GETTING THE PEOPLE PART RIGHT
A Report on the Human Resources Dimension
of U.S. Public Diplomacy

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The United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy
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June 25, 2008

To the President, Congress, Secretary of State and the American People:

The United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, authorized pursuant to Public Law 110-113, hereby submits its report on U.S. government public diplomacy programs and activities.

The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy is a bipartisan panel created by Congress in 1948 to formulate and recommend policies and programs to carry out the public diplomacy functions vested in U.S. government (USG) entities, and to appraise the effectiveness of USG public diplomacy activities.

Our 2008 report takes up the important and relatively under-explored topic of the human resources dimension of U.S. public diplomacy. Specifically, this report examines how we recruit, test, train and evaluate our PD professionals; and whether the State Department’s current bureaucratic structure, both in Washington and overseas, is conducive to the integration of public diplomacy considerations into State Department policy-making. We believe that getting the human resources dimension of public diplomacy right can go a long way toward enhancing the overall effectiveness of our nation’s outreach to the world. We hope that this report, in casting a spotlight on this important basket of issues and offering some concrete recommendations for improvement, contributes to that process.

The Commission salutes the talented and dedicated practitioners of U.S. public diplomacy in Washington, D.C. and U.S. missions worldwide. Their job has never been more important to the security of our nation than it is today, or more demanding. We thank these men and women for their service and wish them the best in all their efforts.

Respectfully Submitted,

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**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Introduction:** Public diplomacy—the effort to understand, inform and influence foreign publics in support of foreign policy objectives—has never been more important to the security of our nation than it is today. The challenges confronting U.S. public diplomacy (PD) are varied and there is no single easy fix for them. Getting the human resources dimension of public diplomacy right, however, can go a long way toward enhancing the overall effectiveness of our nation’s outreach to the world. This report casts a spotlight on this important basket of issues and offers some concrete recommendations for improvement.

**Section I:** The Department of State makes no special effort to recruit individuals into the PD career track who would bring into the Foreign Service experience or skills specifically relevant to the work of communicating with and influencing foreign publics. The Commission recommends that the Department make a more concerted effort to recruit candidates for the PD career track who have experience and skills that are more directly relevant to the conduct of public diplomacy.

**Section II:** The Foreign Service Officer Test and Oral Assessment do not specifically test for public diplomacy instincts and communication skills. The Commission recommends that the Department modify its examination process, particularly the Oral Assessment, to include questions and tasks directly germane to the conduct of public diplomacy.

**Section III:** Public diplomacy training has never been stronger; nevertheless, it is not yet strong enough, and a number of conspicuous, and serious, blind-spots in the Department’s public diplomacy training persist. The Commission recommends that the Department’s Foreign Service Institute develop courses, comparable in quality to graduate-level university courses, in the area of communication theory, with special emphasis on political communication/rhetoric, advertising/marketing theory, and public opinion analysis; and that the Department establish a nine-month in-depth public diplomacy course for mid- to senior-level PD officers modeled on that currently offered to rising economic officers.

**Section IV:** The Department of State’s employee evaluation report (EER) form lacks a section specifically devoted to public diplomacy outreach; it thus contains no inherent requirement that State employees actually engage in such outreach. Public diplomacy officers are being asked to spend the overwhelming majority of their time on administration and management, not outreach. The Commission recommends that the
Department build a specific PD requirement into the EER form itself, whereby Foreign Service officers (FSOs) are required to undertake a certain number of outreach events per rating period in order to be eligible for promotion that cycle; and that the Department require that all PD officers include in their work requirement objectives one or more specific tasks of directly engaging and influencing foreign publics on matters salient to current U.S. foreign policy or American society.

Section V: Though public diplomacy is now clearly built into the State Department structure in a way that it was not prior to the 1999 consolidation, it is more difficult to judge whether Department officials are taking public diplomacy into consideration in actual foreign policy decision-making to a greater degree, or with greater evident effect, than was the case prior to consolidation. The current bureaucratic arrangement via which PD is integrated into the Department’s geographic bureaus, while generally deemed satisfactory by the current cohort of directors of these offices, is somewhat anomalous. The Commission recommends that the Department undertake a zero-based review of the PD area office staffing structure to determine if the current arrangement is functioning optimally.

Section VI: In the nearly nine years since the consolidation of the USIA into the State Department in 1999, the overseas public diplomacy staffing structure has remained essentially unchanged. Public affairs officers (PAOs) view themselves, and are viewed by others, more as managers and administrators than as expert communicators. The Commission recommends that the Department undertake a zero-based review of the overseas PD staffing model to determine if the current staffing structure, particularly at large posts, continues to make sense in the post-USIA era, in which public diplomacy is no longer the endeavor of an independent USG agency; and that the Department require that all PAOs, including those at large posts, have at least one work requirement entailing substantive engagement with the host-country public.

Section VII: The integration that the 1999 consolidation was supposed to bring about remains elusive; PD officers continue to be significantly under-represented in the senior-most ranks of Department management. Persistent under-representation is not just a matter of equity and morale; it is also emblematic of a lack of progress on the overarching issue of the integration of PD into the core work of the Department. The Commission recommends that the Department appoint suitably qualified PD officers to senior positions within the State Department with approximately the same frequency that it appoints other career Foreign Service officers to such positions, thus eliminating the “glass ceiling” that continues to prevent PD officers from rising to the same levels as other Foreign Service officers.
Public diplomacy—the effort to understand, inform and influence foreign publics in support of foreign policy objectives—has never been more important to the security of our nation than it is today. In recent years and months, a large number of organizations and groups—governmental, quasi-governmental, and academic/private—have published reports about the U.S. government’s conduct of public diplomacy. Many of these groups have come to similar conclusions about both the overall effectiveness of USG public diplomacy efforts and the need for improvement in a number of areas. For example, nearly all have called for substantially increased resources for public diplomacy, especially for exchanges; greater leveraging of private sector expertise and resources (“public-private partnership”); and enhanced bureaucratic coordination both within the State Department, the USG’s lead public diplomacy agency, and the USG more broadly. Some have called for improvements in the USG “messaging process,” specifically, increased and more rigorous integration of meaningful research into the development of USG message campaigns, more serious efforts to measure and evaluate the effectiveness of such efforts, and so on. Relatively few of these reports, however, have addressed what might be termed the “human resources dimension” of public diplomacy. This report will address that aspect of USG public diplomacy operations.

For purposes of this report, the human resources dimension of public diplomacy embraces the following broad topics, with the principal focus on the U.S. Department of State:

- The manner in which we recruit public diplomacy officers;
- The degree to which the Foreign Service examination process tests for public diplomacy-related instincts, knowledge and skills;
- The way we train public diplomacy officers;
- The degree to which the employee evaluation report (EER) incentivizes the performance of public diplomacy outreach;
- The function, in the post-USIA era, of the public diplomacy area offices housed within the Department’s regional bureaus;
- The role, in the post-USIA era, of public affairs officers (PAOs) at large posts; and
- The degree to which the 1999 merger of the USIA into the State Department has resulted in better integration of the public diplomacy function into the work of the State Department—in particular, as measured by the presence of PD officers in the Department’s decision-making ranks.
A review of the dozens of reports that have come out in recent years establishes that several of these questions—specifically, those relating to recruitment, the examination process, the EER/promotion process, the function of the PD area offices, and the role of the PAO—have rarely if ever been posed. A good number of reports have taken up the issue of training, but though these reports have emphasized the need for enhanced language and area studies training (with a heavy accent on the Middle East region), very few, if any, have called for enhanced training in the fields of communication and persuasion—skills that are at the very heart of effective public diplomacy. And while some reports have called for a new, more PD-friendly, “corporate culture” at State, few have explored the question of whether, nearly nine years after the 1999 consolidation, public diplomacy is fully integrated into the mainstream of State Department work; and concomitantly, whether PD officers are fully integrated into the senior ranks of the Department’s staffing structure. These are important questions that go directly to some of the systemic challenges facing our nation’s public diplomacy apparatus.

The Commission recognizes that the challenges confronting U.S. public diplomacy are varied and that there is no single easy fix for them. We also recognize that U.S. foreign policy is probably the most significant proximate determinant of how foreign publics view the United States as a player in international relations (if not necessarily as a polity, society or culture). Still, we believe that getting the human resources dimension of public diplomacy right can go a long way toward enhancing the overall effectiveness of our nation’s outreach to the world.

We hope that this report, in casting a spotlight on this important basket of issues and offering some concrete recommendations for improvement, contributes to that process.

1 See, for example, the CRS Report for Congress entitled, “Public Diplomacy: A Review of Past Recommendations,” last updated October 31, 2005 (http://www.opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33062/).
I. RECRUITMENT

Background

It is axiomatic that success in public diplomacy, as in any endeavor, begins with recruiting the right people for the job. Indeed, several recent secretaries of state, including the incumbent, have made the point that people are the State Department's most valuable resource. Given that, does the Department make any special effort to recruit into its ranks individuals with backgrounds in public diplomacy-related disciplines? According to officials responsible for the Department's recruiting efforts, the answer is, “no.”

Addressing the Commission in 2007, an official with the Foreign Service Board of Examiners explained that the Department of State “does not specifically recruit for public diplomacy jobs.” More generally, he said, the Department does not recruit people with particular, specialized skill-sets, but rather, seeks to hire generalists, including for the public diplomacy career track. The only specific goal in the Department's current recruiting efforts, he added, is diversity (e.g., racial, ethnic, socioeconomic). Beyond that, the official said, Foreign Service recruitees largely “self-select,” namely, by checking the appropriate box on the Foreign Service exam registration form; in this way, the officer effectively self-assigns a career track, and while this self-assignation no doubt reflects the applicant's interests, it is less self-evident that it reflects his or her actual skills.

The Foreign Service employs approximately 6,500 generalists, including about 1,070 public diplomacy officers, and 4,500 specialists. According to 2007 data provided by the Department to the Commission, public diplomacy is the second smallest of the five State Department career tracks. Only the management career track has fewer members (about 1,040); conversely, the political and economic career tracks are roughly 70% and 30% larger (at about 1,750 and 1,370 members, respectively), and the consular career track is roughly 5% larger (at about 1,150 members).

The Department of State employs ten full-time recruiters. These recruiters travel across the country to universities, youth organizations and high schools to build awareness about and drum up interest in Foreign Service careers. The recruiting staff is augmented by ten “Diplomats-in-Residence,” Senior Foreign Service officers who are detailed to major universities across the United States. The Diplomats-in-Residence endeavor to ensure some geographic diversity in Department recruiting. The Department's recruiting budget has increased “dramatically” since the beginning of Secretary Colin Powell's tenure at State, from about $75,000 some years ago to several million dollars today.2 Notwithstanding this recent, and welcome, increase in resources devoted to recruiting, however, the Department still lacks the means to dispatch recruiters specifically.

2 Our interlocutors were unable to provide a precise budget figure because, they said, a number of different offices have a piece of the overall recruiting effort and the associated monies.
to institutions where PD expertise is especially concentrated, such as schools of communication and international NGOs. Nor is the Department specifically recruiting for other PD-salient skills and competencies, such as foreign language fluency (and, relatedly, "cultural fluency"), marketing, coalition-building, and the like.

In a 2007 open meeting, the Commission asked Department officials if the recruiting process takes into account the current needs/deficits of the Department, e.g., through the following type of syllogism: “What is the Department trying to accomplish? What skills do we need to achieve these objectives? And how can we get those particular skills?” In response, Department officials stated that, though State conducts a periodic job analysis survey that seeks to gauge what Foreign Service officers actually do on a day-to-day basis, the nexus between this data and Department recruiting efforts is unclear. In other words, there is no evident connection between current Department recruiting activities and current or future Department policy or programmatic priorities.

**Findings and Analysis**

The Department of State makes no special effort to recruit individuals into the PD career track who would bring into the Foreign Service experience or skills specifically relevant to the work of communicating with and influencing foreign publics. Rather, the Department relies essentially on self-selection to get the PD professionals it needs; that is, the only certain connection to the public diplomacy field State’s incoming officers have is having checked the PD box while registering to take the Foreign Service Written Examination. Thus, whether the Department is able to bring in individuals with the skills necessary to conduct effective public diplomacy is essentially a “hit-or-miss” proposition.

This problem, which is systemic and rooted in the “generalist” construct that undergirds the entire Foreign Service intake system (to be discussed in more detail in the next section), is particularly acute for the public diplomacy career track. That is because, unlike the other career tracks (or, at least, to a greater degree than them), public diplomacy requires skills—and, perhaps more to the point, instincts—that are somewhat more specialized and less readily acquired than those associated with the other career tracks. For example, in the case of the political and economic career tracks, candidates for the Foreign Service, having typically excelled in college and post-graduate programs (often, in these very fields), generally bring to the Department the kind of research, writing and analytical skills that are required for success in these career tracks. In the case of consular and management work, the relevant skills are usually acquired only after entry into the government, as the particular skills involved (e.g., adjudicating visas, providing American citizen services, requisitioning materiel, etc.) are associated with either work over which the government has a monopoly (consular) or special processes specific to the government (management). In the case of
public diplomacy, however, the core skill at issue is the ability to persuade across cultural and linguistic boundaries—a somewhat more complex type of skill, in our view, and one that the average Foreign Service applicant may not have and, moreover, that is less readily transmitted through short-term training (also to be discussed below). To put it another way, public diplomacy is, in our judgment, the least “generalist” of the five career tracks, and thus, the need to recruit candidates who bring with them PD expertise right from the outset is most pronounced vis-à-vis this career track.

The State Department should make a more concerted effort to recruit specialists in areas that are directly related to effective public diplomacy, such as communications sciences/rhetoric, media relations, public opinion research, marketing, and area and culture studies, among others. We believe the Department needs public diplomacy officers who possess, from day one, the ability to articulate, usually in a foreign language and always with the requisite level of cultural awareness and sensitivity, contentious policies in compelling and effective ways. We can train an officer to administer an exchange program, manage a grant, or organize a press conference, but developing the instincts and characteristics associated with effective public diplomacy is virtually impossible. For the most part, either candidates bring them into the Foreign Service, or they do not. That is why the State Department needs to do a better job of identifying and recruiting people with such instincts and characteristics right from the start.

Recommendations

- That the Department link its recruiting efforts more directly to its skill-set needs and programmatic priorities.
- That the Department make a more concerted effort to recruit candidates for the PD career track who have experience and skills that are more directly relevant to the conduct of public diplomacy.
II. THE FOREIGN SERVICE EXAMINATION PROCESS

**Background**

The most common method of entry into the Foreign Service is via the Foreign Service Written Examination (FSWE), the first of a series of exams and checks designed to identify and screen for the most qualified Foreign Service officers. Historically, the exam has been designed to test candidates for generalist-level knowledge of a wide array of subjects relevant to Foreign Service work. It also included career track-specific questions designed to test the candidate’s aptitude in the five career tracks (i.e., with questions on public diplomacy, politics, economics, and so on); candidates who fared particularly well on the public diplomacy-related questions, for example, were steered into the public diplomacy cone.

Last year, the Department revamped this exam significantly, inaugurating in the fall of 2007 a “total candidate” approach that takes into account, in a way that was largely impossible prior to this time, the Foreign Service-relevant work history, education and capabilities of the candidate. This revamped exam is now called the “Foreign Service Officer Test” (FSOT).

In 2007, Department officials briefed the Commission about the new exam. They stated that the FSOT greatly reduces the wait between the initial recruiting approach and the candidate’s taking of the exam, and places a greater (and earlier) premium on demonstrated language proficiency. Citing data for a recent exam cycle, the officials noted that approximately: 32,000 individuals expressed interest in taking the written exam; 17,000 actually took the exam; 3,400 were invited by the Department to take the oral examination, of whom 3,300 actually sat for the exam; 320 passed the oral exam; and of these, roughly 65 became PD officers. They added that the PD career track has been the second most popular career track for the past several years, behind only the political career track, the perennial top choice. Candidates for PD positions, like those for political positions, tend to score above average on the assessment—about 5.5 to 5.6 on a 1 to 7 scale; the average score, across all cones, is 5.25.

**Findings and Analysis**

The Foreign Service Officer Test, like the Foreign Service Written Examination before it, does not specifically test for public diplomacy instincts and communication skills. To the limited extent that it addresses public diplomacy-related material, it disproportionately tests knowledge of the public diplomacy field, per se (e.g., “Who coined the term ‘public diplomacy’?” “Who was the first director of the United States Information Agency?”), not the...
instincts and skills vital to the actual performance of complex public diplomacy tasks. Nor does the Oral Assessment test these skills sufficiently, in our view. Though the Oral Assessment has rightfully earned high marks (including from the international consulting firm McKinsey & Company) for its overall quality and rigor, it lacks a public diplomacy element designed to ascertain whether the candidates have a penchant for cross-cultural persuasion. Because of this, officers may enter the PD career track (as well as the four other career tracks) without ever having had to demonstrate aptitude in core PD skills. And as noted in the previous section, it is not evident that the Department is getting this kind of expertise via recruitment, which, as Department officials have repeatedly stressed, is one-dimensionally focused on diversity objectives.

Because the FSWE, to date, has been entirely standardized, there has been little room in the exam to test for skills specifically relevant to the public diplomacy cone. Though the Oral Assessment features a considerable amount of oral communication, it lacks a component specifically designed to test public diplomacy expertise and talent. The recently revised Foreign Service Officer Test (FSOT) now allows for a greater degree of consideration of specific qualifications than the former system allowed—a reform that the Commission lauds and that may, in fact, increase the likelihood that the Department gets the kind of talent that it is ostensibly seeking – but we nevertheless believe the PD component remains under-emphasized on the examination.

In a day and age in which the secretary of state expects all Foreign Service employees to engage in public diplomacy outreach—and, indeed, at an exceptionally trying time for the cause of U.S. public diplomacy—the Foreign Service should ensure that incoming employees have been tested on their cross-cultural communication skills, their media savvy, and their outreach and persuasive abilities, regardless of their preferred career track. These areas of performance need to be emphasized to a greater degree in the Foreign Service examination process.

**Recommendation**

- That the Department modify its examination process, particularly the Oral Assessment, to include questions and tasks directly germane to the conduct of public diplomacy.
Background

As established above, the Department of State neither recruits specifically for public diplomacy expertise, nor rigorously tests for such expertise in the course of its intensive examination process. The question then becomes: How does the Department go about training the generalists it brings on board in the craft of public diplomacy, and is this training adequate?

Without a doubt, the Department has expanded its public diplomacy training (and training in general) over the last several years. At the time that the United States Information Agency (USIA) was merged into the State Department, on October 1, 1999, the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) offered a paucity of public diplomacy training courses. The USIA, while it was a separate, independent agency, provided most of its public diplomacy training in-house, largely through its orientation course for incoming FSOs and through details of varying lengths in USIA (and, overseas, USIS) offices. With the 1999 consolidation, however, the PD training function migrated to FSI. Under Secretary of State Colin Powell’s leadership, the quantity and quality of public diplomacy courses increased significantly.

In the fall of 2007, the officials in charge of the Department of State’s public diplomacy training briefed the Commission on the Department’s efforts in this area. They noted that they received very strong support, including in the development of new courses, from Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes. The Department, they said, now attaches much greater importance to PD training than was the case years ago, and the budget reflects that heightened priority; the training budget increased from about $1,000,000 just two years ago to about $1.4 million today. According to these officials, that is because Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Under Secretary Hughes have both stressed that “public diplomacy is everyone’s job.”

FSI’s public diplomacy training regimen focuses on preparing PD (and, increasingly, non-PD) officers for interacting with the media, giving effective presentations, and absorbing policy guidance on breaking issues in short order. It aims to provide cultural affairs officers (CAOs) with the knowledge and skills they need to manage exchange programs, recruit participants, administer budgets, deal with human resources issues, and so on. PD training also serves officers who, while not PD officers, nonetheless have significant PD components to their jobs, e.g., ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission (DCMs) and entry-level employees going into first and second tours of duty.

A high-level representative of the Association of Diplomatic Training and Studies (ADST), speaking before the Commission at the same meeting, said that the question at the core of PD training is how to take the
III. Public Diplomacy Training

U.S. message and package it in a way that resonates with foreign audiences. At issue, he said, is “persuasive communication.” The ADST representative singled out the 1993 report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (on “Public Diplomacy in the Information Age”) as especially compelling. In his view, its last finding was the most important, namely, that in the end, what matters most in public diplomacy is the person-to-person connection, what former USIA Director Edward R. Murrow called “the last three feet.” PD training, he said, should focus above all on the question of how to make our communications with foreign publics more effective. The official noted that outside models, such as PD-related courses taught at Georgetown University and George Washington University (among others), might be instructive for FSI.

The relatively spare public diplomacy training budget, while considerably larger than that of recent years, is a significant constraint. FSI has sought to leverage the budget to the maximum degree possible through the use of regionally-based training and distance courses, three of which are being rolled out in 2008. The training officials stated that with more resources, FSI would try to bring more training out to officers in the field, as many officers have difficulty getting back to the United States for two weeks of training, owing to the press of business at post; this would likely result in an increase in the number of people taking the courses. FSI would also do more in the area of training in foreign languages, e.g., mock TV appearances using Arabic, Chinese, Spanish, and so on; at present, officers use English in most of these exercises.

In a departure from past practice, two to three hours of PD training is now mandatory for outgoing ambassadors; this supports the exhortations on the part of the Department’s leadership for all ambassadors (and FS personnel more generally) to “get out” into the foreign media much more often than was typically the case in years past. Officials acknowledged, however, that there have been complaints about the scheduling of PD training at the very end of the one-week ambassadorial training seminar; by the end of the week, some ambassadors have to cut short their training owing to the press of business, and thus, may not get the benefit of this training. FSI is exploring the feasibility of moving the training to a better slot in the schedule, and in fact, has already started doing this in the ambassador and DCM courses, according to the officials. Recently, former Department spokesman Ambassador Richard Boucher led the PD session for the ambassador course, a sign, the officials said, of the importance attached to this component of the training.

The training officials explained that PD training has changed a great deal over the past decade. Indeed, the PD discipline itself has changed to a much greater degree than other areas of Department work, such as the management function. That is why current PD training boasts new concepts, courses, and resources, relative to ten years ago. For example, FSI is now looking at text messaging as a means of getting a PD message out to target audiences, something that was not conceived of even a few years ago. FSI also brings critics of U.S. policy into class in order to train the participants in how to respond effectively to such criticism.

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4 For example, one PD training program designed to develop Spanish-language media presentation skills brings PD officers from Latin America to Mexico City rather than all the way back to the United States.
Findings and Analysis

Clearly, in recent years, the Department of State has made significant strides in the area of public diplomacy training. The Commission lauds these strides. Indeed, we believe that with more courses and a greater budget than ever before, public diplomacy training has probably never been stronger. Nevertheless, it is not yet strong enough, and a number of conspicuous, and serious, blind-spots in the Department’s public diplomacy training persist.

A review of the titles of public diplomacy training courses recently offered at FSI is instructive in this regard:

- Advanced Administration of Public Diplomacy Operations Overseas
- Advocacy Through the Media
- Essentials of Public Diplomacy for FSNs
- Ethics in the Grants Environment
- Foreign Service National Current Issues Program
- Foreign Service National Educational and Cultural Programs
- Foundations in Public Diplomacy
- FSN Information Resource Centers Programs
- FSN Information/Media Programs
- Introduction to Grants and Cooperative Agreements
- Introduction to Public Diplomacy
- Monitoring Grants and Cooperative Agreements
- New Trends in Public Diplomacy
- Outreach Diplomacy: America’s Story
- PD Engaging Foreign Audiences
- PD Tradecraft for Exchanges and Educational and Cultural Programs
- PD Tradecraft for Information and Media Affairs
- Policy Goes Primetime: Advanced Broadcast Media
- Strategic Communications: Regional Training for PD FSNs
Of these nineteen courses, offered in mid-2007, seven are for Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs), not American PD officers; and seven others are entirely administrative in nature (e.g., grants management). Just five of these courses, totaling perhaps three or four weeks of training in all, deal at all with what might be termed the substance of the communication field (i.e., communications as an intellectual discipline), and even these courses are mostly focused on tradecraft rather than hard communication theory—and in one or two cases, the courses are designed not for State PD officers but as general familiarization courses for non-PD USG personnel who work with our overseas missions. The overall message seems to be: PD officers are administrators and managers, not communicators or “influencers.”

To be sure, these are all necessary and useful courses. But the absence of even a single course on such vital topics as communication theory/rhetoric, political communication, mass communication, the psychology of communication/persuasion, public opinion, advertising/marketing, and coalition-building is striking and, indeed, troubling. In the nation that practically invented the study of persuasive communication, in a training program designed specifically for those tasked with communicating purposefully and effectively with key foreign audiences on behalf of our nation, not a single course on the science of communication is offered. This apparent deficit of high-level communication/persuasion theory is cast into further relief by the fact that, as noted above, the Department currently relies exclusively on training, as opposed to recruitment, to produce the PD expertise nominally required by the Department. Thus, the State Department deliberately recruits generalists, does not rigorously test these officers for PD expertise or skills in the examination process, and then largely fails to train them in such basics as how to influence, persuade and counter misinformation overseas. The Commission believes that this state of affairs must be rectified.

The Commission notes that FSI has an intensive, and very well regarded, nine-month course of study for rising economic officers. This course, entry into which is highly competitive, trains dozens of mid- to senior-level economic officers in economic and trade theory and the key issues on the U.S. economic and trade agenda. According to officers who have taken the course, it provides a rigorous, master’s-level experience in the discipline of economics. Smaller numbers of officers can get similar experiences (and, in some cases, master’s degrees) in the fields of international politics and diplomacy through nine-month programs at the National Defense University, Princeton University, and other institutions of higher learning. Similarly, all consular officers receive several months of intensive training in their field, mostly at FSI. 5
In light of the above, the absence of an intensive, months-long training program for PD officers seems very conspicuous. The Commission believes that public diplomacy, like economics, politics and other disciplines, has associated with it a substantial corpus of knowledge that practitioners ought to master as they move into the more senior ranks. At present, however, there is no training program to deliver this corpus of knowledge to PD officers in a systematic and concentrated way.

Finally, when the Commission asked FSI for its PD bibliography—its list of key books, reports and articles with which PD officers ought to be familiar—we were told that no such list currently exists. We believe such a reading list would be of great value to the State Department’s PD practitioners.

Recommendations

- That the Department's Foreign Service Institute develop courses, comparable in quality to graduate-level university courses, in the area of communication theory, with special emphasis on political communication/rhetoric, advertising/marketing theory, and public opinion analysis.
- That the Department establish a nine-month in-depth public diplomacy course for mid- to senior-level PD officers modeled on that currently offered to rising economic officers.
Once PD officers have been recruited, tested and trained, there is the matter of how they are evaluated. Does the current evaluation structure place sufficient emphasis on the actual performance of public diplomacy outreach? At a 2007 Commission open meeting, senior Department managers briefed the Commission on the employee evaluation report (EER) and its impact on the conduct of public diplomacy.

State Department officials informed the Commission that the critical question in the EER system is, “Has this officer demonstrated the potential to serve at the next higher level of the Foreign Service?” The officer is evaluated against a set of “precepts” that articulate the particular skill-sets necessary for advancement. About three years ago, in an effort to enhance the profile of public diplomacy in the EER process, the Department added, for the first time, a “public outreach” component to the precepts (at the entry-, mid-, and senior-levels). These outreach precepts, which continue to be in force for the current (2007–2008) promotion cycle, read as follows:

**Entry-Level:** Develops public speaking and writing skills by seeking appropriate opportunities to present U.S. views and perspectives.

**Mid-Level:** Seizes and creates opportunities to advocate U.S. perspective to a variety of audiences. Actively develops the skills of subordinates.

**Senior-Level:** Deals comfortably with the media; is active and effective in public diplomacy, both in the U.S. and overseas. Contributes to and implements strategies to encourage a fair hearing for U.S. views and perspectives.

Unlike the individualized work requirement statements (WRSes), the precepts themselves do not appear anywhere on the EER form itself; in theory, the promotion panels take the level-appropriate precepts into account when evaluating the performance of Foreign Service officers.

The evaluation forms used for officers at the FS-01 (colonel) level and above are different from those used to evaluate FSOs at the FS-02 (lieutenant colonel) level and below. The number of promotions each year depends on the number of “vacancies” at the next level of the Foreign Service; it also takes into account the need for a training float, and the fact that a good number of FSOs will perform details in other executive branch agencies, multilateral organizations, Congress, and the private sector.

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7 The Commission notes, however, that in 2008, the Department will apply the FS-01 form to FS-02 officers on a pilot basis.
According to officials, for public diplomacy officers, the promotion panels look to see if the individual has undertaken all aspects of PD work; officers who have focused exclusively on one or the other aspect of PD work (e.g., cultural, as opposed to information) often do not fare as well in the process as those who have accumulated successful experiences in both areas. Breadth of experience is increasingly important, particularly at the higher levels.

In response to an inquiry from the Commission as to how a public diplomacy element might be built into the EER to a greater degree, Department officials said that first and foremost, the work requirements statement (effectively, job description) should make clear what is expected of the employee. The form itself does not include a section specifically devoted to PD, they confirmed. Though the form does ask supervisors to address communication and foreign language skills, there is no requirement, inherent to the form itself, that mandates that these skills be applied in the context of public diplomacy. Indeed, there is evidence that even for PD officers, these skills are not necessarily being brought to bear in the service of outreach objectives. That said, a Department deputy assistant secretary (DAS) responsible for human resources policy told the Commission that “PD is a part of the job” [for all Foreign Service officers], and that “everyone is expected to do some outreach as part of his or her job.”

A member of the 2007 class-wide promotion boards (FS-03 to FS-02), in a 2007 Commission open meeting, expanded on the question of how public diplomacy accomplishments are presented on the EER form. He told the Commissioners that, initially, he thought PD officers would fare well in the process in relative terms, because they tended to display the kinds of experience required for advancement, e.g., managing resources and staffs, working with interagency interlocutors, engaging in public outreach, and so on. As it turned out, however, PD officers, at least in this random batch of files, were promoted at the lowest rate of any career track.

A key problem, this official said, was that “raters” (those writing the EERs) tended to do a poor job of describing the PD officer’s accomplishments in terms that were meaningful to an outside observer. More “striking,” this problem was particularly pronounced in the case of PD officers rating PD officers. Non-PD raters generally did a better job in describing the nature of the public outreach and explaining its importance: the purpose of the outreach, the quality of the outreach, the effect of the outreach, and the “so what?” impact. PD raters, counter-intuitively, did a poorer job of this, according to this interlocutor (himself, an FS-01 PD officer and a former chief of a major overseas public affairs office). The problem seems to lie in both the WRSes (e.g., to the degree they do not articulate “promote-able” work assignments) and in the ability of supervisors to translate, in the context of the EER, an officer’s achievements into a narrative that impresses promotion panels. The official opined that part of the problem is that PD officers, at least as evidenced in this

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8 See below for a detailed discussion.
9 Director General of the Foreign Service George Staples, writing in State Magazine in July/August 2007, went even further, stating that outreach was the central element of Secretary Rice’s “transformational diplomacy”; he wrote: “The essence of Transformational Diplomacy will have to be enhanced outreach to foreign audiences for them to gain broader understanding not only of our policies, but also, of who we are as a people…[E]veryone at post will have to work harder and smarter in support of this effort.”
batch of evaluations, are being “underutilized” for substantive communication purposes; to put it another way, they are evidently spending a disproportionate amount of time on relatively mundane administrative tasks.

Notably, Under Secretary Hughes herself came to a very similar conclusion about the matter earlier in 2007. In an unclassified personal message cabled to chiefs of mission, deputy chiefs of mission and public affairs officers, Under Secretary Hughes observed, “PD officers, and their raters, are getting better at documenting the contributions PD officers make. But there is still room for improvement. Senior officers must spell out more clearly how PD fits into the big picture of U.S. foreign policy objectives. And while our officers are competitive class-wide[,] it is clear that PD officers still need to make a compelling case that their work is advancing policy goals and objectives. …You should be communicating your accomplishments to your supervisors in terms that emphasize their contributions to the Mission and to overall U.S. policy goals.”

Moving to the topic of interpersonal skills (as evaluated in the EER), the official observed that, to his great surprise, there was often “little mention of the PD officers’ contact with the outside [host-country] community.” Indeed, in some cases, there was no reference to the specific country in which the officer was serving—that is, on occasion, it was difficult or even impossible for the panel to ascertain from the substantive content of the EER what country the officer was working in. Too often, he said, the officer’s accomplishments were linked to too great a degree to the internal (administrative) workings of the office, not public outreach, per se. Overall, the official said, he and several other panelists came to the conclusion that PD officers were simply not engaging with foreign publics. Distilled down to the essence of the matter, the question for PD officers in the EER context is, “Did this officer have an impact on how the United States, or U.S. policy, is viewed in this foreign country?” According to a number of Department officials familiar with the situation, in too many cases, the answer was, “no.”

Addressing the Commission in 2007, a senior representative of the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), the Foreign Service’s union and professional association, elaborated on this point. For Foreign Service officers to get into the host-country community and have a real impact, he said, they need to have the support of their supervisors. Often, however, they do not have this support. In some cases, for example, ambassadors prefer that their staff not give speeches on sensitive U.S. policy matters.

While the Commission recognizes that each ambassador has the prerogative to manage staff in consideration of specific in-country circumstances, it is apparent that there remain some very real cultural barriers to rank-and-file officers becoming as fully engaged in outreach as Department leadership seems to expect them to be. As noted above, the Department’s leadership has issued a clarion call to all FSOs to engage in public diplomacy outreach, but this call will only generate tangible results to the extent that line supervisors empower and encourage their subordinates to get out into the local community. Absent that empowerment

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10 This may explain why at least as recently as 2005, according to official Department analysis, PD promotion opportunities actually went unused “due to lack of qualified candidates.” See the Department (HR/RMA) study, “Public Diplomacy Workforce Analysis” (released on May 11, 2007).
and encouragement, the evident disconnect between the exhortations of the Department’s leaders and the
day-to-day activities of PD field officers will likely persist.

**Findings and Analysis**

The Department of State’s EER form lacks a section specifically devoted
to public diplomacy outreach; it thus contains no inherent requirement that
State employees actually engage in such outreach. Inasmuch as State employees,
like employees of most organizations, tend to work to their EER, then the question becomes, “To what
degree is PD outreach being built into the employees’ individualized work requirements statements?”

The Commission requested and received a number of WRSes for PD officers of various levels, respons-
sibilities and geographic postings.11 A careful analysis of these statements suggests that the problem iden-
tified above by the member of the 2007 promotion panels is real: public diplomacy officers are being asked
to spend the overwhelming majority of their time on administration and management, not outreach. In other
words, the officers that senior Department leaders often refer to as the Department’s vanguard in the cause
of communicating with foreign publics are not, in fact, spending much time communicating with their host-
country interlocutors, at least if the WRSes that we have reviewed are an indicator.

In the case of a senior-level public diplomacy officer at a mid-sized African post, for example, the
employee’s eleven work requirements began as follows (in this order):

- “Plan, develop and implement programs…”
- “Administer…”
- “Supervise, counsel and support staff members…”
- “Oversee the operations…”
- “Utilize opportunities to explain U.S. foreign and domestic policies…”
- “Safeguard classified information…”
- “Serve as acting PAO in the PAO’s absence…”
- “Further efforts to re-establish relationships [between alumni and the Mission]…”
- “Continue to promote and enhance [the viability of American Corners, etc.]…”
- “Lead and coordinate a program of outreach…”
- “Work with the Educational Advisor to implement…”

Of these eleven work requirements, nine, or possibly ten, were administrative in nature, while only one
(“Utilize opportunities to explain polices…”) represented what might be called a substantive communication

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11 The Department removed the names and other identifying information prior to making these WRSes available to the
Commission, out of consideration for the privacy of the officers.
Moreover, there is nothing in this list that even hints at what may be the most important PD function of all, that of correcting and countering inaccurate information and perceptions of U.S. policy.

Other WRSes read very similarly:

- “Identify and implement…”
- “Assess…”
- “Serve as liaison to…”
- “Plan and manage conferences…”
- “Coordinate programs…”
- “Encourage greater participation…”
- “Improve the effectiveness…”
- “Design and oversee…”

In short, by our rough count, based on data the Department provided us, at least 90 percent of the tasks assigned to public diplomacy officers stationed overseas—those presumably in the business of communicating purposefully with foreign publics—were essentially administrative in nature. This was true for officers at all levels and of all positions, from first-tour junior officer assistant cultural affairs officers (ACAOs) and assistant information officers (AIOs), to senior-level PAOs at major posts. In other words, our independent review of the data available to us strongly affirms the concern expressed by a number of our interlocutors that public diplomacy officers are simply not being utilized in direct pursuit of key USG communication objectives. And if they aren’t, then who is?

Conspicuously, and indeed virtually wholly, absent from the WRSes we reviewed—WRSes for PD officers, it should be kept in mind—were directives such as:

- “Influence public discourse…”
- “Shape the terms of the debate…”
- “Persuade key interlocutors…”
- “Correct inaccuracies and misrepresentations appearing in the local media…”
- “Appear on talk shows on television and radio…”
- “Publish articles in newspapers and magazines…”
- “Publish a book…”
- “Teach a university course…”
- “Lecture at major venues…”
- “Launch an American-style debate program at a university or high school…”

12 In the requirement that begins, “Lead and coordinate…,” it is unclear whether the officer was expected to take part in the outreach to universities, or merely coordinate/facilitate the participation of others.
• “Inaugurate elective student government...”
• “Perform in a mock presidential debate...”
• “Participate in regular webchats...”
• “Start a blog...”

It seems to us that tasks such as these ought to constitute a substantial element of every PD officer’s job. We should expect our nation’s public diplomacy officers to be influencers, not merely administrators; and in this career track, one should have to communicate, not administer, one’s way to the top. **A PD officer should not be able to fulfill his or her job requirements—let alone be promoted—without having engaged in substantive, persuasive interaction with host-country interlocutors.** While we certainly recognize that PD officers cannot do it all on their own, and that administering and coordinating is part of the job in a large organization, there seems to be a major imbalance, at present, in favor of administration at the expense of outreach. We believe there should be an increased emphasis on the conduct of effective communication itself.

**We commend Secretary Rice’s vision of “transformational” public diplomacy outreach, but note that there remains a substantial divide between this vision and the way the Department actually evaluates its personnel.**

The Commission is persuaded by the argument that building PD into the EER form is a highly cost-efficient and effective way of incentivizing the performance of public diplomacy outreach. As one observer put it, “If it’s in the form, people will do it; if it’s not, they won’t.” A small change—of perhaps fewer than twenty words—on the EER form could result in an increase of literally tens of thousands of public diplomacy outreach events within the span of months.13 A revision of the EER form itself is the surest way to bring about a fundamental change in the prevailing, and still relatively conservative, State Department corporate culture.

**Recommendations**

• That the Department build a specific PD requirement into the EER form itself, whereby FSOs are required to undertake a certain number of outreach events per rating period in order to be eligible for promotion that cycle.
• That the Department require that all PD officers include in their work requirement objectives one or more specific tasks of directly engaging and influencing foreign publics on matters salient to current U.S. foreign policy or American society.

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13 One possible formulation might be: “I, the rating officer, hereby certify that the rated officer has undertaken ten public outreach events this rating period.”
Background

In 1999, the United States Information Agency (USIA) was folded into the State Department, thus bringing the public diplomacy function wholly into the State Department for the first time since 1953. At the time of the consolidation, the central question, from the USIA standpoint, was essentially, “How do we preserve a robust public diplomacy function that can stand on its own two feet while ensuring that public diplomacy is fully integrated into the work of the Department of State?”

Aside from some obvious cosmetic changes, the 1999 “cross-walk” into the State Department had relatively little direct impact on most of the Washington-based USIA staff and similarly negligible impact on the day-to-day activities of PD generalist officers overseas. In Washington, for example, most, though not all, of the USIA employees remained housed at “the old USIA building,” now called State Annex 44 (SA-44). Overseas, the staffing structure that had been in place for decades remained essentially unchanged: assistant cultural affairs officers (ACAOs) and assistant information officers (AIOs) (and increasingly, information resources officers, or IROs) reported to cultural affairs officers (CAOs) and information officers (IOs), who, in turn reported to deputy public affairs officers (DPAOs) and PAOs. The PAO, as had always been the case, reported to the deputy chief of mission (DCM) and the ambassador. For the most part, the merger did not fundamentally alter the staffing structure overseas, nor did it do so for most Washington-based personnel.

The one major exception was the old USIA “area office.” The area offices—so named because there was one for each of the six geographic areas into which the U.S. foreign affairs community divides the world—felt the impact of consolidation more acutely than most other offices. The area offices were essentially the posts’ support network in Washington; when a PD officer in the field had a question about a policy or program, he or she could query the area office; in turn, the area office, in the person of the country affairs coordinator for the country or region in question, would go to the relevant functional office within the USIA (or, occasionally, elsewhere in the USG) to get the answer for the post. The area office directors or deputy directors also attended regular meetings at the State Department. 14

With the merger, the USIA area offices were transferred en masse, and basically intact, into the State Department’s regional bureaus, the analogous (though much larger) entities in the State Department bureaucracy, where they mostly became offices of “public diplomacy and public affairs” or “press and public diplomacy.” The rationale for moving these offices into the State Department’s regional bureaus was to enhance coordination between the underlying U.S. policy and the public diplomacy efforts designed to

14 Indeed, these officers typically held State Department ID badges, which very few other USIA personnel did.
support that policy. Whereas the cultural and information bureaus of the old USIA, upon entry into the State Department, essentially retained their original structures and ways of doing things—basically, just putting a new shingle on the outside of the building—15—the area offices were necessarily the crucibles for whatever integration was actually achieved in this process.

There are six PD area offices and each office is home to some seven or eight Foreign Service generalists (mostly PD officers) and two or three support personnel, as well as one or two auxiliary personnel (e.g., Presidential Management Fellows, interns, and so on). In all, approximately sixty-five or seventy Foreign Service employees, including both generalists and specialists, work in the State Department PD area offices.

In a 2007 Commission open meeting, the six PD area directors and the director of the undersecretary’s Office of Policy, Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (“R/PPR,” in State jargon) briefed the Commission on the role of their offices in the State Department bureaucracy nearly nine years after consolidation.

These senior PD officials stated that public diplomacy has never been more integral to the work of the State Department than it is at present. The presence of the PD area offices in the heart of the State bureaucracy—the regional bureaus—ensures that PD considerations are taken into much fuller account than was the case prior to 1999, or even a few years ago, the officials held; it also engenders greater “cross-pollenization.”

The officials acknowledged, however, that though the system functions adequately, there are some quirks and seeming inefficiencies. For one, the PD area offices, which nominally report through the regional assistant secretaries to the undersecretary of state for political affairs (“P,” in State parlance), actually take policy direction and get resources from the undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs (“R”), an official to whom they do not report on paper. One area director conceded that this bureaucratic arrangement is “a bit anomalous.” It also necessitates “more meetings,” several of the officials agreed. 16

Findings and Analysis

Public diplomacy appears to be better integrated into the State Department bureaucracy than was the case some years ago. The presence of public diplomacy offices in the geographic bureaus, for example, has raised the profile of public diplomacy work within the bureaus charged with managing the United States’ bilateral relationships. Moreover, the very term “public diplomacy” is now a part of the State Department working vocabulary to a greater degree than ever before, with the secretary and other senior Department leaders frequently invoking the term and characterizing public diplomacy as a key Department priority.

15 The Commission is certainly aware of the major structural/operational changes that have been implemented in the Bureau of International Information Program (IIP) in recent years, but notes that these changes were not a part of the consolidation/ “cross-walk” process, per se.

16 R meets weekly with the PD area office directors to help ensure the uniformity of message across geographic bureaus. R also meets regularly with the regional bureau deputy assistant secretaries (DASes) responsible for public diplomacy. And the PD area office directors (PDODs) themselves meet once a week, as well.
The Commission commends Under Secretary Hughes, in particular, for the efforts she led in recent years to bring public diplomacy considerations into the State Department’s decision-making processes.

The jury is still out, however, as to whether PD’s higher profile has led to appreciable differences in policy outcomes. Admittedly, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the impact of one factor or another on a process as inherently amorphous as policy-making. Still, the Commission cannot point to any specific recent policy outcome that was different for public diplomacy having been “at the table.” Thus, though public diplomacy is now clearly built into the State Department structure in a way that it was not prior to the 1999 consolidation, it is more difficult to judge whether Department officials are taking public diplomacy concerns into consideration in actual foreign policy decision-making to a greater degree, or with greater evident effect, than was the case prior to consolidation.17

The Commission believes that at least part of the problem is structural. The current bureaucratic arrangement under which PD is integrated into the geographic bureaus, while generally deemed satisfactory by the current cohort of directors of these offices, is somewhat anomalous. As noted above, these offices nominally report through the geographic assistant secretaries to the undersecretary of state for political affairs; but de facto, they actually report to the undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs—the Department official from whom they receive funding and take guidance.18 Though “matrix management” arrangements such as this can and often do function effectively, in this particular instance, it appears to reflect a continuing ambiguity about where, and how, PD fits into the overall Department structure.

The current structure would seem to suggest that PD is a class of activity that somehow exists and operates independently of bilateral relationships, rather than an activity that is organic, or at least closely tied, to the management of those relationships. For example, the political, economic and consular functions are all lodged squarely within the country desk, the locus of action in all U.S. bilateral relationships (e.g., the Indonesia desk manages the overall U.S.-Indonesia relationship, and so on).20 Why isn’t the public diplomacy

17 Some Commissioners acknowledge that effective public diplomacy may well impact the development and implementation of our foreign policy in ways that are not visible, let alone measurable. At the very least, our policies may be better understood and appreciated by foreign publics due to the recent increased emphasis on public diplomacy in the State Department and in other areas of our government.
18 The Commission recognizes that the under secretary for public diplomacy plays an invaluable role in developing broad strategic and tactical policies related to the effective communication to foreign publics of U.S. policy. Moreover, the under secretary provides essential budgetary support for the PD function within the Department. We do not mean to suggest in any way that this essential relationship be modified. Having said that, there remains a need to develop a way to better integrate PD officers into the regional bureau policy-making process.
19 Matrix management is a type of organizational management in which employees are grouped both functionally (e.g., by skill-set) and on a project basis (e.g., by mission); in a matrix management arrangement, employees effectively have “two bosses.”
20 See bottom of page 27.
function? What is the rationale for having, for example, the Indonesia PD desk officer work in an office with other PD officers, rather than with his or her other Indonesia affairs colleagues on the Indonesia desk? The answer to this question, as best the Commission can discern it, is that the PD area offices came over from USIA to State intact and they remain intact largely because of simple bureaucratic inertia, not necessarily because this is the arrangement that optimizes PD integration into State Department policy-making—the stated goal of the integration in the first place. Simply put, form seems to be driving function rather than the reverse.

Then there is the question of what these offices, as currently configured, actually do on a day-to-day basis. According to the PD office directors, the primary function of these offices is to serve as a “window on Washington” for posts, and concomitantly, a “window on the (PD) field” for the Washington bureaucracy. Thus, their principal role is as a conduit for communications—in effect, a “middle man.” One class of task that is emblematic of this role is that of arranging appointments and briefings at Main State for visiting participants in U.S. exchanges, such as International Visitors, Fulbright Scholars, and so on. For instance, the International Visitor office might call over to the Mexico PD desk officer and say, “We’ve got two Mexican IVs coming through town. Could you set up briefings with the Mexico desk and the folks at Main State who handle U.S.-Mexico environmental cooperation?” The Mexico PD desk officer will then make these arrangements, escort the visitor to the meetings, and, effectively, serve as “control officer” for this mini-visit. This type of administrative/liaison task can constitute a fair percentage of the PD desk officer’s day.

20 Though country desk officers do routinely perform tasks generated by other bureaus, e.g., the Bureaus of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs (EEB) or Consular Affairs (CA), these officers nonetheless regard their regional assistant secretary and the undersecretary of state for political affairs to be their “bosses.” In contrast, according to interlocutors who addressed the Commission in 2007, the PD officers in the regional bureaus do not regard the undersecretary of state for political affairs (“P”) as their “boss” in a day-to-day sense, and indeed, their work has virtually no bearing on the day-to-day work of P; rather, they view the undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs (“R”) as their boss, and to a large degree, R sees these officers—and indeed, PD officers overseas—as “its own.” Note, for example, the phrasing in Under Secretary Hughes’ 2007 telegram to ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission and public affairs officers, cited earlier in this report: “…[W]hile our officers are competitive class-wide[,] it is clear that PD officers still need to make a compelling case that their work is advancing policy goals and objectives” (emphasis added). In this respect, PD officers do not seem to be as well integrated into the mainstream of P work as officers of the other four career tracks. In matrix management terms, there seems to be an imbalance in favor of function at the expense of (integrated) mission.

21 The Indonesia desk is part of the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs’ Office of Maritime Southeast Asia Affairs. The Commission understands that, at present, PD desk officers often have responsibility for more than one country, e.g., in this example, not just Indonesia, but also Malaysia, the Philippines, and others. But the question remains: in principle, what is the value of having PD officers working with other PD officers, as opposed to their country affairs colleagues?

22 On the contrary, the PD area offices are not tasked with preparing the daily “press guidance,” country- and issue-specific material used by the Department spokesperson in the daily noon briefing; rather, political and economic officers routinely prepare this material. The Commission finds it odd that the regional bureaus are not relying on officers who generally have served as embassy spokespersons to prepare press talking points.
We do not see the value-added in this layer of communication.23 24

Some observers make the case for the reprogramming of these PD positions overseas, where USG communications needs are most acute25; others call for the increased integration of PD officers into the country desks (e.g., the PD officer for Indonesia moving onto the Indonesia desk)—and indeed, a number of area offices have already begun doing this on a trial basis.26 Presumably, a collateral benefit of the former scenario would be an increased pressure for mid-level and senior PD officers to bid on country desk jobs, including at the level of deputy director and director. True integration of public diplomacy considerations into the policy process will be achieved only when PD officers are in the policy-makers’ seats; as long as there is a separate PD office in the bureaucracy, the incidence of PD officers rising into such positions will likely remain, as it is at present, fairly low.27

At a minimum, the Department ought to perform a zero-based review of the current arrangement to determine if the system, with its informal and somewhat unclear lines of authority, is functioning at peak capacity and maximizing the integration of PD considerations into the Department’s policymaking process. To our knowledge, no such review has ever been conducted.28

**Recommendation**

- That the Department undertake a zero-based review of the PD area office staffing structure to determine if the current arrangement is functioning optimally.

23 In this example, for instance, we do not see why the ECA or IIP action offices could not reach out to the desk directly, thus obviating a communication layer that seems to be largely extraneous.

24 In a candid, internal 2006 e-mail message, one PD area office officer, arguing for the continued intermediary role of the PD area offices in making IV appointments, wrote, “I would strongly object to having the IV program officers take over any responsibilities for making the DOS appointments. Often, setting up these appointments and escorting the visitors around is our best opportunity for contact with other offices… and even more importantly, our own front office. I usually only see [our own DASes] thru IV appointments. [Cutting the PD area office out of the appointment process] would also confuse even more the issue of why there is a separate PD office within the regional bureau” (names of DASes and other identifying information redacted from the original). This message, part of a longer multi-party e-mail discussion on this topic and the broader issue of the relevance of the PD area offices, suggests, at least anecdotally, that even the officers who work in these offices find it difficult to define their niche within the regional bureaus. The comment that escorting IVs represents “the best opportunity for contact… with our own front office” is particularly revealing.

25 The State Department already faces a major and chronic shortage of FSOs for field positions; indeed, the Director General of the Foreign Service recently felt compelled to direct overseas posts to identity 10% of their bid-able positions for non-filling. With respect to PD positions specifically, according to official Department analysis, the shortage is particularly acute at the mid-levels, and the vacancy rate has increased in recent years. In other words, there are not enough PD officers, particularly at the mid-levels, to fill the existing job slots; in mid-2007, for example, the mid-level deficit was 253. For more details, see “Public Diplomacy Workforce Analysis.”

26 For example, the China and Russia PD officers are “embedded” on the China and Russia desks, respectively.

27 See the last section of this report for a more detailed discussion of this point.

28 In our 2002 report, the Commission called upon the secretary of state, in concert with the Commission, to conduct “a review of all consolidation initiatives and make any necessary recommendations in such areas as training and the location and reporting structure of public diplomacy units.” Our current recommendation, above, is narrower in scope than the 2002 recommendation.
VI. THE ROLE OF PAOS AT LARGE POSTS

Background

The senior-most public diplomacy official at overseas U.S. missions is the country public affairs officer (PAO). A member of the “country team,” the PAO is the overall manager of the public diplomacy operation at post and principal advisor to the ambassador for public affairs-related matters. On the organizational chart, the PAO sits atop two very distinct embassy functions that, jointly, constitute the public diplomacy function: cultural affairs and information (press) affairs. At large posts (which are the focus of this discussion), there has often been a deputy public affairs officer (DPAO), who effectively serves as the PAO’s “alter-ego” and, in the absence of the PAO, serves in that capacity on an acting basis; the number of DPAO slots has decreased significantly in recent years, however. As a general rule, neither the PAO nor the DPAO has a substantive portfolio that is distinct from the cultural and information functions; their role is essentially managerial.29

With the 1999 consolidation, the PAO went from being the head of an independent USG agency overseas (e.g., akin to the head of the U.S. Agency for International Development or the Foreign Commercial Service), to being a senior-level State Department official; in other words, the PAO went from “head of agency” to “head of section.” When USIA (or overseas, USIS) was a distinct bureaucratic entity, the PAO, while clearly subordinate to the ambassador, had considerable management autonomy over such issues as public diplomacy budgets, administrative matters (e.g., pertaining to office space, vehicles and the like), and so on. Though the 1999 consolidation had little substantive impact on the PAO’s basic role at post, it did strip away some of the purely managerial/administrative responsibilities associated with service as a PAO, with the direct impact greatest on the old USIS executive officers, who managed most of the PD-related administrative support functions on a day-to-day basis.

At a 2007 Commission open meeting, senior PD officials at the Department of State, most of whom had previously served as PAOs, stated that the PAO remains a key member of the country team. Some acknowledged, however, that “personalities” at post can have a significant impact on the degree to which the PAO is integrated into mission decision-making. Most of the officials who addressed the Commission on this issue agreed that the PAO’s role is primarily managerial, not representational; that is, the PAO spends the great majority of his or her time managing, rather than directly engaging foreign counterparts. As one put it, “The PAO is not necessarily the outreach person.” Another senior PD official elaborated by noting that there is now an expectation on the part of senior Department leadership that “everyone does PD,”

29 See below for a more detailed discussion of this point, including specific references to PAO work requirements statements.
or more precisely, “outreach.” That notwithstanding, the official added, there is still a need for PD officers—trained practitioners of public diplomacy who are capable of conceptualizing, managing, implementing, and measuring the effectiveness of public diplomacy and PD programming. This skill- and knowledge-set is distinct from those associated with outreach. As one senior PD official colorfully observed, “This ain’t rocket science, but it is science”; and thus, we need seasoned officers managing our PD efforts in the field. Most of those who have spoken to the Commission on this matter have stated that if they were building an overseas PD operation from scratch, they would, in fact, have a PAO, as well as officers responsible for the cultural and information affairs functions; some officers, however, have disagreed, arguing that the PAO function is largely superfluous in the post-USIA era. There was general unanimity, though, about the fact that consolidation had not fundamentally altered the way business was being done overseas.

Findings and Analysis

In the nearly nine years since the consolidation of the USIA into the State Department in 1999, the overseas public diplomacy staffing structure has remained essentially unchanged. Prior to consolidation, the PAO headed the overseas office of an independent U.S. agency, with all the attendant managerial responsibilities and issues associated with such a role (e.g., budget, personnel, etc.). Nearly nine years after the consolidation, the Department has yet to re-examine the utility of this old USIA-era staffing pattern. While many FSOs advocate the current arrangement, some believe that large posts are excessively management heavy and that large-post PAOs and DPAOs can constitute an extraneous layer of senior-level management between the CAOs and IOs, on the one hand, and DCMs, on the other. In large missions, for example, the presence of a PAO, and possibly DPAO, creates up to two layers between the embassy spokesman and the embassy front office—a situation that is all the more difficult to fathom considering that IOs (and also CAOs) at large posts are often, at least in theory, members of the Senior Foreign Service; in individual sections, there shouldn’t be even one layer, let alone two, between fellow members of the Senior Foreign Service. Such a structure is needlessly top-heavy.

The Commission is also concerned that in many cases, our most experienced and able PD officers overseas evidently are “not necessarily the outreach person.” To the extent this is so, it begs the question: then just who is “the outreach person” if not the PAO? While the Commission certainly lauds the idea that PD outreach is now everyone’s job, we are troubled that PAOs are not, in fact, leading the charge in this outreach effort, especially in light of U/S Hughes’ assertion, articulated in her 2007 message to ambassadors, DCMs and PAOs, that “we all need to remain fully engaged in making sure that we are effectively reaching foreign audiences.” Why aren’t PAOs tasked with “reaching foreign audiences?”
In reviewing PAO WRSES, which the Department provided to the Commission at our request, we found that, unfortunately, there seems to be some validity to the assertion that PAOs view themselves, and are viewed by others, more as managers and administrators than as expert communicators. Here are the first words of each of the responsibilities assigned to one major-post PAO:

- “Oversee the implementation of…”
- “Supervise, manage, and evaluate [staff]…”
- “Manage the [PD] allotment…”
- “Upgrade technologies…”
- “Manage classified material…”
- “Organize…”
- “Revitalize [organizations]…”
- “Oversee…”
- “Undertake special assignments…”
- “Oversee professional development…”

Numerous other PAO WRSES were virtually identical; and indeed, one senior PD official told the Commission that PAO (and, more generally, PD) WRSES are largely “generic,” a characterization that the Commission found to be accurate.

A close look at the verbs above makes it clear that, indeed, PAOs are essentially high-level managers without their own substantive (e.g., communications) portfolios, just as a number of interlocutors, including the PD official who sat on the 2007 promotion boards, asserted to the Commission. In the above case, the words “oversee,” “supervise,” and “manage” appear six times out of ten requirements in all. And to reiterate a point made in the EER section of this report, above, words and phrases that pointedly do not appear in the above PAO WRSES include, for example: “Influence…,” “Shape public discourse…,” “Speak to foreign audiences on…,” “Persuade influential journalists…,” and so on. In fact, in the example cited above, not a single one of the ten work requirements mandates communication with the host-country public or requires the use of foreign language skills. We find this astonishing. Moreover, this state of affairs seems to be squarely at odds with the expectation set forth in the senior-level promotion precept mentioned in section four of this report.30 If PAOs are not required to engage foreign publics, then why is the Department spending millions to train them in foreign languages? And more fundamentally, is the value added by the PAO’s management worth the considerable expense to the USG associated with maintaining these high-salary positions? In summary, we believe that a zero-based review of the basic overseas staffing model—something that has not occurred since the 1999 consolidation—is long overdue.

30 Again, the senior-level precept is: “Deals comfortably with the media; is active and effective in public diplomacy, both in the U.S. and overseas. Contributes to and implements strategies to encourage a fair hearing for U.S. views and perspectives.”
Recommendation

- That the Department undertake a zero-based review of the overseas PD staffing model to determine if the current staffing structure, particularly at large posts, continues to make sense in the post-USIA era, in which public diplomacy is no longer the endeavor of an independent USG agency.
- That the Department require that all PAOs, including those at large posts, have at least one work requirement entailing substantive engagement with the host-country public.
Background

An enduring question in the wake of the 1999 consolidation is the degree to which public diplomacy has been integrated into the State Department policy-making process; and one important proxy for this is whether PD officers are serving at the senior-most levels of the State bureaucracy—in particular, the PD bureaucracy—in greater numbers than was the case before October 1, 1999.

The input the Commission received from the many interlocutors we heard from on this topic in 2007 Commission open meetings was mixed. A number of senior PD officials told the Commission that, in a dramatic change from the past, PD officers are now well-represented in the senior-most ranks of Department management. One senior PD official claimed that the PD community has become “a victim of its own success” in the sense that such a large number of PD officers are now in senior management jobs that there is a relative dearth of PD officers available to take senior-level PD assignments (such as PAO positions, for example).

Other officials, from both the PD and other career tracks, were considerably less sanguine about the degree to which PD officers have attained senior positions in the Department. These officials argued that the old bias against PD that has always existed in the Foreign Service endures on, albeit not as dramatically or obviously as before. Given the conflicting perspectives on this important issue, the Commission requested that the Department provide definitive human resources data to document PD officers’ career paths in the nearly nine years since October 1, 1999.

Findings and Analysis

Authoritative human resources data provided to the Commission by the Department establish that PD officers continue to be significantly under-represented in the senior-most ranks of Department management. The data suggest that the integration that the 1999 consolidation was supposed to bring about remains elusive.

The following two graphs, generated from the data the Department provided the Commission, illustrate the problem:
Though the percentage of PD officers serving in senior-level positions\(^{32}\) has, in fact, increased somewhat (Graph 1); statistically, **PD nevertheless remains the most under-represented of the five career tracks, in both absolute and relative terms** (Graph 2). Indeed, since 2005, there has been an evident downward trend in the percentage of PD officers serving in senior-level positions, from 9% to 8% to 7% in 2005, 2006 and 2007, respectively (Graph 1). Moreover, the problem is most pronounced at the assistant secretary and ambassadorial levels. In 1999, the PD career track produced no assistant secretaries and just 1% of all U.S. ambassadors; in 2007, the PD career track produced just one

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31 In Graph 2, the percentages of senior management positions by cone add up to 70, not 100; political appointees encumber the remaining 30 percent of these slots.

32 The Department defines “senior-level positions” as assistant secretary, deputy assistant secretary, chief of mission, deputy chief of mission, and principal officer (e.g., consul general).
assistant secretary-level official and 3% of ambassadors (specifically, an increase from two ambassadors to four). Indeed, no career track has yielded fewer ambassadors than PD in any year from 1999 (the year consolidation occurred) to 2007 (the last year for which the Department has complete data), except for the consular career track in 2004. And similarly, no PD officer has ever risen to the Foreign Service personal rank of “career ambassador,” the Service’s top rung, in the decades the rank has existed. Thus, nearly nine years into consolidation, the PD career track is no longer “separate,” but it is certainly not yet “equal.”

We recognize that many PD officers now at or coming into the prime of their careers, and who therefore would be candidates for senior positions at State, spent their formative years working in what was then a separate government agency—the United States Information Agency. That being the case, it is understandable that these experienced PD officers may well not be effectively integrated into State, or may lack the mentorship and broader support within the Department hierarchy that is necessary for advancement into the higher-level positions. Having said that, we are nonetheless troubled that, nearly nine years after consolidation, PD officers have not attained senior management positions in the Department of State in considerably greater numbers, let alone, in rough proportion to their representation in the Foreign Service as a whole. While important in itself as a matter of equity and morale, the more fundamental point is that the relative lack of success on this front suggests a lack of progress on the overarching issue of the integration of PD into the core work of the Department.

The Commission believes that if we are to attract and retain first-rate PD officers, then the Department of State needs to demonstrate over time that these officers will be regarded as generally capable of holding the Department’s senior-most positions—particularly, those responsible for the conduct of public diplomacy. Looking ahead toward the second decade after consolidation, the Commission hopes and expects to see increased representation, more commensurate with PD’s representation in the Foreign Service itself, of PD officers in the ranks of the Department’s leadership. We will revisit this issue periodically to monitor progress. Unless and until PD officers can rise to the senior-most ranks of the Department leadership, the cause of weaving PD considerations into the Department’s policy process will not meet with the success originally hoped for in 1999.

**Recommendation**

- That the Department appoint suitably qualified PD officers to senior positions within the State Department with approximately the same frequency that it appoints other career Foreign Service officers to such positions, thus eliminating the “glass ceiling” that continues to prevent PD officers from rising to the same levels as other FSOs.
CONCLUSION

The human resources dimension of U.S. public diplomacy is by no means the “silver bullet” to the nation’s current public diplomacy challenges, but it is an important, and generally under-emphasized, part of the puzzle. The Commission believes that we can significantly enhance the quality and effectiveness of our nation’s outreach to foreign publics by: recruiting for the public diplomacy career track in a more focused way; testing our recruits more thoroughly and methodically for their PD instincts, knowledge and skills; training them more intensively in the core PD skill-set of persuasive communication; and evaluating them more on communication and less on administration. The Commission also believes that now is the time, nearly a decade after the 1999 consolidation of USIA into the State Department, to assess the utility of two key PD-related bureaucratic constructs: the PD area office and the PAO at large posts. Finally, the Commission hopes and expects to see progress, over the coming months and years, in the integration of PD officers in the Department’s leadership ranks, including those of the PD bureaus themselves. The enduring under-representation of PD officers, vis-à-vis officers of other career tracks, in the Department’s top ranks is important both as a matter of equity and morale, and also, because it suggests that there is much more work to do in the larger cause of integrating PD considerations into State Department policy-making.

The Commission and the State Department share a very important goal: to make U.S. public diplomacy as effective as it can possibly be. We submit this report in that spirit and look forward to working closely with the State Department and other USG agencies in continuing to enhance the quality and impact of America’s communication with the world.
Mr. William J. Hybl is Chairman of the Commission. From 1990–1997, he served on the Commission, including as Vice Chairman, under Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Hybl is the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of El Pomar Foundation, a general-purpose foundation and a national leader in innovative grantmaking recognized by the Association of Fundraising Professionals in 1998 as National Foundation of the Year. He is also President Emeritus of the United States Olympic Committee. He twice served as President, leading the U.S. Olympic delegations at the 1992 Winter Games in Albertville, France and 1992 Summer Games in Barcelona, Spain; and doing so again for the 1998 Winter Games in Nagano, Japan and the 2000 Summer Games in Sydney, Australia. Hybl also serves as Chairman of the U.S. Olympic Foundation and is a member of the Colorado Sports Hall of Fame. An attorney, former member of the Colorado legislature and former special counsel to President Ronald Reagan, Hybl also serves as Chairman of the Board of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), as Commissioner on the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, and as Civilian Aide Emeritus to the Secretary of the Army. In 2001, President George W. Bush appointed Hybl as U.S. representative to the 56th General Assembly of the United Nations. Hybl currently serves as Vice Chairman of the Board of the BROADMOOR Hotel, Inc., and is President of the Air Force Academy Foundation and The Hundred Club of Colorado Springs. Hybl also serves on numerous corporate boards. He was named 2003 Citizen of the West and, in 2005, was elected to The Colorado College Board of Trustees. Hybl holds a bachelor’s degree from The Colorado College and a law degree from the University of Colorado.

Ambassador Elizabeth Frawley Bagley is Vice Chair of the Commission. She serves as “of counsel” to Manatt, Phelps & Phillips Law Firm and senior advisor to Manatt Jones Global Services. From 1997 to 2001, Bagley served as Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State; she also served as Senate liaison for NATO enlargement. From 1994 to 1997, Bagley served as U.S. Ambassador to Portugal. From 1977 to 1981, she held several positions in the U.S. Department of State, including, Congressional Liaison Officer for the Panama Canal Treaties (1977–1979); Special Assistant to Ambassador Sol Linowitz for the Camp David Accords (1979–1980); and Congressional Liaison to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1980–1981). Ambassador Bagley is a Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and serves on several international boards, including the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Vital Voices International, and the American Ireland Fund. An attorney specializing in trade and international law, Bagley was an Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown University in Washington until January 1993. She is a member in
good standing of the Massachusetts and District of Columbia Bars. Bagley serves as Chair of the National Advisory Board for the Democratic National Committee and Chair of the Clinton Library Board of Trustees. She is a recipient of meritorious awards from the Portuguese Navy and Air Force, as well as the “Grand Cross of Prince Henry the Navigator,” the President of Portugal's highest civilian commendation. Bagley holds a bachelor's degree from Regis College and a law degree from Georgetown University.

**Dr. Maria Sophia Aguirre** is an associate professor of economics at The Catholic University of America. Aguirre has also held appointments at the University of Chicago and Northwestern University's Economics Department. Aguirre's specialization is in international finance and economic development. She has researched and published in the areas of exchange rates and economic integration, as well as on theories of population, resources, and family as it relates to economic development. Her work has been widely published in numerous academic journals, including, among others, *International Advances in Economic Research, Journal of Economic Studies, International Review of Economics and Finance,* and the *Journal of Economics and Finance*; it has also been featured in major international media, such as the *Washington Post,* the *Wall Street Journal,* PBS and BBC. Aguirre has served as an advisor to several governments on women's education, family policies and health, and several U.N. representatives; she has also testified before numerous federal legislatures on her areas of expertise. She serves as an officer in different capacities on several organizations' boards, including the Commission on the Status of Women in the Professions, a working group of the American Economic Association. Aguirre has received numerous honors for her work, including a Citation for Excellence (1998), the Magister en Gestión Educativa by the Consejo Iberoamericano (2004), and inclusion *Who's Who Among America's Teachers* (1996 and 2006).

**Mr. John E. Osborn** is currently a visiting research fellow at the University of Oxford's Centre for Socio-Legal Studies and a senior member of Wadham College Oxford. For more than ten years, he held various senior executive positions with Cephalon, Inc., a leading biopharmaceutical company, where he was responsible for managing all legal, intellectual property, quality assurance, government and public affairs matters at the company. Prior to joining Cephalon, Osborn held various positions with The DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Company. He served in the U.S. Department of State as special assistant to the legal adviser, practiced corporate law in Boston with the firm of Hale and Dorr, clerked for Judge Albert V. Bryan of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and worked on Capitol Hill in the offices of former U.S. Representative Jim Leach of Iowa and the late U.S. Senator John Heinz of Pennsylvania. Mr. Osborn also has held a visiting research appointment in politics at Princeton University, has lectured at the Universities of Pennsylvania and Michigan, and was an Eisenhower Fellow to Northern Ireland, a visiting scholar in East European Studies at
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., and a member of the Board of Governors of the East-West Center in Honolulu. He is a member of the American Law Institute, the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation and the Council on Foreign Relations.

Mr. Harold C. Pachios is a former chairman of the Commission and is serving his fourth term as a Commissioner; he is the longest serving Commissioner in the 60-year history of Commission. Pachios is managing partner in the law firm of Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau, Pachios & Haley, based in Portland, Maine. In his prior government and political career, he served as associate White House press secretary under President Lyndon B. Johnson and on the Peace Corps staff under President John F. Kennedy. He has also served as chairman of the Maine Democratic Party. Pachios is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a director of the Salzburg Seminar in Salzburg, Austria, and a member of the National Governing Board of Common Cause. He is also Chairman of the Board of the University of Maine School of Law, and a former Northeast Regional Vice Chair of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law.

Ambassador Penne Korth Peacock has served on the Commission since 1997. President George H.W. Bush chose her to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Mauritius (1989–1992) and as his first female appointee to serve as co-chair of the American Bicentennial Presidential Inaugural. She currently serves on the boards of directors of Chevy Chase Bank, the Council of American Ambassadors, the Hillwood Museum (Emeritus), and the U.S.-Mauritius Business Council; as well as on the Advisory Boards of the America Australia Association and the Washington Ballet. While living in Washington, Peacock previously served as a member of the boards of the White House Preservation Fund, the Washington Round Table of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, the Meridian International Center, and the National Symphony Orchestra at the Kennedy Center. In Sydney, Australia, Peacock served as Chairman of Republicans Abroad in 2004, and is currently a member of the Sydney Cancer Center Advisory Committee and an International Representative of Sotheby’s. In Austin, Texas, she is a member of the Advisory Board of The Harry Ransom Center at the University of Texas. Peacock attended the University of Texas from 1960 to 1964.

Mr. Jay T. Snyder was sworn in as a Commissioner by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell on May 8, 2003 and reappointed to the Commission in 2005. He is a principal of HBJ Investments, LLC, specializing in private equity investments. His prior government service includes serving as a U.S. Representative to the 55th United Nations General Assembly. As a public delegate appointed by President Clinton, Snyder was actively involved in a variety of issues, particularly those related to the international HIV/AIDS pandemic, sustainable development,
and U.S. efforts at U.N. reform. In 2007, he became the Non-Executive Chairman of Pelion Financial Group, a company that provides retirement wealth and plan management solutions for small and mid-sized businesses. He was a principal of Ashfield Consulting Group from 2003 to 2005. Prior to his employment with HBJ, Snyder enjoyed a 17-year career at Biocraft Laboratories, a publicly held generic drug manufacturer. At the end of his tenure, Snyder was the Vice President of Research and Development and a member of both the Management Steering Committee and Board of Directors. From 1991 to 1996, Snyder acted as managing director for the Mayberry Core Asset Management Group, where he collaborated with various members to negotiate the acquisition of investment management firms. In addition to his professional work, he continues to serve on the Board of Trustees of the Beatrice Snyder Foundation, Phoenix House Foundation and Milano Graduate School of Management and Urban Policy, all non-profit organizations, and is an active participant in many charitable organizations. In 2008, he joined the Advisory Board of the Brookings’ Saban Center/ Council on Foreign Relations Middle East Project. Snyder studied chemistry while attending Boston University and New York University.

Mr. Carl K. Chan is the executive director of the Commission. Born and raised in Hong Kong, Mr. Chan is a former Senior Foreign Service officer. His foreign postings included Israel, where he was press attaché and embassy spokesman; Pakistan, where he was cultural attaché; and China, where he reestablished the United States Information Service (USIS) operations in the city of Guangzhou after a 33-year hiatus. He also did press and cultural work in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines. In domestic assignments, he worked on international trade and security issues and served as a member of the Foreign Service Board of Examiners, which administers the Oral Examination to Foreign Service officer candidates. Before entering the Foreign Service, Chan was a radio and television writer and producer. He has a bachelor’s degree from the University of South Dakota and a master’s degree from Northwestern University, both in mass communications.

Mr. David J. Firestein is the senior advisor to the Commission and the project director and principal drafter of this report. A Foreign Service officer since 1992, Firestein has served at the U.S. embassies in Beijing, China (five years) and Moscow, Russia (four years) and in domestic positions in the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He is the recipient of numerous Department of State honors, including the Secretary’s Award for Public Outreach and the Linguist of the Year Award. He is fluent in Chinese and Russian. A prolific author, Firestein has published three books and some 130 articles in major international periodicals; in 1995, he became the first foreign citizen to have a newspaper column in the People’s Republic of China. Firestein is an adjunct member of the public diplomacy faculty at the Foreign Service Institute, where he teaches “Best Practices in Public Diplomacy”; and the graduate faculty of the
University of Texas (Austin), where he has taught U.S.-Russia relations and U.S.-China relations. In 2001, he was an adjunct professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Russia’s premier university and diplomatic training ground, where he taught two courses on “Political Consulting and the American Political Campaign”; he was the first U.S. diplomat ever to teach at MGIMO. Firestein is a recognized expert on the political communication effect of contemporary country music and is the author of the seminal 2005 study, “The Honky Tonk Gap: Country Music, Red State Identity, and the Election of 2004.” He is an elected member of the Board of Governors of the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA). A native of Austin, Texas, Firestein is a graduate of Georgetown University (B.S.F.S., 1990) and the University of Texas (M.P.Aff. / M.A., 1992).

**Mrs. Jamice Clayton** is the administrative officer of the Commission. Her 30-year career with the federal government has included service with the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, the Selective Service System, and the Department of Health and Human Services.