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DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley
Chairman
Committee on Finance
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

JUN 10 2020

The Honorable Ron Johnson
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Chairmen Grassley and Johnson,

I am writing in response to your 22 May 2020 letter seeking the declassification of Annex A of the 30 December 2016 Intelligence Community (IC) Assessment titled *Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections* and the 22 March 2018 report from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) titled *Report on Russian Active Measures*.

We have a shared interest in public transparency consistent with the need to protect classified information. To that end, I have reviewed Annex A to the 2016 IC Assessment and have concluded, in consultation with Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Central Intelligence Agency, that it can be publicly released with minimal redactions. I have enclosed a declassified version of that document.

The 2018 HPSCI report is a Congressional record. To ensure that the IC does not encroach on Congressional prerogatives, I have requested that the Chairman of HPSCI share a copy of the report with me so that the IC can conduct a classification review.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to reach out to Ryan Crumpler, ODNI Director, Legislative Affairs at 703-275-2032 (unsecure).

Sincerely,



John Ratcliffe

Enclosure:

Intelligence Community Assessment Annex A, Additional Reporting From an FBI Source on Russian Influence Efforts, Declassified on 09 June 2020 (U)

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Cc:

Acting Chairman Marco Rubio
Vice Chairman Mark R. Warner

[REDACTED]

(U) Annex A

[REDACTED] Additional Reporting From an FBI Source on Russian Influence Efforts

[REDACTED] An FBI source, using both identified and unidentified sub-sources, volunteered highly politically sensitive information from the summer to the fall of 2016 on Russian influence efforts aimed at the US presidential election. We have only limited corroboration of the source's reporting in this case and did not use it to reach the analytic conclusions of the CIA/FBI/NSA assessment.

- [REDACTED] The source is an executive of a private business intelligence firm and a former employee of a friendly foreign intelligence service who has been compensated for previous reporting over the past three years. The source maintains and collects information from a layered network of identified and unidentified sub-sources, some of which has been corroborated in the past. The source collected this information on behalf of private clients and was not compensated for it by the FBI.
- [REDACTED] The source's reporting appears to have been acquired by multiple Western press organizations starting in October.

[REDACTED] Some of the FBI source's reporting is consistent with the judgments in this assessment. The FBI source claimed, for example, that Putin ordered the influence effort with the aim of defeating Secretary Clinton, whom Putin "feared and hated."

- [REDACTED] The FBI source quoted three sub-sources who reported that Moscow's aim in its campaign was to upend the international liberal order, cause tensions with European allies, shift US policy on key Russian interests, and undermine US politics regardless of the electoral result.
- [REDACTED] The FBI source also quoted a sub-source who said that the Kremlin was providing a select number of Russian journalists with privileged access to pre-published Wikileaks material on Clinton and other Democratic Party officials, and that Russian journalists were being pressured not to publish critical pieces on the President-elect or favorable stories on Clinton, consistent with our assessments of Russian state control of the media and its demonstrated preference for the President-elect.
- [REDACTED] The FBI source also reported that the Kremlin curbed its influence efforts following the media outcry in the US in late July and August, and that Putin regretted his decision to intervene.

[REDACTED] The most politically sensitive claims by the FBI source alleged a close relationship between the President-elect and the Kremlin. The source claimed that the President-elect and his top campaign

[REDACTED]

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advisers knowingly worked with Russian officials to bolster his chances of beating Secretary Clinton; were fully knowledgeable of Russia's direction of leaked Democratic emails; and were offered financial compensation from Moscow.

- [REDACTED] The FBI source claimed that the Kremlin had cultivated the President-elect for at least five years, had fed him and his team intelligence about Secretary Clinton and other opponents for years, and agreed to use WikiLeaks in return for policy concessions by the President-elect—assuming he won the election—on NATO and Ukraine.
- [REDACTED] The FBI source also claimed Russian authorities possessed compromising material on the President-elect's activities when he was in Russia, as well as a compromising dossier on Secretary Clinton's political activities that was controlled by the Kremlin and not shared with the President-elect or his team.
- [REDACTED] The FBI source claimed that secret meetings between the Kremlin and the President-elect's team were handled by some of the President-elect's advisers, at least one of whom was allegedly offered financial remuneration for a policy change lifting sanctions on Russia.

[REDACTED] The same source provided the FBI with additional information not developed by the layered subsource network. The FBI source caveated that, although similar to previously provided reporting in terms of content, the source was unable to vouch for the additional information's sourcing and accuracy. Hence this information is not included in this product.

[REDACTED]