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STATEMENT OF

MR. KENNETH HANDELMAN PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS

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THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
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Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Johnson, members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you to discuss the Department of Defense's contributions to U.S. Government efforts to improve nuclear security and combat nuclear terrorism. The Department is building upon our successful legacy of nonproliferation and threat reduction cooperation, adjusting our programs to meet today's proliferation challenges and emerging threats.

President Obama made clear in his April 2009 Prague speech that combating nuclear terrorism, "the most immediate and extreme threat to world security," requires a comprehensive approach. Recent diplomatic initiatives and policy reviews have increased broad awareness of the threat – and expectations for the United States, the Department of Defense, and our international partners to work collaboratively to reduce and counter it. Of note, Secretary Panetta's January 2012 strategic guidance, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," reinforces countering weapons of mass destruction as a primary mission of the Department and specifically names the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program as a key contributor towards that mission. CTR is the Department's primary mechanism to support all three approaches of our interagency strategy to implement the President's four-year nuclear security effort: site-level, country-level, and global-level.

Site-Level Cooperation

Since its inception two decades ago, CTR has worked in the former Soviet Union (FSU) to reduce WMD threats, including those associated with the security of nuclear weapons and material. In Russia, CTR's Global Nuclear Security (GNS) Program continues to support the security of nuclear weapons and materials in transportation and storage. This includes an extensive joint project with the Department of Energy to improve Russia's expertise and logistics capacity to sustain and improve the security

systems the United States has provided and supported to date. These activities represent some of our best-known contributions to the President's four-year nuclear security effort. Allow me to highlight some of our successes in this area since the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit. Over the last two years, CTR/GNS has increased U.S. and global security by:

- securely transporting 92 train loads of nuclear warheads from Russian Ministry of Defense operational locations to dismantlement facilities or more secure, consolidated storage sites;
- securely transporting spent nuclear fuel containing weapons-usable, highly enriched uranium, from two decommissioned Russian submarines to the Mayak fissile material disposition site;
- maintaining security systems at 23 nuclear weapons storage sites in Russia, and conducting site visits to confirm operational capability at four sites;
- initiating expansion of nuclear weapons inventory management systems to 11 Russian additional Ministry of Defense (MOD) facilities;
- increasing the capacity of the Russian MOD's nuclear security training center outside of Moscow from 961 to 1,501 students per year;
- conducting 37 different nuclear security courses for the Russian MOD, providing training for up to 213 security experts; and,
- deciding with the Russian MOD to establish a joint program to identify and assess next generation physical security technologies and processes.

I'm pleased to report that CTR cooperation continues to be a steady component of the U.S.-Russian relationship that has remained largely insulated from the broader peaks and troughs. Although the international agreement that governs our CTR cooperation with Russia (i.e., the CTR "Umbrella Agreement") is due to expire in June 2013, we look

forward to an uneventful extension of that key agreement and a continuation of our work with Russia.

Country-Level Cooperation

We are also leveraging our experience in the FSU as we adapt the CTR Program to meet the challenges of an evolving global security environment. CTR has expanded geographically and built new partnerships to advance shared nonproliferation objectives, including nuclear security. You've heard from my Department of Energy colleague about the U.S. Government's new partnerships to establish Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence, through which we will be able to exchange nuclear security best practices, demonstrate equipment, contribute to national and regional training programs, and collaborate on the research and development of nuclear security technologies. The Department of Defense is supporting the establishment of those Centers by providing technical expertise and a modest level of resources.

Although securing WMD materials at their source is an important objective of the CTR program, our strategy requires a layered defense against proliferation threats. The WMD Proliferation Prevention Program (PPP) is CTR's means to enhance our partners' ability to detect and interdict WMD "on the move" through the provision of detection, surveillance, and interdiction capabilities. The Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, recently authorized CTR to undertake activities in select countries in Southeast Asia, where there are requirements for the detection and interdiction of WMD and related materials while in transit. It is our hope that as cooperation matures, the resulting relationships with these new partners will endure beyond the four-year effort and support our broader security objectives in these regions.

Although not an element of CTR, the International Counterproliferation Program (ICP) is a DoD activity that complements the capital-intensive investments of the CTR/PPP program through its modest yet effective "train-and-equip" efforts. ICP is unique in that its legislative authority explicitly directs a partnership with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. Customs and Border Protection in furtherance of deterring the proliferation of WMD in priority countries and regions. ICP and PPP are tightly coordinated with complementary programs managed by our interagency partners, to include the Department of State's Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program and the Department of Energy's Second Line of Defense (SLD) program.

Global-Level Cooperation

The Department of Defense is also active within nuclear security efforts at the multinational and global level. As you might expect, the Nuclear Security Summit is keeping us all quite busy these days, and we're pleased to support the White House in this high-profile event. DoD also participates in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, described by my Department of State colleague as an important mechanism to coordinate and deconflict international threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance. While the Global Partnership has made it easier to share work on threat reduction projects with like-minded international partners, thanks to CTR's legislative authority to receive funds from outside contributors, we now have greater flexibility also to share costs.

The nuclear security treaties described by my colleagues – the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and the 2005 Suppression of Unlawful Acts Protocols – represent an important element of the U.S. global approach. The Department of Defense encourages the passage of implementing legislation that will

allow the United States to meet its obligations under these treaties, and clear the way for their ratification.

CTR is one element of the broader United States nonproliferation framework, and collaborating with our interagency partners is critical to our success. The geographic expansion of CTR that I described earlier happens only after formal coordination with the Department of State, and consultation with the Department of Energy and the White House. You've already heard about our Bridge process, but allow me to underscore that although we may get together for Bridge Meetings at a senior level every few months, there is robust collaboration at the working level on a daily basis. Of course, the White House leads a broader interagency coordination process that also regularly brings us together to discuss all aspects of the four-year effort.

For Fiscal Year 2013, the Department of Defense has requested \$519.1 million for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program; this includes \$99.8 million for the Global Nuclear Security Program and \$32.4 million for the Proliferation Prevention Program. Congressional support for this request will enable the Department to continue its important contributions to the President's nuclear security objectives.

Additional Department of Defense Contributions

I would be remiss if I did not mention our two other approaches to counter the spread of nuclear material and the threat of nuclear terrorism that fall outside the immediate nuclear security focus of the four-year effort. For years we have worked with our allies and partners to develop a global nonproliferation infrastructure that can reduce our collective vulnerability to these weapons. The current network of initiatives, regimes, and treaties offers some important tools for advancing this critical agenda – but much more remains to be done. Today, we are accelerating efforts to work with other

government agencies, and with our allies and partners to rejuvenate the nonproliferation regime, starting with a renewed commitment to strengthen the international legal frameworks that serve as the foundation for our efforts. The Administration is working to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. We are seeking to strengthen the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as we begin the next five-year treaty review cycle, and we are pursuing negotiations for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). All of these efforts are instrumental to increasing the barriers to proliferation of WMD.

Another element of the Department's approach involves improving our ability to deter, detect, defeat, and respond to emerging WMD threats. Here the Department has a particular responsibility to our nation, as well as to our allies and partners. For instance, instability resulting from the collapse of a nuclear-armed state could risk the global proliferation of nuclear material, weapons, or technology, posing a threat to our homeland and the homelands of our allies. We must improve our ability to detect WMD threats, defend against them, and ultimately defeat them. This includes close and continued coordination with the intelligence community.

With the nuclear terrorism threat in mind, DoD is working with other U.S. agencies on an expanded whole-of-government response should we suspect a terrorist organization is actively pursuing efforts to obtain one or more nuclear devices. Faced with such a threat, we will need a globally synchronized response to detect, interdict, and contain the effects of nuclear weapons. This would include activities such as securing material at the source, intercepting material on the move, and increasing defenses to protect against an attack on the homeland. We are confident in our ability to take on this tactical challenge, but we understand the potential risks.

This threat of nuclear terrorism is also closely intertwined with challenges related to unstable governments. For instance, the instability or collapse of a nuclear-armed state

could quickly lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or materials well beyond the country of origin and involve multiple state and non-state actors as it moves across the globe. We therefore seek to improve our defensive posture against these threats. This includes enhancing the protective posture of the homeland; working with the intelligence community to analyze and track terrorist networks and identify likely paths to proliferation; and characterizing the source and nature of the threat. We can be certain that in a nuclear or other WMD crisis, all these activities would be occurring simultaneously. Our work at DoD has focused on how U.S. military units would coordinate with other U.S. agencies and with allies and partners in the face of such a "loose nuke" threat scenario.

We also must enhance our ability to respond quickly to an attack should these efforts fail. In this regard, the President's budget request includes new resources to improve capabilities for technical nuclear forensics technologies and the fielding of new capabilities, including funding for ground and air collection, in order to attribute the source of a terrorist attack more quickly. For Fiscal Year 2013, we have requested \$6.5 million to accelerate integration, testing, evaluation, and certification of new air sample collection systems, and we are conducting a comprehensive review of the overall nuclear sample collection requirements to inform future-year efforts. We are also working to enhance capabilities for interdiction, elimination, and consequence management.

Conclusion

Through site-level security efforts, country-to-country engagement, and support to multinational fora, the Department of Defense is actively supporting President Obama's four-year nuclear security vision at all levels. We will continue to work alongside our colleagues at the Departments of State and Energy to make this vision a reality, and to plan for our enduring nuclear security responsibilities after 2013.