



Border Security: Analysis of Vulnerabilities Identified by Frontline Agents

UNITED STATES SENATE
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

MINORITY STAFF REPORT
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On January 25, 2017, in one of his first acts as President, Donald Trump ordered “the immediate construction of a physical wall on the southern border[.]”¹ As the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken steps to comply with this presidential directive, it has repeatedly offered the needs of frontline Border Patrol agents as its justification for building the border wall. Then-DHS Secretary John Kelly agreed during April 2017 testimony that the border wall proposal would be derived by asking every Border Patrol sector chief, “How many miles do you need and where?”² During her confirmation process, Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen stated that additional infrastructure needs “should be identified by our operators[.]”³ On February 27, 2018, DHS issued a statement that it “looks forward to building the wall where our frontline operators say it is needed.”⁴

An investigation by the Democratic staff of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs has uncovered that Border Patrol agents have rarely recommended building a wall to address the most commonly identified vulnerabilities – or “capability gaps” – along the southwest border. More often, agents recommended additional technology and personnel as solutions for securing the border.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) collects data annually from frontline Border Patrol agents and chiefs for each of the nine Border Patrol sectors along the southwest border. These data (1) identify vulnerabilities – or “capability gaps” – that inhibit agents from securing the border and (2) catalog preliminary requests for solutions that would address each capability gap using infrastructure, technology, personnel, or other resources. The tool CBP uses to capture its vulnerability assessments and initial resource requests is known as the Capability Gap Analysis Process (CGAP).⁵

The following report summarizes the results of the Democratic Committee staff’s review of nonpublic data contained in CGAP in Fiscal Year (FY) 2017. Based on information provided by DHS, Democratic Committee staff assumed that all requests for border wall would be

¹ Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017).

² Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Hearing on Improving Border Security and Public Safety*, 115th Cong. (Apr. 5, 2017).

³ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Pre-hearing Questionnaire, *Hearing on the Nomination of Kirstjen Nielsen to be Secretary, Department of Homeland Security*, 115th Cong. (Nov. 8, 2017).

⁴ Department of Homeland Security, *DHS Acting Press Secretary Statement on Border Wall Ruling* (Feb. 27, 2018).

⁵ Democratic staff also learned of another relevant CBP data source during the course of this investigation. Subsequent to the President’s January 25 executive order, CBP developed a Wall Decision Support Tool (WDST), which has been used to identify the relative priority of various segments along the border for the President’s proposed border wall. Among other inputs, the WDST is based on feedback from sector chiefs along the border. Democratic staff have repeatedly requested the production of specific WDST data but have yet to receive it.

associated with “Deterrence, Impedance, and Resolution” capability gaps – a category of capability gaps that would typically be addressed “through the use of man-made infrastructure,” including physical barriers, patrol roads, or lighting.⁶ Staff reviewed all 230 Deterrence, Impedance, and Resolution capability gaps CBP provided. Democratic Committee staff also reviewed all of the Border Patrol’s highest priority vulnerabilities, regardless of the category of capability gap they related to. Key findings include:

- **Border Patrol agents and sector chiefs rarely requested a “wall.”** Less than one-half of 1% of the solutions Border Patrol agents and sector chiefs proposed for closing capability gaps along the southwest border in FY 2017 referenced a “wall.” The Border Patrol identified a total of 902 southwest border capability gaps through its FY 2017 CGAP process. The word “wall” was suggested as a possible solution for just three of those gaps.
- **Border Patrol agents and sector chiefs infrequently requested fencing.** Border Patrol agents referenced “fence” or “fencing” as a possible solution to just 34, or less than 4%, of the 902 capability gaps identified.
- **Only one “Urgent and Compelling” request mentioned either a wall or fencing.** Fourteen southwest border capability gaps received an Urgent and Compelling ranking at both the station and sector level; only one included a reference to a wall or fencing as one of a variety of possible solutions. More often, these Urgent and Compelling capability gaps were associated with technological or personnel needs, such as insufficient manpower, poor training, or inadequate surveillance equipment.
- **The Border Patrol classified just one in four vulnerabilities as ones that could be addressed using man-made infrastructure of any type.** Of the 902 capability gaps agents and sector chiefs identified along the southwest border in FY 2017, just 230 received a “Deterrence, Impedance, and Resolution” designation. Another 672 gaps were classified under other “master capabilities,” such as “Domain Awareness” or “Mission Readiness” – two categories of vulnerabilities that typically indicate a need for technological and personnel approaches to securing the border.

These findings are in line with public statements made by senior CBP and DHS officials regarding the importance of technology and personnel in securing the southwest border. David Aguilar, former Acting Commissioner of CBP, told the Committee at an April 4, 2017 hearing, “The ranking now is technology definitively first just about anywhere along the border. Infrastructure and personnel will be going back and forth depending on the area.”⁷ Former DHS Secretary Kelly, who now serves as White House Chief of Staff, testified on January 10, 2017 that a “physical barrier in and of itself will not do the job.” He added, “If you are to build a wall from the Pacific to the Gulf of Mexico, you’d still have to back that wall up with patrolling by

⁶ Department of Homeland Security, *Border Security Improvement Plan: Fiscal Year 2017 Report to Congress* (Jan. 4, 2018).

⁷ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Hearing on Fencing Along the Southwest Border*, 115th Cong. (April 4, 2017).

human beings, by sensors, by observation devices.”⁸ Secretary Nielsen agreed with Kelly’s assessment during her November 8, 2017 confirmation hearing. “I look forward, should I be confirmed, to working with the folks at CBP, understanding their operational needs on the border,” she told the Committee. “It is a combination of both personnel and technology. We also have to remember that technology can always serve also as a force multiplier if implemented and executed correctly.”⁹

Despite these statements and despite the capability gaps Border Patrol agents themselves identified through the annual CGAP process, the Trump Administration has requested funding for a wall along the southwest border in amounts that far exceed requests for border security technology and personnel. Furthermore, Democratic staff for the Committee have been presented with evidence that the President’s funding requests for border wall construction do not align with the Department’s own budget priorities. In a prior report, Democratic Committee staff revealed that an internal budget document from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) instructed DHS to dramatically increase its request to Congress for border wall funding in FY 2019 while decreasing its request for specific technology and equipment.¹⁰ The OMB document made no reference to operational requirements. Rather, it stated that the office’s recommendations were a result of “Presidential priorities.”¹¹

I. CAPABILITY GAP ANALYSIS PROCESS

The Capability Gap Analysis Process (CGAP) is one component of the Border Patrol’s Requirements Management Process, which was launched in 2014 as a method for identifying vulnerabilities along our nation’s borders and for planning and executing future deployment of infrastructure, technology, personnel, and other requirements to address those vulnerabilities.¹² According to a document published by DHS in January 2018:

CGAP is intended to provide [the Border Patrol’s] field personnel with an easy to follow, scenario-driven process that aids in standardizing requirements management and ensures requirements are derived from a “bottom up approach.” USBP accomplishes this by

⁸ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Hearing on the Nomination of General John F. Kelly, USMC (Ret.), to be Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security*, 115th Cong. (Jan. 10, 2017).

⁹ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Hearing on the Nomination of Kirstjen M. Nielsen to be Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security* (Nov. 8, 2017).

¹⁰ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Overruled: White House Overrides Department of Homeland Security Budget Request on Border Security Priorities* (Dec. 2017).


¹¹ Office of Management and Budget, *Department of Homeland Security Fiscal Year 2019 Budget and Policy Guidance* (Nov. 28, 2017).

¹² Customs and Border Protection, Briefing with Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Staff (Oct. 26, 2017).

surveying the field to determine the shortfall between a Sector’s baseline capabilities and the required set of capabilities needed to perform mission essential tasks.¹³

Frontline agents are encouraged to participate in the CGAP process each year by identifying limitations they routinely face and then proposing possible solutions to address those limitations. The capability gaps that agents identify are consolidated at the station level and are further refined by Border Patrol sector chiefs before being transmitted to Border Patrol Strategic Planning and Analysis staff at CBP headquarters in Washington, D.C. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), CGAP documentation is required before any requirements can be approved, funded, and, ultimately deployed through subsequent steps in the Requirements Management Process.¹⁴

BORDER PATROL SECTORS AND STATIONS ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER



The Border Patrol divides the southwest border geographically into nine “sectors”: San Diego, El Centro, Yuma, Tucson, El Paso, Big Bend, Del Rio, Laredo, and the Rio Grande Valley. Each sector has its own headquarters and sector chief. Sectors are further divided into a number of different “stations” and “zones.” The head of each station is known as the Patrol Agent in Charge. (Source: Government Accountability Office)

¹³ Department of Homeland Security, *Border Security Improvement Plan: Fiscal Year 2017 Report to Congress* (Jan. 4, 2018).

¹⁴ Government Accountability Office, *Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Assess Fencing’s Contributions to Operations and Provide Guidance for Identifying Capability Gaps* (GAO-17-331) (February 2017).

II. CGAP DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Through the FY 2017 CGAP process, frontline agents and Border Patrol sector chiefs identified 902 capability gaps along the southwest border. The Border Patrol sorted these gaps according to various criteria. One classification was type of capability gap: for instance, whether the gap was related to “Domain Awareness,” “Mission Readiness,” or “Deterrence, Impedance, and Resolution,” among other “master capabilities.” Another classification ranked capability gaps by urgency – either “Urgent and Compelling,” “High,” “Medium,” or “Low.” The Democratic staff of the Committee requested that CBP provide all FY 2017 capability gaps along the southwest border that were classified as “Deterrence, Impedance, and Resolution” — vulnerabilities that would typically be addressed with an infrastructure-based solution. The Democratic staff also requested that CBP provide all of its FY 2017 “Urgent and Compelling” gaps along the southwest border — vulnerabilities that were rated as CBP’s highest priorities. Through two separate review sessions, on February 5, 2018 and February 12, 2018, Democratic Committee staff reviewed this data at CBP Headquarters.¹⁵

A. Border Patrol agents and sector chiefs rarely requested a “wall.”

Less than one-half of 1% of the solutions Border Patrol agents and sector chiefs proposed for closing capability gaps along the southwest border in FY 2017 referenced a “wall.” The Border Patrol identified a total of 902 southwest border capability gaps through its FY 2017 CGAP process. The word “wall” was suggested as a possible solution for just three of those gaps. In one of these instances where the word “wall” was explicitly used, the Border Patrol also recommended fence construction, along with surveillance technology, lighting, and access roads, as a means of mitigating a capability gap – “quick vanishing time for adversary” – in the Rio Grande Valley sector in South Texas.

B. Border Patrol agents and sector chiefs infrequently requested fencing.

Border Patrol agents referenced “fence” or “fencing” as a possible solution to just 34, or less than 4%, of the 902 capability gaps identified. For example, in one area of the El Centro sector in southern California, Border Patrol suggested replacing existing “landing mat” fencing – barriers that were built with steel panels used to create landing strips during the Vietnam War – with “a fencing style that allows visibility south of the fence.” For this particular capability gap, Border Patrol also listed enhanced technology, such as a greater radar presence, as a possible solution.

In the Del Rio and Laredo sectors – two Border Patrol sectors with a combined 381 miles of frontage along the Texas-Mexico border¹⁶ – “wall,” “fence,” and “fencing” were not suggested as methods for mitigating any of the sectors’ 63 capability gaps. “Tactical

¹⁵ Because CGAP identifies vulnerabilities along the border, its contents are not publicly available. In order to prevent its misuse, Committee staff have aggregated the data and eliminated references to specific vulnerabilities in particular stations and zones.

¹⁶ Government Accountability Office, *Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Assess Fencing’s Contributions to Operations and Provide Guidance for Identifying Capability Gaps* (GAO-17-331) (February 2017).

infrastructure” or “TI” was listed as a possible solution for seven of the two sectors’ 63 capability gaps. All but one of these tactical infrastructure gaps related to road construction or maintenance to improve lateral mobility along the Rio Grande River.

C. Only one “Urgent and Compelling” request mentioned either a wall or fencing.


Fourteen southwest border capability gaps that Democratic staff for the Committee reviewed received an Urgent and Compelling ranking at both the station and sector level. Just one of these gaps – a lack of detection technology and infrastructure in one remote area of the Yuma sector, which covers 126 miles of the border in southeast California and southwest Arizona – referenced additional fencing or a wall as a possible solution. For this particular capability gap, the Border Patrol also identified mobile detection equipment, additional staffing, vegetation removal, cameras, sights, scopes, and sensors as possible remedies. Three other Urgent and Compelling capability gaps recommended some type of tactical infrastructure, such as patrol roads, as methods for addressing the gaps.

In most instances, the Urgent and Compelling capability gaps that Border Patrol identified were associated with a lack of technology or personnel. For example, another gap in the Yuma sector – the inability to detect underground tunnel incursions – listed research, training, intelligence, partnerships with other agencies, and the acquisition of tunnel detection technology as possible solutions. In the Big Bend sector in southwest Texas, frontline agents and the Big Bend sector chief identified a variety of Urgent and Compelling “mission support” needs affecting one remote Border Patrol station. Possible solutions for closing this gap included external assignments, signing bonuses for new recruits, and increased manpower generally. In one station located in the El Paso sector, which spans two Texas counties and the entire state of New Mexico, the Border Patrol proposed addressing an Urgent and Compelling capability gap – the inability to effectively deter illicit cross-border traffic – by purchasing and installing permanent surveillance equipment, such as Integrated Fixed Towers (IFTs), Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS), and a Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) platform.

D. The Border Patrol classified just one in four vulnerabilities as ones that could be addressed using man-made infrastructure of any type.

Only 230 of the 902 capability gaps that frontline agents and sector chiefs identified along the southwest border in FY 2017 were classified as “Deterrence, Impedance, and Resolution” – gaps that, according to DHS, would be filled “primarily through the use of man-made infrastructure, such as physical wall[.]”¹⁷ Another 672 capability gaps had no nexus to Deterrence, Impedance, and Resolution and were classified under other “master capabilities,” such as “Domain Awareness,” “Mission Readiness,” and “Access and Mobility.” The most commonly identified gaps Border Patrol agents and sector chiefs identified along the southwest border in FY 2017 were associated with Domain Awareness and Mission Readiness – indicating a need for technological and personnel approaches to securing the border.

¹⁷ Department of Homeland Security, *Border Security Improvement Plan: Fiscal Year 2017 Report to Congress* (Jan. 4, 2018).



Among the 230 Deterrence, Impedance, and Resolution capability gaps Democratic Committee staff reviewed — all of which could have reasonably been expected to feature an infrastructure-based solution — less than 4% identified “wall” or “fence” as a possible solution. Agents often identified other types of tactical infrastructure, such as patrol roads or lighting, as possible solutions. For example, to address one Deterrence, Impedance, and Resolution capability gap in the Laredo sector — limited ability to deny storm drain entry — agents suggested policies allowing agents to safely enter storm drain tunnels and the installation of storm drain grates.

Many of the capability gaps that received a Deterrence, Impedance, and Resolution classification were also classified under other master capabilities, such as “Access and Mobility,” “Domain Awareness,” and “Mission Readiness.” For example, Democratic staff of the Committee reviewed one capability gap that received both a Deterrence, Impedance, and Resolution and Access and Mobility designation. The gap cited a lack of patrol roads in the Border Patrol’s San Diego sector. Proposed solutions for addressing this Access and Mobility gap included the construction of all-weather roads or deploying additional Border Patrol agents with all-terrain vehicles (ATVs). A Domain Awareness gap in one area of the Laredo sector — lack of surveillance technology — featured the acquisition of additional cameras as a possible solution. And agents recommended increased staffing as a method for addressing a Mission Readiness gap in the El Centro sector, which includes Imperial and Riverside counties in southern California.

III. WHITE HOUSE BUDGET REQUESTS

The desire for better technology and more personnel is in line with public statements made by senior CBP and DHS officials. David Aguilar, former Acting Commissioner of CBP, told the Committee at an April 4, 2017 hearing, “The ranking now is technology definitively first just about anywhere along the border. Infrastructure and personnel will be going back and forth depending on the area.”¹⁸ Former DHS Secretary John Kelly, who now serves as White House Chief of Staff, testified on January 10, 2017 that a “physical barrier in and of itself will not do the job.” He added, “If you are to build a wall from the Pacific to the Gulf of Mexico, you’d still have to back that wall up with patrolling by human beings, by sensors, by observation devices.”¹⁹ Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen agreed with Kelly’s assessment during her November 8, 2017 confirmation hearing. “I look forward, should I be confirmed, to working with the folks at CBP, understanding their operational needs on the border,” she told the Committee. “It is a combination of both personnel and technology. We also have to remember that technology can always serve also as a force multiplier if implemented and executed correctly.”²⁰

Despite these statements and despite the capability gaps frontline Border Patrol agents themselves identified, the Trump Administration has requested funding for a wall along the southwest border in amounts that far exceed requests for border security technology and personnel.

The President’s FY 2019 budget request to Congress includes \$1.6 billion for border wall construction compared to approximately \$255.6 million for CBP hiring and retention initiatives, \$43.7 million for Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS), \$2 million for Integrated Fixed Towers (IFT), and \$1.6 million for Mobile Video Surveillance Systems (MVSS).²¹ The President’s budget request did not include funding for CBP’s Cross Border Tunnel Threat (CBTT) program, Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS), or Tethered Aerostat Radar Systems (TARS) – all of which were listed as possible solutions to high-priority capability gaps in multiple locations across the southwest border through the FY 2017 CGAP process.²²

¹⁸ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Hearing on Fencing Along the Southwest Border*, 115th Cong. (April 4, 2017).

¹⁹ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Hearing on the Nomination of General John F. Kelly, USMC (Ret.), to be Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security*, 115th Cong. (Jan. 10, 2017).

²⁰ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Hearing on the Nomination of Kirstjen M. Nielsen to be Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security* (Nov. 8, 2017).

²¹ Department of Homeland Security, *FY 2019 Budget in Brief* (February 2018); Department of Homeland Security, *U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Procurement, Construction, and Improvements, Fiscal Year 2019 Congressional Justification*.

²² Department of Homeland Security, *FY 2019 Budget in Brief* (February 2018); Department of Homeland Security, *U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Procurement, Construction, and Improvements, Fiscal Year 2019 Congressional Justification*.

These budget priorities are reflected in additional internal documents obtained by the Committee. A long-term border security investment strategy that DHS provided to Democratic Committee staff on January 5, 2018, identified approximately \$18 billion in funding needs over a 10-year period for 722 miles of “border wall system,” including “316 miles of new primary wall and 407 miles of replacement and secondary wall.”²³ By comparison, the long-term investment strategy included \$5.7 billion for “Technology,” \$8.5 billion for “Law Enforcement Personnel and Mission Readiness,” and \$1 billion for “Access and Mobility” improvements, a category that included roads, vehicles, and fleet management tools.²⁴

Democratic Committee staff have also been presented with evidence that the President’s funding requests for constructing a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border do not align with the Department’s own budget priorities. In a prior report, Democratic Committee staff revealed that an internal budget document from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) instructed DHS to dramatically increase its request to Congress for border wall funding in FY 2019 while decreasing its request for specific technology and equipment.²⁵ The OMB document made no reference to operational requirements. Rather, it stated that the office’s recommendations were a result of “Presidential priorities.”²⁶

The prior staff report revealed that OMB ordered DHS to seek \$1.6 billion – “\$700 million more than the agency request” – for border wall construction in FY 2019 while reducing the Department’s initial funding requests for specific technology and equipment upgrades by approximately \$175 million.²⁷ For example, OMB instructed the Department to scale back its original request for Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) technology by \$44.6 million.²⁸ According to DHS, RVSS technology consists of remotely controlled day and night cameras that are mounted to towers or other permanent structures and “provide persistent wide-area surveillance for the visual detection, identification, classification, and tracking of items of

²³ Department of Homeland Security, *Critical CBP Requirements to Improve Border Security* (Dec. 27, 2017).

²⁴ Department of Homeland Security, *Critical CBP Requirements to Improve Border Security* (Dec. 27, 2017).

²⁵ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Overruled: White House Overrides Department of Homeland Security Budget Request on Border Security Priorities* (Dec. 2017).

²⁶ Office of Management and Budget, *Department of Homeland Security Fiscal Year 2019 Budget and Policy Guidance* (Nov. 28, 2017).

²⁷ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Overruled: White House Overrides Department of Homeland Security Budget Request on Border Security Priorities* (Dec. 2017).

²⁸ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Overruled: White House Overrides Department of Homeland Security Budget Request on Border Security Priorities* (Dec. 2017).

interest.”²⁹ The initials “RVSS” were used to identify possible solutions for at least 24 of the Deterrence, Impedance, and Resolution capability gaps Democratic Committee staff reviewed.

IV. CONCLUSION

Democratic Committee staff’s review of the capability gaps frontline agents and Border Patrol sector chiefs identified through the FY 2017 CGAP process – and budget documents staff has received – provide strong evidence that the agency’s highest priorities for securing the southwest border are not the “contiguous, physical wall” that President Trump has ordered.³⁰

In the limited set of data Democratic Committee staff reviewed – all of which could have reasonably been expected to feature an infrastructure-based solution — the word “wall” was scarcely mentioned as a method for mitigating current vulnerabilities along the southwest border. To be sure, there were instances in which Border Patrol agents proposed “fencing” or other tactical infrastructure, such as patrol roads, lighting, and storm drain grates, for addressing current capability gaps. But, more often, technological and personnel solutions, such as sensors, cameras, improved radio communications systems, additional hiring, and better training, were proposed. In still other cases, Border Patrol listed relatively low-tech options, including horse patrols, K-9 units, ATVs, and better vegetation management, as ways to improve border security.

With finite resources, federal funding for border security must be allocated in the most effective and efficient manner possible. At a minimum, funding decisions should reflect the operational requirements of frontline agents and Border Patrol sector chiefs – and should not be based on a desire to fulfill campaign promises made by the President.

²⁹ Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, *Budget Overview: Fiscal Year 2018 Congressional Justification* (May 2017).

³⁰ Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017).

APPENDIX — Methodology

Border Patrol agents and sector chiefs identified 902 “capability gaps” along the southwest border through the FY 2017 Capability Gap Analysis Process (CGAP). For each capability gap, a corresponding “core card” was created. Each core card featured:

- A unique Core Card ID
- Location (by sector, station, and zone)
- Sector and station priority ranking (“Urgent and Compelling,” “High,” “Medium,” or “Low)
- Summary of the capability gap
- Master capability (e.g. “Deterrence, Impedance, and Resolution,” “Domain Awareness,” and/or “Mission Readiness”)
- Possible Solution (short-term, mid-term, and long-term)

The Democratic staff of the Committee requested that CBP provide all FY 2017 capability gaps classified as “Deterrence, Impedance, and Resolution” — vulnerabilities that would typically be addressed with an infrastructure-based solution. The Democratic staff also requested that CBP provide all of its FY 2017 “Urgent and Compelling” gaps — vulnerabilities that were rated as CBP’s highest priorities. Through two separate review sessions, on February 5, 2018 and February 12, 2018, Democratic Committee staff reviewed this data at CBP Headquarters.

Each capability gap was classified using one or more “master capabilities” defined in CBP’s “Master Capabilities List” (MCL). CBP presented Democratic Committee staff with 230 capability gaps that received a Deterrence, Impedance, and Resolution designation. Staff did not review the 672 capability gaps that were not classified as Deterrence, Impedance, and Resolution. The 12 master capabilities used to classify capability gaps through the FY 2017 CGAP process are as follows:

- 1) Access and Mobility – “Refers to the ability to gain and maintain access to USBP areas of responsibility (AORs) and rapidly move USBP resources (conveyances, response personnel, pooling/pre-staging etc.) in all weather, terrain, vegetation, and light conditions for providing security-in-depth along the border area.”
- 2) Command and Control – “Refers to the ability to exercise authority and direction by a properly designated individual or team over assigned resources in the accomplishment of a common goal or mission.”
- 3) Communications – “Refers to the ability to reliably and securely transfer data and information among organizations, personnel, and technology; ensuring interoperability, and protecting vital information.”
- 4) Deterrence, Impedance, and Resolution – “Refers to the ability to impede border incursions and deny the threat’s use of terrain (i.e. land, air, water) for advantage in conducting illegal activity and acts of terrorism. This includes dissuading illegal border

activity by conveying a certainty of detection, apprehension, and the implied application of appropriate consequences.”

- 5) Doctrine and Policy – “Refers to the ability to guide resources through a fundamental set of principles as they pursue national security objectives. Policy refers to the development and dissemination of long-term priorities and guidelines for USBP activities: administrative, management and operations.”
- 6) Domain Awareness – “Refers to the ability to continuously detect, identify, classify and track all border incursions (land, air, maritime, and subterranean) in targeted areas under all weather, terrain, vegetation, and light conditions for providing security-in-depth along the border area.”
- 7) Human Capital Management – “Refers to the ability to select, educate, train, and offer border patrol personnel with opportunities to progress in the organization; while ensuring the highest levels of agent safety.”
- 8) Information Management – “Refers to the ability to collect, consolidate, manage, disseminate, and archive information to support the USBP mission across the enterprise.”
- 9) Intelligence and Counter Intelligence – “Refers to the ability to produce and disseminate timely, well-formulated and actionable intelligence from the collection, processing, integration, exploitation, evaluation, analysis and interpretation of available information concerning border security threats and prevent threat organizations from successfully gathering and collecting intelligence against USBP.”
- 10) Mission Readiness – “Refers to the ability to develop, construct, deploy and redeploy, maintain and secure physical infrastructure, vehicles, and equipment to support Border Patrol operations. Integral to this capability is the assurance of a proper logistics chain.”
- 11) Planning and Analysis – “Refers to the ability to effectively plan at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, supported by robust analysis, and acquire the proper mix of resources to successfully execute the USBP mission.”
- 12) Security Partnerships – “Refers to the ability to harness the political, social, economic, information, infrastructure, and technology assets/resources of the border areas to enhance our national security.”³¹

³¹ Customs and Border Protection, Briefing with Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Staff (Dec. 20, 2017).