

**REPORT**  
**ON**  
**SECURING THE NONPROLIFERATION**  
**CAPABILITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

**SUBMITTED BY**  
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**TO THE HEARING ON**  
**NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAUCRACY FOR ARMS**  
**CONTROL, COUNTERPROLIFERATION, AND**  
**NONPROLIFERATION PART I: THE ROLE OF THE**  
**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

**BY THE**  
**SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF**  
**GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL**  
**WORKFORCE AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

**OF THE**  
**U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND**  
**SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS**

**MAY 15, 2008**

## FOREWORD

This report was prepared by a volunteer task force. The task force solicited views from participants through two general meetings and from contributors via written comments.

These two groups included many former U.S. officials most with decades of experience in nonproliferation or arms control who graciously gave of their time to this project. They are named below—a short biography of each appears in the annex.

This report contains a general consensus that the Administration taking office in January 2009 should strengthen the organizational capacity of the State Department to meet critical nonproliferation and arms control challenges. Participants and contributors endorse the general thrust of this report though not necessarily every finding and suggestion.

Christopher Mitchell of the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) of George Mason University served as convener of the two meetings that were held. Norman Wulf led those discussions and along with Dean Rust and Barclay Ward drafted the discussion papers and this report.

The task force also included Linda Gallini, Fred McGoldrick, and Sharon Squassoni.

Participants in at least one of the two meetings included members of the task force and Vic Alessi, Kevin Avruch, Joseph M. DeThomas, James E. Goodby, Allan Krass, Frances Omori, Randy Rydell and Andy Semmel.

Among those commenting upon various drafts of the paper were William Burns, Ralph Earle II, Mark Fitzpatrick, Bob Gallucci, John Holum, Edward Ifft and John Rhineland.

No funds were made available to the task force other than by ICAR for use of their new retreat and conference center located on Mason Neck in Northern Virginia and for refreshments at the two meetings. Special appreciation is expressed to Gina Cerasani and Aneela Shamshad, and Saira Yamin, graduate students at ICAR, who served as volunteer note-takers at the two meetings.

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

*All three major presidential candidates have endorsed ( i.) maintaining and strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime and (ii.) pursuing nuclear arms control measures with Russia and others. Regrettably, the State Department, which will bear the brunt of the work on nonproliferation and arms control, has lost significant capability—critical personnel have left, the arms control bureau has been abolished, and the bureau whose mandate includes nonproliferation is burdened with tasks outside its traditional purview that dilute its mission. Moreover, the State Department is simply not organized to ensure continued access and accountability to the Secretary of State and President on these critical issues.*

*Following the election, the President-elect should appoint a high-caliber individual to head up a task force charged with laying out detailed priorities in nonproliferation and arms control and recommending structural changes needed within the executive branch to achieve those priorities. The White House and National Security Council will need to be well-organized to serve the President, but the task force should direct its primary attention to the Department of State. Restoring focus at State will require creating a bureau focused on arms control, removing non-core tasks from the bureau whose responsibilities include nonproliferation, and limiting the activities of the verification and compliance bureau to those required by law. If there are substantial obstacles to near-term creation of an arms control-focused bureau, then those functions should be consolidated in the verification and compliance bureau effectively making it the arms control and verification bureau while seeking a long-term structure. Aggressive steps must be taken to redress the loss of expert staff. For the civil service, this means rehiring, recruiting, and strengthening career paths for personnel, including physical scientists, with expertise in nonproliferation and arms control. For the foreign service, this means providing training in these topics and career paths that reward those working on these functional issues.*

*Particular attention should be focused on ensuring that nonproliferation and arms control views get to the Secretary of State and the President. Both not only need advice but someone accountable in these areas. Existing law makes provision for such advice but it has proven difficult to implement those provisions effectively. Relying on personal relationships can work up to a point, but as personalities change, other priorities intrude, and administrations change, a more enduring channel and focus not dependent upon personal relationships is needed.*

*Decisions on these structural issues are critical in the transition period so the new administration can hit the ground running. Iran and North Korea, among others, will not delay their proliferation progress while a new administration organizes itself. Delaying decisions until after the inauguration risks subordinating structural questions to the crisis of the day or decisions being thwarted by “turf” issues as political appointees are put into place. A variety of alternatives should be considered ranging from creating a special office attached to the Secretary, or creating a separate agency within the State Department or an independent agency.*

## **ENSURING THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS THE CAPACITY TO MEET CRITICAL NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL CHALLENGES**

This short Report which is the result of meetings and discussions between a number of experts focuses on improving the Nation's capacity for dealing with the increasingly complex issues associated with nonproliferation and arms control. It lays out a number of alternative strategies for improving the Government's currently attenuated capacities for effective nonproliferation and arms control action.

### **I. Introduction**

All three major presidential candidates have endorsed the following objectives: (i.) maintaining and strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime and (ii.) pursuing nuclear arms control measures with Russia and others. Regrettably, what the next President will find is a diminished capability within the Executive Branch to achieve either objective.

The historical leadership role of the United States in nonproliferation and arms control has been severely downgraded and the nonproliferation regime significantly weakened. Along with this overall decline, there has been a loss of valuable expertise and bureaucratic structure diminishing the capacity of the United States to pursue nonproliferation and arms control measures.

Restoring U.S. leadership in these areas will require a personal commitment by the new President. Within the Executive Branch, there will need to be a strong organization to execute policies and be accountable to the White House. This paper looks at key organizational issues that must be met, particularly in the State Department, if the new administration is to meet its nonproliferation and arms control objectives.<sup>1</sup>

### **II. Critical Proliferation Challenges**

The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the foundation for global cooperation in this area. Its primary goal is to decrease the risk of nuclear war by preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. It also obligates the five states which the NPT recognizes as possessing nuclear weapons -- U.S., Russia, UK, France and China -- to work toward nuclear disarmament. The urgency of dealing with the threat posed by nuclear weapons has been highlighted recently by former senior officials of both political parties -- Secretaries of State Kissinger and Shultz, Secretary of Defense Perry, and Senator Nunn -- who have called for renewed efforts to work towards a nuclear weapon free world, arguing that "the world is now on a precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era."<sup>2</sup> Their agenda, known as the Hoover plan after the Stanford institute where the group meets, is built around the NPT and focuses on U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control as well as on specific nonproliferation measures. No vision of a nuclear weapon free world or major progress toward that goal can be achieved without an intensive focus on both nonproliferation and arms control.

The three major candidates for the Presidency have called for strengthening the NPT and other elements of the nonproliferation regime and for reducing the nuclear arsenals of the United States and other nuclear powers; two have endorsed specific portions of the Hoover plan.<sup>3</sup> Any new administration will likely focus on a wide variety of other nuclear-related challenges as well, e.g., Iran and North Korea; protecting against the theft

or diversion of nuclear material; strengthening export control and interdiction activities; and developing nuclear fuel cycle strategies to reduce the spread of sensitive nuclear facilities. It may reconsider the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which the Senate failed to endorse in 1999, and give higher priority to U.S-Russian cooperation on strategic nuclear and missile defense issues and to a fissile material cutoff treaty. The new administration will have to continue specific measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons.

### **III. Structural Factors**

The first year of a new administration offers a unique opportunity for progress. Grasping that opportunity requires diligent preparations during the transition period. To prepare, the President-elect should establish a task force to identify key substantive goals and devise a plan for the creation of nonproliferation and arms control structures to achieve those goals. The task force should be led by an individual of stature who is directly accountable to the President-elect and well-known to the Congress. The task force could continue beyond the inauguration but should not be permanent. After the inauguration, the task force leader might be directly attached to the White House with the assignment of ensuring that substantive and structural goals are achieved. .

As cabinet departments with equities in nonproliferation and arms control have appointees put into place, a senior official in each department should be identified to work with the relevant White House and NSC officials. The NSC structure must include interagency groups responsible for integrating the activities and resources of each department, promoting transparency and information flow among agencies, and ensuring the input of the intelligence community. The appointment of a Deputy National Security Adviser for Nonproliferation and Arms Control would demonstrate the priority attached to these issues and allow for greater coordination of interagency activities.

The task force must pay special attention to the organizational structure under the Secretary of State, as State will bear the brunt of the work. State must be capable of performing a wide range of daily activities such as monitoring information, crafting and implementing policy initiatives, anticipating problems, advising high-level political officials, coordinating with other agencies, consulting with Congress, informing the public, and most importantly engaging in extensive diplomacy to maintain and strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Effective nonproliferation can only be achieved if the U.S. works closely with others.

A good organizational structure will help to set priorities, allocate resources, maintain the quality and morale of staff, and get issues to decision-makers in a timely manner.<sup>4</sup>

Among the key determinants of an effective structure are: (i) enough senior policy officials and supporting bureaus to focus attention on the full range of issues; (ii) an experienced multi-disciplinary career staff with a high percentage of civil servants including physical science officers; and (iii) high-level channels for getting views to the Secretary of State and President.

As shown below in Section IV, the current structure, which reflects the priorities and approach of this Administration, is entirely inadequate for pursuit of a more comprehensive approach by the new administration. The suggestions offered in Section IV do not require legislation but should lead to near-term improvements in State's

capacity. Even though not required, the administration and Congress may decide that it would be beneficial to codify some of these Section IV changes to ensure that the United States maintains over the long term a high level of capability in these critical areas.

Section V looks at other possible legislative approaches that would create either a semi-autonomous agency within the State Department or a separate agency for nonproliferation and arms control with an independence similar to that possessed by the former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), which was merged with the State Department in 1999.<sup>5</sup>

If not already decided by campaign commitments, the President-elect should decide during the transition whether to pursue a separate agency or limit structural reforms to near-term changes that do not require legislation. Even if the President decides on a separate agency, some improvements in the State structure will still be desirable while awaiting the necessary legislative action. Thorough consultations with the Congress should occur regardless of which direction is chosen.

#### **IV. Suggested Changes to the Current State Department Organizational Structure**

##### A. Bureaus and Special Representatives

At the outset of this Administration, three separate bureaus in State dealt with nonproliferation, arms control, and verification and compliance. The arms control bureau was abolished in 2005. Some of the arms control functions, e.g., START, were taken over by the verification and compliance bureau but that bureau's duties remain largely verification and compliance as prescribed by law. Other arms control duties were transferred to the former nonproliferation bureau, now renamed International Security and Nonproliferation. A quick inventory of this bureau's jurisdiction includes: six treaties, five export control regimes, three international organizations that specialize in nonproliferation or arms control topics, conventional arms proliferation, missile proliferation, missile defense, the Proliferation Security Initiative, implementation of several UN Security Council resolutions and negotiation of resolutions in the UN General Assembly, combating nuclear terrorism, country strategies, cooperative threat reduction in the former USSR, and securing and disposing of fissile material.

Diluting the focus of the bureau charged with nonproliferation by adding such areas as missile defense and General Assembly resolutions makes it much more difficult to achieve priority nonproliferation objectives. Abolishing the arms control focus and scattering its remains renders it unlikely that a renewed arms control agenda as proposed in the Hoover plan can be successfully pursued. Finally, while verification and compliance remain important, the need for U.S. global engagement on nonproliferation and arms control measures should have higher priority and greater focus.

##### Suggestions

1. Establish a bureau focused solely on nonproliferation by shifting all non-core duties,

such as missile defense and General Assembly resolutions, to a bureau with an arms control focus.

2. Revitalize the organizational structure for arms control by bringing back a bureau solely focused on arms control. Given the difference in priorities in 2005 and what will exist in 2009, new priorities can best be met by creating such a single-focus bureau.
3. Through administrative action, limit the activities of the verification and compliance bureau to the minimum necessary to fulfill its statutory duties. The goal should be to eliminate bureaucratic infighting and free up staff from this bureau for high priority nonproliferation and arms control activities.<sup>6</sup>
4. If there are substantial obstacles to near-term creation of an arms control focused bureau, then consolidate those functions in the verification and compliance bureau effectively making it the arms control and verification bureau while seeking a long-term structure. This approach should include clearly defining the verification role as suggested above.
5. Utilize existing statutory authority to appoint "Special Representatives of the President" at the ambassadorial level, with at least one dedicated to nonproliferation treaties and related activities; and another to the reemerging arms control agenda. They would work with the assistant secretaries for nonproliferation and arms control and be responsible for negotiations, conferences, and consulting with other governments.

#### B. Staffing

The State Department should have skills and experience relevant to bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and negotiations; the development, testing and manufacture of nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and their delivery systems; the civil nuclear fuel cycle; and to the implementation of interdiction measures, export controls, treaties and international organizations. An interdisciplinary group of civil servants from the physical and social sciences is needed along with foreign service officers (FSOs) and detailees from the military services. This mix has worked well in the past.

Unfortunately, there has been a significant loss of civil servants from the State Department in recent years, and recruiting physical scientists in particular faces strong competitive pressures outside the government. Moreover, with the elimination of ACDA, it has become more difficult to sustain civil service career patterns up through the office director position. Within the relevant bureaus, the State Department has reduced the number of senior executive service positions (SES) for civil servants and several office director positions have gone to FSOs. Such officers have much to offer, including in some cases as office directors or other senior positions. But FSOs must meet the qualifications of the positions, and in most leadership positions, including office directors; the qualifications require a high level of expertise in the field. Regrettably, the foreign service creates few incentives for FSOs to obtain the requisite knowledge for leadership positions in nonproliferation and arms control.

#### Suggestions

1. Halt any further "bleeding" of the career nonproliferation and arms control staff. Encourage those who transferred out of these jobs in recent years to return. Promote a civil service career path leading to office director positions, including at the SES level. Launch a recruiting program to hire the next generation of civil service specialists, including in relevant scientific and technical fields. Seek special hiring authority, if necessary, to recruit individuals with technical competence and to tap the skills of those officers who have retired from State.
2. Develop the technical competence of FSOs by creating a career path for nonproliferation and arms control with a protocol of training and assignments in these areas. For all FSOs, regardless of their career path, at least one assignment in nonproliferation and arms control or other functional bureaus should be a factor in promotion decisions to mid or senior level FSO positions. Such assignments could reduce some cultural barriers that exist between the regional and functional areas.

### C. Advising the Secretary of State and the President

Competing interests are a fact of life at the highest political levels and it is important that those advocating on behalf of controlling nuclear weapons be heard. The Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security ("the Under Secretary") is the most senior State official with clearly defined responsibilities for nonproliferation and arms control, although that position's mandate covers other issues including security assistance and conventional arms. This official is subordinate to the Deputy Secretary of State, is one of six under secretaries and ranks below the Under Secretary for Political Affairs who oversees the powerful regional bureaus. This senior level structure is further complicated by policy officials attached directly to the Office of the Secretary of State for diverse areas, such as reconstruction and stabilization, foreign assistance, development aid, counter-terrorism, and global AIDS programs.

Seeking to ensure that nonproliferation and arms control were not lost among the competing interests, the legislation merging ACDA into State authorized the Under Secretary to assume the former ACDA Director's role of senior adviser to the Secretary *and the President* on arms control and nonproliferation and *to attend NSC meetings at the President's direction* (22 U.S.C. Sec. 2651 a. (b) (2)) (*emphasis added*). Use of this authority, however, was not embraced by the current Administration.

It has long been clear that the State Department structure tends to favor regional interests. This tendency is reflected in the fact that the under secretary to whom the regional bureaus report is the third ranking official in the department. This does not mean that functional interests must give way to regional interests but it does mean that a Secretary of State or a President must ensure that functional priorities are clearly understood and always given appropriate weight. For that to happen, a mechanism must be found to ensure that nonproliferation and arms control equities are represented.

Different approaches -- with varying degrees of success -- have been taken by different administrations. Some administrations have relied upon the personal relationships among the relevant assistant secretaries, under secretaries, the Deputy Secretary and the

Secretary to ensure that nonproliferation and arms control are accorded adequate priority. Others have created various additional mechanisms such as an ambassador-at-large to obtain this result. Of course, up to 1999, the ACDA Director had the rank of Deputy Secretary of State and the authority to advise the Secretary and the President.

Relying solely on personal relationships places at risk over time the capability to sustain the attention of the Secretary of State as personalities change and the inevitable crush of foreign policy issues competes for the Secretary's attention. Continuity of attention to these critical issues could be enhanced by having a structure not dependent upon personalities. Set forth in the suggestions immediately below, which would not require new legislation, and in Section V, which would require new legislation, are various alternatives that should be considered. They could supplement any NSC or White House structural components set up to advise the President. As noted earlier, decisions with respect to these issues should be taken during the transition—delaying those decisions until after the inauguration risks critical substantive issues crowding out attention to structural questions and “turf” mentalities developing that hamper organizational change.

#### Suggestions

1. Establish procedures to implement the Under Secretary's already existing statutory role as senior adviser to the Secretary and the President on nonproliferation and arms control matters. This would allow the Under Secretary to weigh in on major policy questions, including with the President. It would elevate this position in relation to the other under secretaries. Implementing such an approach would work only if understood and accepted up front by all involved, including the President. Actual use of this authority by the Under Secretary with the President is likely to be rare, in any event, given this person's subordinate position to the Secretary.

2. Establish a position in the Secretary's office such as Coordinator, Ambassador-at-Large, or Special Adviser to the Secretary of State and President, that would focus on nuclear policy or nonproliferation. The mandate could be limited to a few critical topics, e.g. Iran, North Korea, anti-nuclear terrorism, and/or elements of the Hoover plan, or could be broad enough to focus on all aspects of nuclear proliferation. This would elevate nuclear issues to the highest level in State and permit more focus than the Under Secretary, whose mandate is far broader. This sort of arrangement was used with varying degrees of success during the Carter, Reagan and Bush I administrations. It would require a high degree of coordination between the Under Secretary and the new position, as well as with the relevant assistant secretaries. It would not create any clearer path to the President for views that are contrary to the Secretary's.

#### **V. Separate Agency**

State and ACDA working in tandem over nearly three decades were able to sustain a high level of U.S. global leadership in nonproliferation and arms control. This was in large part due to ACDA's exclusive focus on the mission, its status as an independent sub-cabinet agency with statutory authority to advise the Secretary of State and the President, and a strong cadre of civil service experts. The ten years since ACDA's demise has seen a decline in U.S. diplomacy in this area. That said, there seems little doubt that ACDA-like resources and strengths will be needed for the foreseeable future. The question is

will a strengthened State structure as suggested above in Section IV be adequate to the task over the long run or should the new Administration seek legislation to transfer the nonproliferation and arms control functions to a separate agency? Two different approaches to a separate agency are set forth below.

#### A. Separate Agency, But Part of State<sup>7</sup>

A semi-autonomous agency within State would be similar to the concept of the National Nuclear Security Administration within the Department of Energy. The agency's Director would be the nonproliferation and arms control adviser to the Secretary, and have a rank equivalent to the Deputy Secretary of State. The Director would also have the right to communicate directly with the President. The agency would work closely with State regional bureaus and related functional bureaus, but there would be no need for additional nonproliferation and arms control offices elsewhere in State since this agency would represent the coordinated view of the State Department on these issues.

This approach would ensure optimal access to the Secretary. The agency's unique identity and mission should improve the recruitment and retention of the diverse professional staff needed, including scientists and other technical experts. The elevation of nonproliferation and arms control within State will make clear to other governments the importance placed on these topics by the United States and lead to regular consultations with friends and allies. A separate agency is the best way to promote an enduring focus on nonproliferation and arms control policy, in contrast to embedding it in the Department's traditional structure with the vast array of competing interests and predominant focus on country and regional factors. On the other hand, establishing a separate agency would require legislation and presently Congress is focusing on structural issues relevant to post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, development aid, and foreign assistance. Some argue that a separate agency is not needed; and that State can be structured so that these issues get the attention they deserve and the Secretary gets the necessary advice.

#### B. Independent Agency

The principal difference from alternative A would be the agency's independence from State. The agency's director would have a seat at NSC meetings dealing with relevant issues, and the agency would participate as a separate entity in interagency deliberations. The agency would have a status similar to that of the former ACDA, which would imply a return to a pre-1999 situation where State had its own nonproliferation and arms control offices. The duties and structure of the new agency, however, would have to reflect the priorities and threats of today. Many of the arguments in alternative A are also applicable here.

In addition, this approach is the only one guaranteed to ensure that the President could hear the nonproliferation and arms control perspective even when the Secretary of State has a different view. Equally important, having an independent agency would make certain that unfiltered nonproliferation and arms control views are considered at all levels of interagency policy formulation, a situation that gave ACDA influence. On the other hand, as experience with ACDA demonstrated, the option of going to the President in

opposition to the Secretary of State can be more theoretical than real, and might rarely be exercised. An independent agency would result in State creating its own nonproliferation and arms control officials and they would have more influence on the Secretary on a day-to-day basis than would a separate agency. Some in Congress would also not be receptive to creating a new agency, believing that more than a decade is needed to determine whether State can effectively do the job on its own.

## **VI. Conclusion**

The above suggestions are, we feel, both practical and necessary although which approach to advising the Secretary of State and the President is actually taken up by a new administration remains a topic for debate and discussion, which we hope will occur over the coming months. These suggestions are offered not as firm conclusions but as alternative ways of improving the country's capacities for planning and implementing a coordinated and flexible, but above all effective, strategy for dealing with nonproliferation and arms control issues.

### END NOTES

*1 - Structural reforms on other U.S. "soft" power functions (e.g. foreign aid, public diplomacy) have been discussed in recent months. See (i) "Send the State Department to War", Max Boot, NY Times, November 14, 2007; (ii) "Embassies Grapple to Guide Foreign Aid", Staff Report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, November 16, 2007; (iii) Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Manhattan, Kansas, November 26, 2007; (iv) Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington D.C., Pre-Publication Draft, December 2007; (v) "Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance", Task Force Report, CSIS, Washington D.C., December 2007; (vi) "Beyond Assistance: Report of the Commission on Helping to Enhance the Livelihood of People (HELP) Around the Globe", Commission created by Congress, December 2007; (vii) Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, January 2008.*

*2 - See essays in the Wall Street Journal of January 4, 2007 and January 15, 2008.*

*3 - For Senators McCain and Clinton, see Foreign Affairs, Nov-Dec 2007; and for Senator Obama, see Foreign Affairs, July/August 2007. Also see Senator McCain's speech of March 26, 2008.*

*4 - These points are borrowed from John Holum's article on arms control reorganization that appeared in the June 2005 issue of "Arms Control Today." Holum was the last Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency serving from 1993-1999. He later served as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.*

*5 - ACDA was established in 1961 to provide the United States with a specialized capability to pursue diplomacy to reduce the risk of nuclear war and other arms control measures. A decision was made in 1997 to abolish the Agency and merge its mission into the State Department; this decision was made by the Administration in a deal with then-Senator Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who had been*

*seeking ACDA's elimination (along with AID and USIA). Helms, in turn, agreed to allow the Chemical Weapons Convention to come to the Senate floor for a ratification vote. The Convention was ratified by the Senate on April 24, 1997. The merger legislation did not pass until late 1998 and became effective on April 1, 1999.*

*6 - The position of Assistant Secretary for Verification and Compliance was created by law in 2000; this bureau has far more resources than is needed to carry out its legal mandate. Its statutory responsibilities could be handled by a 10-15 person office reporting to the Under Secretary, but such a transfer of function would require legislation.*

*7 - Some of the reports, studies and recommendations referred to in footnote 1 suggest the creation of separate agencies - some independent and some within State. The HELP Commission proposed the creation of sub-cabinet agencies within the State Department for post-conflict stabilization and another for public diplomacy. The Smart Power Commission recommended a new cabinet level department for global development and a quasi-independent organization on public diplomacy that would report directly to the Secretary of State. The Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy recommended a semi-autonomous agency on public diplomacy reporting to the Secretary. One rationale for separate agencies found in some of these proposals is to ensure that the function in question is not diluted by the strong regional orientation of the State Department. This is a long-standing critique. In 1999, a Commission chaired by former CIA Director John Deutch released a report on organizing the U.S. government to combat proliferation which argued that the historical dominance of bilateral relations in the State Department comes at the expense of functional issues such as nonproliferation.*

## ANNEX

### Brief Background on Participants and Contributors

ACDA - Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

DOD - Department of Defense

DOE - Department of Energy

IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency

ICAR - Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution

NPT - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

**Dr. Victor Alessi** is a physicist with over 30 years experience in nonproliferation & arms control in ACDA, DOE and the private sector. In ACDA, he served as Chief of the Strategic Affairs Division and Executive Assistant to the Director; in DOE, he led the Office of Arms Control & Nonproliferation. From 1999-2006, Dr. Alessi was President/CEO of U.S. Industry Coalition, a non-profit association that facilitates technology commercialization with personnel from the former USSR's strategic programs. Currently, he is the U.S. Representative on the Governing Board of the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow.

**Dr. Kevin Avruch** is the Associate Director of ICAR and Professor of Conflict Resolution and Anthropology at George Mason University (GMU). He has served on the faculties of the University of California at San Diego, the University of Illinois at Chicago, and at GMU since 1980. Among Dr. Avruch's current projects are the role of human rights and truth and reconciliation commissions in postconflict peacebuilding, and cultural aspects of complex humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.

**Major General William F. Burns** retired from the Army to serve as ACDA Director from 1988-89. He also served as the first U.S. special envoy to denuclearization negotiations with countries of the former Soviet Union under the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program. General Burns negotiated the agreement that called for the conversion to peaceful uses of 500 tons of nuclear material from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons. His wide-ranging experience also includes commanding nuclear weapon units in Europe and serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Political-Military Affairs bureau in the State Department. He is a distinguished fellow at the Army War College.

**Ambassador Joseph DeThomas** entered the foreign service in 1977; he served overseas in Iran, Mexico, Ethiopia, Austria and Germany. Much of his career involved efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, including as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Nonproliferation Bureau. He was Ambassador to Estonia from 2001-2004. Currently he is the Director of Nonproliferation Programs at the U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation.

**Ambassador Ralph Earle II** was Director of ACDA in 1980-81 and Deputy Director from 1994-1999. He was the Alternate U.S. Representative to Vice President Gore at the 1995 NPT Conference, which took the historic decision of extending the NPT indefinitely. Ambassador Earle was the chief U.S. negotiator of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II Treaty from 1978-80 and before that was the ACDA representative on the U.S. SALT delegation. Earlier in his career, he served at DOD as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security

Affairs.

**Mark Fitzpatrick** is a senior fellow for nonproliferation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Prior to that he served 26 years in the foreign service, including in the Nonproliferation Bureau as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and head of the Regional Affairs Office. In those positions he dealt with proliferation issues in Iran, North Korea, Libya, Iraq and South Asia. Mr. Fitzpatrick also served for four years at the U.S. mission in Vienna dealing with the IAEA, including as counselor for nuclear policy.

**Dr. Linda Gallini** has over 30 years experience on nuclear nonproliferation, including as head of government offices dealing with the IAEA and NPT. She served in ACDA from 1976-84, and the State Department from 1984 to 2006. Dr. Gallini was Special Assistant to Ambassadors Richard Kennedy and Nelson Sievering while each served as U.S. Representative to the IAEA Board of Governors. Currently she is a consultant for Brookhaven National Laboratory.

**Dr. Robert Gallucci** is Dean of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. His prior service at the Department of State spanned more than 20 years including as Ambassador-at-Large and Special Envoy dealing with proliferation and negotiating the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, and as coordinator for nonproliferation and nuclear safety issues in the former Soviet Union. Prior to that, Dr. Gallucci was the deputy executive chairman of the UN Special Commission overseeing the disarmament of Iraq.

**Ambassador James Goodby** has over 50 years experience in foreign and national security policy. He was in the foreign service until 1989, having served as Deputy and Head of U.S. delegations negotiating on conventional and nuclear weapons, and later as Ambassador to Finland. Thereafter, he was appointed to several senior government positions in arms control & nonproliferation. From 1993-1996, Ambassador Goodby was chief negotiator on nuclear threat reduction and Special Representative of the President on nuclear weapons security and dismantlement. Currently, he is a research fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution and a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

**Under Secretary John Holum** served as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1993 until its merger with the State Department in 1999. For the remainder of the Clinton Administration, he was Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security and Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State and President. From 1981-1993, he practiced law in Washington. From 1979-81, he served on the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department working on arms control and legal issues. From 1965-1979, Mr. Holum was on Senator's McGovern's staff, including as legislative director.

**Dr. Edward Ifft** is a physicist who occupied senior positions at the State Department in nuclear arms control to include negotiations on the SALT Treaty, on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Dr. Ifft served as a Deputy Director of the On-Site Inspection Agency and as a senior adviser to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Currently, he is an adjunct professor in the security studies program of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

**Dr. Allan Krass** is a physicist who held faculty positions at the University of Iowa, U. of California at Santa Barbara, Princeton University, and for 20 years was Professor of Physics and Science Policy at Hampshire College in Amherst, Mass. From 1995-2005, he served as a physical science officer in the nonproliferation bureaus of ACDA and of the State Department.

Dr. Krass was adjunct professor from 1999-2006 in Georgetown University's program on Science, Technology and International Affairs.

**Dr. Fred McGoldrick** has over 30 years experience in nuclear nonproliferation. He served first in DOE and its predecessors and then in the Department of State from 1982-1998, becoming Director of Non-Proliferation and Export Policy and later Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary. Dr. McGoldrick was Minister-Counselor in the U.S. Mission to the IAEA for three years. Currently, he is a principal and manager of a consulting firm, Bengelsdorf, McGoldrick and Associates.

**Dr. Christopher Mitchell** has worked on conflict resolution for four decades, beginning in London and at the University of Southern California, Brigham Young University, University of Maryland, and at George Mason University's ICAR for 17 years, including 4 years as Director. Dr. Mitchell has been involved in many "track two" interventions including between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and diverse Liberian factions. Currently he is Professor Emeritus of Conflict Analysis and Resolution at ICAR.

**Frances Omori** retired from the U.S. Navy as a Commander. She has many years of experience in counterterrorism, counterproliferation, WMD, arms control and war gaming. Commander Omori held branch and section chief positions at the Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and for the Chief of Naval Operations, and served as military assistant to the ACDA Deputy Director. Currently, she is a PhD candidate at George Mason University, ICAR.

**John Rhineland** has been a leading expert on international law and arms control-related topics for more than 35 years. He was a Deputy Legal Adviser in the Department of State in the early 1970's and served on the U.S. delegation that negotiated the 1972 US-USSR SALT Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Mr. Rhineland has taught at both Virginia Law School and Georgetown University. Currently he is a senior counsel at the law firm of Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw, & Pittman.

**Dean Rust** served over 35 years with ACDA and the Department of State, 29 years of which focused on nuclear nonproliferation. He served as a deputy in several offices. His areas of expertise include the Atomic Energy Act, export controls and the NPT. He was instrumental in the success of the 1995 NPT Extension Conference and was a key negotiator at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Currently, he is a consultant for Brookhaven National Laboratory.

**Dr. Randy Rydell** has over 25 years of experience in nuclear nonproliferation at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, the U.S. Senate, and at the United Nations. He worked for Senator John Glenn of Ohio from 1987-1998 on the professional staff of the Committee on Governmental Affairs. In 2005-06, Dr. Rydell served as Senior Counselor and Report Director for the Blix Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction. Currently, he is Senior Political Affairs Officer in the UN's Office of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.

**Dr. Andrew Semmel** has over 25 years of foreign policy experience with the Congress and the Executive branch. He served in DOD and later spent 14 years (1987-2001) on the personal staff of Senator Richard Lugar, becoming senior legislative assistant for foreign policy. Dr. Semmel was Executive Director of the U.S.-China Security Review Commission from 2001-2003. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nuclear Nonproliferation from 2003-2007. Currently, he is a private consultant.

**Sharon Squassoni** has over 15 years of experience with nuclear nonproliferation and related issues. She was in the Executive branch for nine years, beginning as a nuclear safeguards expert in ACDA and ending as director of policy coordination in State's Nonproliferation Bureau. Ms. Squassoni worked for Newsweek in 2001 and was a nonproliferation specialist for the Congressional Research Service from 2002-2007. Currently, she is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment.

**Dr. Barclay Ward** was in the foreign service from 1961-1975 including assignments in Canada, Poland and Washington. He was a member of the political science faculty at the University of the South (Sewanee) from 1975-2006, including as Department Chairman. Dr. Ward taught international studies for Vanderbilt University for 16 summers in London. He was a consultant specializing in NPT matters for ACDA and State for 25 years.

**Ambassador Norman Wulf** served over 38 years in the U.S. Navy, State Department, and ACDA. He was active in State on law of the sea issues and later was ACDA's Deputy General Counsel. From 1985-1999, he was Deputy Assistant Director for Nonproliferation in ACDA, and from 1999-2002 served as Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Nonproliferation Bureau. Ambassador Wulf served as the Alternate Representative to Secretary of State Albright at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Currently, he is a private consultant.

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