Verdugo-Urquidez, non-U.S. persons without a substantial connection to the United States lack Fourth Amendment protections.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Like the search incident to arrest exception at issue in Riley, the border search exception is still subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Numerous cases are beginning to move through the courts, challenging whether electronic devices fall outside constitutional norms. 168 The American Bar Association has raised particular concerns about the extent to which the reading, duplication, and seizure of legal documents violates client-attorney privilege. 169 Similar issues have been raised in regard

167 See https://blinkforhome.com/pages/blink-home-monitor-app?locale=en&gclid=EAIaIQobChMlpZ-lhMeS3AIVC4GzCh2AQgZnEAAAYASAAEgJCMD_BwE&gclsrc=aw.ds.
to doctor-patient records, and journalists’ privileges, spousal communications, information covered by a U.S. federal court protective order, proprietary information, and intellectual property.

As a matter of constitutional law, at least in terms of the Fourth Amendment issues, the Court’s recent decisions in Riley and Carpenter, and the concerns raised by the shadow majority in Jones, suggest that electronic devices warrant a higher level of protection. As a matter of First Amendment doctrine, the Court in United States v. Ickes found such arguments to be unpersuasive. In that case, Ickes argued that border search doctrine does not apply when the material being searched is expressive. “[T]his cannot be the case,” the court wrote. That doctrine “is justified by the ‘longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself.’” National security interests in the contemporary age inescapably implicate expressive material, such as terrorist communications. Recognizing First Amendment interests, moreover, would create difficulties in determining where the line should be drawn. Notwithstanding the court’s decision in Ickes, the implications of access to electronic devices for religious freedom, free speech, and free association are substantial. The type of information contained in mobile phones, tablet, and computers, goes to the most intimate aspects of individuals’ politics, beliefs, and relationships. One of the more recent cases to raise these issues settled. In addition to the important Fourth and First Amendment issues at stake are those related to the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, as well as due process, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

As recognized in the introduction to these written remarks, border searches of electronic devices are increasing at an alarming rate. Thus far, CBP and ICE have been largely left to determine, for themselves, whether and to what extent they can search travelers’ devices. While border searches are supported by claims of sovereignty, technological advances increasingly implicate individual rights. In Riley, the Government offered as an alternative that it be allowed to develop its own protocols to address the unique questions posed by cloud technologies. The Court observed, “the Founders did not fight a revolution to gain the right to government agency protocols.” The Founders fought for rights—rights that are now endangered by the government’s search of electronic devices as citizens depart, and re-enter, the United States. The time is ripe for Congress to take action.

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170 United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506-08 (4th Cir. 2005).
171 Id. at 506 (internal citations omitted).
172 Id.
174 Id.