

1 filling the role as things were getting sorted out and
2 elections that really had not quite been decided yet, and
3 then Bob Bennett did a great job for a period of time.

4 But we have had a chance to visit and I think we will
5 work together well and I look forward to it so welcome to
6 the Committee.

7 Senator Brown. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

8 Senator McCaskill. Why are we here? Well, typically
9 I try to start with self-effacing humor about how dry
10 contracts are and how typically no one cares about this
11 subject matter longer than the brief moment of outrage when
12 they read a brief quote in a paper somewhere about some
13 trouble that has happened in contracting. Honestly this is
14 a little different.

15 We are now much more educated as a Nation about
16 fighting counterinsurgency. We have learned hard lessons
17 about fighting counterinsurgency. Lives have been lost.
18 Families across this great Nation grieve as I speak for
19 members of their families that have been killed fighting
20 counterinsurgencies.

21 One thing we have learned it has become crystal clear
22 that to successfully fight counterinsurgencies you have to
23 be strategic and effective at making sure there is local
24 rule of law. Why is that important? Well, that is
25 important because counterinsurgency thrives on being able to

1 substitute their rule of law for that of a legitimate
2 government.

3 The Taliban has done so well in Afghanistan because
4 they were providing police protection to impoverished
5 communities many times through fear, many times through
6 retribution. But the Taliban, it was a sheriff. And when
7 the Taliban was not the sheriff there was rampant corruption
8 and even when the Taliban was the sheriff there was rampant
9 corruption.

10 We learned all of these lessons in Iraq as we tried to
11 move into the country to get rid of a despot, a bad guy,
12 that was destabilizing the region; and we learned the hard
13 way that if we did not focus on establishing a rule of law,
14 on not just going after the bad guys but leaving a military
15 and a police presence that could stabilize the way of life
16 that most people on this planet want. They want you to be
17 able to take their kids, feed their families, and not worry
18 that they are going to be killed on the way to work.

19 So that is why this hearing is so important. Training
20 the police in Afghanistan is part of our military mission.
21 It is as important as anything else that we are doing in
22 that nation right now. It is as important as training the
23 military. It is as important as hunting down the terrorists
24 and killing them.

25 So what happened in that regard? And it is an

1 unbelievably incompetent story of contracting. For eight
2 years we have been supposedly training the police in
3 Afghanistan. Here is what we have done. We have flushed \$6
4 billion. \$6 billion.

5 Now, am I exaggerating? Let me quote the general in
6 charge of training the police in Afghanistan. This is what
7 General Caldwell said, and I quote, "It is inconceivable but
8 in fact for eight years we were not training the police."
9 He went on to say that essentially we were giving them
10 uniforms.

11 No one had control of these contracts. No one agency.
12 This has been a game of pass off. The ultimate recipe for
13 disaster is not having one single agency with a clear line
14 of authority in charge able to make sure the mission is
15 accomplished with efficiency, effectiveness, and that money
16 is not walking away. None of that happened for eight years.

17 I will give you one anecdote. Early this year the
18 Italians showed up. This has been an international, very
19 unorganized but nonetheless an international effort. The
20 Italians showed up. And the Afghan volunteers that had
21 volunteered to be on these police departments were posting
22 horrible scores on the shooting range. They were the gang
23 that could not shoot straight. And there was this wringing
24 of, what are we going to do about these Afghan police
25 officers that we are training that cannot hit the side of a

1 barn.

2 The first part of this year the Italian paramilitary
3 came in and began looking at the problem. Are you ready for
4 what the problem was? Nobody had checked the sites of the
5 AK-47s and the M-16s they were shooting. They were out of
6 line.

7 So we were paying somebody to teach these people how to
8 shoot these weapons and nobody that we were paying had
9 bothered to check the sites as to whether or not they were
10 in line. So these guys were using the sites that were not
11 even in line with where they were shooting.

12 That is one example but I think it is pretty
13 illustrative. These contractors, for whatever reason, did
14 not have anybody who was saying, have you checked the sites
15 when the scores were coming back bad after year after year
16 after year. Their scores have dramatically improved.

17 Do not get me wrong. There are major challenges here.
18 These people are showing up to become police officers
19 without being able to read or write. Most of them have only
20 seen a role model of police officer that is not the role
21 model we are looking for. We are asking them to change many
22 things about their culture and the way they operate. This
23 is a hard job. And do not get me wrong. I get it. It is a
24 hard job, all the more reason that we need a line of
25 accountability.

1 We have an audit that is going to be the subject of the
2 hearing to a large extent today. I want to make sure, as we
3 talk about this, that we know that there are in fact reasons
4 why people should be angry today. This new joint IG report
5 that just came out in February, and we are going to talk
6 about it extensively during the hearing, talks about the
7 problem of this division of responsibility between the
8 Defense Department and the State Department and how badly
9 this has gone in terms of accountability and authority.

10 Now, if this frankly was the first time that we had
11 heard this, then maybe we should not have a full-blown
12 hearing. We have identified the problem. Now you can get
13 to work. Here is the rest of the story.

14 2005 GAO reported that Department of State had not
15 developed a plan for when, how, or what costs the training
16 or equipping of the ANP would be accomplished.

17 2006, DOS, the Department of State, and Defense
18 Inspectors General found management of the DynCorp contract
19 to be problematic and required more effective coordination
20 between the Department of State and CSTC-A, and I start
21 talking in acronyms. That means I have been here too long.
22 That is essentially the division of the military that is in
23 charge of overseeing these contracts.

24 2008 GAO found State and Defense still had not
25 developed a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and

1 sustaining the ANP force, and DOD Defense IG reported that
2 CSTC-A, the military department in charge, had not developed
3 training programs.

4 How about contracting officers? Department of State we
5 found in this 2010 report that contracting officers were not
6 providing adequate surveillance. Guess what? 2005 they
7 said that. 2006 they said that. CGAR who frankly has not
8 completed enough reports that are meaningful in terms of the
9 oversight capacity of our government, they even found in
10 2009 there was a problem.

11 Curriculum. The current report says there is a problem
12 with curriculum. Guess what? 2006 they said the same
13 thing. 2006 State and DOD IG reported obstacles to
14 establishing a fully professional Afghan National Police
15 including literate recruits, a history of low pay, pervasive
16 corruption, on and on and on.

17 In other words this is the third or fourth time that
18 people who check into our government has said hello, it is
19 not working. You are not doing a good job.

20 This does not compute. Essential to our mission, men
21 and women dying for the cause, and we cannot get basic
22 contract oversight of this function under control.

23 So this is going to be a tough one and there are going
24 to be some tough questions because there is no excuse for
25 this to go any further. There is no excuse.

1 I welcome all of your testimony. I apologize for the
2 delay in the hearing. We got caught up in, I will not go
3 into it because I do not want this to be a partisan
4 exercise. Unfortunately we got caught up in some stuff that
5 we could not have the hearing the last time. And, Ms.
6 Klemstine, that is why you are there today. One up the food
7 chain was going to be here the last time but was unable to
8 come today. So thank you for being here today. I welcome
9 all of you. At this point I would like to turn the hearing
10 over for an opening statement to Senator Brown.

11 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROWN

12 Senator Brown. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to
13 thank you for your nice welcome and the conversations we
14 have had to lead up to this hearing. And I thought what
15 you said was well said and I am not going to duplicate a lot
16 of it but I will say as somebody who has been serving in the
17 military for 30 years, presently holds the rank of a
18 lieutenant colonel, and is familiar with contracting, being
19 the head attorney for defense services in Massachusetts,
20 these are things that I take very very seriously.

21 And having recently come back from Afghanistan and
22 seeing the nature of the challenge and the enormity of the
23 challenge and the fact that I am just flabbergasted as a new
24 member, but as an ordinary citizen prior to this as to the
25 amount money we are spending over there and seeing the clear

1 lack of progress.

2 What does that mean? To me it means obviously dollars
3 that cannot be spent here in the United States for services
4 and other things that we come to know and expect, number
5 one.

6 Number two, it also more importantly comes down to
7 lives. As the chairwoman said about having our men and
8 women going to a foreign country, fighting to protect the
9 rights of a citizenry that sometimes appreciates us,
10 sometimes does not, but with a police force that would be
11 fully stood up and raring to go would take the pressure off
12 of us to not only be a clearing force but now be a security
13 force.

14 One of the things that I noted, as big as the problem
15 is, when we first got into country, Madam Chair, the
16 enormity of the problem is so big, it almost quite frankly
17 feels like when I first got here I looked at the problems,
18 the offices, the logistics, the hiring, it is just so big.
19 By the time we left I actually had a very, I feel real
20 understanding of the plan that General McChrystal was trying
21 to implement when it comes to winning the minds and hearts
22 of the Afghan citizens and also trying to implement a plan
23 with the army and the police force to take the pressure off
24 of our soldiers, our MPs in particular, for going in and
25 securing an area.

1 Then when I read the Newsweek article and then when I
2 have done my own due diligence and the research and read the
3 reports I am like I do not get it. We are not talking about
4 a couple of hundred million dollars. We are talking about
5 \$6 billion.

6 When I saw the police force, with all due respect, I
7 mean I know we have young cadet corps that are more squared
8 away. I know we are in a new chapter here. I know I am new
9 here, Madam Chair, but we have to have someone stop, take
10 responsibility, have communication lines develop between the
11 entities and the agencies and just solve the problem because
12 I am not sure everyone here testifying and people listening
13 know that we are in a financial mess, and it is not getting
14 any better.

15 And for us to ask the American taxpayers and the
16 taxpayers in my State to continue to contribute to an effort
17 where there are wasted dollars, they do not buy it. I am
18 somebody who believes in the value of a dollar. I want to
19 know when my money goes somewhere that it is going to be
20 spent properly. It is going to be fully accountable and
21 that we are going to get a good value for our dollar.

22 Madam Chair, based on your earlier statements, as I
23 said, I am not going to repeat. I am very very interested
24 in getting to the bottom of, number one, who is responsible,
25 identifying that and say, okay, great, who is going to be

1 responsible now? How are we going to solve this problem?
2 How are we going to make sure that the tax dollars that we
3 send overseas are going to be used effectively so we can
4 bring our men and women home quicker. And we can stand up
5 that force so they can protect themselves and allow their
6 produce and their natural resources to be harvested so they
7 can become self-sufficient and we get back to doing the
8 people's business here in the United States.

9 So Madam Chair, I will turn it back to you. I thank
10 you for your welcoming remarks and I look forward to
11 participating.

12 [The prepared statement of Senator Brown follows:]

13 / SUBCOMMITTEE INSERT

1 Senator McCaskill. Thank you.

2 Senator Coburn, it is great to see you. Would you like
3 to wait for questions?

4 Senator Coburn. Yes.

5 Senator McCaskill. Thank you.

6 Let me introduce the witnesses. First, Gordon Heddell
7 has served as Inspector General for the Department of
8 Defense since July--I am sorry. I did not see you, Senator
9 Kaufman. You are so far away. We need to get you closer.

10 Thank you, Senator Kaufman, for being here. Would you
11 like to make a statement before we begin?

12 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KAUFMAN

13 Senator Kaufman. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

14 I just want to say how much I support what both of you
15 have said. This is so incredibly important. The number one
16 priority is our troops in harm's way in Afghanistan and one
17 of the really very very top problems we have regardless of
18 the waste which, as Senator Brown pointed out, is
19 unacceptable under any circumstance, this is key.

20 Getting the police squared away is one of the really
21 key things we need so, as Senator Brown said, we can come
22 home and leave them to do their own security. There is
23 nothing we are working on here--that is the reason I am here
24 today--there is nothing we are working on that is more
25 important in this right here.

1 How can we hold? We got to shape, we got to clear we
2 are told so that we can build, and the police are important
3 part of that. Right now, the police, we are getting it
4 squared away. It is not just a waste of money. They have
5 been a negative. You talk about the rule of law. The rule
6 of law there, the rule of law in most of these areas is
7 because the police are so corrupt. The people they are
8 supposed to go to to get the rule of law are the things they
9 are trying to stay away from.

10 So I cannot think of a more important hearing going on
11 on the Hill today than this one right here.

12 Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Senator Kaufman.

13 Gordon Heddell has served as the Inspector General for
14 the Department of Defense since July 2009. He served as
15 Acting Inspector from 2008 to 2009. Prior to joining the
16 Department of Defense in the Inspector General's office, Mr.
17 Heddell served as the Inspector General at the Department of
18 Labor.

19 Evelyn Klemstine is the Assistant Inspector General for
20 Audits for the State Department. Ms. Klemstine previously
21 served as the Assistant Inspector General for Audits at NASA
22 and as the program director for the International Programs
23 Division at the Defense Department, Office of Inspector
24 General.

25 David Johnson has served as the Assistant Secretary for

1 the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
2 Affairs at the State Department since October 2007. In
3 addition to numerous other distinguished posts with the
4 Federal Government, Mr. Johnson served as Afghan coordinator
5 for the United States from May 2002 to July 2003.

6 David Samuel Sedney is Deputy Assistant Secretary of
7 Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia in the
8 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and
9 Pacific Security Affairs. Previously Mr. Sedney served as
10 Deputy Chief of Mission, Charge de Affairs and Deputy Chief
11 of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan.

12 It is the custom of the Subcommittee to swear in all
13 witnesses that appear before us. So if you do not mind, I
14 would ask you to stand.

15 Do you swear that the testimony that you will give
16 before this Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth
17 and nothing but the truth so help you God?

18 Thank you all very much.

19 Let the record reflect that the witnesses answered in
20 the affirmative.

21 We will be using a timing system today. We would ask
22 that your oral testimony be no more than five minutes. Your
23 written testimony will be printed in the record in its
24 entirety.

25 Mr. Heddell, we would ask you to begin.

1 TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE GORDON S. HEDDELL,
2 INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

3 Mr. Heddell. Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member Brown
4 and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. Thank you
5 for the opportunity to discuss the joint audit that was
6 performed by the Inspectors General of the Departments of
7 Defense and State.

8 This audit examined the administration and contract
9 oversight of the State Department program to provide
10 training to the Afghan National Police. This audit was
11 conducted at the request of the Senate Committee on
12 Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense.

13 As you know, the training and development of the Afghan
14 National Police to provide security in countering the
15 insurgency in Afghanistan is a key element of the US
16 strategy. As such, it is critical that the Afghan police be
17 trained to support the counterinsurgency mission along with
18 community policing skills. Effective contract oversight is
19 crucial to achieving these goals.

20 Prior inspection and assessment reports by this office,
21 as you noted, Mr. Chairman, have noted that adequate
22 staffing of key contracting positions is absolutely
23 essential for immediate and effective oversight. It has
24 become very apparent that the insurgents in Afghanistan are
25 increasingly targeting the Afghan police and that average

1 annual death rates among these police officers have been
2 steadily increasing.

3 As a result, contract requirements regarding training
4 need to be modified to address this growing insurgency.
5 This requires close interaction between the contractor and
6 what is now known as NATO Training Mission Combined Security
7 Transition Command Afghanistan.

8 The current contract arrangement simply does not
9 facilitate this close interaction because the Department of
10 Defense is required first to coordinate all contract changes
11 with the Department of State's Bureau of International
12 Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, at times a very
13 cumbersome process.

14 Furthermore, in August 2009 the Chief of Mission in
15 Afghanistan reported that the lack of a single unified chain
16 of command sometimes created confusion and delays in
17 enhancing the police training program. Accordingly, the
18 Chief of Mission and the commander of the International
19 Security Assistance Forces recommended the transfer of
20 contractual authority to the Department of Defense for the
21 training of the Afghan police.

22 To bring about the recommended transfer of
23 responsibility, the Department of State planned to allow its
24 current police training task order to expire and the
25 Department of Defense planned to add police training to an

1 existing contract.

2 However, a March 15 decision by the Government
3 Accountability Office sustained a DynCorp protest of the
4 planned action. In light of this decision, the State
5 Department plans to make adjustments to improve existing
6 police training program to include more direct involvement
7 by the military in training the Afghan police and moving the
8 contracting authority from Washington DC to Kabul.

9 Furthermore, inadequacies in the administration and
10 oversight of the contract compound the challenges that exist
11 in providing the required training to the Afghan police.
12 These challenges include weaknesses in quality assurance,
13 review of the voices, support for the billing and making of
14 payments, defense contract audit agency involvement or lack
15 of involvement, maintenance of contract files and
16 accountability of government property. My written statement
17 provides additional information on these deficiencies.

18 Our audit also questions the fact that the State
19 Department still holds about \$80 million in expired
20 Department of Defense funds and that this needs to be
21 resolved. The deficiencies identified in the administration
22 and oversight of the contract illustrate the larger
23 challenges that are caused by the lack of sufficient
24 contract personnel, geographic distance and the wartime
25 environment all complicating this important matter.

1 My office will closely follow the efforts of the
2 Department of Defense to oversee the future contract to
3 train the Afghan police and to appropriately use the funds
4 provided by Congress for that purpose.

5 I look forward to continuing our strong working
6 relationship with this Subcommittee and with all oversight
7 organizations engaged in the important work that is being
8 carried out in Afghanistan and in Southwest Asia generally.

9 And this concludes my statement.

10 [The prepared statement of Mr. Heddell follows:]

1 Senator McCaskill. Ms. Klemstine.

1 TESTIMONY OF EVELYN R. KLEMSTINE, ASSISTANT
2 INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
3 STATE

4 Ms. Klemstine. Thank you, Chairman McCaskill and
5 Ranking Member Brown, for the opportunity to present our
6 joint audit on the national police training program contract
7 in Afghanistan with the Department of Defense Inspector
8 General.

9 Deputy Inspector General Geisel sends his regards but
10 he is in Baghdad this week.

11 We conducted this joint audit in response to a
12 congressional request with an objective determining the
13 ability of the Afghan National Police, ANP, training program
14 to address Afghan security needs. We also reviewed contract
15 management activities and the status of Afghan Security
16 Forces, ASF, funds provided by DOD to the State Department.

17 In 2006 when the security environment in Afghanistan
18 was more stable, DOD decided to use the State Department's
19 existing Civilian Police program, CIVPOL, contract to
20 implement the ANP training program. The contractor, DynCorp
21 International, was awarded two task orders valued in excess
22 of \$1 billion.

23 These two task orders directed DynCorp to provide
24 personnel, life support, and communications for the training
25 program. The State Department was responsible for procuring

1 services, overseeing the contract, and managing and
2 reporting on funds transferred from DOD.

3 We found under the CIVPOL contract DOD did not have the
4 authority to direct the contractor thereby restricting DOD's
5 ability to rapidly modify ANP training to respond to the
6 rising insurgency and the changing security situation in
7 Afghanistan.

8 While the State Department was focused on training the
9 ANP to be an effective police force after security in
10 Afghanistan had been stabilized, DOD was focused on the
11 survival and tactical training of the ANP to counter the
12 growing insurgency.

13 In addition, while the foundation has been laid for an
14 effective women's police training program, there has been
15 inadequate progress in training a sufficient number of
16 Afghan women. The lack of trained women's police corps
17 members has limited the effectiveness of law enforcement in
18 Afghanistan.

19 We recommended correcting these deficiencies by clearly
20 defining ANP training program requirements, increasing the
21 training facility capacity for women police members and
22 enhancing efforts to recruit women training instructors.

23 In response to the draft report, management provided a
24 detailed description of the requirements for the training
25 program and agreed to provide additional resources for

1 training policewomen.

2 In overseeing CIVPOL contract, we found the State
3 Department contracting officials did not assign sufficient
4 numbers of contract oversight personnel to the ANP task
5 orders and did not prepare a quality assurance surveillance
6 plan to ensure that the contractor met the performance
7 requirements of the statement of work.

8 In addition, those contracting personnel who were
9 assigned to monitor the task orders did not provide adequate
10 oversight to ensure that all goods and services were
11 received.

12 Specifically the following internal control weaknesses
13 were identified. Number one, government furnished property
14 was not adequately account for. Number two, contract files
15 were incomplete and not always available. Number three,
16 deliverables were not always matched to receiving reports,
17 and number four, procedures for reviewing contractor
18 invoices to determine whether costs were proper were not
19 followed.

20 As a result of these internal control weaknesses, State
21 Department personnel could not ensure that funds allocated
22 by DOD for the program were expended in accordance with DOD
23 requirements.

24 We recommended that the number of contract personnel
25 responsible for contract oversight be increased, that a

1 complete inventory of government property be performed, that
2 the contract officers maintain complete and accessible
3 contract files, and that goods and services be matched
4 against invoices.

5 In addition, we recommended that the Defense Contract
6 Audit Agency, DCAA, perform an audit to determine whether
7 all expenditures were allowable, allocable, and reasonable,
8 and request reimbursement from DynCorp for any payments DCAA
9 determines to be improper.

10 In response to the draft report, management generally
11 agreed to increase the number of oversight personnel going
12 forward and strengthen internal controls and undertake an
13 audit.

14 In addition to identifying various internal control
15 weaknesses, we also requested contract invoices and other
16 supporting documents for \$217 million in ASF funds already
17 expended.

18 Unfortunately State Department financial managers did
19 not provide detailed transaction data until after the draft
20 report was issued. As a result, we could not determine
21 whether the department had expend the funds in accordance
22 with congressional intent.

23 However, we did ascertain that \$80 million in funds
24 transferred from DOD remained unexpended well after the end
25 of the availability period established by appropriations

1 law. We recommended that the State Department determine the
2 status of ASF funds and that any excess funds, to include
3 the \$80 million in expire funds, be returned.

4 In March 2009 the President announced a comprehensive
5 new strategy for Afghanistan which included an emphasis on
6 training and increasing the size of Afghan security forces.

7 The State Department and DOD are committed to providing
8 a stable and secure environment for all Afghan citizens.
9 This requires that we effectively train and mentor Afghan
10 forces, monitor our contracts effectively, and ensure that
11 taxpayers' money is spent appropriately.

12 Finally I would like to note that this audit was
13 conducted in six months. Given the scope of work which took
14 place in the United States and six locations in Afghanistan,
15 the short time for the successful completion is a tribute to
16 the professionalism of the audit co-directors Mr. Mark Ives
17 from DOD IG and Mr. Jim Pollard from the State Department
18 OIG and their teams.

19 Once again I thank you, Chairman McCaskill and Senator
20 Brown, for the opportunity to appear today and I am ready to
21 answer your questions.

22 [The prepared statement of Ms. Klemstine follows:]

1 Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much and thank you
2 to the staffs. That is quite an accomplishment, six months
3 for this audit. I know a little bit about that. That is
4 amazing. Congratulations to your teams.

5 Mr. Johnson.

1 TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE DAVID T. JOHNSON,
2 ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
3 NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S.
4 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

5 Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Chairman McCaskill, Ranking
6 Member Brown, Senator Kaufman. We appreciate the
7 opportunity to appear before the Senate Subcommittee today.

8 The topic of today's hearing, Contracts for Afghan
9 National Police Training, is both urgent and it is
10 important. As we all know, President Obama aims our
11 military to begin transitioning out of Afghanistan in the
12 summer of 2011. That is premised on the expectation that
13 Afghan security forces can provide security for the Afghan
14 people to support their self-governance.

15 Since 2003 the State Department has provided a variety
16 of training and assistance to the Afghan National Police.
17 Since 2005 our training programs have supported the United
18 States military in its responsibility to develop the
19 overarching Afghan national security forces which includes
20 both the army and civilian police.

21 As you know, Madam Chairman, from your Subcommittee's
22 oversight record, building civilian capacity in a conflict
23 zone like Afghanistan where civil institutions had been
24 largely destroyed over 20 years of conflict is incredibly
25 challenging.

1 The State Department's Bureau of International
2 Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs undertake these
3 assignments to advance our broader national security and
4 foreign policy objectives. Our expertise in law enforcement
5 and criminal justice programs is widely recognized.

6 Building on the recommendations for improvement from
7 the oversight community and from this Subcommittee, we hope
8 soon also to be recognized for our agility and proficiency
9 in contract management and oversight.

10 Where our OIG colleagues have identified that we have
11 fallen short is in how we have adapted our contract
12 oversight to challenges of operating in theaters of war
13 where military operations and complex security requirements
14 limit our on-the-ground staffing and our staff's ability to
15 travel to the sites where training takes place.

16 As stewards of increasingly more taxpayer dollars for
17 critical national security and foreign policy objectives, we
18 must effectively adapt to this battlefield environment so
19 that we craft procedures and methods that allow our contract
20 management and oversight activities to be fully carried out.

21 The report discussed here today identifies a number of
22 recommendations with which we fully agree and are working to
23 address. For example, INL's current oversight team has
24 already been enhanced. Our team now consists of 33 staff,
25 12 program officers in Afghanistan and Washington, seven in-

1 country contracting officers' representatives or ICORs now
2 provide oversight in Afghanistan while the contracting
3 officer's representative and 13 of his staff address
4 contract oversight and administration in Washington.

5 The increased ICOR staffing enables us to strengthen
6 our asset management and inventory reviews processes. More
7 ICORs are in various stages of the hiring process and will
8 be in Afghanistan beginning in May. By September we will
9 have 22.

10 We will implement fully standardized contract
11 management operating procedures and guidelines by June 30 of
12 this year. Standing operating procedures and a web-based
13 contracting officers representative file fully accessible to
14 staff worldwide around the clock will be in place by the end
15 of May. Along with more frequent reviews, this will further
16 strengthen our internal controls.

17 We have engaged DCAA to audit our Afghanistan task
18 order with two audits in process and they are preparing to
19 audit the task orders that are the subject of the OIG
20 report. To date, INL has rejected 17 percent of police
21 training invoices for Afghanistan resulting in 16.3 million
22 in the denied claims.

23 Many of INL's police training accomplishments are not
24 easily represented in a chart. Capacity building is a long-
25 term process even in stable post-conflict areas but

1 Afghanistan which continues to face an active insurgency is
2 a special case.

3 For example, our police training programs are designed
4 to empower Afghan civilians, many of whom lack basic
5 literacy with the core skills needed to mobilize as police
6 officers and respond to the direction of their local
7 commanders.

8 Embedded in a Washington Post story on February 27 was
9 an Afghan police training success story. While the news
10 sadly communicated the grim tale of yet another suicide
11 bombing attack, the report indicated that after multiple
12 bomb detonations police officers assembled at the scene
13 rather than retreating and remained until they had covered
14 their fallen colleagues, a scenario which would likely have
15 been different only two years ago.

16 This is one instance but it is descriptive not only of
17 the challenging environment in which Afghan National Police
18 operate but of the kinds of actions and operations their
19 training has made them capable of undertaking.

20 Madam Chairman, the Department takes very seriously the
21 need to safeguard the public's trust in managing programs
22 and contracts that support our national security objectives
23 around the world. It is after all through these programs
24 that our partners worldwide develop the bedrock of civil
25 society, a safe, secure place where people can live free

1 from fear.

2 Thank you for the opportunity to discuss INL's contract
3 oversight. I will do my best to address your questions.

4 [The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]

- 1 Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.
- 2 Mr. Sedney.

1 TESTIMONY OF DAVID S. SEDNEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
2 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN,
3 AND CENTRAL ASIA, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT
4 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC
5 SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

6 Mr. Sedney. Thank you very much, Chairman McCaskill,
7 Senator Brown, Senator Kaufman. Thank you for the
8 opportunity to appear today with my interagency colleagues.

9 As you know, the President's strategic review of
10 Afghanistan and Pakistan recommend that heightened efforts
11 to increase the quantity and quality of Afghan national
12 security forces as part of a strategy to enable the eventual
13 transfer of responsibility for security to the Afghan
14 government. This is not an exit strategy. It is a transfer
15 strategy.

16 Improving the capacity of the Afghan National Police is
17 particularly important as police are the primary link to the
18 Afghan government for many Afghans particularly in rural
19 areas.

20 Moreover, the Afghan police are on the front lines of
21 the fight against the Taliban and its affiliates. The
22 Afghan National Police are situated in areas where no
23 coalition or Afghan national army forces are and are often
24 the target of much greater attacks. Casualty rates are
25 higher in the Afghan National Police than in the army. It

1 is two to three times more dangerous to be a policeman today
2 in Afghanistan than to be a soldier in the Afghan national
3 army.

4 The effort to train the Afghan National Police as you
5 pointed out, Chairman McCaskill, has been under resourced,
6 under prioritized, and under carried out. One of the
7 priorities of this Administration when it came in was to
8 refocus our efforts with the renewed leadership, with
9 greater resources, but more importantly than the number of
10 resources, more targeted and more effective resources aiming
11 at building the quality of the entire Afghan national
12 security forces in an integrated effort with the Afghan
13 national army and in a combined civil/military campaign plan
14 that will enable us to carry out the transition that I
15 described.

16 As part of this revision, we, along with our NATO
17 colleagues, have transitioned to the NATO training mission
18 Afghanistan which General Caldwell, who you mentioned in
19 your opening statement, is now the commander of, of course
20 dual-hatted also as the commander of CSTC-A. The NATO
21 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and our non-
22 NATO partners have made progress towards growing the end
23 strength and quality of ANP.

24 In December 2009, the ANP achieved its end strength
25 goal of 96,800. In January 2010, the Joint Coordination

1 Monitoring Board, the international board charged with
2 ensuring the international and Afghan ministerial plans
3 aligned with the goals of the Afghan government agreed with
4 the Afghan government's plan supported by ISAF and the US
5 government increased the size of the ANP to 109,000 by
6 October 31, 2010 and to 234,000 by October 31, 2011.

7 The increase in 2010 will consist of approximately 5000
8 Afghan border police, 5000 Afghan national civil order
9 police which is the mobile gendarme force that is equipped
10 to act as a light infantry role throughout the country, and
11 2000 Afghan uniformed police as well as other specialized
12 police and enablers.

13 At the end of March 2009, the Afghan Ministry of
14 Interior reported that the total ANP will be equal to
15 102,138, slightly above the February goal of 99,261.

16 However, increases in the size of ANP forces must come
17 with a commitment for improvement in the quality of the
18 force. Initiatives to improve the quality of the force
19 include improvements in the training infrastructure,
20 increased pay equal to that of the Afghan national army,
21 better equipment, expanded literacy training, and embedded
22 partnering and mentoring.

23 In addition, we are working hand in glove with the
24 Department of State to build rule of law structures and
25 processes to support that ANP. As part of our effort to

1 improve the police training process, the ambassador and the
2 commander of US Forces Afghanistan, as my colleagues earlier
3 mentioned, recommended in an August 2009 cable that
4 management of the Defense-funded, State-managed police
5 training contract should be shifted from the Department of
6 State to the Department of Defense. The Department of State
7 and the Department of Defense subsequently approved this
8 recommendation.

9 Due to the operational need to quickly award a new
10 contract and the respective organizations subject matter
11 expertise and experience utilizing the respected subject
12 organizations expertise and experience in support of
13 Afghanistan operations, the commander of CSTC-A selected the
14 counter narcoterrorism and technology program office through
15 the US Army space and missile defense command of the Army
16 strategic forces command to oversee the development of an
17 appropriate acquisition strategy for the ANP program.

18 The strategy called for procuring the required services
19 through the issuance of a task order under existing multiple
20 award indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contracts with
21 CNTPO. The task orders for the training of ANP and ANP
22 programs logistics requirements were to be competed among
23 five holders of an existing MAIDIQ contract.

24 However, before orders could be issued, on March 15 the
25 Government Accountability Office, as the Inspector General

1 earlier mentioned, sustained the protest by DynCorp
2 International. The GAO determined that the task orders for
3 the ANP program were outside the scope of the MAIDIQ
4 contracts.

5 As a result, the ANP training effort will not be
6 awarded under that contract. DynCorp will continue
7 performance under the current State Department contract
8 which has been extended to July of this year while the
9 Department of Defense in conjunction with the Department of
10 State weighs options to ensure the ANP program requirements
11 are met in an expeditious manner in consideration of this
12 development and in compliance with the GAO recommendations.

13 It is important that any contractor DOD selects be
14 responsible and perform within the strict rules,
15 regulations, performance expectations and acceptable ethical
16 and business practices that we demand.

17 Please be assured that we take seriously any allegation
18 that a contractor fails to meet these expectations and
19 requirements. The selection of DOD contractors responsible
20 and capable to meet our requirements to assist in training
21 and development of the Afghan National Police is no
22 exception.

23 I hope you find this information helpful. Thank you
24 and I look forward to your questions.

25 [The prepared statement of Mr. Sedney follows:]

1 Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much.

2 Just to make sure I am respectful of my colleagues, if
3 you all would go ahead and run the clock at seven minutes,
4 if staff would run the clock for seven minutes for each
5 member.

6 We will take as many turns as we need to get all the
7 questions out. I have a tendency to go on and I want to
8 make sure I do not go on too long without being respectful
9 of Senator Kaufman and Senator Brown's time.

10 So let me start with you, Mr. Sedney. What really
11 happened here is the commanders over there decided that when
12 they were telling DynCorp they needed this, DynCorp was
13 telling their folks, well, be careful just because the
14 military is telling you to do it does not mean we are going
15 to get paid for it because State is making those calls.

16 So somebody finally figured out it would be good idea
17 to have the people in charge of military mission be in
18 charge of the contracting over an essential leg of a three-
19 legged stool as it relates to that mission in Afghanistan.

20 Is that a fair characterization?

21 Mr. Sedney. Yes, along with the Inspector General's
22 report, the lack of unity of command in the police training
23 effort. Clearly it was inhibiting what we were trying to do
24 and I would repeat what was said earlier. The shift in
25 environment where the security situation was getting worse

1 and the police were being called upon to do more and
2 different things than envisioned originally when the
3 decision was made to utilize the State Department contract
4 made clear that we needed that flexibility and that ability
5 to have that unity of command.

6 There were multiple examples from the small to the
7 large of where that lack of unity of command was inhibiting
8 what we were able to do, and that is why our new commander
9 and our new ambassador out there made this decision to
10 recommend what I mentioned before in that cable that they
11 sent on August 11.

12 Senator McCaskill. I certainly spent a lot of time
13 when I was in Afghanistan with the ambassador and with
14 General McChrystal and with General Caldwell. I completely
15 agree that was the right thing to do but it is important to
16 note that happened in August of 2009, and we have no
17 contract and we are not even close to having a contract.

18 So I need to know today what is the plan? How are we
19 going to get contractors committed and over there with
20 jurisdiction and the supervision of the Department of
21 Defense and the military to train Afghan police officers?

22 Mr. Sedney. We do not have a final answer for you on
23 that, Chairman McCaskill.

24 Senator McCaskill. That is unacceptable.

25 Mr. Sedney. However, I can tell you what we have done

1 in the months since the GAO decision and where we are
2 working to go to.

3 Senator McCaskill. Let me make sure the record is
4 clear here. The complaint was filed in December. This is a
5 really important part of the mission. There is a chance
6 anybody who knows anything about these contracts and
7 anything about complaints, and believe me if anybody knows
8 about this it is the Pentagon, about challenges to
9 contracting, they know that GAO has an important role to
10 play.

11 At the moment that the complaint was filed, all hands
12 on deck should have been looking at this at the Pentagon to
13 say what is plan "B". If this objection is upheld by the
14 GAO, what is plan "B"?

15 The President had already announced that this strategy
16 was just until July 2011. The clock is ticking. So we know
17 in December of last year that there could be a problem with
18 transitioning this contract under the military control and
19 you are telling me today, what, December, January, February,
20 March, April, you are telling me five months later you do
21 not know what you are going to do.

22 Mr. Sedney. No, Chairman McCaskill, I am not telling
23 you that we do not know what we are going to do. I am
24 saying we have not decided the final form of what we are
25 going to do. But as I said, if I could lay out where we

1 are, what we are moving towards.

2 Senator McCaskill. Okay. What I want to hear is a
3 decision has been made and we are going to get on it. That
4 is what I want to hear but I am open to listening to what
5 you want to say.

6 Mr. Sedney. You are correct that once the contract
7 protest was filed, we should have been and we were aware
8 that we needed to start making alternate plans. Those
9 alternate plans had to of course cover a wide range of
10 possibilities of the contracting, and as I understand it, I
11 am not a contract lawyer, but as I understand it, I was
12 advised that there are some things that we had to be careful
13 to do that in terms of preparation could not go beyond
14 actions that could then lead to further protests so we have
15 to be careful what we did legally.

16 On March 9, 2010 we received a joint message from our
17 military and civilians in the field putting out, and this
18 was a result of work that we had leading up to that,
19 pointing out some of the areas that we need to work on, the
20 areas we need to work on and what were some of the alternate
21 ways forward.

22 Since the GAO decision, my department, myself,
23 Assistant Secretary Johnson, his department, we have met.
24 The current DynCorp contract is an extension of a contract
25 which had expired and that extension runs until July of this

1 year.

2 We determined we had several possible ways forward at
3 the current time. We could, in conjunction with the GAO
4 report which very strongly came out in recommending that we
5 do a full, fair, and open competition of the contract, while
6 we could have appealed that decision or contested that
7 decision and asked for reexamination of that decision, we
8 decided not to because even if we felt that our position was
9 right and the GAO decision was wrong, further contesting of
10 that decision would just lead to a longer period of time
11 with uncertainty.

12 So we are going to go ahead in full conformance with
13 the GAO recommendation of a full and open competition.

14 A full and open competition of that contract requires
15 that we have the requirements put in place, that we follow
16 all the steps of the contracting process, and the Department
17 of Defense is moving forward in an expeditious manner, in a
18 speedy manner, as fast as we can go, but this is not a
19 process that in and of itself is ever fast as I am sure you
20 know, Senator.

21 Senator McCaskill. I do know. I will make a bold
22 prediction. DynCorp will be extended again and DynCorp will
23 be there doing this until a decision is made as to what
24 extent our level is going to change in terms of our
25 commitment in Afghanistan sometime next year.

1 The lesson that probably needs to be learned here is
2 that shortcutting the process through existing task orders
3 and contracts is what generally speaking the Pentagon likes
4 to do.

5 The military has very little patience with the process
6 of full and open competition. It is a process that has a
7 number of required steps. But they are there for good
8 reason. If there is anyplace that I think the American
9 people have figured out that we have got to have some help
10 on full and fair and open competition, it is the hiring of
11 security forces and the training of security forces because
12 I mean I do not know how many other companies in America are
13 as well known as Blackwater, and it is not for good reasons.

14 So circumventing that full and fair, you know in
15 hindsight I just want to say that the moment the decision
16 was made to try to move it out of State it seems to me that
17 full and fair open competition would have been the most
18 efficient way to move forward rather than trying to shoehorn
19 this into something else in order to take a shortcut. It
20 turns out that the shortcut was not so short.

21 My time is up for this round, and I will turn it over
22 to Senator Brown.

23 Senator Brown. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am going to
24 actually, as a courtesy, extend my time to Senator Kaufman.
25 He has a few questions, and then if I could reserve and come

1 back that would be great.

2 Senator Kaufman. Thank you very much. I want to
3 associate myself with the chair's remarks.

4 Look, I have been to Afghanistan three times in the
5 year and a half I have been a senator. I have sat through
6 70 briefings in the preparation before leaving on those
7 trips.

8 I had no idea we spent \$6 billion. I have not had a
9 single person in any one of those briefings refer to the
10 Afghan National Police as anything except a big problem.
11 Not the problem to get them well, a problem just the way
12 they sit. They are purveyors of corruption from one end of
13 Afghanistan to the other to, as the chair so well put it,
14 the rule of law.

15 If we are going to build, clear, hold, we have to have
16 the rule of law. No rule of law. The police are the ones
17 who man the barricades and on the highway stop people. In
18 Marjah, just read the stories about what went on in Marjah
19 and why the people were so upset with us because of the
20 former government.

21 The other thing I want to say, look, before you were
22 doing a great job. I mean I really applaud you for what you
23 are doing. This is incredibly, incredibly difficult. So
24 what I am saying is not referring to you. You happen to be,
25 unfortunately be the messengers sent to sit here at the

1 table.

2 But I think what the chair says is compelling. If we
3 do not do something, we are in dire shape over there. I
4 mean that is not a deep, dark secret. The key to it is we
5 cannot go into places and clear and hold, we cannot hold if
6 we do not have the police to do it and we surely cannot
7 build and we surely cannot transfer.

8 So we have got to come up with something in the next
9 six or eight months. As the chair said, this is not a
10 decision, we talking about June, starting to draw down
11 troops. We are talking about making a decision this
12 December on whether we are going to win or not.

13 And I will tell you what. At the top of my list, not
14 the number one thing, but the number two thing is where do
15 we stand with the Afghan National Police. The attrition
16 rates were out a bit. They are getting out of control.

17 So really what I would like you to do if you could, and
18 I know I have sat here and listened to you, you know
19 deteriorating condition, lack of unity of command, and some
20 of the things that have been said but this is catastrophic.

21 This was not something that you can go around the
22 edges. Deteriorating condition so we have no police. And
23 the literacy, we knew what the literacy of the police are.
24 But they are saying the same things now after \$6 billion.
25 We have this incredible problem with the literacy of the

1 police.

2 So what I would like, if each of you would kind of, and
3 I know you are under constraint. What are the one or two
4 things that you really believe you could spend \$6 billion
5 and end up with practically no where, what are the two or
6 three things.

7 I got the unity of command and I got deteriorated
8 conditions. What are the one or two things that we can do
9 it, and what is the one thing you think could best help us
10 reach the point the chair said so that we can move ahead and
11 actually have progress on the ground so we can reach this
12 134,000 trained troops.

13 I will start with Mr. Heddell.

14 Mr. Heddell. I will say just about for starters just
15 about everything that could go wrong here has gone wrong.
16 And looking back to November 2006, it was relatively clear
17 to my office, Senator Kaufman, that the training that was
18 being provided was already inadequate. The needs of the
19 Afghan police training were already out of date, so to
20 speak, and it was pretty apparent that there was not enough
21 management on the ground in-country overseeing the contract.

22 You are asking for a couple of things here. But I
23 spent 28 years in federal law enforcement so I cannot come
24 up with two things because there is at least 10 things and
25 they all need to be addressed.

1 The fact is aside from the need to increase the size of
2 the total Afghan National Police force just to address the
3 counterinsurgency and to protect civilian population, they
4 need to start at the very beginning.

5 Recruiting is a tremendous challenge over there,
6 finding the right people for this kind of work, and then
7 retaining them, paying them what they need to be paid to
8 live and then training them on the force. Of course we
9 talked about the dangers and the fact that the death rate
10 for Afghan National Police officers, by our records, has
11 gone up four or five times what it was.

12 Senator Kaufman. The total is 129, in my briefing.

13 Mr. Heddell. The death rate, the average death rate
14 per month for Afghan National Police officer in the last
15 four years we think has gone up from 23, 24 a month to about
16 125.

17 Senator Kaufman. Okay.

18 Mr. Heddell. Those figures are approximate but they
19 are dramatic. The fact of the matter is we need to change
20 the training curriculum to be able to address the
21 counterinsurgency. We need to be able to teach
22 survivability over there. They need to know that they can
23 go out on the street, do their work and survive.

24 They need tactical skills aside from the basic
25 community policing skills that any police official would

1 need to have. We need better trainers. The example that
2 Madam Chairman gave with the Carabinieri Italians, I mean
3 what a simple but yet an unbelievable situation that they
4 had not sighted the weapons.

5 Most of all, Senator Kaufman, they need leadership.
6 They need police officers who can lead. If there is one
7 single thing they probably need more than anything else, it
8 is that.

9 And the second thing, if I had to give you two items,
10 would be find a way to dismiss so many corrupt police
11 officials in-country. I met last November with Minister
12 Wardak, the minister of defense, and he talked for almost an
13 hour and most of it was about the corruption.

14 Corruption undermines everything that we are trying to
15 achieve in that country and particularly with respect to
16 police officials.

17 Senator Kaufman. Here is my point is you know there is
18 an old definition of insanity is doing the same thing over
19 again and expecting different results. And what the chair
20 said is what are we going to do in that six months, and the
21 folks in there that have been doing this, I mean you say
22 there are not enough contract oversight.

23 Part of this has to be what were the contractors doing?
24 What you laid out was a problem we knew in 2001. Everything
25 you said you did not have to have a PhD to figure out that

1 those were the 10 or 12 things that we need to do.

2 We are now here nine years later, and we are exactly
3 the same spot. You basically laid out the question as I
4 have. And Wardak and minister of the interior Atmar, they
5 say all the right things but what they say is there is no
6 training going on.

7 I am saying briefing after briefing after briefing was
8 this is just where the police are. What I am trying to do
9 is get at the answer to the chair's question. I guess let
10 me get off, what is the problem. You pretty well laid it
11 out.

12 Does anybody have any ideas what are we doing in the
13 next six months so that when we come up for review, seven
14 months we come up for review we have a realistic opinion of
15 where the police are and how we can move forward.

16 Mr. Heddell. If we have to wait for a contract, a new
17 contract, we are not going to do very much. The Department
18 of Defense is working with Department of State, I know that,
19 to make an interim fix. The fact of the matter is it needs
20 to be fixed right now. And I can tell you you do not train
21 a police officer in a year. It takes two and three and four
22 years to get there.

23 Senator Kaufman. But here is the thing, and I agree
24 with you about that and people talk about us going out in
25 June and we cannot go out in June. We do not have enough

1 time.

2 We do not have to have all the answers but we have to
3 make progress. We have to be able to say we are moving in
4 the right direction. We got to be at some point like in
5 December where we do not have a list of the 12 things you
6 said that are wrong which I totally agree with everyone of
7 the them, that there is maybe six on the list. We are
8 making progress on two of them.

9 Mr. Sedney. I would hate to think we have to wait to
10 get a contract on-board to start training police officials
11 to survive.

12 Senator Kaufman. Can someone else give a suggestion?
13 What is it that we should do? I get back to the question
14 the chair raised. What can we do so that we do not have to
15 wait, so we come in December, we will have a good idea of
16 whether we really can actually train police and get them out
17 there on the job. This is not that the question.

18 Ms. Klemstine. If I could.

19 Senator McCaskill. I think Mr. Sedney wants to also
20 but go ahead both of you briefly or all three of you go
21 ahead and then we will go to Senator Brown.

22 Ms. Klemstine. Briefly I would say that I would put
23 them into three areas. The first thing that we really need
24 to do is we need to adequately define our requirements.
25 Every contract starts on the requirements side.

1 My past experience on the contract side has shown that
2 the requirements are never well defined. We have to do
3 that. Then we have to have adequate performance measures by
4 which to reevaluate the contractors. Without any
5 accountability, it does not make any difference. That was
6 one of the things that the joint report pointed out that
7 there was not performance measurements in this contract to
8 hold the contractor accountable for what needs to be done.

9 And then the third area we need to do is an adequate
10 job of overseeing the contract. But in terms of overseeing
11 the contract, things will have to be a little bit different
12 than what we institutionally know as contract oversight just
13 because we are in a war-type zone.

14 So we have to develop standard operating procedures and
15 adequate ways to do these type of contract oversight in
16 areas of contingency operations.

17 Mr. Johnson. I think I would agree on a couple points
18 and make one further. The basic measures that would improve
19 the recruitment and retention direct, more direct pay,
20 direct pay for all, better and longer training programs
21 focused on literacy.

22 But with due respect to General Caldwell, we have
23 trained many people in Afghanistan. Under his leadership,
24 we trained 3000. Under General Formica, we have trained
25 almost 16,000. Under General Cohen, we have trained almost

1 30,000. Under General Durbin, we trained almost 66,000.

2 So there has been a great number of people trained, and
3 the end strength now is about 100,000. But we have not been
4 able to retain them the way we need to. As the DOD
5 inspector general mentioned, it takes a longer time than a
6 six- or eight-week training program to get the kind of
7 police officer that you need. So retention is a key part of
8 this.

9 I would also join the Ms. Klemstine. A clear statement
10 of work so that we can move out on new training whether it
11 is under the contract that we manage or if we are able to
12 move it over to DOD more rapidly, to do it that way.

13 But those sorts of things would allow us to proceed as
14 rapidly as possible.

15 Thank you.

16 Mr. Sedney. I would offer that there are a lot of
17 things that are happening now and have been happening over
18 the past year that are moving us very much in the right
19 direction.

20 We do not have to start from today to do things right
21 and do things better. We already have started and already
22 have done things better. There are continuing changes and
23 improvements underway.

24 Senator, you mentioned recruitment. Recruitment for
25 the Afghan National Police has been sharply improving over

1 the last several months due to a series of improvements
2 including a recruiting training command, a more focused
3 effort on recruitment and improved pay for the Afghan
4 National Police.

5 The recruitment is also up because we recognize the
6 issue of leadership that everyone has mentioned. General
7 McChrystal in his campaign strategy has focused on a key
8 measure to improve performance and leadership in both the
9 Afghan nation army and Afghan National Police and that is
10 through intensive partnering with the Afghan National Police
11 by US forces and coalition forces, throughout all of
12 Afghanistan.

13 Implementing that partnering is ongoing now. There are
14 already police units that are being partner. Units such as
15 the Afghan national civil order police which had never been
16 partnered before is going to be partnered now by elements of
17 a special forces under ISAF.

18 That partnering will help provide a bridge for the
19 leadership.

20 Senator McCaskill. Is that the same thing as ANCOP?

21 Mr. Sedney. Yes.

22 Senator McCaskill. That is the new name for ANCOP?

23 Mr. Sedney. Afghan National Civil Order Police. The
24 acronym is ANCOP. I try to avoid acronyms.

25 Senator McCaskill. Okay. I have never heard it called

1 anything other than ANCOP which, for the record, ANCOP is
2 the special police force that roams the country. They are
3 not assigned to a province. They are not assigned to a
4 jurisdiction. They are the elite police force. They were
5 designed to be the elite police force.

6 Mr. Sedney. Their performance has been very high.
7 They have also suffered from the highest attrition,
8 attrition meaning people who either leave before their
9 contracts, attrition meaning people who leave before their
10 contracts are up and the lowest retention meaning the fewest
11 number of people who sign on for a repeat contracts.

12 That is due for a number of reasons. One of them is
13 high operational tempo. Another is lack of leadership which
14 is mentoring and partnership. Another is because many of
15 them are recruited by higher paying private security firms
16 to provide private security services in Afghanistan which is
17 a separate program.

18 But let me go back to what is going right, Senator
19 Kaufman. On Sunday and Monday of this week, I was in
20 Afghanistan with General Petraeus and Ambassador Holbrook
21 for their review of the concept drill, in other words an
22 intensive look with the Afghans and our civilian and
23 military leadership on our combined civil and military
24 efforts in Afghanistan.

25 The Minister of the Interior, Mr. Atmar; Minister

1 Mongol, the deputy minister of the interior, both
2 participated in that. The Afghan police and the performance
3 of the Afghan police was a major subject of discussion
4 during that.

5 Minister Atmar pointed out that not only had we trained
6 many police, as Assistant Secretary Johnson pointed out,
7 there are many police who are performing well. He also
8 admitted there are many police that are not performing well.

9 Whether it is a Newsweek article or another forum where
10 you focus on the problems, Minister Atmar asked us, and I am
11 going to comply with his request, to highlight that there are
12 also thousands, and in his words, tens of thousands of
13 Afghan National Police who are doing a good job, who are not
14 corrupt, who are being killed at the rate of 125 or 129 a
15 month, and they are staying on the job. They are not
16 fleeing the job. Some do but many many more do not.

17 They are committed to their country, and they often do
18 not have the right resources, they do not have the right
19 training, whether it is ineffective sights, ineffective
20 equipment, whether they are using unarmored vehicles instead
21 of armored vehicles in areas where IEDs are the biggest
22 killers of people.

23 So these are people on the Afghan side who are working
24 hard to defeat an enemy that has been growing in strength.

25 The message I took away, and I have spent several years

1 living and working in Afghanistan as well as visited there
2 about ten times over the last year, is that General
3 McChrystal's strategy of blunting the rise and the
4 improvement that the Taliban had is succeeding.

5 The next step of course is to reverse that. Every step
6 of the way the Afghan National Police is central to that.
7 So we are building a better police force. We are training a
8 better police force.

9 The partnership is helping us to put in place a police
10 force that is going to perform better. We have a better
11 story today than when you Senator and you Senator were there
12 in the last several months and it will be better next month.

13 Will it be dramatically improved everyday, no. But it
14 will be significantly improved on a month to month basis. I
15 feel very highly confident of that.

16 In terms of the contract, the work that Assistant
17 Secretary Johnson and I have done over the last several
18 weeks, we want to make sure that we do not make any of those
19 mistakes that you referred to, Senator McCaskill, in terms
20 of the contracting process because more mistakes will lead
21 to an even longer gap before we have a permanent contract.

22 We do also need to find a way to bridge to a permanent
23 contract. I agree with your prediction that the most
24 likely, we both agree that the most likely outcome will be
25 an extension. I hope I did not say anything a lawyer will

1 find problematic with that.

2 Senator McCaskill. Just say I made you answer the
3 question.

4 Mr. Sedney. Thank you, Senator.

5 But we have also communicated to the State Department
6 new requirements. I agree with Inspector General Klemstine
7 that we need to be clear about requirements. These new
8 requirements that will address the problems that were laid
9 out by Mr. Heddell on the areas that we need different kinds
10 of performance in the police contract and we are working now
11 to see how we can have that contract, how we can accomplish
12 those goals through a possible extension of existing
13 contract.

14 There might be some other options but we will continue
15 to work through that. We expect to have a resolution within
16 the next two weeks. I hope even sooner in terms of that
17 extension or our other possibility.

18 But as we are doing that, we are continuing to train.
19 We are adding trainers for the police in other ways. The
20 police contract is not the only way we are training. We
21 have brought an additional coalition of military trainers.
22 Other countries have put in more trainers. There are more
23 both third country military trainers and third country
24 police trainers that are already in Afghanistan than there
25 were before as part of an effort through NATO and through

1 our partner nations to increase training.

2 For example, the Germans in the north who had been
3 focusing their efforts on deployed military are now
4 transitioning to trainers and a greater focus on training in
5 the north and that is happening in many other areas as well.

6 So while we focus, and I agree with you, Senator
7 McCaskill, in your criticisms of the process. We have made
8 mistakes. We are going to fix them. But there are many
9 things that are going right, Senator Kaufman. I would be
10 happy to go on at greater length.

11 I apologize for taking up your time.

12 Senator McCaskill. I am just self-conscious about
13 getting to Senator Brown.

14 Senator Brown.

15 Senator Brown. Thank you. Madam Chairman, and through
16 you to the witnesses.

17 I had a whole host of questions but in just listening I
18 wanted to shift gears and then I will come back to my
19 original line. One of the things that I am just getting
20 through the conversation is that the contract transition and
21 the five-month delay in awarding the contract quite frankly
22 is putting our troops at risk.

23 I am flabbergasted sometimes at the slow pace of
24 government at a time when we need quick reaction and quick
25 action on moving forward. So whatever tools and resources

1 you need to get the job done, I would encourage somebody in
2 your respective departments to start to get moving because
3 my sense being in the military and also recently visiting is
4 that we have a serious problem. We have to stop pointing
5 the finger and going back and forth and just get the job
6 done.

7 With regard to who do we hold ultimately accountable, I
8 am a little confused still. I know we have a contract. I
9 have been reading. I understand it. I get it but my
10 concern is now we are extending a contract that has not
11 worked. People who have received \$6 billion.

12 There has been very little training and now we are
13 looking to extend it because we do not have the ability to
14 enter into another contract because we used something that
15 we felt would get it done quicker when in fact it delayed us
16 so we are more time behind the eight ball.

17 But I am hopeful that when you do the new contract
18 there is going to be a way to hold the trainers responsible
19 for delivering what they said they were going to deliver
20 because as somebody who is just so fed up with overspending
21 and over budgeting, at what point do we hold contractors,
22 people that we hire to do a job, responsible for doing that
23 job and getting our money's worth?

24 That is something I would like to ultimately leave for
25 just someone to ultimately speak about.

1 I will start with you, Mr. Sedney. You did say in the
2 beginning you will need greater resources and you have not
3 received the trainers. You need more trainers.

4 I know in speaking to the appropriate authorities in
5 Afghanistan, the United States is the only country that has
6 provided the requested amount of trainers. The other
7 countries have not supplied the appropriate trainers.

8 Who in the food chain is responsible for trying to get
9 the other countries to provide the appropriate amount of
10 trainers?

11 Mr. Sedney. Senator, first of all, let me say in
12 response to the first part of what you said. I agree with
13 you entirely and I can tell you I share your impatience and
14 I can pledge you my greatest efforts to make both the
15 quickest and the most effective response because sometimes
16 speed works against effectiveness.

17 On the issue of trainers that you raised, the US
18 forces, the US military has provided the requested trainers
19 under the NATO request because this is a NATO mission. We
20 have a number of countries that have responded well to the
21 combined joint statement of requirements--

22 Senator Brown. But they have not fulfilled their
23 obligation.

24 Mr. Sedney. There are a number of countries we
25 continue to work with and the overall number of unfilled

1 spaces under the NATO combined joint statement of
2 requirements is in the several hundreds, well over 400 when
3 I checked this morning.

4 That certainly will be a major area of discussion with
5 our colleagues both at NATO and also in the upcoming NATO
6 ministerial in Estonia.

7 At the same time as we are looking for other countries
8 to step forward within the NATO context, we have also had a
9 number of discussions and am not going to name the countries
10 for reasons of the diplomatic confidentiality but a number
11 of countries which have not yet been involved in Afghanistan
12 have shown interest in contributing trainers.

13 We are working aggressively with them because they see
14 the challenge that instability and extremism in Afghanistan
15 poses to their own national security. So we are not being
16 limited by the past. We are actually looking into new and
17 different areas, and again I would be able to do that in a
18 more confidential setting because I do not want to put
19 countries on the spot while we are in the middle of
20 diplomatic negotiations.

21 But I believe there are a number of areas of hope
22 there. At the same time I want to stress what I said in
23 response to Senator Kaufman, we are training police. The
24 coalition and we, the United States, are training police and
25 moving forward. This is an area where we are going to

1 succeed.

2 Senator Brown. Thank you very much and I appreciate
3 that. And I know who is helping and who is not and I would
4 encourage the Administration to strongly encourage them to
5 do what they said they would do.

6 We all know about the 6 billion that has been spent and
7 fewer than 12 percent of the country's police are capable of
8 operating on their own.

9 We know about the lack of respect that the police get
10 in Afghanistan based on their corruption and lack of
11 training, et cetera. So considering all those problems, I
12 guess I would defer this question to the IGs. Considering
13 all these problems which have been apparent for a while who
14 ultimately is responsible in saying how do we not fall into
15 this rut again.

16 Mr. Heddell. I will be glad to try, Senator Brown.

17 Two areas, one is simply the training of police
18 officers and doing it in the right way with the right
19 trainers, with the right curriculum. The second part of
20 that is managing and oversighting a contract worth billions
21 of dollars.

22 In both categories, if we are going to do it and we are
23 going to do it obviously, we have to do it right. Under
24 each of those categories, there are things that we need to
25 do.

1 I mean, under the management oversight of the contract,
2 for instance, we need to have oversight and management in-
3 country looking at the contracting officer representatives
4 on the ground in-country.

5 With regard to the contract itself, we have that
6 performance measures. We have to specifically say what we
7 expect that contractor to do. Then we have to measure that
8 contractor's performance.

9 With regard to property, DynCorp spent millions and
10 millions of dollars on property and we did not do
11 inventories. We did not know what we had or what we did not
12 have many times.

13 Senator Brown. Right. Well, there is no property
14 management. There is no accountability. There are no hand
15 receipts. There is nothing.

16 Mr. Heddell. That is correct.

17 Senator Brown. How does that happen?

18 Mr. Heddell. Because there were no managers on the
19 ground.

20 Senator Brown. What are they getting paid for? Why is
21 that? When they are getting paid to do a job, there has got
22 to be a chain of command. There has got to be a natural
23 flow chart. Here is the boss. Here is the subordinate.
24 Where is the break down? I am missing it.

25 Mr. Heddell. I can tell you what happened.

1 Senator Brown. Where is the breakdown?

2 Mr. Johnson. As I mentioned in the statement that I
3 made, the oral statement, in adapting the procedures that we
4 had to working in a wartime environment, we developed what
5 we thought were effective compromises, sometimes in
6 consultation with our OIG colleagues, so that for example
7 the contracting officers' representatives' files were
8 retained in Washington.

9 It was, therefore, a 24-hour delay, due to the shape of
10 the globe, before someone on the ground in Kabul would have
11 access to that material.

12 They always had access to the material 24 hours later
13 but it is not the same as being able to have the materials
14 in the front of you.

15 We did this because we were working in an environment
16 where we were seeking to manage our risks, having no more
17 people on the ground than we thought we had to. I think in
18 retrospect, having more, taking some risks in the hiring
19 process and having places doubled-billeted or triple-
20 billeted going through the clearance process would have made
21 more sense.

22 I am anxious to come before you at some point and the
23 chairman call me down for having so many people on the
24 ground that I have lost the concept of materiality in
25 auditing.

1 Senator McCaskill. I will not do that.

2 Mr. Johnson. I am aiming for it. But that is where we
3 are trying to head.

4 We did do some things in order to compensate for that
5 by making all of the payments for the contract provisional
6 in nature so that we can claw them back if they need to be
7 and we have when we found issues that need to be addressed.

8 As the Inspectors General pointed out, any delay in
9 doing that, though, represents potential for lost documents,
10 for lost memory, and reconciling that process over time is
11 not nearly as efficient and effective as doing it at the
12 time payment is made even though it does protect the
13 government.

14 So we are moving as rapidly as we possibly can in the
15 direction of having more and more people on the ground.

16 Senator Brown. Thank you. I have run out of time,
17 Madam Chair.

18 Senator McCaskill. Let me first ask about the 2006
19 audit. Let me ask who did this before we started
20 contracting this? Special forces?

21 Mr. Johnson. When the effort was first made to train
22 police to do security sector reform, as it is called in
23 diplo-speak, in Afghanistan in the early part of 2002 there
24 was a division of labor among members of the G-18.

25 The United State took responsibility for the Afghan

1 national army for reasons which I think were intuitive to
2 everybody in the room.

3 The Germans who had a latent program that existed
4 before the Russian invasion and before the Marxist coup that
5 took place before that wanted to take the police
6 responsibility on. They did but their approach was a very
7 long-term approach.

8 Senator McCaskill. Right.

9 Mr. Johnson. And so we step in, the State Department
10 did, and began a very modest training program in order to
11 try to get people on the ground as quickly as possible.

12 But as you may or may not recall, the diplomatic theory
13 at the time was to have a relatively light foot print. We
14 do not have ISAF outside of Kabul. We were still operating
15 only Operation Enduring Freedom efforts outside of that.

16 This has grown over time as we have seen and this is
17 one of the issues that I think we need to take into account
18 here. It is not so much that people did not do what we
19 wanted them to do. It is that both our objectives and the
20 situation on the ground has evolved and sometimes in
21 unexpected and marked ways during this period of time.

22 Senator McCaskill. Let us just assume. We had this
23 requirement to train local police during a counterinsurgency
24 in Iraq. We now have the mission to train police during a
25 counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.

1 I do not think it is beyond anyone's imagination that
2 if we are fighting a counterinsurgency that that is going to
3 be something that is going to have to be a core competency
4 of our military as far as the eye can see.

5 Would anybody disagree with that? That training local
6 police in a counterinsurgency is something that should be a
7 core competency of our military for as far as the eye can
8 see.

9 Mr. Sedney, would you disagree with that?

10 Mr. Sedney. I personally would not disagree with that.
11 In terms of just how we are going to allocate the division
12 of responsibility in the government for future
13 counterinsurgencies in terms of training police I believe
14 that is still a matter that we have not fully come to
15 closure on but I take your point and I would say I
16 personally agree.

17 Senator McCaskill. I will tell you this. That is what
18 I would like to see come out of this hearing. In the
19 volumes of information that I have consumed on this, there
20 is no question that the trading back and forth, the fact
21 that after in 2006 you had an audit report that said you
22 needed in-country CORs, and there were years that you maybe
23 had one on a task force and they were not really doing any
24 on-site checking because of the security risks.

25 I mean it is unacceptable that you know I think I have

1 a couple of documents that by the beginning of 2008 nearly
2 675 million was obligated without any evidence of an ICOR
3 functioning in Afghanistan. That comes directly out of the
4 report.

5 Prior to June of 2009, there was only one in-country
6 contracting officer's representatives on the main ANP task
7 order. That is not going to work.

8 Anybody who is doing contract oversight will tell you
9 that that kind of presence in-country in this kind of
10 environment is woefully, woefully, woefully inadequate.

11 So if we are going to be operating in the
12 counterinsurgency as we do this local police training, it
13 seems to me that it is imperative that somebody step up and
14 say this has got to be a military COR competency and stop
15 this, well, State was not doing it. Well, we got to get it
16 back under the military because the State contractors are
17 not paying attention to us. State cannot really get out in
18 the contingency because of the security risks.

19 I mean if you look at this back and forth over the last
20 four or five years, you can say all you want to how many
21 have been trained.

22 But I think if we are honest about how many are
23 currently operating at an effectiveness level in the country
24 of Afghanistan, Americans have not gotten a good deal on
25 their investment.

1 So I am trying to get someone to come to the table and
2 say it is time that people at the very top of the State
3 Department and the very top of the State Department and
4 General Petraeus acknowledged that this needs to come to
5 defense and it needs to stay there.

6 Let me ask you. Is it not true that there is a plan
7 already in place to not only, we are trying to transition it
8 to defense but we cannot get it done because it was not done
9 right and there is already planning going on on how to
10 transition it back.

11 Is not that true?

12 Mr. Sedney. There certainly is discussion about what
13 will follow after a transition to Afghan security lead so I
14 am aware that there are discussions. I am not aware of a
15 plan along the lines that you discussed but I have to
16 confess I will not be able to speak for every plan in the
17 Department of Defense. But I personally am not aware of
18 such a plan, Madam Chairman McCaskill.

19 Senator McCaskill. I think there is a chance that we
20 will be doing police training in counterinsurgency
21 operations in other places besides Afghanistan. That is
22 something clearly if you understand the security threats
23 around the world whether it is Somalia, whether it is Yemen,
24 this is something that is going to be ongoing. It is my
25 understanding that prior to the State Department taking this

1 on that this had been a special forces function, the
2 training, before it went to private contractors.

3 Mr. Johnson. That is not my understanding. The
4 special forces were operating as part of Operation Enduring
5 Freedom. They had many liaison relationships throughout the
6 country as part of that.

7 But the police training which began after hostilities
8 were concluded formally, if you will, was the responsibility
9 first of our partners and then we began taking on more and
10 more of that.

11 If I might say while I have the floor, I think we are
12 going to find that we need more than one solution to this
13 problem because there are going to be places in the world
14 where a defense-led effort will be both more appropriate and
15 more effective and acceptable, and there are going to be
16 places in the world where if for only for reasons of
17 acceptability from our partners, having a civilian-led
18 effort is going to be also needed to be in this mix.

19 Senator McCaskill. My reference to special forces was
20 worldwide. It had been special forces prior to the State
21 Department. You are referring to Afghanistan. There was a
22 time that the State Department was not involved in this and
23 it was purely military that did training of local police
24 under these circumstances.

25 Mr. Johnson. My earliest recollection of this comes in

1 our initial effort to assist the training of the police
2 force in Haiti in the early 1990s and that was a State-led
3 effort. I understand that before that when there were needs
4 there may have been special forces training programs which
5 bled over to civilian police but it has not been the
6 civilian lead at least over the course of the last couple of
7 dozen years.

8 Senator McCaskill. Okay. Did you want to add
9 something, Mr. Sedney?

10 Mr. Sedney. No.

11 Senator McCaskill. No. Okay.

12 Senator Kaufman.

13 Senator Kaufman. You are doing great. Keep going.

14 Senator McCaskill. Why do you not take another round,
15 Senator Brown, and then I will probably come back for one
16 more.

17 Senator Brown. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate
18 it.

19 This has been very very interesting. I wanted to just
20 touch on the civilian training verses military style
21 paramilitary training. Although the primary reason for
22 change certainly is sensible, the Afghan police are
23 suffering inordinate casualties in the field compared to
24 their counterparts in the army based on this new emphasis on
25 military style training, I think precipitated by the several

1 debates between State and DOD.

2 The State and DOD inspectors' report that we have been
3 obviously citing cited the delay in changing the curriculum
4 to emphasize the paramilitary skills as the problem in the
5 current DOD-State management.

6 Did this delay stem from the resistance by state to buy
7 into this change or resistance from DynCorp or basic
8 bureaucratic problems or for some other reason?

9 Mr. Johnson. There is no resistance to this on our
10 part. We will respond to the defined requirements. If it
11 requires additional or different trainers, that is what we
12 will seek. If it requires skills that are outside the scope
13 of civilian trainers, we will inform our military colleagues
14 that we are not in a position to provide that service.

15 Senator Brown. Do you wish to comment on that, sir?

16 Mr. Heddell. Yes. There is actually something I think
17 to be learned from your question, Senator Brown, in the
18 sense that the original contract required that there would
19 be this joint relationship between the Department of State
20 and the Department of Defense.

21 And that in order for the Department of Defense to make
22 a change, for instance, in the training curriculum, it was
23 required that DOD provide at least 120 days notice before
24 that change could be effective.

25 What we found when we interviewed staff from the State

1 Department, they indicated on average it took six months to
2 actually execute a change.

3 It brings us to the heart of the issue which is that
4 the Department of Defense needs in this particular case to
5 be able to talk directly to the contractor. That was really
6 the heart of the problem.

7 The bureaucracy was holding us back and the lack of
8 contracting management on the ground to effect these changes
9 and bring about a new curriculum and to do the things that
10 DOD needed to have done, the structure was not in place to
11 do it.

12 So what we learned from that is that we should not have
13 this intermediary where DOD has to go through another entity
14 to make changes.

15 And number two, we do not want to build a contract
16 where it takes 120 days to make a rapid change when the
17 insurgency is making rapid changes very day that we have to
18 adjust to.

19 Senator Brown. I think that is accurate. I just want
20 to shift gears just a touch. When we talk about the
21 training, and I asked these questions in Afghanistan, it has
22 gone from eight weeks to six weeks.

23 Do we really think that is adequate enough to instill
24 professionalism and ethics in that police force, into the
25 trainees, and is that enough time to actually filter out

1 those trainees determine if they in fact have the ability to
2 be professional and ethical?

3 I think that is probably an IG question.

4 Mr. Heddell. I would be glad to give you my opinion on
5 that, Senator Brown. From the standpoint of basic training,
6 no, six weeks, in my own opinion, is not enough.

7 Senator Brown. Especially since you do not have all
8 the trainers you need as we referenced.

9 Mr. Heddell. The fact of the matter is that six weeks
10 or even eight weeks or even 16 weeks is not enough for
11 anyone if you do not have some follow-up because, as I said
12 earlier, it takes years, not weeks, not months but years to
13 develop a police officer just to be at the acceptable level.

14 So I presume that the reason that it went from eight
15 weeks to six weeks is to get more police officers through
16 the training.

17 But once they get through the training, they need
18 mentoring. They need advanced training. They need follow
19 up. There is so much more to it than simply putting through
20 a six- or eight-week course.

21 So I do not necessarily think that whether it is six or
22 eight weeks is right or wrong. I think what is important is
23 that there has to be a long term plan here for development.

24 Senator Brown. So are we asking for contractors to put
25 too much of an influence on the quantity of trainees versus

1 actual quality or ethical responsibilities and
2 professionalism? Do you think we should maybe go to a
3 different standard of some kind?

4 Mr. Heddell. Well, I cannot answer the question. It
5 is probably more for Department of Defense or Department of
6 State. But it would appear to me that the way we were doing
7 it it was just not going to work.

8 Senator Brown. So saying that and referring it over,
9 what is the solution? How do we change from quantity to
10 quality to get the value for our dollars?

11 Mr. Sedney. We are currently working on addressing
12 both and we are very aware of the challenges that you laid
13 out, Senator Brown.

14 To address the specific question of the six weeks
15 versus eight weeks training, yes, we have transitioned to
16 six weeks training in order to be able to make maximum use
17 of the police training facilities and produce more police.

18 But those six weeks of training are better than the
19 eight weeks before. There is not less contact hours. There
20 are more contact hours in those six weeks. It has gone
21 from, we have shortened a rather long lunch period to a
22 shorter lunch period. The training is longer days. One day
23 off has now become a day of training.

24 So the actual contact hours over six weeks is greater
25 than the eight weeks.

1 Senator Brown. Right. I am aware of that.

2 Mr. Sedney. So it is not a lesser training.

3 However, I agree with Mr. Heddell. This is not a weeks
4 or months long process. It is a year's long process. The
5 key here is not just continued training but also modeling,
6 and that is where the intensive partnering that General
7 McChrystal has put in in both the army and the police is so
8 important because in order to instill those ethics that you
9 talked about, the Afghan trainees, the Afghan policemen have
10 to see them in operation. They have to see that they work.

11 In the past we would train people and put them out into
12 a corrupt society. No matter how well you train them,
13 whether it was eight weeks, six weeks, 16 weeks or 60 weeks,
14 if you just stuck them out with no mentoring and training
15 they were going to become more corrupt.

16 We have realized that. Now we are working to change
17 that. We also have developed and are going to be putting
18 more emphasis on continued and repeat training, as Mr.
19 Heddell mentioned, because again you have to keep bringing
20 people back on.

21 Senator Brown. I am sorry. I do not mean to
22 interrupt. I understand that. We got fully briefed as to
23 what it is.

24 I guess at least in my second question, so how much is
25 it going to cost? I mean what is the number that the

1 American people are ultimately going to be responsible for
2 next year and the year after and the year after? What type
3 of dollars are we talking about to once again to come up
4 with?

5 Mr. Sedney. I do not know the exact figure for what we
6 have requested in the supplemental. I will be happy to get
7 that up.

8 Senator Brown. Do you have a general idea if you do
9 not have an exact number? Do you have a general number, an
10 approximate number?

11 Mr. Sedney. I understand and my staff is always
12 willing to come up, is going to give me an exact number. I
13 was going to say about 6 billion.

14 Senator Brown. For a year?

15 Mr. Sedney. \$6 billion for this year.

16 Senator Brown. Just to stand up a police force, it is
17 going to be \$6 billion a year?

18 Mr. Sedney. The Afghan police and national army is
19 together about \$11.6 billion in fiscal year 2011 request.
20 That is the Afghan National Police and army together.

21 Senator Brown. So \$11.6 billion to basically uplift
22 the police and army in Afghanistan.

23 Mr. Sedney. And continue to train them, pay them.

24 Senator Brown. Equip them. The whole nine yards.

25 Mr. Sedney. Right.

1 Senator Brown. I will save my remaining questions for
2 follow up. Thank you.

3 Senator McCaskill. I have several I want to get to so
4 I will try to limit my editorial comments because I know I
5 am the biggest offender. If you all will try to help me by
6 keeping your answers brief.

7 I want to make sure I get a couple of documents in the
8 record. The first has to do with the State Department's
9 ability to oversee contractors. Without objection, if there
10 is an objection just let me know, I want to enter into the
11 record the contractor past performance evaluation document
12 that deals with the evaluation of Blackwater in Iraq.

13 This is a dollar value on a contract of \$1.2 billion.
14 This occurred after the killing of 17 Iraqi citizens in
15 Nisor Square. That is why it is important to remember the
16 time frame here, that this was around the problems of that.

17 When you read this document, the question is asked,
18 would you recommend the contractor be used again, the answer
19 is yes. It states that, quote, this is the quote that is
20 used in reports, incidents cause the program officer to lose
21 confidence in Blackwater's credibility and management but
22 concludes that new personnel have improved confidence in the
23 contractor that, quote, it is expected that next past
24 performance evaluation will be substantially improved.

25 I would like to place that in the record.

1 Senator Brown. No objection, Madam Chairman.

2 / SUBCOMMITTEE INSERT

1 Senator McCaskill. The second thing I would like to
2 place in the record is the DCAA DynCorp audit. This audit
3 is an audit that came out in November of last year. As of
4 last November, these are some of the findings of the audit
5 of DynCorp. Keep in mind this is the contractor we are
6 stuck with now. We are going to have this contractor for
7 the indefinite future since we are going to a full and fair
8 open competition which means it will likely be at least a
9 year from now before there would be a new contract.

10 These are some of the findings. Inadequate controls to
11 ensure contract briefs contain adequate information for the
12 billing department to prepare current, accurate, and
13 complete those vouchers. Inadequate control to verify pay
14 rates were authorized and accurate. Failure to prepare
15 adequate budgets which may result in significant over or
16 understatement of proposed costs. Failure to notify the
17 government upon awards of subcontracts.

18 This is problematic from an auditing standpoint because
19 this is all the documentation that is necessary, all the
20 oversight that is necessary to make sure that they are not
21 walking away with our money and not performing the work.

22 So I want to make sure that we enter that audit into
23 the record.

24 / SUBCOMMITTEE INSERT

1 Senator McCaskill. Tell me where the \$80 billion is
2 now, Mr. Johnson, that was found in the audit. Has it been
3 returned?

4 Mr. Johnson. It has not been returned. The moneys
5 have been obligated against a task order and the
6 reconciliation is ongoing on that task order. As soon as
7 that is completed and we determine how much should be
8 returned, we will do so immediately.

9 Senator McCaskill. Could you respond to that, Mr.
10 Heddell or Ms. Klemstine? Is it true they were obligated?
11 I thought you found in your audit they were unobligated.

12 Mr. Heddell. What we found, Madam Chairman, is that
13 the Department of State improperly kept \$80 million that had
14 been transferred from the Department of Defense even though
15 the funds had expired.

16 The money we are talking about was used specifically,
17 was supposed to be used for Afghan National Police training.
18 It came in three separate appropriations and each
19 appropriation had an estimated availability period. And as
20 of December 2009, the Department of State was still holding
21 \$80 million, and the availability period for that \$80
22 million on the first one expired, 56.8 million expired in
23 September of 2007 and 23.2 million expired in September of
24 2008.

25 As of January of this year, that was our understanding.

1 Senator McCaskill. Do you disagree with that finding,
2 Mr. Johnson?

3 Mr. Johnson. I do not disagree that it would have
4 expired had it not been obligated but it has been obligated
5 and has to be reconciled against these billings so that we
6 return the proper amount.

7 Senator McCaskill. The question is, I assume you are
8 saying it was obligated during the audit period or it was
9 obligated after the audit period?

10 Mr. Johnson. It was obligated prior to the audit
11 period. What the Inspector General is referring to is that
12 had it not been against a task order which was during the
13 period of time the money was available to be spent, had it
14 been fully reconciled, any monies left over should and would
15 have been returned to the Treasury or to DOD depending on
16 the date at which it became available.

17 We are doing our best efforts to complete that process
18 so that we return exactly the right amount.

19 Senator McCaskill. Mr. Heddell.

20 Mr. Heddell. Madam Chairman, it was obligated but the
21 money had expired and it was not expended. The money, as
22 far as we know, has never been returned to the Treasury.

23 Senator McCaskill. So what you are saying is the
24 obligation makes no difference if the time period expires
25 and it is not expended.

1 Mr. Heddell. That is my understanding.

2 Senator McCaskill. I think that is something that I
3 would like to writing an answer with somebody's signature
4 that you all disagree with that because \$80 million is a lot
5 of money.

6 Mr. Johnson. I would be pleased to provide you with
7 that.

8 Senator McCaskill. DCAA told the Subcommittee that the
9 State Department did not engage them to perform real-time
10 reviews. Why have you not used DCAA for this type of
11 review? And secondly, in the audit it was reported that the
12 State Department had canceled an audit. The contracting
13 officer had canceled an audit. I would like an explanation
14 on both of these, why DCAA is not being used for real-time
15 reviews and secondly why you would ever cancel an audit.

16 Mr. Johnson. We are using DCAA and we are very pleased
17 with their assistance to us.

18 Senator McCaskill. Great.

19 Mr. Johnson. We had a point of confusion between us
20 and them about the request that we hade made of them. We
21 were ongoing and worked on a request for a transfer of funds
22 to pay for this audit on two other task orders and those
23 were ongoing.

24 And for reasons having to do with the way that payment
25 was processed, one of those requests under one of those task

1 orders was accidentally canceled. We were unaware of that.
2 When we became aware of it, we began re-engaging with DCAA
3 on that specific task order. Those discussions are ongoing.
4 We intend for them to come and work for us and we intend to
5 pay them for it.

6 Senator McCaskill. Okay. Since we are going to have a
7 State Department-run contract on police training in
8 Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, are your in-country
9 CORs getting out in the field as we speak? Mr. Johnson, are
10 they conducting regular site visits to the training sites at
11 this point in time?

12 Mr. Johnson. They are getting out and they are
13 conducting regular site visits. I do not think they are
14 there yet because the numbers are not up to what we want
15 them to be conducting as regular and frequent site visits as
16 I think we want and I think as our oversight colleagues
17 would like but we fully intend to remedy that.

18 Senator McCaskill. I would certainly like, I mean we
19 will follow up with some of these questions. We want to be
20 notified how many you have on the ground every quarter and
21 we want to know how many site visits are going on, how many
22 of them are regularly scheduled and how many of them are
23 unannounced.

24 The unannounced site visits are crucial in a contract
25 like this. That is when you find people doing things I mean

1 I hate to bring back bad memories of another hearing. But
2 when you have craziness going on with the security force at
3 an embassy which also happened in Afghanistan, those
4 unscheduled site visits are incredibly important.

5 Mr. Johnson. In my checkered past I was a bank
6 examiner.

7 Senator McCaskill. You know about showing up
8 unannounced.

9 Mr. Johnson. Right.

10 Senator McCaskill. Let me turn it over to Senator
11 Brown for a few follow up questions.

12 Senator Brown. I just want to go on that line of
13 questioning, Madam Chair, and then I will go back.

14 On the \$80 million issue we were talking about, is
15 there an enforcement arm of any kind that says, hey, listen
16 your time has expired. You have the money. You have not
17 used it. It is time to come back to the Treasury.

18 Is there any mechanism that you have because I have to
19 be honest with you, it seems like it is political
20 doublespeak in terms of you know the money has not been
21 used. It was back in 2007 and 2008. We are in 2010. And
22 then you say, well, it was not allocated before the audit.
23 Well, if not, then when was it allocated because it is 2010
24 and the time expired. Was there an amendment of some sort
25 that went into effect? Is there an agreement with the

1 appropriate authorities to extend it out to another period
2 of time to give you the authority to continue to retain
3 that?

4 Mr. Johnson. If I poorly communicated, I am sorry. My
5 understanding is the monies were obligated against an
6 ongoing activity. As soon as all the reconciliation of the
7 billings which took place during that time period, not
8 billings which will take place later --

9 Senator Brown. It has been what? Three years now.
10 When does the reconciliation take place?

11 Mr. Johnson. It is ongoing. We are running at about a
12 two-year delay from conclusion of the task order.

13 Senator Brown. That is 2009 if we are in 2007. So it
14 is longer than that obviously. We are in three years now,
15 right?

16 Mr. Johnson. I am not certain but I will work that
17 time line for you, yes, sir.

18 Senator Brown. I guess what I am trying to say is you
19 know I am a firm believer in contracts and dates. As it is
20 the rule of law, we have a date. We perform. We fulfill.
21 If we do not, it goes back.

22 There seems to be a slippery slope here that we are
23 going down in that you know we allocate money, taxpayer
24 money, hard-earned taxpayer money for certain purposes. It
25 does not get used. It should go back to be re-allocated, to

1 be reused.

2 We could use it right now for unemployment insurance to
3 find another way to pay for that. I am hopeful, Madam
4 Chair, that we can get a reasonable answer like, number one,
5 why was not the reconciliation done right away, when are we
6 going to have it done, and when if at all and how much money
7 is actually going to be actually returned.

8 I would also like to have that in writing for us to
9 review, number one.

10 Number two, do you have the ability, sir, to delegate
11 the site visit responsibilities to the military or any other
12 entity to assist you until you get up to speed because I
13 hear you? I understand. I was there. I get it now. I see
14 how big it is.

15 But if you are not up to speed and you cannot account,
16 we are giving billions of dollars to people, is there
17 anything that I can do, make a recommendation to the
18 President or to the Majority Leader, anybody who is dealing
19 with this issue to give you the tools and resources you need
20 to either delegate or get this job done quicker and more
21 efficiently?

22 Mr. Johnson. In terms of some issues, for example,
23 inventories, we have worked with the military to assist us
24 in those. I think though that there is no substitute to
25 have contracting office representatives who know the

1 contract, who are trained to do this type of work there on
2 the ground and getting out to do those things. That is the
3 aim that we have.

4 One of my kind colleagues pointed out to me that the
5 monies that were appropriated for fiscal year 2007 could
6 have been expended on things through September of 2009. So
7 we have a little while where we need to make sure we paid
8 all our bills before we give the money back.

9 Senator Brown. Okay. I would appreciate that in
10 writing.

11 Madam Chair, I forgot and I am wondering if you will
12 accept my modified opening statements for the record, if
13 possible.

14 Senator McCaskill. Your opening statement will be made
15 part of the record.

16 Do you have anything else?

17 Senator Brown. I do but I will allow you to get back
18 to your line.

19 Senator McCaskill. That is okay. Why do you not
20 finish up because I only have like one or two more. See if
21 there is anything else you want to cover.

22 Senator Brown. Just some general questions. As you
23 know, the Afghan culture is largely tribal and locally
24 based. I wrestled with this when I was there when I was
25 getting back.

1 Does it make sense to have a national police force that
2 basically the tribal leaders do not recognize, they do not
3 know. Some of the individual citizens do not even recognize
4 the uniforms. Does it make sense to have a one-size-fits-
5 all strategy in Afghanistan?

6 Mr. Sedney. The kind of security force that we should
7 have in Afghanistan is one that has been discussed and the
8 question that you raise is an excellent one, Senator Brown,
9 and there are people who have felt very strongly for all
10 sides of a question that has many answers.

11 There are certainly areas of Afghanistan where a
12 national police force, a uniformed police force, large
13 cities. Kabul has well in excess of 4 million people there
14 now. For example other major cities.

15 In some of the rural areas, Afghan justice is very much
16 in the hands of traditional justice systems.

17 One of the problems however is that over the years,
18 especially as result of the occupation by the Soviets during
19 the civil war a lot of those traditional structures have
20 either been destroyed or been seized by small, powerful,
21 maligned actors who pervert the local systems so that they
22 do not work effectively.

23 So there are a number of activities that are going on
24 looking at restoring those local activities in a way that is
25 acceptable to the board expanse of people while at the same

1 time building national police in areas where they are most
2 able to be effective.

3 The latest polling I saw on that was of rural people in
4 eastern Afghanistan where 38 percent of the people said they
5 preferred local gurkhas to national police. Fifty percent
6 of the people said they preferred national police to local
7 gurkhas.

8 So you have a fairly significant split but the people
9 thought very strongly on both ways.

10 It is a country in transition, and we are working on
11 all those areas. But I would say that in terms of the kind
12 of order that is required in the midst of an insurgency, the
13 police have played, continue to play a very important role.

14 In many ways, the acceptability of the police depends
15 upon their performance. You and Senator Kaufman just
16 mentioned the areas where there have been problems of the
17 performance of the police.

18 Minister Atmar has developed a program called the
19 personal asset inventory that is designed to combat
20 corruption. He believes that that increased prosecution of
21 corrupt police through efforts by the major crimes task
22 force we put in place are already having significant
23 improvements in that area.

24 We support Minister Atmar in those efforts and look
25 forward to continued qualitative improvements in the police

1 force.

2 Senator Brown. I have a whole host of questions but in
3 the interest of time I will narrow it down to the top three
4 at this point. They are not too difficult. Is that okay?

5 Senator McCaskill. Absolutely. We will take as many
6 questions as you have for the record and we will keep that
7 open for a week so that any additional questions we did not
8 get to today because I have the same problem.

9 Senator Brown. Thank you.

10 Senator McCaskill. If we stayed here with all my
11 questions, it would not be good.

12 Senator Brown. Would you like to go?

13 Senator McCaskill. No. Go ahead. You finish up.

14 Senator Brown. Thank you.

15 I found it fascinating and so did our team. 500 meters
16 from our forward operating base there are poppy fields all
17 over the place. I know the reasons why. I get it.

18 But is there, and I guess it would be directed to
19 either one of you. Is there a plan? Are we going to
20 eradicate? Are we going to allow it? Are we going to
21 transition? Are going to give them time lines, listen, we
22 know you are doing it, we know why you are doing it. But
23 listen you only have another year to do it and then we are
24 going to transition you into a different crop. And if you
25 do not, then we are going to just eradicate it, because I

1 have to be honest with you, seeing all those poppies flying
2 in those choppers for three days everywhere we went in full
3 bloom, I just thought about how that transitions into lives
4 in our country and young people and others using drugs.

5 Any thoughts?

6 Mr. Johnson. You are correct in that we have had a
7 rather expensive and not very effective eradication program
8 in the past where we attempted to provide the ability of the
9 central government to have the eradication capability.

10 Seeing the expense involved and the relative
11 inefficiency, practically in the areas where you were where
12 poppy growing is indeed an agribusiness, Ambassador Holbrook
13 has determined that we should focus instead on seeking an
14 alternative livelihood-based approach where we find more and
15 more opportunities for these individuals to grow a
16 legitimate crop.

17 I think that program is just barely getting underway.
18 It could have significant impact over the course of the next
19 year or two.

20 Outside of the area where you were the area of
21 Afghanistan is largely poppy free. In Helmand and in
22 Kandahar, it is a basic business though.

23 The other issue is we are focusing much more clearly on
24 an interdiction effort. The Drug Enforcement
25 Administration's deployment in Afghanistan is the largest on

1 the planet. It is working very hard in concert with the
2 capabilities that we are helping to develop, my colleagues
3 and I, of the Afghans to have their own counter narcotics
4 police.

5 Those have been quite effective over the course of the
6 last several months. The seizures are up. But this very
7 much remains a work in progress.

8 Senator Brown. Well, you know it is interesting. The
9 seizures are up but then the growing is up too in certain
10 regions.

11 Getting back to policy a little bit I have two more
12 short questions. How many companies are currently capable
13 of providing police services such as the ones in the
14 contract? Who are they and do they have a fair opportunity
15 to compete for the business, number one?

16 And then how would re-bidding for the contract of
17 Afghan police forces impact America's ability to win and
18 perform our mission the next couple of months and years I
19 should say?

20 Mr. Johnson. The current indefinite quantity,
21 indefinite delivery contract that we work under for the
22 civilian police program in the State Department has three
23 participants.

24 DynCorp is one. Pacific Architects and Engineers is
25 the second one, now a division of Lockheed Martin. The

1 third is Civilian Police International that I think is a
2 division of L-3.

3 We have just this week put on the street a request for
4 proposals that will we hope provide us a much broader number
5 of companies who are willing and able to provide this
6 service. We anticipate the program will close in terms of
7 the bids being due I believe in June and we will have a
8 period of time in the summer to evaluate.

9 It is my goal, and I have been working on this for some
10 time, to broaden that contractor base because I think there
11 are more companies and more opportunities out there than we
12 have had in the past.

13 Senator Brown. Thank you, Madam Chair. I will defer
14 to you.

15 Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Senator Brown.

16 Mr. Heddell and Ms. Klemstine, do you think that the
17 State Department has added enough in-country contracting
18 representatives with the acronym of ICOR, do you think they
19 have added enough to provide adequate oversight to this
20 contract?

21 Mr. Heddell. Madam Chairman, what I know from January
22 of this year I would say no. Unless something has occurred
23 in the last 30 days, I am not aware of it. But I would say
24 no.

25 Senator McCaskill. Ms. Klemstine.

1 Ms. Klemstine. I would reiterate that answer being no.
2 However, I do think that there are plans in place to
3 increase the number. I think if they get up to that number
4 they will probably be in pretty good shape at that point.

5 Senator McCaskill. What is that number?

6 Ms. Klemstine. I believe it is 33.

7 Senator McCaskill. In-country?

8 Ms. Klemstine. Yes.

9 Senator McCaskill. Is that correct, Mr. Johnson?

10 Mr. Johnson. There are not 33 presently in-country.
11 There are seven currently in-country. Our aim by September
12 is to get to 22.

13 Senator McCaskill. Is 22 enough, Ms. Klemstine?

14 Ms. Klemstine. I would have to go back and re-evaluate
15 that. I do not know that off the top of my head.

16 Senator McCaskill. I think if are working toward 22,
17 as soon as we could possibly get the input of your agency
18 that did the audit whether or not you think that is an
19 adequate number. I would hate for us to have a goal of 22
20 and get there and still know we do not have enough to
21 adequately keep track of what is happening with this
22 contract.

23 It is my understanding the people you are hiring to do
24 this are in fact contractors?

25 Mr. Johnson. Madam Chairman, the individuals who have

1 traditionally done this are what are known as personal
2 services contractors.

3 I know I could read you from the FAR what that means
4 and how it is virtually the same as an employee but I also
5 know that it would not answer the mail for you.

6 We are in the process of using an opportunity we have
7 under the law of so called 3161 employees. We plan to
8 convert as many of these individuals as possible to that
9 employment status so that they will be direct employees of
10 United States government.

11 I have the opportunity in Afghanistan but I do not have
12 it globally. I will be looking for other ways to provide
13 direct employees who are performing this service because I
14 recognize the demand that you made that we have them not
15 just be the functional equivalent of direct employees but
16 actually be so.

17 Senator McCaskill. Mr. Sedney, if you all take it
18 back, does that mean you have the CORs ready and available
19 to oversee this contract?

20 I have spent an awful lot of time talking to people in
21 uniform about contracting representatives over the last
22 three years. Would it be your plan to try to utilize the
23 individual personal service contracts that the State
24 Department is going to execute over the next six month to
25 oversee this contract?

1 How do you envision the contract oversight working if
2 you all in fact enter into a contract as opposed to State?

3 Mr. Sedney. In terms of the complete and open
4 competition that we are looking for, the numbers of
5 contracting representatives will be part of that process.
6 We are in the process of determining what that will be now.

7 In terms of what the contracting officer
8 representatives that Mr. Johnson was talking about having in
9 place, our people out in the field have helped to contribute
10 to the request for additional contracting office
11 representatives.

12 In terms of one of the requests that we are making of
13 the Department of State if we were to extend the current
14 contractor with DynCorp beyond that time, additional
15 contracting office representatives are one of the areas that
16 we have agreed is important and would like to see move
17 forward.

18 I do not have the figures on the exact numbers that we
19 think would be necessary and we can get back to you on that.

20 Senator McCaskill. I think it is really essential. I
21 will be shocked. It will be like winning the lottery if we
22 end up with anybody other than DynCorp through the time
23 period in which the President has indicated that we are
24 going to have this increased presence.

25 In that case, if there is by a chance to transition, it

1 will be terribly counterproductive if you have CORs in-
2 country that are there and have made the commitment to be
3 there for all of a sudden then get pulled back because now
4 we have switched again.

5 It would be unconscionable to switch contractors and
6 not have a CORs force ready to go to oversee that contract
7 because we could go a year without anybody in-country
8 essentially like we have had on this contract.

9 For parts of the time there has been really almost
10 nobody home. So we have to make sure that happens and I am
11 going to depend on the two of you to communicate and figure
12 out how to work that out. And if you need help above you,
13 you need to speak up if there is going to be an issue
14 because I do not want the contracting representative COR to
15 go down anytime while we are making this kind of financial
16 commitment for police training in Afghanistan.

17 The last thing I wanted to cover on this subject matter
18 is that the GDP of Afghanistan is about 13 billion a year.
19 Sustaining what we are building, it is 11 billion in the
20 supplemental for the army and the police, sustaining it, not
21 building it but sustaining is 6 billion a year.

22 I think it is pretty obvious that Afghanistan is not
23 going to be able to afford to sustain what we are building
24 for them. They cannot take over half of their GDP just to
25 do local police and military.

1 So that means the American people have probably made
2 some kind of multi-billion-dollar commitment for many years
3 forward. Certainly not at the level that we are this year
4 and next year but certainly billions of dollars which means
5 we are going to need contractors over there for many many
6 years.

7 I just want to make sure that we get a sense of urgency
8 about getting it right as quickly as possible because this
9 has gone on way too long, way too long.

10 I want to ask a favor before we close the hearing. We
11 will have questions for the record for all of you. I want
12 to as always thank the auditors, the Inspector General's
13 offices, for your great work. It is brave. Your people
14 went in-country and the services of the auditing community
15 are not valued enough in our government and I hope you all
16 know the deep respect for that work.

17 I also want to thank both of you. This was not an easy
18 hearing. But this is hard stuff. It is a hard thing we are
19 trying to do and the contracting in this area has certainly
20 not been anything that any of us should be proud of.

21 We are going to have a hearing, Mr. Johnson, in a few
22 months on the contracting for counter narcotics in South
23 America.

24 We gave plenty of notice for documents. We have had
25 difficulty getting documents out of the State Department.

1 We were able to do this hearing without a lot of the
2 documents we requested from State.

3 But it will be impossible for us to have the oversight
4 hearing that we need to have on these contracts in South
5 America without the cooperation of the State Department
6 giving us the documents.

7 So I would like to implore on the record today that you
8 spend sometime. I think this is under your silo at State,
9 if you would work to help us get the documents we need for
10 that important hearing.

11 I do not think we have ever had an oversight hearing on
12 the expensive contracts that we issue on counter narcotics
13 in South America and I would like it to be a full and
14 complete hearing and it will not be without your
15 cooperation.

16 Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Madam Chairman. We have
17 gathered the documents. They are going through the
18 clearance process now. I will endeavor to push that as
19 quickly we can.

20 Senator McCaskill. That would be terrific.

21 I want to thank everyone for being here. I especially
22 want to thank Senator Brown for his participation.

23 This hearing is adjourned.

24 [Whereupon, at 4:39 p.m., the Subcommittee was
25 adjourned.]